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Analysing the processes and relationships of political territoriality and 
collective identity in the American borderlands, this thesis examines the narrative 
and material dimensions of policies increasingly favouring securitised border 
‘control’. This ‘reterritorialisation’ contrasts markedly with concurrent moves to 
increase economic integration under the North American Free Trade Agreement and 
with long patterns of transnational socio-cultural interaction, emblematic of larger 
relational, transnational ‘mobilities’ fostered by globalisation.
Through a historical and transdisciplinary survey, borders are examined as 
representations and socio-political constructs’, a unique, contingent, political 
cartography connected to a precise, early modem notion of space and identity. 
Borders are in a continual process of being reproduced through both material means 
and supportive state-produced ‘texts’ or narratives. The analysis is part of a larger 
project in International Relations: the development of the ‘identities/borders/orders’ 
heuristic triad, designed to narrow and produce new theoretical and empirical 
insights by coupling three key concepts . and exploring the co-constitutive 
relationships.
Focussing on the identity-border link within the triad, the first case study 
analyses ‘Operation Hold the Line’ and related events in the securitisation of the 
southern borderlands against undocumented migration. The second case study 
provides an account of major official documentation and public debate framing 
current developments on the northern border, including a reading of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
Border policy is understood as an example of reflexive territoriality, 
suggesting continual, ever speedier revision, monitoring, and reproduction of a 
state’s constructed strategy responding to control defined ‘risks’, such as migration. 
These regulations are fed and actualised by new information flows and technologies, 
as the state’s attempt to ‘control’ its borders by making them political realities of 
difference with particular material and normative outcomes. Here, the politics of 
representation involves an image of border ‘security’ which effects the socio- 
spatialisation of collective identity, specifically the reinforcement of difference and a 
secure nationalism narrative. The securitisation also reflects a modem understanding 
of knowledge as regulation and order.
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C H A P T E R  O N E
In t r o d u c t io n
1.0 O verview
Very little is more central to the human experience than the notion and 
experience of a ‘boundary’—whether it is the uncomfortable feeling we have when 
someone sits too close us, standing in the immigration queue at the airport, or the 
struggle between states over a swaths of land. Much of our life is spent figuring out 
the proper limits of borders. Most of the difficulty surrounds figuring out which 
borders are unnecessary—but also determining and maintaining those that are 
required.
Borders are all around us; they are an essential part of every system or object, 
a ubiquitous ‘metapattem’ found throughout the social, natural, and political worlds.1 
They help construct reality by structuring and defining what is in and what is out, 
who ‘we’ are and who ‘they’ are. ‘Define’, in fact, derives from the Latin word for 
‘boundary’, finis. In the political world, in many ways they are at the heart of 
international relations, serving as the predicate for a Westphalian system of unique, 
sovereign states in interaction.
Such a key concept seems ripe for problematisation in the discipline of 
International Relations (IR) because it presents numerous trajectories of inquiry. 
Surprisingly, however, few IR scholars have taken up the study of borders, with most 
accepting them as given, static, legal demarcations or issues fostering conflict. But 
the patterns of state policies of inclusion and exclusion over interstate frontiers, such 
as migration control, economic integration, or information flows, are intensely 
salient social and political practices that have particular relevance in an increasingly 
globalising world. Moreover, how borders and territorial control are represented has 
much to say about the ethics and politics of difference, identity, and territory, just as 
the drawing of personal boundaries does. With these complicated and contradictory 
characteristics, borders are prime ‘laboratories’ for social and political research of 
many stripes.
1 On metapattems, see Tyler Volk, Metapatterns: Across Space, Time and Mind (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1995). Metapattems are broad phenomena occurring repeatedly 
throughout the social and natural worlds. A basic template for a leaf, for instance, is found in most
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This thesis embarks on a journey of exploration that begins with these 
premises. It is concerned with the processes of building—and representing—these 
boundings of the modem state and the dynamics of political territoriality and 
collective identity enmeshed in them. It evaluates how borders, often enshrined or 
reified in the discipline, are in practice socially and politically constructed through 
intricate, complex, and varied processes—such as border ‘control’ policies and their 
supportive discursive or narrative frameworks. These impact collective identity and, 
generally, differentiation in international and domestic politics. The research is thus 
dedicated to evaluating some of the many complexions and facets of international 
borders. Borders are considered cmcial elevating links between larger, ongoing 
discussions of identity and order in IR.
In seeking a deeper understanding of the modes of representing political 
space and identity—which are important factors in the substantiation and 
reproduction of the state—political territoriality and collective identity fall under 
examination. These two highly important, modem socio-political processes form 
some of the principle organising frameworks of the international state system.
The conditions of modem political territoriality, for example, have 
formulated the boundaries of modem political state at least since the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648 which helped organise the globe into discrete ‘containers’ 
encased by rigid territorial boundaries; within these borders space and identity were 
meant to coincide, overseen by governmental authorities with particular powers to 
regulate and stake claims to legitimacy. These units then constitute IR’s chief 
cartographic ‘blueprint’: a sharply defined world of states with clearly demarcated, 
exclusionary borders that operate on the basis of power in a supposedly anarchical 
international society.2
Most often the drafting of boundaries in the West was a generic and 
homogeneous process. Indeed, it was in early modernity that the idea and practice of 
a fixed, linear state border, as we now understand the term, was first established. 
How such ‘maps’ of territoriality and collective identity are drawn, however, has 
major political, practical, and disciplinary significance. From the inception of
forms of plants. Similarly, in the political realm, classes are a reoccurring element of societies across 
time and space.
2 On this question of ‘order’, particularly exclusionary fashioning of national boundaries and state 
formation, see among others, Jason Ackleson, ‘Discourses of Identity and Territoriality on the U.S.- 
Mexico Border’, Geopolitics 4, no. 2 (1999): 155-79; Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and 
Violence (Cambridge: Polity, 1985); Mathias Albert, ‘Security as Boundary Function’, paper 
presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Toronto (18-23 March 
1997); and Andrew Linklater, The Transformation o f Political Community (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
modernity—and indeed dawning from before Westphalia—these maps have served 
to frame and help reproduce a strong, statist-oriented global political discourse, 
reinforced by positivist forms of IR scholarship.
The modem bounded state, however, is only one unique form of socio­
political organisation in history. Because of the historical contingency of these 
particular forms of socio-political organisation, and in order to understand the 
current formulations of territoriality and identity and in the contemporary 
international system, the development of modernity’s ‘dominant spatial story’ that 
crafted our current situation must be analysed. This involves an exposition of pre­
modem forms of political territoriality and the transition, both processually and 
epistemologically, to our modem dominant state form.
At the new millennium, however, these historical conditions and images of 
modem political territoriality may, in fact, be increasingly challenged by the 
intensification of what can be usefully called ‘mobilities’ of international system: 
flows of information, trade, capital, and information across state boundaries that 
promote the intensified transnationalisation of economic and social practices and 
potentially weaken sovereign state control. Much of this falls into our conceptions 
of ‘globalisation’. Part of this process can be understood as ‘deterritorialisation’, and 
is generally driven by inclusionary state or non-state policies and forces, such as 
capitalism and information technology.
At the same time, as we shall see in the case studies, states can respond to 
some of these pressures of mobility by ‘reterritorialisation’, re-imposing official 
authority and control through political territoriality and exclusion, often actualised 
through the medium of its interstate borders. Forces both of inclusion and exclusion 
thus may be in tension, or in different states of flux, under globalisation. Moreover, 
as the thesis will argue, the policies which regulate this contingent political 
territoriality are increasingly reflexively organised in advanced states in the West.
Globalisation, then, is seen as an imprecise, uneven, and evolving—but 
increasingly intensifying and transformative—process that is not necessarily a zero-
3 See, for example, Jim George, ‘Discourse of Modernity: Toward the Positivist Framing of 
Contemporary Social Theory and International Relations’, in Discourses o f Global Politics: A Critical 
(Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 41-69. For an 
overview of post-positivism, see Steve Smith’s ‘Positivism and Beyond’, in International Theory: 
Positivism and Beyond, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 25. Determining that ‘positivism and its epistemological foundations, 
empiricism, are seriously flawed’, Smith outlines a field of alternative approaches, including critical 
theory and hermeneutics (two perspectives touched on in this study) as well as scientific realism, 
feminist standpoint epistemology, and postmodernism.
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sum game for the state or transnational forces. In discursive terms, it can be seen as 
representing in geographical terminology the scale where economic, social, and 
political processes occur at a global level. This thesis, by not engaging in the wider 
scholarly debate, does not take globalisation as its focus, but rather as a context: it 
suggests how political territoriality may be reflexively changing given trends and 
responses to some of these transnational conditions. Borders may in fact be useful 
metaphors for understanding conditions of globalisation as a feature of the broader 
contemporary order.
‘Borderlands’, the distinctive, often interdependent, multicultural swaths of 
land that surround international boundary lines, are focal points for globalisation 
pressures as the real, local junctions, valves, and barriers of transnational processes. 
Like the situation in many contemporary borderlands, the North American cases 
under study here are representative of some of the dimensions and paradoxes of 
globalisation world-wide. Economic integration under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, has created ‘dual regimes’ for the 
regulation of particular mobilities: freedom of movement for goods, capital, and 
services, but not labour.
Tensions and contradictions result from this situation, and a strict state 
sovereignty approach is unable to deal with the complexities and problems of the 
region, especially concerning flows such as undocumented economic migration into 
the U.S.4 A sense of reflexivity in policy there is increasingly indicated, in fact, in 
issues like migration: demand by business and public interests in the U.S. creates the 
conditions the dual regime approach seeks to affect and regulate. The perceived 
policy need to counter the territorial ‘risk’ here is reflexive: the ‘hazards’ to be 
combated (for example undocumented workers) are the product of industrialisation 
and demand (the need for inexpensive labour in the U.S.) itself.
How such contentious issues are framed to justify and support regulation 
becomes of import. Beneath what we accept empirically and epistemologically as 
the international state system and its borderlands lie multiple narratives of 
differentiation and collective identity—the representations of interstate borders. 
These, along with other material policies, help ‘write’ the political space of the state 
as owned and bounded, as an imagined community with a concomitant (and
4 This is unlike that of the EU which relies on supranational institutional structures. NAFTA 
regulation stems from the harmonisation of state laws and creates few overarching authorities to 
handle transnational questions such as labour flows.
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seemingly congruent) political identity. Thus, both the political symbols and images 
of borders—and their socio-political construction—are of concern to this study.
Accordingly, this thesis seeks a deeper understanding of representations of 
political space and identity; in particular, those narratives that help substantiate and 
reproduce collective identity and territoriality vis-a-vis borders. The policy issue 
(and metaphor) of international migration is seen as the key to unlocking many of 
these relationships. And borderlands, as the sites and junctures of transnational 
flows like migration, trade, and information, are thus crucial regions for study.
To access them, the thesis works from a critical, reflective, and pluralistic 
perspective.5 In doing so, it helps introduce and employ two relatively new research 
tools for theoretical and empirical exploration: the identities/borders/orders (i/b/o) 
triad and a methodology of narrative analysis, inspired by studies of discourse, to 
look at one segment of the triad in particular borderland situations. This segment is 
then linked back to the triad in the conclusion to approach wider international order 
questions, such as globalisation.
The thesis moves first, however, to ask how modem political territoriality 
affected the change from loose, variable frontiers into solid, discrete borders in 
history and what changes in our conceptions of space and collective identity went 
hand-in-hand with this transformation. It then explores what the field of ‘border 
studies’ has made of these modem political and social differentiations, and what 
tools may be available in IR and other disciplines to study them. In the case studies, 
questions how and why, when unprecedented economic and social integration under 
NAFTA is occurring, the effort and image of ‘border control’ is being so heavily 
fostered as an official U.S. narrative strategy. It considers how, in fact, the 
American borderlands are represented discursively and reinforced territorially, and 
how this reflects a modem understanding of knowledge as ‘regulation’ and ‘order’. 
Finally, it asks what the often marginalised but paradoxical nature of borderlands 
narratives tell us about local and normative experiences of globalisation, 
securitisation, and national identity.
5 Reflective analysis, according to Robert Keohane and Ole Waever, among others, emphasises 
interpretation, ‘the reflection of the actors as central to institutions’ examined through non-positivist 
methods. Reflectivists, Keohane maintained, encompassed poststructural, hermeneutic, and social 
constructivist perspectives, and serves as a component of the ‘fourth debate’ in International Relations 
theory. See Ole Waever, ‘Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate’, in International Theory: 
Positivism and Beyond, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 164; Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in 
International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989). See also Yosef Lapid, ‘The Third 
Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era’, International Studies 
Quarterly 33, no. 3 (1989): 235-54.
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1.1 T h e  A r g um ent  in  Brief
One overall goal of this study is to begin to understand how contemporary 
boundaries are socially and politically reproduced; this is done by taking an 
historical, socio-political, and transdisciplinary perspective on borders—seeing them 
as contingent, unique, but always constructed, phenomena. Moreover, their material 
and discursive dimensions have definite impacts on collective identity construction 
as individuals are socialised as members of a bounded political community.
To explore this relationship, and find out not only why but also how the 
securitisation of borders, and by extension migrants, is proceeding word-wide—and 
importantly how this tends to be represented, this thesis explores the American 
borderlands with Mexico and Canada under the economic integration logic of 
NAFTA. The U.S.-Mexico border is the best example of a joint boundary between 
an advanced developed state and a developing country. Since the early 1990s, it has 
increasingly been ‘militarised’ and securitised at the cost of billions of dollars. The 
U.S.-Canada border presents an excellent and complimentary counterpoint: as a 
previously heralded ‘undefended’ frontier, that status now is coming under doubt, as 
the prevailing American policy and narrative strategy introduces new ‘threats’ like 
terrorism and promotes securitisation there as well. Both borders are classic 
illustrations of modem political territoriality, formed processually and 
epistemologically through violence and a discrete, linear notion of space—and 
corresponding identity—first formulated in early modernity.
Finally, both borders are also representative of a form of political 
territoriality that is increasingly reflexively organised, that seeks a modem 
understanding of regulation, control, and order, or at least their image. The notion of 
‘reflexive territoriality’ is drawn from an overarching reflexive modernisation 
concept and connotes the dynamic, technical, continual, and ever-speedier revision 
and reproduction of a state’s strategy of constructed control over a particular 
territory in the face of ontological insecurity and newly defined ‘risks’ to the state, 
such as migrants.6 Such regulation of state borders is fed by new information flows 
and advanced surveillance technologies, and expressed through control of its borders 
through both material-technological and discursive means.
This concept works in concert with a schema of regulation and emancipation 
in modernity. The case studies suggest the exclusionary process and representation
13
of border ‘control’ are dominant manifestations of ‘regulation’ as a form of 
knowledge in modernity. State actions can attempt to achieve a perceived ideal 
knowledge-goal of regularity and ‘order’ (or at least the image thereof) amidst 
system mobilities and ‘disorder’ brought by globalisation and its undesired flows, 
mainly of drugs and migrants. This disorder or ‘chaos’ (connoted by inclusive 
movement of individuals and heterogeneity of identity and culture), is projected 
against knowledge as ‘order’ (suggested by exclusionary securitisation, 
homogeneous, stable identity and territoriality), the goal of the new border policies.
The case studies will argue that the major discursive and material dimensions 
of current border policy in the United States realise this particular end, applying both 
advanced technology and narrative control to attempt to realise a particular political 
territoriality and collective identity relationship and achieve the privileged goal of 
‘knowledge-as-regulation’. Both concepts of reflexive territoriality and regulation 
thus work as a package here to help analyse contemporary border practices and 
discourses.
By analysing both material policy ramifications and discourse, the cognitive 
and linguistic possibility structures created and reproduced in the political debates on 
‘border control’ in the U.S., we have a convenient and intriguing window into the 
processes of framing a bounded community and consolidating national identity. The 
thesis argues the politics of representation involved in the political presentation of 
this image of border ‘security’ has implications for the socio-spatialisation of 
identity in borderland situations, specifically the reinforcement of difference and a 
‘secure’ American nationalism story. This is partly forged against transnational 
pressures and the ‘other’. Official state narratives, particularly those that involve 
conceptions of national collective identity, can serve to fuel a modem territorially 
based conception of the American borderlands and promote an impression of the 
state’s borders as ‘secured’ against flows of migration and illegal drugs (and the 
problems which are seen to accompany such movements), when in fact evidence 
suggests they are anything but closed to these flows.
More specifically, in the U.S.-Mexico case, the emergent material and 
discursive dimensions of reterritorialisation operates to help consolidate notions of 
national American collective identity. The securitisation of the frontier recasts the 
social and historical construction and discourse of the border and changes
6 See Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, eds., Reflexive Modernization: Politics, 
Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modem Social Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).
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‘socio-spatial consciousness’, the way in which individuals and communities are 
socialised as members of a territorially bounded community.7 This is directly related 
to an understanding of social consciousness created by a clearer, exclusionary notion 
of collective identity that illuminates the ‘us’ and the ‘other’ division. That 
dichotomy is both symbolised and materially reinforced by the existence of the 
territorial boundary as well as the tighter U.S. policy along it; it also depends in part 
on larger scripts of national myth.
The policy in the southern borderlands is representative of ‘reflexive 
territoriality’, especially its advanced technology dimension. Moreover, as noted 
above, the perceived policy need to counter the territorial ‘risk’ is also reflexive: the 
‘hazards’ to be combated (in this case of undocumented workers) are the product of 
industrialisation and demand (the need for inexpensive labour in the U.S.) itself. 
Finally, the ‘metanarrative’—the dominant discursive framework—emerging from 
this case advances a representation of border security (regulation) to the public of a 
particular ‘order’ in the face of perceived societal ‘chaos’ from migrants. This 
image, which has particular political purposes, emerges despite evidence that the 
securitisation policy has not stemmed cross-border flows of labour.
In the U.S.-Canadian case, the thesis also examines the practices and 
narratives there which help reproduce modem norms of political territoriality and 
collective identity. Drawing from the conceptual literature on discourse and 
narrative, the thesis helps to ‘denaturalise’ these conditions and power frameworks 
through a constitutive theory of language. A discussion of the nature of life on this 
interdependent frontier follows, particularly in the context of NAFTA-inspired 
deterritorialised flows. The focal point is on the ‘threats’ to collective identity, like 
terrorists, and the state’s official responses to these—read through narrative analysis.
To evaluate this, an analysis of major public ‘texts’ relating to northern 
border issues follows, concentrating on the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996—a major milestone in 
contemporary U.S. immigration and border control—and its provisions to establish 
strict control of entry and exit along the northern line. This reading includes both 
official and non-official public statements, legislative language, as well as a survey 
of material policy changes. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of more recent 
policy developments which help formulate the emergent metanarrative—and several
7 See Anssi Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies o f the 
Finish-Russian Border (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1996).
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counter-narratives—of the northern border, many of which operate via perceived 
threats from terrorists and migrants.
1.2 O r g anisatio n  a n d  D evelopm ent  o f  t h e  A r g u m en t: A  
Co n t e x t  o f  Transform ation
The next chapter discusses how state borders and national collective identity 
became linked to the same conception and practice of political space in modernity. 
These trends contrast markedly from pre-modem forms of political organisation. 
The shift between the two is detailed with an eye toward critical theoretical 
implications for understanding potential transformations of space in the 
contemporary world.
The chapter begins by looking at the definition and historical development of 
‘political territoriality’: a state’s constructed strategy for control, access, and 
regulation of its land, and by extension, of its borders. Control is actualised through 
symbolic and material representations of reified, impersonal power. Territoriality is 
perhaps one of the most important concepts in IR, but has received surprising little 
scholarly attention.8 Here, it is engaged with as an important way of examining 
historical and contemporary changes in the international system.
But the modem interstate boundary is only one specific, contingent, and 
unique form of geopolitical and cartographic ‘mapping’—and is particular to 
modernity. To contextualise the evolving phenomena of territoriality, and provide 
clues into its real nature and potential changes, the chapter next examines the 
transition from pre-modem to modem territoriality—this is specifically done with an 
emphasis on how space and collective identity help order international politics. This 
section considers how the modem state order began to form from these looser and 
more fluid forms of political organisation that involved different jurisdictions and 
identity patterns. In many ways, this can be seen as the transformation from 
‘frontiers’ into the ‘borders’ emblematic of the modem Westphalian state system: 
solid, discrete, abstract and precise linear demarcations; this was the carving up of 
the earth’s surface for centralised political authority and legitimisation.
The conceptual work concentrates on the changes in identity and territoriality 
that occurred as firm modem international borders were set. This involves a rigorous
8 For two important exceptions, see John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing 
Modernity in International Relations’, International Organization 41, no. 1 (1993): 139-74 and 
Hannes Lacher, ‘Historicising the Global: Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of 
Modernity’ (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 2000).
16
‘unpacking’ of how our now-naturalised perspectives of a seemingly ‘static’ modem 
cartography and its supportive epistemology (such as the historical development of 
the single-point perspective idea from the Renaissance) informed modem territorial 
and international political practices. These perspectives were framed by a discourse 
that defined epistemologically a new concept of linear, precise, and ‘empty’ space; 
on a process level, it also meant the key development of political and social 
structures, including bureaucracies, capitalism, information control, and, in effect, 
the sovereign state system. All these helped constitute an early modem worldview 
that produced a unique political subject. That subject was constmcted from a 
premise that often sought to match a homogenous collective identity to a unified and 
discrete territory.
Now, with globalisation and transnational flows and pressures of capital, 
ideas, information, and individuals—what has usefully been called various 
‘mobilities’—disjunctures emerge in the state system. They challenge states as 
static, rigid ‘containers’ that correlate identity, citizenship, and territory.9 These 
transformations pose intriguing new challenges for the dominant way of ‘mapping’ 
global politics in IR theory. The intensification of mobilities and development of 
new forms of global civil society and international organisation all pose questions 
about the function and conception of borders.
New issues of identity and difference emerge, especially as the prevalent old 
Cold War discourse which efficiently organised dichotomous worldviews and 
enemies continues to fade: regions, virtual communities, identity-driven conflicts, 
migrants and diasporas who travel across the globe (and stay) in increasing numbers 
are just a few such phenomena.10 The borders in and of this turbulent, ‘post- 
traditional’ world can simultaneously change, shift, strengthen, and weaken with 
these flows, creating greater complexity and uncertainty as well as demands for new
9 See John Urry, ‘Mobile Sociology’, British Journal o f Sociology 51, no. 1 (2000): 185.
10 Much of the burgeoning globalisation literature addresses these themes. Some of the main texts 
dealing with the discourse include David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan 
Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity, 1999); 
Andrew Herod, Gearoid O Tuathail, and Susan Roberts, eds., An Unruly World? Globalisation, 
Governance and Geography (London: Routledge, 1998). Anthony Giddens looks at the concept of 
‘reflexive modernisation’ in ‘Living in a Post-Traditional Society’, in Reflexive Modernization, 56- 
109. James Rosenau among many others articulates a similar view of a ‘turbulent’ world scene; see 
Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). See also, for instance, Barry Hughes, ‘Rough Road Ahead: 
Global Transformations in the 21st Century’, paper presented at the Annual Conference of the 
International Studies Association, Toronto, March 1997.
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forms of political organisation and democracy.11 The ‘deterritorialisation’ brought 
by flows of peoples, ideas, and capital suggests a moment of reflexive late 
modernity, and perhaps a point of transition, but as the case studies will indicate, this 
is constantly in tension with dynamics of ‘reterritorialisation’ imposed by the
territorial state and made possible by the modem state-based frames of policy and
public discourse.
This study, accordingly, seeks a more active, dynamic view of political 
territoriality—as a continually contested, constructed process which, in some cases, 
is reflexively organised. Reflexivity is often invoked in response to an ontological 
insecurity when new ‘threats’ or risks are defined. Because state borders constitute 
the metaphoric/symbolic and material representations of the dynamics of de- and
reterritorialisation under globalisation, transformations can be evaluated by the
degree of territorial, e.g., border control of particular mobilities.
Increasingly, many state institutions have ever greater resources at hand to 
develop, implement, and continually readjust a particular territorial strategy to meet 
these perceived threats, including advanced information and technology. This is 
especially the case on the physical boundaries themselves where advanced 
surveillance and security technologies are now in place. Both monitoring and data 
gathering, as well as reflexive public input into policy formulation, are factors in the 
self-confrontational (in the institutional sense) process of redefining policy goals or 
regulation—and their public representations.
Dominant representations and practices of political territoriality are in fact 
linked here to a particular concept of regulation: modernity’s ‘knowledge-as-
regulation’ form. This innovative schema, introduced by the sociologist Santos, 
posits a trajectory of regulation in modernity between what is understood as 
ignorance and designated as threats or ‘chaos’ and a privileged point or goal of 
knowledge, understood as ‘order’.12 Thus, a state can reflexively seek and re­
evaluate policies that are designed to combat what is seen as ‘disorder’—somehow a
11 See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992); Andrew Arato 
and Jean L. Cohen, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); and S.L. 
Hurley, ‘Rationality, Democracy, and Leaky Boundaries: Vertical vs. Horizontal Modularity’, The 
Journal o f Political Philosophy 7, no. 2 (1999): 126-46.
12 As will be detailed in chapter four, Boaventura de Sousa Santos posits the paradigm of modernity 
involves two main forms of knowledge: hegemonic ‘knowledge-as-regulation’ and ‘knowledge-as- 
emancipation’ which involves a trajectory between ‘ignorance designated as colonialism and a point 
of knowledge designated as solidarity’. His work provides an important epistemological clarification 
and unmasks a neutralisation which has allowed ‘human suffering.. .[to] be justified in the name of 
the struggle of order and colonialism against chaos and solidarity’. See ‘The Fall of the Angelus 
Novus: Beyond the Modem Game of Roots and Options’, Current Sociology 46, no. 2 (1998): 101.
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less enlightened, retrogressive condition to be released from—by seeking a future 
condition of regularised control and order.
1.3 B orders  a n d  Border  Studies
Chapter three focuses on intellectual contexts for both the thesis as well as 
future research. Specifically, the chapter outlines the nature of what could be called 
‘border studies’, recognising that this is an underdeveloped and undertheorised area 
of study, particularly in the IR discipline. Most examinations of borders in IR have 
traditionally focussed on territorial conflicts or the status of international legal 
boundaries, and in those cases, work tends to accept them as abstract or given 
expressions of modem political territoriality: they become static reifications of what 
are, beneath the projections, socially constructed and arbitrary phenomena 
characteristic of a particular form of territoriality. Scant attention has been given to 
the active, material, or discursive dimensions of borders, such as securitisation or 
narratives of national identity which support border policies. Fewer still take a 
critical approach.
This study, however, does. Borders, in fact, open themselves to such an 
examination; they are extremely complicated, multidimensional, and contradictory, 
requiring careful, wide theorisation. A broader vision of the very concept of a 
‘border’ can be potentially insightful into the larger dynamics of the international 
state system. New developments outside IR now insist on thinking of borders as 
active, constructed forms of limits, of difference, of identity. They are not fixed 
lines, but seen as processes and relations which are continuously reproduced and 
sustained by the material, sociological, and discursive practices of the state and other 
actors and the international system.13 Some of the literature now understands all 
borders to be socially and politically ‘constructed’ phenomena. That kind of 
approach connects particularly well with those that also consider the socialisation of 
identity to be related to space and discourse.
Few surveys of this border literature exist. Accordingly, the third chapter 
attempts one of the first assessments of recent developments in border studies with
13 See Tyler Volk, ‘Borders’, in Metapattems', Eviatar Zerubavel, The Fine Line: Making Distinctions 
in Everyday Life (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 2 and ‘Lumping and Splitting: Notes on Social 
Classification,’ Sociological Forum 11, no. 3 (1996): 421. See also Anssi Paasi, ‘Constructing 
Territories, Boundaries and Regional Identities’, in Contested Territory: Border Disputes at the Edge 
o f the Former Soviet Empire, ed. Tuomas Forsberg (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1995) and David 
Newman and Anssi Paasi, ‘Fences and Neighbors in the Postmodern World: Boundary Narratives in 
Political Geography,’ Progress in Human Geography 22, no. 2 (1998): 186-207.
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the intention of firmly situating the thesis in this increasingly fruitful field. It 
operates conceptually in a kind of flexible academic ‘borderlands’, looking to 
synthesise work on the questions of borders, discourse, identity, and territoriality 
from several disciplines, including Cultural Studies, Sociology, and Political 
Geography. These works concentrate on the ‘writing’ of political space through 
discursive practices and seek deeper understandings of international boundaries and 
identity under conditions of globalisation.
This kind of thinking leads to a vision of border studies for IR that can treat 
boundaries from a transdisciplinary perspective: as wide patterns in the social and 
political worlds, central to defining and comprehending entities and processes like 
collective identity. This approach is especially concerned with processes of 
inclusion and exclusion over state boundaries that impact territoriality and identity. 
International boundaries can thus be seen as political representations of power that 
have much to do with the spatiality of self, identity, and the state; they are a 
cartography that ‘connects territory with social order’.14 In the end, they can be seen 
as processes which help configure political and cultural difference.15 As some 
scholars have shown, numerous symbolic and ideational relationships emerge from 
territorial organisation achieved through border practices; the ‘spatial socialisation’ 
or constitution of identity, for example, often follows the ‘borderlines between 
human and “something else’” .16
The chapter thus illustrates the value of the border concept within a more 
‘mobile’-oriented approach. This breaks it from its traditional Geopolitical and 
realist IR moorings and enriches it with concepts from other disciplines, thinking 
that offers insight into increasing heterogeneity under globalisation. In the end,
14 Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (London: Reaktion Books, 1997), 20. Black’s work is a critique 
of dominant forms o f political mapping, unmasking presumptions and biases in modem cartography 
and how this has served to help structure our worldviews.
15 Much new work in critical geopolitics deals with many of these questions such as the juncture of 
‘postmodern’ forms, space, and questions of identity. See, for example, Edward Soja, Postmodern 
Geographies: The Reassertion o f Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1989); John 
Agnew, ‘Representing Space: Space, Scale, and Culture in Social Science’, in 
Place/Culture/Representation, ed. James Duncan and David Ley (London: Routledge, 1993); Gerard 
Toal, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics o f Writing Global Space (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997); and Henri Lefebvre, The Production o f Space (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 
among others.
16 On the concept of spatial socialisation, see Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness and 
‘Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of Flows’, in Boundaries, Territory and 
Postmodemity, ed. David Newman (London: Frank Cass, 1999). See also the seminal work by 
Frederik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization o f Cultural Difference 
(Boston: Little Brown, 1969). See also Mathias Albert, ‘On Boundaries, Territory, and 
Postmodemity: An International Relations Perspective’, in Boundaries, Territory and Postmodemity, 
ed. David Newman (London: Frank Cass, 1999); and Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of 
France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989).
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borders understood in this way as both metaphorical and political spaces highlight 
issues of migration, trade, and other socio-political interactions; their study may be a 
key to understanding some of the larger relationships between order and identity in 
international politics.
1.4 T ools fo r  Analysis
The Identities/Borders/Orders Triad
Understanding modem transformations in international politics, as Quentin 
Skinner suggests, can requires ‘a willingness to emphasize the local and the 
contingent, a desire to underlie the extent to which our own concepts and attitude 
have been shaped by particular historical circumstances, and a correspondingly
• 17strong dislike...of all overarching theories and singular schemes of explanation’. 
Whilst recognising single paradigmatic approaches to IR and broad-stroke theories 
may fall short of Skinner’s ideals, the research here looks for ways to focus inquiry 
in this way by looking at the local and regional experiences of globalisation, in this 
case through the prism of borderlands.
This stance acknowledges that both change and continuity seem to 
characterise international politics in the current environment. Accordingly, the thesis 
adopts a reflective, ‘engaged pluralist approach’ to theorising border and identity 
practices which can perhaps better cope with the puzzles, complexities, and
» I Q  # # f
subtleties that increasingly characterise international relations. This is done within 
the wider framework of border studies and IR’s turn to culture and identity, heeding 
the call by leading theorists like Ruggie for re-interrogations of fundamental, 
ordering concepts like territoriality, especially under globalisation.19
Specifically, chapter four helps introduce the ‘identities/borders/orders’ 
(i/b/o) project in International Relations theory.20 The i/b/o ‘triad’ is a heuristic tool,
17 Quentin Skinner, The Return o f Grand Theory in the Human Sciences (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 12.
18 See Lapid’s ‘The Third Debate’ for a discussion of post-positivist approaches and such a research 
framework.
19 On culture, identity and IR, See Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The Return o f Culture 
and Identity to IR Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996) and John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the 
World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998).
20 Several scholars (Lapid, Albert, Jacobson, Bigo, Brock, Brown, Harvey, Heisler, Koslowski, 
Kratochwil, Lipschutz, Mansbach, Newman, Wiener, and Wilmer) are beginning work on the 
identities/borders/orders project and have recently produced the first volume circulating these themes: 
Identities, Borders, Orders: New Directions in International Relations Theory, eds. Mathias Albert, 
David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). This thesis is 
a partial contribution to this effort. For an introduction, see Yosef Lapid, ‘Identities/Borders/Orders:
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an open, ‘pre-theory’ instrument which may help us deconstruct and re-evaluate the 
mutually constituting processes and relationships between these three key concepts. 
In the end, it may generate interesting findings at a ‘mobile’-oriented moment 
characterised by globalisation and fluidity.
The triad draws on conceptual insights from several disciplines; for example 
on identity from Anthropology and Sociology, on orders from IR, and on borders 
from literary analysis and Geopolitics (among others) which enrich and synthesise 
each other. Each component of the triad interacts and is interdependent with the 
other two, but is not necessarily a dependent variable. This allows for interesting 
postulations. Identity, for instance, may be both constituted by and constituting of 
borders, but borders do not exclusively determine identity. Similarly, both identities 
and borders impact and affect orders. I/b/o-oriented analyses can thus be more 
concrete than the fuzzy, macro debates about globalisation because they help 
examine the interaction between the processes and, most importantly, narrow and 
focus the scope of inquiry.
The i/b/o triad is deliberately designed to be wide and open to enable scholars 
from many perspectives freedom of approach; it is neutral about ontological, 
epistemological or methodological preferences. For the research here, however, a 
specific ‘leg’ of the triad is the starting point: the interplay between identity (i)— 
particularly collective identity based conceptions of nationalism—and borders (b) as 
interrelated social and political processes. A theoretical section in this chapter 
accordingly looks at the interrelationship of borders and identity as co-constitutive 
social processes of socialisation that demands analysis. The argument returns to the 
triad later in the thesis by recognising some of the larger order (o) issues for ER that 
‘i-b’ relationship—and, by extension, each of its ‘points’—help structure.
More specifically, collective identity is investigated here by integrating the 
spatial dimension of politics, which involves setting control over particular territory, 
and its historical dynamics into discussions about identity change and constitution. 
This can be an undertheorised and misunderstood link. The resulting phenomena is 
closely related to the concept of ‘socio-spatial consciousness’, first elaborated by
A Rationale for a New Voyage in IR Theory’, idem. The i/b/o project is being spearheaded at New 
Mexico State University by Lapid but is being theoretically developed and expanded in different 
directions by these scholars world-wide. It should be noted, however, the initial coupling of the 
concepts and theoretical sketches of the larger project are his alone. This thesis, however, provides 
some additional theoretical work on the triad and the two cases studies included here are some of the 
first original empirical movement at the its intersections.
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Paasi, whereby individuals and communities are socialised as members of a 
territorially bound community.21
To understand how this process actually works in practice, the analysis looks 
at the relationship between narratives and policy in official discourse which help 
construct the state ‘order’, made up of material and representational practices and 
politics which discretely designate individuals as national citizens separate from 
others. This is a key part of how certain naturalised and reproduced identification 
processes and relations legitimate the state and connect it to a designated national 
collective identity or myth.22
Interfacing contemporary literature on nationalism, the analysis rests on a 
notion of a constructed national collective identity that is modem and state-centred, 
involving unification and substantiation on civic, and to some extent ethnic, grounds. 
Official state discourse—and the material interstate border policies—which it 
reinforces are some of the tools of such consolidations. In taking a discursive and 
modem, instmmental view of nationalism in the drive to consolidate collective 
identities, a high priority is given to elites and symbolic practices.
Thus, the thesis argues that there is a strong constitutive and socialising link 
between borders and collective identity within various territorial practices and 
discourses world-wide. This theoretical section, then, informs the basis for the 
empirical work developed later in the thesis, in particular concerning i/b/o dynamics 
on the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada borders.
A Narrative Analysis Methodology
Navigating the ‘i-b’ component of the i/b/o triad for empirical research 
purposes can be done in several ways. The chief methodological tool and employed 
in the thesis to understand identity-border relationships in the case studies is 
narrative analysis. This is a preliminary, multi-step, post-positivist form of 
discourse analysis that examines some of the defining ‘scripts’ of international 
relations: ‘texts’ (broadly understood as public documents, speeches, legislation, and 
other symbolic resources) and their connections to power, policy, and collective 
identity. In effect, the texts work as ‘framing’ devices which help formulate the
21 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness.
22 See William Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations o f Political Paradox (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) and Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
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possibilities and justifications for particular material initiatives, such as border 
control or neoliberalisation. Official policy texts help identify the ‘problem’ or risk 
facing the public, set a field of potential solutions, and introduce rhetoric and 
symbolisation to support particular political preferences. This narrative can circulate 
in both official and wider public circles, and the case studies look to both for clues 
on its content.
Through a conceptual overview of major scholarly work on discourse, the 
chapter seeks to denaturalise prevailing conditions and power frameworks of border 
policies. This involves taking a constitutive theory of language and positing the 
ways in which language and symbolism articulate political positions, power, and 
space. In effect, they help constitute our understandings and naturalisations of the 
boundaries around us by setting the fields of interpretation and possibility. The 
emphasis is here is on the particular practices embedded and sanctioned by these 
narratives which help reproduce modem norms of political territoriality and 
collective identity.
By analysing this discourse, we have a convenient and intriguing window for 
understanding some of the possibilities of bounded communities or the limits of 
particular domestic and international political projects. This sort of analysis can 
offer new insights into where, how, and why territoriality is being ‘unbundled’, to 
use Ruggie’s term, or ‘re-inscribed’ through socio-political practices, and what 
impact state action or globalisation has on notions of community or identity. 
Material political initiatives like border securitisation, the argument goes, are 
bolstered and authorised as continual processes through a variety of state-produced 
‘texts’ or official discourse.
Ultimately, the final steps in a narrative analysis methodology can help us 
uncover a dominant, officially preferred ‘metanarrative’. The metanarrative emerges 
as the chief structure for policy implementation (such as territorial control strategies) 
and becomes naturalised and reproduced through actual implementation on the 
ground.
23 See the seminal article on territoriality by Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’.
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1.5 Em pirical  R esearch  in  t h e  A m erican  B o rderlands
Frederick Jackson Turner’s pioneering ‘frontier thesis’ set out one of the 
most influential interpretive histories of America in 1893.24 Turner advised that 
attention be paid by social scientists to conditions in the boundary regions of 
expanding states, arguing they were formative of the national experience. Well 
ahead of his time, Turner urged particular attention be placed on social and 
environmental factors, such as immigration, international interaction, and generally 
foreign contact. Because of this, he argued innovation occurred at the frontier where 
‘the cake of custom is broken, and new activities, new lines of growth, new
y e
institutions and new ideals, are brought mto existence’.
Turner was, in many ways, an early theorist of borders and their role in 
identity construction.26 If this early work connotes the importance of the western 
frontier during the continental consolidation of the United States, it seems equally 
appropriate to return to study these boundaries now. This is especially necessary at a 
time of increased transnational flows, for these forces, now rapidly increased and 
intensified since Turner’s time, find their way through the medium of the American 
borderlands.
The settlement of both the Mexican and Canadian borders as frontiers 
followed Turner’s thinking about the American west; while they are now ‘set’ 
examples of modem political territoriality, they continue to have major significance. 
The North American NAFTA case at the moment presents a good social science 
laboratory; there the late modem forces of intensifying transnational capital, 
information, and culture flows suggest greater continental integration and more 
porous borders whilst at the same time political contestation emerges over questions 
of migration, regionalism, and identity. Much of this is centred in the borderlands, 
the unique, interdependent, bi-national zones of exchange, synthesis, and 
differentiation that are, in many ways, the ‘joints of continental articulation’.27
24 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (1893; reprint, Tucson, AZ: University 
of Arizona Press, 1986). Despite his seemingly mono-causal approach, Turner in fact insisted on a 
multi-causal perspective on history, emphasising social, environmental, and political factors.
25 Frederick Jackson Turner, ‘The Problem of the West’, Atlantic Monthly (September 1896) 
[http://www.theatlantic.eom//issues/95sep/ets/tum.htm] (21 February 2001).
26 For a problematisation of Turner and his image x>f western American expansion, see Patricia 
Limerick, The Legacy o f Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: W.W, 
Norton, 1987) and Something in the Soil: Legacies and Reckonings in the New West (New York:
W.W. Norton, 2000).
27 Victor Konrad, ‘Borderlines and Borderlands in the Geography of Canada-United States Relations’, 
in North America Without Borders? Integrating Canada, the United States, and Mexico, eds. Stephen
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Moreover, the North American case involves unique tripartite interactions 
between a hegemonic, highly advanced state (the U.S.), another advanced country 
(Canada), and a developing polity (Mexico), thus implicating different variables and 
issues. No other set of borderland situations in the world has this particular 
composition, and accordingly the choice of cases here offers multiple insights into 
other borderland situations in the world that may only have one set of similar 
characteristics.
In examining the changing meanings of boundaries in both the U.S.-Canadian 
and U.S.-Mexican cases, the new post-Cold War, exclusionary securitisation of 
borders and migrants is seen as one response to a new kind of defined uncertainty 
and ‘threat’, as well as a partial means for national identity consolidation. Such 
border policy in the United States also reflects the deployment of two new policy 
regimes: economic integration through decreased restrictions on capital and trade 
flows in North America with a concurrent, exclusionary tightening of labour flows.
In the American case, the material policies and narratives of border security 
construct an ‘order’ made more from the illusionary ‘image’ of ‘control’ rather than 
actually addressing some of the public policy questions, such as undocumented 
migration or drugs, it supposedly set out to do. Recent empirical evidence suggests 
securitisation has actually done nothing to stem these flows. Instead, the policies 
further ‘knowledge-as-regulation’ on an epistemological level, but also help justify 
exclusionary ‘control’ over suffering human elements (migrants) in the name of the 
struggle for order. The situation also has a role in identity consolidation for 
Americans.
Several research questions are offered for the case studies: how has the 
modem, Westphalian model framed social and political thinking and practice, 
particularly in regards to political territoriality and national collective identity in 
America? How can narrative policy analysis and the identities/borders/orders 
conceptual triad serve as a useful tools to examine both the complex nexus of these 
key relationships in the post-Cold War era of NAFTA? Finally, what 
‘metanarrative’ is emerging within contemporary American border discourse as a 
whole and what are its wider order implications for territoriality and identity?
J. Randall, Herman Konrad, and Sheldon Silverman (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1992), 
191.
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The Turbulent U. S. -Mexico Borderlands
The U.S.-Mexico boundary was set through violence in the era of American 
‘Manifest Destiny’, an imperial policy that underpinned the movement of the frontier 
westward as an expansion thought to be sanctioned by God. Through the course of 
the 19th century, the United States acquired nearly half of Mexico, the ‘borderlands’ 
of Spain’s former northern empire. This process of acquisition, and the 
determination of the current boundary line, is a classic example of modem political 
territoriality. The establishment of the international boundary in 1853—when the 
Gadsden Purchase finally consolidated the continental American state—was a 
function of state narratives of expansion and national myth, and a need for 
sovereignty over a previously porous and, in many cases, vague borderline.
Chapter five thus begins by looking at the historical and political forces of 
this process which are embedded with modem, rational principles and assumptions. 
The historical review evaluates the evolution of the international boundary and the 
order and identities it helped produce. This pattern is briefly traced to more 
contemporary developments which solidified the boundary and more recently have 
reinforced it in new ways. In particular, heightened concerns about illegal narcotics 
and illegal immigration in the 1990s brought a renewed interest in ‘controlling’ 
economic migration and conducting drug interdiction. Two years after the end of the 
Cold War, a radical new policy of ‘border control’ through securitisation and 
militarisation was put in place. The Clinton administration—whilst advocating 
continental free trade and economic integration under NAFTA—sought to ‘get 
tough’ and ‘seal’ the southern borderlands from economic migrants filling the huge 
demand for unofficial work in the United States, primarily in the agricultural or 
service sectors.
The development, goals, and justification of this narrative strategy that 
defines and delegates the ‘problem’ of migration and ‘disorder’ to the southern U.S. 
frontier are very much the subjects of this chapter. Paradoxically, the 
reterritorialisation or securitisation strategy has developed amidst massive 
transnational economic development (largely through border industrialisation) and 
trade flows which mean an unprecedented dynamism in the borderlands and the 
fostering of large-scale social, demographic, and political changes.
Chapter five thus argues that American foreign policy has established two 
regimes for the continent: free trade and transnational interaction and increased
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border securitisation and restrictions on the free flow of labour. The U.S.-Mexico 
borderlands, however, are the more extreme crystallisation of these somewhat 
paradoxical regimes. The chapter details the gradual build-up of the securitisation 
policy through a reading of U.S. policy documents and decisions that have 
authorised major increases in U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 
Border Patrol, and military budgets and operations.
The main anchoring component of the case study looks at the effects of 
‘Operation Hold the Line’, a U.S. Border Patrol initiative launched in 1993 in El 
Paso, Texas and subsequently exported to other sectors of the borderlands. It is the 
exemplar of the new ‘get-tough’ policy of prevention of undocumented migration 
‘through deterrence’. The initiative places a restrictive ‘line-watch’ strategy to 
attempt to control the entry of undocumented workers into the United States by the 
strategic placement of Border Patrol officers within line of sight of one another to 
guard the boundary. In addition, it involves building walls and barriers and the use 
of sensors, electronic monitoring devices, low-light goggles, aerial reconnaissance, 
and other military measures known as ‘Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine’. Some of 
the most advanced security technology in the world is now in place along the border.
The case study research is centred on the narratives of identity and 
territoriality that authorise the policy’s development, justification, and 
implementation. Following the multi-step narrative analysis set out earlier, in-depth 
interviews and a review of the major texts involved with the policy were undertaken 
to examine the way the initiative impacted worldviews of borderlanders. Residents 
are experiencing the radical changes of rigid governmental control through new 
physical and psychological borders of exclusion. The research also looks to identify 
the underlying narrative structures that define the threat, justify securitisation, and 
signal the ‘goal’ of the policy: presenting an image of ‘control’ and order in the 
borderlands.
Following this discussion of Operation Hold the Line, the analysis then 
proceeds by highlighting recent developments along the border since 1993 which 
have introduced even more tension to this turbulent region: further militarisation, 
shootings, vigilante violence, and deaths of migrants attempting to cross. These are 
exposed by examining the material, narrative, and normative dimensions of 
securitisation.
The chapter concludes that the policy changed the cultural and political 
reproduction of the U.S.-Mexico boundary through both the physical construction of
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the border but also the rhetoric of nationalism surrounding the initiatives. The 
launch of Operation Hold the Line, and the subsequent securitisation along the entire 
length of the frontier, has helped recast the social and historical construction and 
discourse of the U.S.-Mexico border and changed socio-spatial consciousness, 
helping to consolidate notions of national American collective identity. The policy 
also indicates reflexive territoriality, especially in its advanced technology, 
surveillance, and policy monitoring control measures.
Finally, the metanarrative emerging from this case fosters and presents a 
representation of border security (regulation) to the public of a particular ‘order’ in 
the face of ‘chaos’ brought by Mexican migrants and concomitant shifts in identity, 
culture, and demographics. This image, which has particular political purposes, 
persists despite strong evidence that the multi-year, multi-billion dollar policy has 
not radically stemmed cross-border flows of labour across the southern frontier.
Narrating the U. S. -Canadian Borderlands
Chapter six also monitors the politics of writing space through the narratives 
of territoriality and identity, especially as they help formulate the key processes of 
identities/borders/orders—but this time surrounding what was seen as the longest 
undefended border in the world, the U.S.-Canadian boundary. The narratives there 
also help construct an order made more from the image of control rather than 
actually addressing some of the public policy questions, such as preventing entry 
into American land by terrorists, drugs, or undocumented economic migrants, as it 
supposedly set out to do. A new discourse of tightened control there has a role in 
national identity consolidation through the casting of a perceived threat. This flies in 
the face of a history of especially close binational interaction and interdependence 
created through seemingly analogous social and political systems along the frontier.
In this chapter, the development of the U.S.-Canadian boundary is 
highlighted as a particularly good example of ‘modernity’s dominant spatial story’. 
After detailing the highly interdependent, unique, and binational nature of border 
communities there, a discussion of contemporary developments in the context of 
NAFTA-inspired deterritorialisation follows. An examination of recent U.S. 
government policy texts or public transcripts on boundary control, as well as 
supporting and contending policy speeches made by key officials and border 
residents are the points of crystallisation for the case study. In particular, the chapter
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offers an analysis of the official documentation and public debate—the narratives 
and counter-narratives—which surround both current developments on the border 
and the watershed IIRIRA legislation of 1996.28
One exclusionary component of the law, Section 110, is a highlighted as an 
excellent example of a futile state attempt to reterritorialise. This provision seeks to 
establish strict entry and exit controls for each and every one of the hundreds of 
millions of individuals who cross the border each year. The official narrative 
justifications for such a policy are windows into the processes of reflexive political 
territoriality. Such discursive formulations help write (and ultimately partly 
construct) exclusionary space by seeking to establish strict control of entry and exit 
in the regulatory frame of ‘protection’ against the defined threat of terrorists and 
migrants transgressing the northern line. These policy and narrative developments 
have much to do with image, identity, and trade but in the end are further examples 
of exclusion like that which is occurring in the southern borderlands with Mexico.
1.6 Co n c lu sio n s
The thesis emerges from its journey through the borderlands with some 
concluding thoughts that both review and evaluate the findings of the project but also 
broaden the discussion to outline in-depth specific theoretical and empirical concerns 
requiring further research. The multidimensional nature of borders and identity 
indeed present many more questions than this study poses or can answer—intriguing 
challenges for both theory and practice. The conclusion also considers some of the 
important normative, ethical questions surrounding current U.S. border securitisation 
policies—and potential policy alternatives—a move that seems increasingly required 
in our continual quest to figure out both necessary and unnecessary borders.
28 Division C of U.S. Public Law 104-208, 104th Cong., 2d sess. (30 September 1996).
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C H A P T E R  T W O
Fr o n t ie r s  in t o  Bo r d e r s: Po litic a l  Ter r ito r iality
a n d  M o d e r n it y
2.0 In t r o d u c t io n
Given their bedrock nature, it seems logical to begin an inquiry into 
international borders with two, often inaccurately presumed ‘twin’, issues in IR: 
territoriality and identity. Contemporary practices and discourses of territoriality, 
such as those in the American case, are historically unique and contingent political 
differentiations; they are immersed in a large web of long-standing political and 
social processes and relations which are socially and politically constructed, partly 
through regulation. In order to understand borders as representative of this control, 
then, we must first explore the nature of political territoriality as a spatial strategy of 
power and control itself, as well as the historical, sociological foundations and 
conditions upon which it is predicated.
Often concomitant with particular territorialities are particular collective 
identity formations, and these too must be understood in a similar fashion. The 
conditions and interplay between modem territoriality and collective identity are 
extremely important, for together they both form the principle differentiating and 
organising dynamic of the international state system. Thus, this chapter seeks 
evaluate the historical, socio-political ‘mapping’ of space and its connection with 
national collective identity within the dominant state order—in effect to begin to 
understand the historical development, organisation, and production of borders in the 
international system. This is done to lay the groundwork for the later analysis of 
changes in contemporary political territoriality and the accompanying patterns of 
regulation.
The chapter thus begins by providing a brief genealogy of political 
territoriality from the pre-modem to Westphalian through to the late modem with the 
state under globalisation, outlining the development of current patterns of bounded 
organisation by tracing how they emerged from both pre-modem and early modem 
modes of social and political life. Two key and linked developments are most 
responsible for these patterns of the territorially-based interstate, Westphalian
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system: the maturation of capitalism which replaced the old feudal economic order, 
and Western consolidation and expansion, which is based on a definition of space 
from the Renaissance that emphasised single-point perspective and modem mapping 
methods. These introduced an entirely new, radical, single subjectivity and 
technologies which completely readjusted political space.
As a metaphor for this development, it is one main goal of this chapter to 
understand how the word ‘border’ came to mean the precise spatial demarcations of a 
state as ‘container’—which seemed to encapsulate the perceived promises of 
modernity: stable and coherent collective identities, citizenship, division of labour, 
and social differentiation. In effect, this considers modernity as a process of 
territorialisation. The claim is made here that borders are predominantly modern and 
constructed phenomena. To read how borders came to be the instruments of 
spatialisation, the key underlying modality which organises the world, is to explore 
the state project as an evolving socio-spatial geography involving layered forms of 
identity and territoriality, but now potentially in a stage of transformation.
Contemporary political territoriality is linked to these institutional, social, 
and political changes brought on by the rise of modernity, but what makes it 
interesting are the dynamics of a global order characterised by both change and 
continuity amidst intensified transnational pressures. The rise of the processes of 
globalisation, powered by strengthened international economic, social, and political 
links, calls some aspects of state borders into question, and with its concomitant 
social and cultural changes (often defined as societal ‘risks’ and ‘dangers’), may 
disturb (or in some cases reinforce) the typical dimensions of the ‘container’ idea.
The past decade has seen globalisation become a key concept in the social 
sciences and beyond. Scholars, however, vary widely on its nature and dimensions, 
ranging from those who posit the decline of the state to those who regard 
transnational processes as epiphenomenal. Exploring the nature of that debate is not 
the objective here, nor is globalisation the point of concentration. However, for 
broad context within the discussion of territoriality and identity, the chapter does 
accept growing empirical evidence which is suggestive of changes in the 
international system brought on by what can be considered transnational ‘mobilities’: 
goods, services, information, production, and increasingly, even people which are 
intensifying and ‘flowing’ more quickly and easily across state boundaries.
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Given this, the focus is recast to suggest that globalisation may encourage 
transborder flows as well as consolidate state sovereignty; globalisation need not be 
seen as a zero-sum game for the nature of the state.1 Examining this conceptually is 
a challenge, but the social theory of reflexive modernisation has emerged as one of 
the most salient frameworks for understanding such contemporary socio-political 
phenomena and it is taken up here.
Moreover, research channelled by the i/b/o triad can isolate several of these 
salient manifestations of continuity and change in late modernity. In some advanced 
states, contemporary political territoriality (b) and collective identity (i) 
relationships—within a changing global order (o)—can be understood through a 
notion of ‘reflexive territoriality’. This concept suggests continual, ever speedier 
revision, monitoring, and reproduction of a state’s strategy of constructed control 
over a particular territory. This is done through impulses of inclusion and exclusion, 
or ‘deterritorialisation’ and ‘reterritorialisation’, in response to particular defined 
risks or opportunities—such as opening a border to trade but not individuals.
What makes this conception of political territoriality different now is the fact 
these regulations are fed by new information flows—knowledge is applied through 
advanced technologies and then reflexively expressed through a state’s varied, 
adjusted operationalisation of its borders. They are made political realities of 
difference through both material-technological and discursive means. Globalisation 
can thus be understood as characterised by de- and reterritorialisation impulses 
which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In the end, the key point is that 
borders are arbitrary and not inevitable forms of political differentiation, having 
changed through history; they must be constantly maintained through a variety of 
embedded processes and relations which can be reflexively organised.
The map of the chapter itself is as follows: first, we begin with an historical 
genealogy of political territoriality, starting with a theoretical exploration of what it 
is and then moving to trace key examples of pre-modem forms of socio-political 
organisation. Then, preceded by a brief discussion of modernity, the chapter moves 
on with this review to evaluate movement in history to the modem territorial forms 
of political organisation we know as the clearly bounded state. This was fuelled by
1 See work advanced by David Held, among others: David Held, ed., A Globalizing World? Culture, 
Economics, Politics (London: Routledge, 2000) and David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt,
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massive socio-political changes as well as epistemic transformations, such as the rise 
of single-point perspective in cartography. Several representative and intriguing 
primary examples of historical border practices are pointed out. The discussion then 
turns to globalisation and the impact transnational mobilities are having on 
territoriality and collective identity, particularly in border situations. The concept of 
reflexive territoriality is considered as a means by which some advanced states seek 
to achieve particular goals or knowledges. Connected with this, the chapter 
concludes with the presentation of a schema of knowledge as ‘regulation- 
emancipation’ to help understand the policies connected with such state actions of 
inclusion and exclusion across borders. In some cases, border ‘control’ is seen as an 
outgrowth of larger processes of regulation that attempt to affect a perceived ‘ideal’ 
knowledge-goal of ‘order’ under globalisation.
2.1 P olitical  Territoriality
It is truly astonishing that the concept of territoriality has been so little studied by 
students of international politics; its neglect is akin to never looking at the ground 
that one is walking on.
—John Gerard Ruggie2
Ruggie’s comment issues a stem call for action in IR to examine the principle 
organising dynamic of the international state system: territoriality, the ‘ground’—in 
more than one sense—of the discipline. This chapter agrees, maintaining that 
territoriality is a key ‘hook’ to help understand both historical and contemporary 
international transformations, particularly as it may be ‘unbundled’ (what is referred 
to as ‘deterritorialisation’ in this text) or ‘rebundled’ (reterritorialised), under 
globalisation. This thesis argues that changes in territoriality, in particular border 
change, are important dynamics of globalisation, and indeed their study may be one 
of the more effective ways to analyse larger contemporary transformations, 
something Ruggie argues the discipline is not very good at doing.
But before investigating how territoriality may be changing, and its 
relationship to collective identity, it will be important to examine just exactly what it
and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity, 
1999).
2 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations’, International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 174.
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is and how it operates in international politics. Following Ruggie’s suggestion, we 
seek a re-interrogation of the concept, for it has often been ignored or taken 
objectively, as a static given in much IR work.3 In seeking a proper definition, our 
most reliable source comes not from the field of IR, but rather Human Geography. 
Robert Sack is widely acknowledged as one of the leading figures in the social 
sciences to explore the nature of territoriality; in doing so, he moves beyond earlier 
scholarly efforts which situated the concept only within a biological, needs based 
framework or failed to provide a systematic analysis. His 1986 book, Human 
Territoriality, remains the landmark text in these explorations.4 In it, Sack provides 
a theory and history of territoriality which begins with a concise definition:
Territoriality.. .is best understood as a spatial strategy to affect, influence, or control 
resources and people, by controlling area...[it] is an historically sensitive use of 
space, especially since it is socially constructed.5
Thus, territoriality is ‘intimately related to how people use the land, how they 
organize themselves in space, and how they give meaning to place’ and it is ‘a 
primary geographical expression of social power’.6 The crucial element from this 
definition for our purposes is the focus on the interrelated factors of social 
construction and power. In fact, as the case studies will demonstrate, this spatial 
strategy is often a manifestation of official state border policies and narratives which 
seek to affect and maintain a particular territoriality-collective identity relationship 
that is reflexively organised, an argument developed later in this chapter.
3 For an important exception that also departs from Ruggie’s analysis, see Hannes Lacher, 
‘Historicising the Global: Capitalism, Territoriality and the International Relations of Modernity’ 
(Ph.D. diss., University of London, 2000).
4 See Robert David Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986).
5 Ibid., 1-2, emphasis added.
6 Ibid., 5.
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Sack extends his discussion, but only cursorily, to the issue of borders, the 
bounds of a territorial space: he views borders in terms of communication—‘a 
territorial boundary may be the only symbolic form that combines a statement about 
direction in space and statement about possession or exclusion’.7 Thus, borders are 
the vehicles to differentiate political projects. From this limited starting point, we 
can expand his discussion into the international realm to formulate a concept of 
political territoriality which becomes important in understanding its precise effects 
and impact.
A modem interstate border signifies constructed political territoriality in at 
least three ways: first, classification and control through inclusion of citizens and 
exclusion of the other, e.g., non-citizens or, more often in the discourse, ‘aliens’; 
second, possession through sovereignty and its accompanying effects such as a 
monopoly on violence; and third, and especially vital for our analysis here, the 
symbolic and material representation of reified, impersonal power.8 Borders must be 
maintained constantly via these three dimensions in order to be sustained and 
accepted—precisely because of their largely symbolic nature; at base they are 
relatively arbitrary material delimitations.
Ultimately, political territoriality came to be used by governments to control 
resources and people by creating and enforcing the boundaries of the state. As the 
next section points out, however, imprecise borders and technologies in the pre­
modem era limited the effectiveness of this control. But as will be illustrated, when 
it was eventually established, by controlling access and through other hallmarks of 
sovereignty such as monopolising the use of force and easing the creation of 
hierarchical bureaucracies, territoriality gave state power relationships permanence 
and feasibility; the logic of territorial control then extended in time to eventually 
consolidate and regulate strict external boundaries. Nevertheless, as Anderson and 
O’Dowd point out, some of these strengths are also some of its weaknesses:
[Territoriality] is arbitrarily divisive and disruptive of social processes, particularly 
at borders. In the interests of control, it reifies power, de-personalizes social 
relationships, and oversimplifies and hence distorts social realities.9
7 Ibid., 21.
8 It should be noted this definition does not generally apply to pre-modem borders or, as will be 
pointed out later, ‘frontiers’.
9 James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd, ‘Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory 
Meanings, Changing Significance’, Regional Studies 33, no. 7 (1999): 598, emphasis in original.
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Accordingly, we need to find a relatively critical perspective which can 
question territoriality’s development and its effects—best examined through the 
symbolic and material ‘markers’ of borders. Moreover, because the phenomena is 
historically contingent, and of a socially constructed nature, it is important to situate 
political territoriality within a particular historical stream to understand its 
development and potential transformation. The next section examines pre-modem 
political organisation to this end.
2.2 ‘M a p p in g ’ P re-m o d e r n  P olitical T errito riality
Territoriality in the traditional, or pre-modem age, as in modernity, can 
perhaps be best understood from a starting point that considers the concept of 
‘mapping’: the process of delineating the limits and structure of a spatial system. 
From a theoretical and critical perspective, we can see mapping as a discourse of 
power, reflecting the assumptions, values, and culture of the mapmaker; mapping is 
fundamentally political.10 Foucault, among others, articulates the point that mapping 
is a central political act in part because knowledge represents and reproduces 
power.11
Since even before relatively recent technology began to provide the means to 
precisely measure and chart the earth’s surface, humans have carved the globe into 
units—not only distinct, tightly bound territorial units but also more fuzzy and 
overlapping structures. In doing so, the practice of cartography has strongly 
influenced the way in which we perceive and reproduce our social and political 
world. Richard elaborates on the usefulness of this metaphor, particularly as it 
applies to political order:
Maps are one of the most common cultural metaphors in our conception of the 
world...the history of cartography is also the history of a certain rationalization: of 
how an order measures and cuts up surfaces to articulate territories of signification 
and representation is, itself, subject to order.12
10 See Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (London: Reaktion Books, 1997) for a superb explication of 
this idea.
11 See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1980).
12 Nelly Richard, ‘The Cultural Periphery and Postmodern Decentering: Latin America’s 
Reconversion of Borders’, in Rethinking Borders, ed. John C. Welchman (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1996), 71.
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In this sense, and for this study, ‘mapping’ correlates to determining the bounds of 
‘the political’, a term defined by Beck as ‘an ambivalent, multilevel “expressionistic 
concept of politics” (Habermas) which permits us to posit the social form and the 
political as mutually variable’.13 To ‘map’ in some senses, then, is to set a geography 
of power, to help determine the outcomes, status, and future of actors and resources 
through territorial demarcations or territorially defined parameters. The important 
point is to recognise common political maps and boundaries as expressions of 
dominant discourses of power and representations which are connected to particular 
interests and worldviews.
Modernity has embedded a particular set of images and frameworks for 
understanding political space. This worldview—as simple as interpreting states as 
geometric abstract ‘colours’ on any run-of-the-mill contemporary political map—is 
now so ingrained that it becomes necessary to withdraw from this historically 
peculiar perspective and reinterpret our assumptions historically.
Pre-modem understandings of political space were not so clear cut or 
ingrained and, in fact, non-exclusive forms of territoriality based around the 
‘frontier’ concept predominated; ‘virtually no pre-modem societies’, Giddens writes, 
‘were as clearly bounded as modem nation-states’.14 The modem applications of 
land surveys, and technology like satellite imaging which produces crisp, clear linear 
demarcations on top of ‘empty’ topographical space were not available. Instead, we 
see a much cloudier, nebulous and ‘fuzzy’ picture.
Indeed, no borders as we understand them can be found on maps of this 
period. The prevailing conception of political territoriality in the pre-modem world 
was of social definition. Relations were local and bound by the prevailing imperial 
or socio-political structures, such as those imposed by the church; only with 
modernity would this change to a more abstract territorial definition. Conceptions of 
geography were as restricted and imprecise as to the contours and limits of empire 
and rule. With some exceptions, ‘zones’ tended to be more common than precise
13 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization’, in 
Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modem Social Order, eds. Ulrich 
Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, eds., (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), 18
14 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences o f Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 14.
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jurisdictional boundaries.15 While some major forms of stricter political 
differentiation existed (such as Hadrian’s wall which marked the frontier of Roman 
rule in the British Isles, or the Great Wall of China—‘a genuine palladium to the 
heart of the Chinese Empire’—which differentiated the Chinese from the 
‘barbarians’), precise demarcation, or in some cases even knowledge of where the 
limits lay, was rare; such a situation illustrates that political systems need not 
necessarily be territorially set.16 Even the Roman empire, for example, despite 
Hardrian’s wall and natural boundaries, scarcely had any borders as we might 
understand them today.
Some pre-Westphalian societies, in fact, existed ‘which seem not to 
“possess” any territory of their own’, conforming to a general pattern of 
nonexclusive territoriality.17 Maurice Godelier, in a landmark survey of the matter, 
points to several representative examples. The Peul WoDaabe, a tribe from the south 
of Iran and pastoralists of the Niger and the Bassari, are indicative of nomadic 
societies which use the same territory and the same watering places in rotation and in 
a definite order. Godelier also illustrates this with the pre-modem Inca and pre-Inca 
Andean societies which followed a similar pattern. The Kingdom of Lupaqa, he 
explains, exploited several territories on the east and west sides of the Andes and 
comprised two separate ethnic groups speaking both Aymara and Uru; they shared 
the same territory and resources. These forms of loose boundaries, overlapping, 
shared social and territorial mappings, persisted until the Inca Empire consolidated 
and reordered space, and transcended these arrangements.18
15 See Stephen Jones, ‘Boundary Concepts in the Setting of Place and Time’, Annals o f the 
Association o f American Geographers 49, no. 3 (1959): 241-55.
See Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers o f China 2d ed. (New York: American Geographical 
Society, 1951); Jones, ‘Boundary Concepts’; George Nathaniel Curzon, Frontiers: The Romanes 
Lecture 1907 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1908).
17 Maurice Godelier, The Mental and the Material: Thought Economy and Society, trans. Martin 
Thom (London: Verso 1986), 86
18 Ibid., 88-90.
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Feudal medieval Europe, dominated by rituals of inheritance, a system of 
nobility, and a higher church order, also lacked clearly defined frontiers and was 
characterised by overlapping territories and jurisdictions. Medieval maps reflected 
this pattern. The Mappa Mundi is a superb example of this pre-modem territorial 
discourse in the Middle Ages; it is the oldest surviving medieval map from England, 
drawn around 1290 A.D. Whitfield calls it ‘the largest, most detailed and most 
perfectly preserved medieval map in the world’.19 It illustrates how medieval 
scholars interpreted the world in spiritual and geographical terms: primarily this is a 
text of religious or social cosmography. The Mappa Mundi is actually based on 
Roman cartographic traditions, which placed Rome at the centre of the projection. 
The map illustrates a conception of political space which plots Jerusalem (and thus 
Christianity) at the centre, with overlapping jurisdictions and provinces, fuzzy 
boundaries, and unclear realms. The map also sought to demonstrate the 
compendium of existing knowledge; it depicts illustrations of human achievement 
and the natural world. Myths predominate: races, beasts, and people and 
supernatural beings of all sorts dot the map, such as the ‘Sciapod’, an extraordinary 
being who sheltered himself from the heat of the sun with his single enormous foot. 
Christ, sitting at the Day of Judgement on the top of the map, is of course central in 
the text, seen as the true path to salvation above a complex and confused world.
The Mappa Mundi—particularly compared to our contemporary conceptions 
of what a map should be like—gives us a clear sense of the changes in territorial 
discourse brought on by modernity. As Jancey puts it, ‘to the modem mind much of 
the content seems so wildly fanciful that it is difficult to believe that the same people 
who created the vast stone cathedrals, abbeys and castles of the medieval period, 
should have been persuaded so easily by the map’s incredible claims’.20
19 Peter Whitfield, The Image o f the World: 20 Centuries o f World Maps (San Francisco: Pomegranate 
Artbooks, 1994), 20.
20 Meryl Jancey, Mappa Mundi: A Brief Guide (Hereford: The Dean and Chapter of Hereford, 1994). 
See [http://www.ibmpcug.co.uk/~mserve/mapmundi.html] (26 October 2000). The site also provides 
a fascinating and excellent digital reproduction of the map. The map itself is displayed in the 13th 
century Hereford Cathedral.
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Anderson’s seminal work, Imagined Communities, is particularly insightful 
on this point. Anderson suggests that, in the pre-modem era, ‘the fundamental 
conceptions about “social groups” were centripetal and hierarchical, rather than 
boundary-oriented and horizontal’.21 He goes on to suggest that, ‘in the older 
imagining, where [monarchical] states were defined by centres, borders were porous 
and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another’.22 
Decentralised, ‘[discontinuous holdings were common’, producing ‘a patchwork 
political map’.23 Better then, perhaps, to understand them as ‘frontiers’ rather than 
‘borders’.
These blanket suppositions of geographically imprecise frontiers in pre­
modem societies, however, need a bit of tempering. In a pioneering study, Grosby 
argues for ‘a more nuanced understanding of not only certain collectivities of 
antiquity and their respective territories, but modem nationality as well’.24 His recent 
work on nationalism and territoriality in the ancient Near East and Armenia is that 
kind of revealing study that shades the argument on mapping made so far in a new 
way. Political communities remarkably similar to seemingly ‘modem’ nation-states 
did exist, in his view, as early as the Greek city state in the 9th century B.C. and in 
Assyria in the 8th century B.C. These communities were unified trans-locally by a 
certain common factor—in this case religion—which, in Grosby’s view, constitute 
them as ‘nations’ with ‘territorial referents in the mutual recognition through which a 
sociologically relatively homogenous “people” is formed’.25 But in the end, most 
forms of pre-modem political organisation were informed by the prevailing historical 
patterns of flexible boundaries where ‘fuzzy’ jurisdictions prevailed. There are, 
however, significant degrees of variance with which these communities maintained 
clearly defined identities and territoriality, such as these notable exceptions identified 
by Grosby.
Marxist and Weberian influenced approaches would offer various 
explanations for these pre-modem territorial patterns so different than our own. A 
Marxist analysis, for instance, would possibly point to the pre-capitalist mode of 
production which characterised many ancient and feudal societies, arguing the
21 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983), 15, 19.
22 Ibid., 19, emphasis added.
23 Jones, ‘Boundary Concepts’, 247.
24 Steven Grosby, ‘Borders, Territory, and Nationality in the Ancient Near East and Armenia’,
Journal o f the Economic and Social History o f the Orient 40, no. 1 (1997): 1.
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oppressive nature of capitalism had not yet consolidated within a state structure. 
Similarly, Weber would likely maintain the modem institutions of state bureaucracy 
and hierarchy were not present to consolidate monopolies of territorial control; in the 
end, pre-modem political territoriality could not create impersonal relations and 
‘empty’ space conceptually, and thus fundamentally lacked the definition of social 
relationships through territoriality.26
As the next section will illustrate, however, the development of Newtonian- 
Descartian technologies, the rise of single-point perspective in art and cartography, 
the development of new institutional forms, as well as capitalism fundamentally 
altered political territoriality, leading to the precise demarcation of ‘empty’ ground 
and the consolidation of the inter-state system. This occurred first in the West and 
then gradually throughout the globe with colonialism. While still lingering in the 
initial stages of modernity, pre-modem political territoriality became washed away 
when the new, technologically advanced maps of global political life restructured 
international relations on paper and in practice. That fundamental change is still 
with us today as technology is increasingly applied to survey and control state 
boundaries but increasingly now in a reflexive manner.
2.3 M o d e r n it y  a n d  T h e  Rise o f  M o d e r n  State  
T erritoriality
Anthony Giddens manages perhaps the most successful exposition of the 
features of modernity and the dynamism which makes it very different than pre­
modem or traditional societies.27 Broadly, he suggests ‘modernity refers to the 
modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Western Europe from about 
the seventeenth century and which subsequently developed a world wide 
influence’.28 Giddens goes further by identifying the factors which led to place (the 
local) being ‘emptied’ from space within the development of modernity This change 
was part of a greater trend of ‘disembedding’ of social systems where relations were
25 Ibid., 2.
26 Ibid. For another treatment of territoriality and historical materialism, see Lacher, ‘Historicising 
the Global’.
27 See Giddens, The Consequences o f Modernity.
28 Anthony Giddens, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, [http://www.lse.ac.Uk/Giddens/FAQs.htm#GQl] 
(28 September 2000).
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‘lifted* from the local situation to regional or national structures. This is 
accomplished through the development of ‘symbolic tokens’ (such as a national 
currency) and ‘expert systems’—state bureaucracies, for instance.29
This section is particularly concerned with questions of space and identity 
within the development of modernity. Such an examination is useful to set the 
context for a discussion of contemporary bordering practices—situating them as 
contingent historical processes—and to establish a historical framework to explore 
future transformations centred around changing border practices and discourses.
Ultimately, a unique territoriality developed historically which was ‘the 
central attribute of modernity in international politics; it became the primary 
symbolic and material mode of political difference for a community’.30 We proceed 
in its exploration by examining two powerful developments in the West: 
epistemic/discursive changes which altered the worldview of both the modem subject 
and empirical transformations within and among early modem polities resulting in 
the emergence of the modem state. While these are clearly interrelated and 
interdependent, for schematic reasons, they may usefully be taken in turn.
Epistemic/Discursive Changes
A major epistemic shift in early modernity allowed subjects to re-imagine 
their political communities in the form of ‘states’; new knowledges gradually 
‘authorised’ and wrote a new vision of territory. Most importantly, the concept of 
place was released from reliance on a privileged locale which forced a particular 
vantage-point from which to understand the world. This change from the pre­
modem territorial perspective meant the spatial focus in people’s lives altered 
dramatically: textual representations within the discourse re-ordered the world into a 
generic and abstract (if still Eurocentric) map of exact latitude and longitude, no 
longer placing a particular location at the centre, such as Jerusalem in the Mappa 
Mundi. In cartographic terms, the new discourse of modem maps reinforced this 
radically altered worldview; while Ptolemy’s system of projection and co-ordinates 
had been available to medieval civilisations in the West, it was not until the fifteenth 
century that it was rediscovered to map and finally used to ‘master’ the earth’s
29 Ibid., 23.
30 Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’, 144.
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surface. His co-ordinate system united discrete and precise space and time as a singe 
frame of reference for territorial space. Similarly, the West’s ‘discovery’ of the 
‘outside’ world reflected this development—especially as space was ‘cleared’ for 
colonisation and exploitation.
Indeed, by the advent of the Renaissance in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, precision was re-discovered and radical changes in concepts of space 
occurred. These early modem definitions of space began to rest on Cartesian- 
Newtonian principles, primarily understanding it as a natural element or container 
which was highly abstract and discrete. Highly influential in this process was the 
invention of single-point perspective in the golden age of reason between 1405 and 
1515 that dramatically affected worldviews; this came from Raphael, who perfected 
the last remaining technical mysteries of the image through perspective.
Concomitant with this new Renaissance worldview was also strict reliance on 
delineated, abstract, and mathematically determined cartographic and geographic 
systems; all was discrete and precise—representing the enigmatic penchant for exact 
technical mastery of nature through technology. Maps were completely revised, 
destroying the ‘archaic’, pre-modem ambiguous and amorphous landforms and 
recasting them as precise positions on a grid. Fundamental pre-ontological 
distinctions were made: nature and man, mind and body, and nature and state, and 
this extended to an understanding of socio-political organisation. Later 
Enlightenment principles of reason, universalistic progress, and science would 
further underpin these narratives.
By the seventeenth century, a persuasive definition of political space 
developed: borders could finally be precise and known; in turn that worldview 
reinforced itself, repaying its producers, cartographers, and elites with seemingly 
easy understandings of identity and space relationships as well as resources for 
national control and differentiation within a newly established, constructed state 
system.31 Space became organised on great scales for the dynamics of capitalism and 
the practices of statecraft to replace the old feudal economic order. The world 
became conceptualised as a linear matrix of empty space, divided along strict
31 Ultimately, all this helped produce the norms of the nation-state system and sovereignty and 
interstate relations as we understand them today emerged. Researchers have suggested several 
explanations as to how the state system developed, especially as partly a social construct depending 
on a variety of processes and relations, economic and technological. See, for example, Alexander 
Murphy, ‘The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary
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territorial borders into ‘coloured’ nation-states. This idea became rapidly entrenched 
so as to dominate how we understand the world and ‘write’ its spaces; it is now so 
naturalised that it is hard to imagine now how pre-modem Western societies 
envisioned the world.
Borders as Consequences of Modernity
Hand in hand with these radical epistemic worldview changes went concrete 
material transformations in political organisation. Modernity, to a great extent, was a 
process of territorialisation. The sharp spatial borders of the modem state, as 
illustrated in the previous section, have few precedents in pre-modem societies. The 
approach to explain this follows very roughly and supplements that attempted by 
Giddens in detailing the nation-state, but does not undertake or suggest an all- 
encompassing treatment of the state, which is attempted elsewhere.32 Giddens does 
not have a focus on boundaries as his centrepiece, nor does he deal with territoriality 
sufficiently. He does, however, usefully take a Political Sociology approach and 
applies it through a critique of historical materialism, which is a relevant jumping off 
point for such a discussion.33
Considerations’, in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, eds. Thomas Bierstaker and Cynthia Weber 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel 
Nexon, ‘Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics’, European 
Journal o f International Relations 5, no. 3 (1999): 291-332 and Lacher, ‘Historicising the Global’.
32 See, for example, Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1 (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1978); Bierstaker and Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as Social Construct', Jens 
Bartelson, A Genealogy o f Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Stephen D. 
Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and 
Hideaki Shinoda, Re-examining Sovereignty: From Classical Theory to the Global Age (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2000).
33 See Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, vol. 2 of A Contemporary Critique o f 
Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Polity, 1985).
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Through his critique, Giddens outlines how ‘the political’—which, for him 
‘concerns... [the] capability of marshalling authoritative resources [and] 
administrative power’—has functioned in the consolidation of the nation-state form 
through history.34 Similar to Weber, he understands the state to mean a polity with 
the control of the means of legitimate force, developed bureaucracy—and 
importantly, a monopoly over territory. A modem state, then, is built through 
structural aspects of modernity’s social systems: ‘signification (meaning),
domination (power), and legitimisation (sanctions)’, expressed through discourse 
and reproduced systemically.35
Giddens argues two broad categorical factors within the matrix of capitalism 
are responsible for this change: material factors (industrialisation, military power) 
and discursive or information control. In a spatial sense, territoriality as both 
concept and process became used as an instrument to guide and mould fluid 
individuals, events, and identities within a conception of abstract, ‘emptiable’ space 
to then build institutions, states, and contain capitalism.36
Frontiers into Borders
The development in the West of some early forms of socio-political 
organisation (the city-state, feudal polities, or empires, for example) can be partially 
understood in terms of the concept of thq frontier. A frontier, as will be explained in 
the subsequent chapter, suggests the limit of a settlement extension. More ‘fuzzy’ 
and imprecise than modem, linear boundaries, vague frontiers characterised much of 
the political world until the modem age. As illustrated, political community in the 
ancient and Middle Ages was not generally imagined along strict territorial lines, 
drawn by statesmen, demarcated with fences or monitored by sensors. ‘Few 
reflexively ordered relations [of states and territoriality] existed’ Giddens writes, and 
the ‘notion of “international relations” made no sense’.37
34 Ibid., 19.
35 Ibid, 19.
36 See Sack, Human Territoriality, 78.
37 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences o f Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 73.
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Not surprisingly, some IR theorists like Hedley Bull, have described this 
situation as one of multiple, overlapping authority structures, which varied from 
local feudal to ‘transnational’ papal control from Rome.38 The idea was extended by 
Bull to characterise Western Europe in the 1970s, and recently revived by Andrew 
Linklater in his suggestion of the emergence of a ‘neo-medieval’, ‘post-Westphalian’ 
order, characterised by similar authority structures and new citizenship concepts.39
Western methods of political organisation via the frontier began to change, 
however, as the modes of production shifted from feudalism to mercantilist and 
industrial forms following the ‘general crisis’ of the Dark Ages.40 Gradually, the 
forces of territorial production tied to land ownership, private property, and 
industrialism began to consolidate state power in Western Europe by the decline of 
the Renaissance period.41 The medieval world ended with deep socio-economic 
changes occurring by the early 15th century. In the wake of this crisis, the outlines 
of the modem political map with firmer sovereign states began to form, especially 
following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and mutual sovereign recognition.42
This emergence of modem territoriality expressed in the Westphalian state 
system may thus be seen as marked by the transformation of loose frontiers into 
solid, delineated international borders, which generally only exist in the state as we 
now understand it. Borders conceptualised in this way, then, are predominantly 
modern phenomena.
Correlating Fixed Identities and Modern Borders
The state’s institutions began to employ the naturalised visual representation 
of territory to confer legitimacy as well as to continually re-establish the image of the 
‘nation’ of collective identity as limited in its bordered, constmcted chunk of
38 See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1977).
39 See Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f International Relations (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1990), and The Transformation o f Political Community (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
40 Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London: New Left Books, 1974), 198.
41 In Eastern Europe, however, waves of successive nomadic invasions lasting from the end of the 
Roman empire to the 13th century impacted political order and territoriality; as Anderson maintains, 
‘no commensurate political forms emerged from [the invaders] territorial advances—in contrast with 
the state formation of the epoch of the German migrations in the West. See ibid., 227.
42 Recent research, however, has suggested the rudimentary roots of the sovereign state system may 
date earlier, to the property rights and church-king relations set out in the Concordat of Worms of
1122. See Bmce Bueno de Mequita, ‘Popes, Kings, and Endogenous Institutions: The Concordant of 
Worms and the Origins of Sovereignty’, International Studies Review 2, no. 2 (2000): 93-118.
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political space. It easily and logically followed that precise boundaries would 
naturally correlate to precise collective identities. Paradoxically, at the same time, of 
course, modernity was accompanied by a variety of new forms of displacement: 
travel, exploration, expatriation, and migration to name but a few.
Even so, the concept of geometrical boundaries became highly popular by the 
18th century. A rational, neo-classical quest for ‘order’, exemplified by Thomas 
Jefferson in America, gained momentum.43 This tradition of delimiting empty space 
with constructed, precise lines continued and was critical in establishing most 
boundaries around the world, including one of the case studies here: the 49th parallel 
as the international boundary between the United States and Canada.
By the late 19th century, the idea of fixed, solid borders and a ‘naturally’ 
corresponding collective identity had become entrenched in the Western worldview. 
John Stuart Mill, writing in 1872, illustrates the strength of this position in the minds 
of the West:
It is, in general, a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of 
government should coincide in the main with those of nationality...Where the 
sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all 
the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to 
themselves apart.44
Increasingly, from the Peace of Westphalia on, patterns of modernity 
promoted the deceptively seductive equation: ‘certain space = certain identity’; the 
state came to be seen as the unifying container of a single, homogenous national 
identity for its members. To reinforce this point, Blaney and Inayatullah’s recent 
analysis of modem sovereignty and identity concludes
[t]he doctrine of sovereign power was necessarily related (by Bodin, Grotius, 
Hobbes, and Locke) to the conception of a ‘body politic’, bringing together people, 
state, and territory into a unified, harmonious whole.45
This sort of discourse is patently embodied in Fawcett’s influential 1918 
work, Frontiers: A Study in Political Geography. In it, he outlines the assumptions 
of this system of understanding the world:
43 Jones, ‘Boundary Concepts’, 252.
44 John Stuart Mill, Considerations o f Representative Government (London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1872).
45 David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, ‘The Westphalian Deferral’, International Studies Review 2, 
no. 2 (2000): 42. See also F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2d. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986).
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In modem times the political map, especially of the newer lands, bears many 
patently artificial boundary lines. The English traditions of order which have 
dominated settlement in North America and Australia are party the cause of the 
prevalence of artificial straight-line boundaries there. The laxer system of 
occupation of South America by the Latin peoples is reflected in the less regular 
boundaries on that continent.46
But clearly, this method is somewhat peculiar. How can the earth’s surface 
be (correctly) ‘demarcated’? On this question and very much also of the modem 
period, the influential Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India from 1898-1905 and British 
Foreign Secretary from 1919-24, somewhat unknowingly validated the point in his 
classic work of border literature, the Romanes lecture ‘Frontiers’. He pointed out as 
early as 1908 the artificiality (and sometimes arbitrariness) of modem political 
mappings:
The straight line from point to point is also a method very popular in America, 
where it has been employed in laying down the internal Frontiers of States, and is in 
keeping with the mathematical precision commonly applied to the laying out of 
cities and streets. Like the Frontiers of latitude or longitude this type of boundary is 
a useful and sometimes an indispensable expedient; but it possesses no elasticity, 
and it is apt to produce absurd and irrational results 47
Consider also the following modernist prescription for delimiting a contested 
frontier, as advised by the Peru-Bolivia Boundary Commission in 1913:
On each boundary pillar shall be marked the exact longitude and latitude in which it 
is placed, the date of this placing...the serial number, the words ‘Peru’ and ‘Bolivia’ 
inscribed on the sides which correspond, and the signs which may be adopted to 
prove the identity of each boundary pillar 48
This is clear-cut example of the nature of modem territoriality that 
presupposes a nation-state correspondence. The emphasis is clearly on solid, 
uncontested delimitations of the earth’s surface, a goal premised on a worldview of 
artificially constmcted lines of longitude and latitude which ‘create’ space 
politically. Each marker of the boundary becomes a locus of a uniform, ‘exact’ 
method to organise human life—through reified horizontal and vertical lines. 
Moreover, serial numbers on each pillar both quantify and scientifically authenticate 
and authorise the boundary’s location and function, thus conferring political 
legitimacy on an otherwise arbitrary border. The nation-state designators ‘Peru’ and
46 C.B. Fawcett, Frontiers: A Study in Political Geography (Oxford: Clarendon, 1918), 66.
47 Curzon, ‘Frontiers’, [http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/docs/curzon3.html] (21 May 2001).
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‘Bolivia’ confer immense connotations of identity and meaning to an ordinary 
physical object, a pillar: when facing the side of the boundary that says ‘Peru’ one 
automatically visualises the geographical representation of that state and calls forth 
the meanings of that nation. Moreover, if you are Peruvian, you most likely feel ‘at 
home’ when on that side of the pillar, no matter how abstract, distant, or remote from 
your actual residence you might be. The early modem marriage of state space and 
collective identity through the nationalism project is repeated in this way around the 
world; this is part of the fundamental framing of the modem subject.
Such a case, then, becomes a useful, if anecdotal, example of the 
power/knowledge nexus that boundaries, maps, and state assumptions have on 
connecting and communicating territoriality and identity. The Peruvian-Bolivian 
border—as all other political frontiers—becomes reified, as Sack argues, and comes 
to be seen as a ‘real’ entity, reproduced by both the assumptions and interests of the 
actors who built it. The border as represented pays little regard to those who would 
dare cross or subvert it, perhaps, for example, an indigenous group.
The classic, intriguing, and highly employed ‘how-to’ on boundary making in 
this vein is Jones’s Boundary Making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors, 
and Boundary Commissioners.49 Jones prescribes—without being truly aware of it— 
a strongly realist, modernist framework for appropriating and demarcating the 
world’s surface. From regionalism, to nationality, to language, to ‘native peoples,’ 
he provides clear tips and tactics for setting territorial limits of nation states. This is 
his understood fulfilment of modem historical mission and progress embodied in the 
Westphalian moment. As he opens his introduction:
We are in—perhaps emerging from—a historical period in which the dominant 
feature of the general situation has been the political organization known as the 
nation state...The boundaries of the near future almost certainly will limit the 
domains of governments with many and complex functions and so will deeply 
influence the lives of the people whose homelands they traverse.50
48 See Peru-Bolivia Boundary Commission, ‘Bolivia-Peru: Treaty of Arbitration with Regard to 
Boundaries’, Peru-Bolivia Boundary Commission, 1911-1913: Reports o f the British Officers o f the 
Peruvian Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1918), 61.
49 See Stephen Jones, Boundary-Making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors, and Boundary 
Commissioners (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945). This work, 
first published in 1945 under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is a 
classic in the realm of international law, establishing, guiding—and reproducing—many boundary 
demarcation practices. The ‘modest-sized handbook is written for busy men, many of whom face 
boundary problems for the first time’. Idem, vi.
50 Jones, Boundary-Making, 4.
50
Jones proceeds to note by the beginning of the 20th century, ‘the 
geographical expression of nationalism perhaps reached its ultimate in the territorial 
clauses of the Paris Treaties of 1919’, which consolidated certain colonial claims and 
now mainstream state practices.51 Concomitant with this historical development was 
Mill’s notion of a strong and ideal correspondence between nation and state.
Exporting Strict Borders through Imperialism
Intrinsic to the West was the export of these practices and knowledges. The 
precise demarcation and delimitation of the earth’s surface was seen as something 
‘civilised’: it was man’s fulfilment of his historical destiny to map and conquer the 
world. Fawcett, deeper in his text, expresses this view, as late as 1918:
It is clear that the tendency towards precise demarcation is universal among 
civilized powers. The territories of savage tribes or barbarous states had precise 
limits where they were bounded by the sea, or a great river, or some other very 
definite and strong natural barrier.52
The implications, of course, are clear: unless one’s state-territory is precisely 
delimited, one is ‘savage’ e.g., non-modem or non-western. The western project of 
modernity, in seeking to ensure a nation-state correspondence, transmitted this 
concept to its colonies. During the imperial era from the 16th to the 20th century, 
non-westem forms of political organisation (which often tended to be flexible, 
overlapping, and sometimes ill-defined) were transformed, ‘developed’, and 
moulded into the rigid statist containers of the West—with especially clear 
international boundaries.
51 Jones, Boundary-Making, 4.
52 Fawcett, Frontiers, 92.
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All this was influenced on an epistemological level by the abstract geometric 
system, detailed earlier, of precise spatial references: longitude and latitude, which 
from the Renaissance onwards enabled exploration itself. And this territorial 
appropriation process was further assisted by secular and religious sanction. Initial 
colonial claims and grants can be traced to the Alexandrine Papal Bulls of 1493 
which were the first ‘stark metrical territorial definition of social relationships’ and 
set into motion vast colonial expansion by the West.53 In this decision, a huge global 
area of control was granted to Spain and Portugal and divided for the first time in 
history by an abstract line of latitude from the northern to the southern pole. As the 
ideology of colonialism took root, the ability to appropriate native lands (which were 
seen as ‘empty’) and then subject them to the structure of modem political 
territoriality grew easier; hand-in-hand with this was an understanding of native 
peoples and lands as ‘savage’, ‘untamed’, and generally sub-human.54
International boundaries, in Africa, for example, were increasingly imagined 
as ‘walls’ built through existing ethnic groups with little or no regard for the 
consequences. Evaluating ‘artificial’ frontiers, Curzon clearly explicates his (and 
seemingly the West’s) preference for ‘superior’, ‘modem’ forms of territoriality of 
the kind of territoriality represented by borders in the British Isles. He asserted:
Artificial Frontiers...have been artificially or arbitrarily created by man. These 
may be classified as ancient and modem, the distinction between them—which is 
one of method only and not of principle—roughly reflecting the difference between 
the requirements of primitive and of civilized peoples.55
The disastrous drawing of state boundaries in Africa is but one stirring reminder of 
both this propensity to categorise territorially as ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ and the 
dangers which follow from such an authorisation; problematic state boundaries 
drawn from this perspective still exist world-wide and are the cause of much conflict.
53 Sack, Human Territoriality, 131.
54 For example, John Smith, in his history of the colony of Virginia, describes the Indians he 
encountered as ‘perfidious and unhumane people; cruell beasts [with] a more unnaturall brutishness 
than beasts’. With such an understanding, land could be easily appropriated by Western ‘conquerors’ 
without violating international law. Quoted in Francis Jennings, The Invasion o f America: Indians, 
Colonialism, and the Cant o f Conquest (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1976), 78
55 Curzon, ‘Frontiers’, [http://www-ibm.dur.ac.uk/docs/curzon3.html] (21 May 2001).
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To return to our metaphor of maps, the new cartography and epistemology 
formed a certain dependent relationship; they both served to help record and 
reproduce the modem, Western narratives of identity and territory, the dominant 
worldview of politics and geography. Modem maps, like those on every 
policymaker’s wall, remain ‘specific images of spatiality [which] reflect the 
structures of knowledge which define the philosophical and cultural thinking of a 
tradition’—modernity.56 Maps may be the guiding documents of modem political 
discourse and practice. They are not natural, however, nor immutable; the conditions 
of social and economic production are historically contingent. Godelier elaborates: 
‘no absolute referent exists [such as the state], no particular line of evolution which 
has the privilege of displaying a supposedly universal line of humanity’s 
condition’.57
To summarise, the rise of political territoriality went hand in hand with the 
development of modernity in two broad dimensions: the epistemic/discursive and the 
material.58 The process involved expanding sovereignty through centralised control 
and resulted in an exact correlation between a state’s administrative purview and its 
territorial delimitation. In the end, as Mann usefully points out, it is the territorial 
centralisation of the modem state which remains its touchstone characteristic.59
We can accordingly suggest that the construction and organisation of a 
particular polity can be understood historically in terms of its borders and may be 
expressed along a spectrum: loose, allocated frontiers with heterogeneous
borderlands and overlapping interaction—which are not extensively controlled—on 
one side of the spectrum, and on the other, highly administered and controlled 
international boundaries maintained discursively and materially, through walls, 
border patrols, and regulated ports of entry. All of these, are reproduced through a 
variety of practices and discourses in modernity, including surveillance and
56 Richard, ‘The Cultural Periphery’, 71.
57 Godelier, The Mental and the Material, 74.
58 See Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, 49.
59 See Michael Mann, The Rise o f Classes and Nation-states, vol. 2 of The Sources o f Social Power 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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policy actions which the state can undertake to attempt to preserve the ‘purity’, 
homogeneity, and integrity of its space (connected with national collective 
identity).60 State practices can vacillate along this spectrum in response to a variety 
of national and international pressures.
2.4 T r a n sn a t io n a l  ‘M obilities’ in  th e  In t e r n a t io n a l  
System
We are living on the edge of history, embarking on a grand historical adventure, 
comparable only to the late 18th century in its degree of transformation.
—Anthony Giddens61
The preceding sections outlined the development of political territoriality and 
some of its associated collective identity relationships from the pre-modem to the 
modem eras. In the past several decades, however, social scientists, and increasingly 
scholars and commentators from other fields have begun to suggest the emergence of 
new forms of economic, political, and social organisation—transactions and linkages 
in the West which might challenge established political territoriality. These 
processes, they suggested, are increasingly constructed across state boundaries, 
potentially challenging certain modem assumptions about territoriality. Driven by 
innovations in transportation, communication, and information technologies, time 
and space are seen to be ‘shrunk’ through ever-speedier interaction and transaction 
time. Transnational forces are understood to place both individuals and institutions 
in a more outward-looking frame, increasing global consciousness and changing 
social, cultural, and political relationships across the local, state, and global levels. 
Internationally, some point to the development of transnational networks, a 
burgeoning international civil society, and new norms which foster alternative 
networks of identity and order construction. These transformations are often most 
attributed to advances in the information technology and economic realms, such as 
major neo-liberal reforms to bolster multinational firms and increase trade and 
capital flows, leading to integrated economic spaces such as the European Union and 
the U.S., Canada, and Mexico under the NAFTA.
60 Ibid.
61 Anthony Giddens, Public Lecture, London School of Economics, London, 28 October 1998.
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All of this is generally referred to as ‘globalisation’ and it has become the 
‘new mantra for our times’.62 It can perhaps be usefully framed as a prevailing 
discourse that represents in geographical terms the scale where economic, social, and 
political processes occur at a global level. The positions of many scholars on 
globalisation can usefully and roughly be split into at least three camps. The first, 
the ‘hyper’ globalists, such as Ohmae, argue the nation-state is nearly irrelevant 
given these changes, that territoriality is being washed away in a net Toss’ for the 
state. 63 Similarly, those like Appadurai maintain these changes mean identities and 
culture are also becoming de-linked with traditional political forms.64
The second are the ‘sceptics’ like Hirst and Thompson who attempt to 
challenge empirical accounts of change and end up arguing either the world has seen 
previously ‘stronger’ forms of globalisation, such as during the industrial revolution 
of the 19th century, or that the current changes are epiphenomenal.65 Finally, the 
third, what could be called the more ‘critical’ camp of scholars, seek to understand 
globalisation as an uneven process and discourse, often ambiguous and laden with 
neo-liberal ideology—but with real material effects66—that, as Kelly usefully points 
out, ‘need not reach some notional globalized state in order to be important’.67
62 See Philip F. Kelly, ‘The Geographies and Politics of Globalization’, Progress in Human 
Geography 23, no. 3 (1999): 379-400.
63 See Kenichi Ohmae, The End o f the Nation State (New York: The Free Press, 1995).
64 See Aijun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions o f Globalization (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
65 See, for example, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: The International 
Economy and the Possibilities o f Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1996); Kevin Cox, ‘The Politics of 
Globalization: A Sceptic’s View’, Political Geography 11 (1992): 427-29; Richard O’Brien, Global 
Financial Integration: The End o f Geography (London: Pinter, 1991).
66 For examples of the more ‘critical’ stance on globalisation, see Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan, 
‘The Imagined Economy: Mapping Transformations in the Contemporary State’, Millennium:
Journal o f International Studies 28, no. 2 (1999): 267-88; James H. Mittelman, ed., Globalization: 
Critical Reflections (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1996); and Held et al, Global Transformations.
67 Kelly, ‘The Geographies and Politics of Globalization’, 395.
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This chapter allies itself to the third camp, seeing globalisation as an 
imprecise, especially uneven, and evolving—but increasingly intensifying and 
transformative—process without simple implications for the state or anything else.68 
This approach recognises the discursive as well as material nature of globalisation. 
For our purposes here, it is not possible nor necessary to provide a thorough critique 
of globalisation, but rather to suggestively illustrate how political territoriality and 
identity may be reflexively changing given trends in some transnational flows.
Given these caveats, it seems reasonable then to posit a degree of qualitative 
change in social and economic interaction is underway world-wide, forming the 
outlines of an environment perhaps best seen as marked by both change and 
continuity. As Amin points out, in any event, ‘the growing number of chains of 
economic, social cultural and political activity that are world-wide in scope’ may be 
leading to the ‘intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness between 
states and societies’; thus globalisation can produce many complex dynamics.69 In 
relation to identity and the state, as Marden argues, such globalising tendencies ‘are 
producing a complex mix of responses centred around identity’ which make ‘the 
distinction between the global and the local.. .quite complex and problematic’.70
Thus, it is fair to now suggest some specific ‘middle range’ dimensions of 
real material transformation in the international system. Some of these can be best 
understood through the useful heuristic ‘hooks’ of borders and territoriality because, 
at bottom, globalisation is highly connected with both. While this comment cannot 
undertake a comprehensive examination of the myriad characteristics of 
globalisation in the international environment, some key facets may be mentioned as 
they pertain to territorial change, border discourses, and identity formation.71 These 
may be usefully be framed as ‘flows’ and ‘mobilities’.
68 For example, at least 80 to 90 per cent of all computers exist in the developed world. See Hamid 
Mowlana, ‘Information Hunger and Knowledge Affluence: How to Bridge the Gap’, Development 3 
(1993): 23-26.
69 Ash Amin, ‘Placing Globalization’, Theory, Culture and Society 14, no. 2 (1997): 129.
70 Peter Marden, ‘Geographies of Dissent: Globalization, Identity and the Nation’, Political 
Geography 16, no. 1 (1997): 38-39.




International relations must address the basic question of whether it is adequate as a 
mode of understanding global life given the increasing irruptions of accelerated and 
non-territorial contingencies upon our political horizons, irruptions in which a 
disparate but powerful assemblage of flows— flows of people, goods, money, 
ecological factors, disease, ideas, etc.—contest borders, put states into question 
(without rendering them irrelevant), re-articulate spaces, and re-form identities.
—David Campbell72
Campbell’s passage is suggestive, if somewhat exaggerated, of the increasing 
importance and transformative potential of new flows over boundaries in 
international politics. Increasingly, the Enlightenment fantasy of a unified, 
homogenous space coinciding in a perfect ‘fit’ with a straight corresponding national 
collective identity is being eroded away by changes in the international system; 
difference is becoming an increasing reality. This has prompted Blaney and 
Inayatullah to recently make an ‘interpretation of international society in which the 
problem of difference is pervasive’; they are driven by a concern that ‘the principle 
of formal equality among states...intensifies the difficulties in culture, religion, and 
mode of life’; inertia in the system, they argue, has delayed adequately dealing with 
the problem leading to what they call ‘The Westphalian Deferral’.73 The dynamics 
of globalisation only exacerbate the problem these scholars identify and, as argued 
below, can lead to reflexive territorial responses.
In such a situation, the concept of ‘mobilities’ may be the most appropriate 
metaphor to conceptualise potential changes in territoriality. This is an active, 
dynamic vocabulary in-line with the phenomena it seeks to examine. In confronting 
the challenge of globalisation for sociologists, Urry recently proposed a ‘mobile’- 
oriented approach, concerned with
the diverse mobilities of peoples, objects, information, and wastes; and of the 
complex interdependencies between, and social consequences of, these diverse 
mobilities.74
72 David Campbell, ‘Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics, and the Anarchical World’, in 
Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities, eds. Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward 
Alker (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 9.
73 David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, ‘The Westphalian Deferral’, International Studies Review 2, 
no. 2 (2000): 30.
74 John Urry, ‘Mobile Sociology’, British Journal o f Sociology 51, no. 1 (2000): 185.
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To apply this idea in IR, we can usefully list flows of peoples (refugees, 
migrants, both undocumented and documented), capital, goods and services, and 
information, among many others across international boundaries. These phenomena, 
Urry argues, are best made sense of through metaphors like heterogeneous 
‘networks’ and ‘fluids’, conceptions of space which connote interconnectedness, or 
transient and flexible borders fostered by new technologies which shrink time and 
space.75 Mobilities, Urry suggests, are radically changing the nature and subject of 
study in Sociology, requiring a re-orientation of perspectives beyond rigid ‘national’ 
containers increasingly unable to regulate the flows already underway and which are 
intensifying. Transnationalism, the process of extending or going beyond state 
borders by such mobilities, thus might be considered the means to an outcome 
understood as ‘globalisation’.
While it is not necessary to fall back into dichotomous ideas of state decline 
or strengthening in the face of such flows, thinking in terms of mobilities may be 
useful in IR to help us move beyond the ideas of sovereignty and social 
govemmentality as isolated issues that are theorised as such.76 In particular, it lets us 
theorise about transnational processes as just that: interrelated processes which open, 
constitute, and reconstitute the state and its political parameters. The 
interdependence of these relations, as well as the inherent self-regulation within 
polities, helps constitute states. Thus, thinking about ‘relational’ mobilities seems 
apt; rather than re-using a reified concept, it offers an account of the state which 
points not only to solidity but also to its fluidity.77
75 See also Arthur Mol and J. Law, ‘Regions, Networks, and Fluids: Anaemia Social Topology’, 
Social Studies o f Science 24 (1994): 641-71; Manuel Castells, End o f Millennium (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1998); Held et al, Global Transformations.
76 This is the point of interdependence Mann makes clear in his recent work. See The Sources o f 
Social Power.
77 The question of relationality is important, particularly as it concerns processes of borders, and is 
alluded to in the conclusion of this work. Innovative new work is being done in this area, looking to 
prioritise process over things and activities over substances. Process relationalism looks at the 
configuration of ties, of social webs and interaction, as the basis for social activity. For preliminary 
work on this project, See Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Relations Before States: 
Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics’, European Journal o f International Relations 5, 
no. 3 (1999): 291-331 and Emirbayer Mustafa, ‘Manifesto for a Relational Sociology’, American 
Journal o f Sociology 103, no. 2 (1997): 281-317.
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Examples o f  Mobilities: Economic and Individual
Given the overall concerns of this thesis, the focus is on two categories of 
mobilities: goods, services, and capital over state borders, particularly in the North 
American context, and movement of individuals (economic migrants) across those 
same boundaries. Taking the first, within the current round of neoliberalisation, free 
trade regimes and economic integration have become highly desirable politically, as 
they are seen as able to ‘unleash’ the seemingly creative and benevolent power of 
capital, investment, and production across state boundaries while driving 
multinational corporate accumulation. The NAFTA, which creates a nearly tariff- 
free transnational economic space for these particular mobilities between Canada, 
America, and Mexico, is an excellent case in point; the agreement has radically 
transformed economic relations between the three states, allowing free movement of 
capital, goods, and services irrespective of boundaries. The treaty will be examined 
in more detail in chapters five and six.
In terms of movement of individuals, we live in an era were more and more 
people are crossing borders. Migrant flows, constituted by legally admitted 
immigrants, undocumented migrants, temporary workers, asylum seekers, and 
refugees are variously estimated to number at least 150 million globally, are 
increasingly moving transitionally and especially from north to south.78 Many such 
members of diasporas around the world seek or have dual-citizenship, and participate 
politically through transnational networks.79 The past several decades have also seen 
major surges in the numbers of refugees and homeless, driven by complex 
humanitarian emergencies: cross-border conflicts, intrastate war, ethnic cleansing as 
well as natural disasters such as earthquakes.
78 See Peter Stalker, Workers Without Frontiers: The Impact o f Globalization on International 
Migration (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000). See also Sarah Collinson, ‘Globalisation and the 
Dynamics of International Migration: Implications for the Refugee Regime’, UNHCR Working 
Papers -  New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper 1 (Geneva: UNHCR, 1999). 
[http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/pub/wpapers/wpnol.htm#_Toc454803350] (26 October 2000); Nurit 
Kliot, ‘Global Migration and Identity’, in Geographies o f Global Change: Remapping the World in 
the Late Twentieth Century, eds. R.J. Johnson, Peter J. Taylor, and Michael J. Watts (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1985), 189.
79 Mexican migrant political activists, for example, are lobbying to obtain the right to vote in Mexican 
elections for those citizens living abroad. Moreover, Mexico has officially sanctioned dual­
nationality status for its citizens. See Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, ‘In Search of Mexican Communities 
Abroad: Transnational Immigrant Politics Across the U.S.-Mexican Border’, paper for Workshop on 
‘Perceptions and Policies of Sending Countries’, London School of Economics, London (10 July 
2000).
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In the United States alone, recent demographic changes point to a 
increasingly diverse, multi-ethnic population driven by these migration patterns 
which are expected to increase given the need for low-cost manual labour. For 
example, according to U.S. Census Bureau in 2000, nearly 1 in 10 residents of the 
U.S., some 26.4 million, was foreign-born (nearly one-third were bom in Mexico), 
the most since 1930, when 11.6 million were natives of another country; almost 1 in 
3 of these foreign-born residents was a naturalised citizen.80 The conceptual and 
empirical implications of these individuals’ identity preferences on states are only 
now beginning to be examined or understood by innovative, often transnationally 
oriented, social science work.81
Migration flows are but one example of the increasingly complex and 
changing environment of national identity patterns and implicate questions of 
membership directly connected to globalisation. This is increasingly impacting the 
policy world. As the new Mexican Foreign Mexican foreign minister, Jorge 
Castaneda recently commented
what is clear is that globalization also means people moving around in ways which
are much more constant, fluid and massive than before. This is not new.. .but
obviously the quantities and the impact on societies is g r o w i n g . 82
Throughout the world, international boundaries respond to the flows of migrants and 
forced refugee movements in various ways, as states implement policies of exclusion 
or inclusion. In any event, the responses often relate to different values, with 
migration often conforming to a general pattern of undesirability. The interplay 
between the dynamics of these two particular mobilities, economic and human, will 
frame much of the following discussion, especially in terms of deterritorialisation 
and reterritorialisation.
80 Data taken from the official website of the U.S. Census Bureau for 2000. See 
[http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p20-519.pdf] (26 October 2000).
81 For an excellent examination of the identity questions and impact on state politics the Haitian 
diaspora is having, see Michel S. Laguerre, ‘State, Diaspora, and Transnational Politics: Haiti 
Reconceptualised’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): 633-51.
82 Jorge Castaneda, quoted in Barry James, ‘A Plea to Accept Immigrants: Globalization is Mover, 




Globalisation can result in manifestations of ‘reterritorialisation’ and 
‘deterritorialisation’, of exclusionary and inclusionary policies on the part of a state 
concerning different sorts of mobilities and flows. These are terms first originated 
by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.83 Deleuze and Guattari formulated an 
understanding of the state informed by a concept of ‘desire’, a productive force that 
produces subjects by organising or ‘coding’ society in particular ways. Territoriality, 
in this sense, becomes important when the state acts to inscribe a boundary with 
meaning.
Reterritorialisation here refers to the reconfiguring and re-imposition of 
political territoriality as understood in the modem framework set out earlier: as 
precise, linear, collective identity bound, and state controlled. Deterritorialisation, 
on the other hand, denotes a disembedding of social, economic, and political 
relations from their prerequisite territorial status connected with the state. 
Capitalism, for example, is a deterritorialising phenomena, but is most often 
actualised by state regulation and institutions and, in the process becomes 
territorialised. As Doty helpfully maintains, ‘deterritorialisation always has 
reterritorialisation as its flipside’; they tend to be interrelated.84 Thus, the 
transnational processes of globalisation can prompt de- or reterritorialisation at 
multiple levels, from the local/regional, to the state, to the global, even at the same 
time.
83 The initial use of these terms in their work, it should be noted, is related to psychoanalysis See 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987). For an innovative application of their work in IR as it applies 
to migration and neo-racism, see Roxanne Lynn Doty, ‘Racism, Desire and the Politics of 
Immigration’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): 585-606. See also 
Emily D. Hicks, Border Writing: The Multidimensional Text (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991) and Mathias Albert, ‘On Boundaries, Territory and Postmodemity: An International 
Relations Perspective’, in Boundaries, Territory and Postmodemity, ed. David Newman (London: 
Frank Cass, 1999).
84 Doty, ‘Racism, Desire, and the Politics of Immigration’, 592.
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It is important to note the processes of de- and reterritorialisation are not 
‘zero sum’ games where either the ‘end of the state’ emerges or the ‘prevailing of the 
state’ occurs, an ad nauseum debate circulating recently in JR. The approach in this 
thesis does not see either process as necessarily resulting in a simple loss (or gain) of 
power to the state. While the state may reassert itself, for instance, by hardening its 
borders to migrants, this does not necessarily mean globalisation is not occurring, 
nor does opening its boundaries to capital suggest the end of its sovereignty over 
economic matters. In a more nuanced vein, Ruggie clarifies this idea by suggesting a 
condition of ‘extraterritoriality’ can emerge, as territoriality is ‘unbundled’ through 
institutional and social processes such as regimes, common markets, political 
communities, and others, effectively negating exclusivity of territoriality in the world 
system.85
These two concepts of territorialisation are used here to simply help 
problematise bounded space by allowing us to isolate certain state processes—for 
example border regulation as a form of reterritorialisation. Regulation may fluctuate 
due to the social and political meanings assigned to different mobilities. Borders, in 
fact, as the case studies will indicate, may or may not be reinforced as markers of 
sovereignty in the face of the perceived growing incongruence between society, state, 
and economy. We must examine the particulars of these new institutional responses 
of reterritorialisation—and their meanings and representations—taken up by states 
with regard to transnational pressures, especially as they relate to collective identity. 
Moreover, there is a need to see these emerging spatial relationships of governance 
and identity as relational, non-hierarchical processes in flux; in such a schema, 
neither the ‘local’, ‘state’, or ‘global’ is necessarily privileged but considered 
contingent and interconnected. This is evaluated later in this chapter through the 
joint concepts of ‘reflexive territoriality’, and regulation, as well as illustrated 
empirically through the case studies in chapters five and six.
85 Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond’, 165
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2.5 G l o b a l isa t io n  a n d  ‘R eflexive  T e r r it o r ia l it y ’
The disparate and sometimes perplexing nature of contemporary 
developments in the international order have led scholars in several different 
directions and produced a confused set of responses. Most of the debate, as noted 
above, centres on what exactly globalisation is, if anything, and if it does exist, what 
implications result. Some posit the disappearance of borders and dawn of a ‘post­
national’ era; some maintain the state system is as strong as ever; and yet others 
assert the dawn of some kind of vague ‘postmodemity’.86 This latter group maintains 
the West has moved ‘out’ of modernity into ‘postmodemity’, its structures vaguely 
characterised by ‘hyper’ flows of information, people, and technologies which result 
in a ‘blurring’, and often somehow ‘virtual’, reality.
A better way of coming to terms with some of these changes may not be 
positing the emergence of a new era of ‘postmodemity’ (as though modernity as we 
have understood it has somehow been eclipsed), but rather suggesting a more 
nuanced understanding of modernity itself, recognising its inherent ambivalence. 
Globalisation is thus understood as the intensification and expansion of these modem 
relations over ever-longer distances. Such an approach has the advantage of not 
requiring a reconfigured ontological perspective or engagement in the myriad, 
intractable ‘modernity versus postmodemity’ debates which have plagued IR. 
Rather it offers a framework within modernity which is reflexive and critical that 
revolves around two, interconnected theoretical concepts: first, reflexive
modernisation, particularly a notion of reflexive territoriality and second, a 
‘regulation-emancipation’ schema which is useful for understanding inclusion and 
exclusion across state boundaries.
86 Among others, see for example, David Harvey, The Condition o f Postmodemity (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1989); Andrew Herod, Gearoid O Tuathail, and Susan M. Roberts, eds., An Unruly 
World? Globalization, Governance and Geography (New York: Routledge, 1998);
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Reflexive Modernisation
The concept of reflexive modernisation has emerged in social theory as one 
of the most interesting frameworks for understanding some contemporary socio­
political change. It denotes a new, distinct phase of modernity which has left all 
traces of ‘tradition’ behind. The idea of reflexivity in this is crucial; it was initially 
explored by Giddens in The Consequences of Modernity and several of his other 
older works. There he exposed the reflexivity of social and institutional practices, 
arguing they are constantly examined and reformed in a confrontational manner in 
light of new information on the practices themselves; this reflexivity, he argued, is a 
dominant feature of late modem forms of modernity.87
Several years after his initial exploration of the idea, Giddens joined with 
Beck and Lash to provide an initial, if varied, development of the concept in their 
1994 work Reflexive Modernization,88 There, Beck gives a thorough, but at times 
problematic, analysis of the concept.89 He begins by suggesting many modernities 
are possible, including ‘simple’ modernity and ‘reflexive’ modernity. ‘Simple’ (or 
orthodox) modernisation means, ‘at bottom, first the disembedding and second, the 
re-embedding of traditional social forms by industrial social forms’ while ‘reflexive 
modernization’ means ‘rationality reform of existing historical ordering categories of 
modernity, or first the disembedding and second the re-embedding of industrial 
social forms by another modernity’.90 For Beck, like Giddens, there has been a 
‘structural and epochal break’ in this move to a moment of reflexive modernisation.91 
This has been prompted by the inherent complexity of the new information driven 
industrialism that makes calculating external risk much more difficult than in the 
past. This, Beck suggests, implies the ‘radicalization of modernity...breaking up the 
premises and contours of industrial society and open[ing] paths to another 
modernity’ involving ‘risk society.’92 He defines risk as
87 See Giddens, The Consequences o f Modernity. For Giddens, ‘high modernity’ is roughly 
tantamount to ‘reflexive modernisation’.
88 Beck, Giddens, Lash, eds., Reflexive Modernization.
89 See Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization’, in 
Reflexive Modernization. In praise of Beck, Wolfgang Zapf has written his work ‘is so fascinating 
because it holds firm to both the programme of modernization as well as to a fundamental critique of 
current society, including the majority of today’s sociology. Beck wants a new modernity and a more 
insightful, more conscientious and more reflected, in short a reflexive theory. It is capable of winning 
over the adherents of the Critical Theory of the 1930s and 1960s, for whom Adorno’s dictum applies: 
the totality is the untrue’. See Wolfgang Zapf, ‘Entwicklung und Zukunft modemer Gesellschaften’
64
a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced 
by modernization itself.93
Given this, ultimately the prevailing problem for advanced developed societies now 
is the creation of ‘ontological security’ and the construction of particular dangers and 
risks to it.
Giddens goes in a slightly different direction when considering ‘Post- 
Traditional Society’, which in his view has emerged in era of reflexive modernity 
(also with the inherent problem of ontological security) and left modernity as such 
behind.94 For Giddens, the new transformation involves two factors: first the 
‘extensional spread of modem institutions, universalized via globalizing processes’ 
and second,
processes of intentional change, which can be referred to as the radicalizing of 
modernity. These are processes of evacuation, the disinterring and problematizing 
of tradition.95
Within this, ‘reflexive modernisation implies coming to terms with the limits and 
contradictions of the modem order. The existing social order or structure becomes 
the object of its own forces’.96 Contra Beck, Giddens considers reflexive 
modernisation as open and contingent because of ‘the knowledge that we have 
accumulated about ourselves and about the material environment’.97
in Einfuehrung in die Hauptbegriffe der Sociologie, eds. H. Korte and B. Schaefers (Opladen: 
Buddrich, 1992), 204.
90 Ibid., 2.
91 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity’, British 
Journal o f Sociology 51, no. 1 (2000): 81.
92 ‘Risk society’: is ‘a developmental phase of modem society in which the social, political, 
economic, and individual risks increasingly tend to escape the institutions for monitoring and 
protection in industrial society’ which is an ‘undesired, unseen, and compulsive within the dynamic 
of modernization’. See ibid., 3,5.
93 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter (London: Sage, 1992), 21.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid, 57.
96 Giddens, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’.
97 Giddens, ‘Living in a Post-Traditional Society’, 59.
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All of this involves knowledge, not as a concept of reflection, but rather as 
‘self-confrontation’ of the effects and products of modem institutional structures in 
an increasingly self-critical society. This encompasses uncertainty, ecological crises, 
sub-politics, risk, and individualisation (‘the disembedding and, second, the re­
embedding of industrial society ways of life by new ones, in which the individuals 
must produce, stage and cobble together their biographies themselves’).98 Within 
such an understanding, one could group some of the issues and ‘risks’ of 
globalisation, such as rapid, interdependent economic change and integrated, diverse 
labour structures.
Reflexivity, then, is defined as scenarios where
Decisions have to be taken on the basis of more or less continuous reflection on the 
conditions of one’s action. ‘Reflexivity’ here refers to the use of information about 
the conditions of activity as a means of regularly reordering and redefining what
99activity is.
While Giddens’s focus in most of his work is on narratives of the self in the light of 
uncertainty, he does hint at how this might work in institutional cases in Modernity 
and Self-Identity:
What distinguishes modem organisations is not so much their size, or their 
bureaucratic character, as the concentrated reflexive monitoring they permit and 
entail.100
Thus, we can suggest the presence of institutional reflexivity in the face of particular 
uncertainties, especially in advanced information-driven societies, where policy 
agents confront themselves vis-a-vis their relationship to the environment and other 
actors. They then, through various knowledges, formulate discursive and material 
strategies, or in governmental cases, policies in response to these dangers and risks.
98 Anthony Giddens, ‘Living in a Post-Traditional Society’, in Reflexive Modernization, 13.
99 Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right: The Future o f Radical Politics (Cambridge: Polity,
1994), 86.
100 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modem Age 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 16.
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Scott Lash’s insightful post-structural analysis of reflexive modernisation in 
the volume is also useful to us in exploring territoriality, particularly in terms of 
understanding it vis-a-vis is ‘unarticulated other’, its unspoken assumptions, its own 
‘radical alterity’. Through a hermeneutic foundation, aesthetic reflexivity is 
developed to provide a critique of ontological assumptions in the theory as 
formulated by Beck and Giddens.101 Lash’s work can provide additional insights into 
the reflexivity of border practices in the American borderlands evaluated in the case 
studies which follow.
Reflexivity, he argues, can be expressed in ‘structural’ terms (where agency 
reflects on its ‘social conditions of existence’) or ‘self terms, the self-monitoring of 
agents.102 Beck and Giddens (through a double hermeneutic involving interpretation 
and expert-systems) focus their work on the structural component, and this is of most 
relevance here. But Lash also suggests structural conditions of reflexivity underpin 
networks of information and communication. Applied to the thesis, this means 
reflexivity can exist in transnational, but primarily state-anchored economic and 
political elite networks which inform and formulate policy discursively and 
materially.
Lash alludes to, but does not expand upon, the formation of a ‘new’ lower 
class connected to these expanding networks characteristic of new structural 
conditions of reflexivity. That idea bears exploration for some of the issues of this 
thesis. Exclusion from these dominant and hegemonic information and 
communication structures, which facilitate transnational and national political and 
economic action and capital accumulation, means insertion into the ‘new’ lower 
classes. For instance, workers in the garment industry, or in maquiladoras, the 
thousands of ‘twin-plant’ assembly factories for large multinational firms which 
utilise low-wage labour on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border, might be 
considered part of this class. Importantly so too can the marginalised undocumented 
worker who labours for cheap wages in poor conditions in the informal sector of the 
economy such as domestic service or in farming. These individuals, which current 
border policies attempt to exclude from U.S. territory, are members of this emergent 
lower class. They are driven by transnational wage pressures and the realities of




reflexive economic policy structures. Dominant territorial practices and discourses 
of the state are fuelled by accelerating information and given over to transnational 
economic integration, but they actually reinforce the development of this class and 
connote the re-imposition of Beck’s more abstract, ‘simple’ form of modem 
territoriality. In this sense, exclusion (potentially through the formation and 
maintenance of strict territorial borders) of this class (or other threats such as chugs 
or terrorists) becomes a prerequisite of the dominant policy discourse.
'Reflexive TerritorialityJ
Taking this analysis further and applying the general arguments to a specific 
concept, we can consider the classically understood, linear state patterns of territorial 
control as expressions of a ‘simple’, or more usefully, an ‘abstract’ modernity as set 
out in Giddens, Beck, and Lash’s theory. This is embodied in homogeneous, 
‘controlled’, discrete space and time; the state as symbol and structure is reproduced, 
understood, represented, and interpreted as a universal and abstract phenomena, not 
particular or concrete, and as a clear reflection of the Westphalian ‘nation-state’ 
concept. Collective identity, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, was seen to 
correlate with (and be influenced by) these territorial bounds.
Similarly, within the framework of reflexive modernisation, we can then 
build a notion of what might be called ‘reflexive territoriality’ that represents a 
qualitative change for some advanced information-driven states in how political 
territoriality is conceptualised. This term suggests, in the face of ontological 
insecurities, the continual, ever speedier monitoring, revision, reproduction, and 
implementation of a state’s (institutional) strategy of continually constructed and 
technologically-enabled control over its particular territory to counter defined 
dangers and ‘risks’. Some may be real and others may be perceived. And some risks 
are reflexive themselves, as they may be actually generated by the state which then 
has to paradoxically deal with the ‘hazard’. Information, as Giddens suggests, is 
used to reorder and redefine the conditions of institutional action—or may present 
the ‘image’ of the action the actor may seek to affect—such as the defined policy 
‘problem’ or, in this case, the particular issue of ‘control’ through reterritorialisation.
State borders, as policy vehicles for reflexive territoriality on the ground, are 
symbolic and material manifestations of de- and reterritorialisation under
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globalisation; they often are in flux due to forces of inclusion and exclusion from 
within and without the state. Globalising tendencies can feed and inform the 
institutional and structural reflexivity of state territoriality in two ways: creating high 
speed, comprehensive flows of information and also encouraging individuals to 
transgress boundaries. Thus, knowledge becomes increasingly critical in the 
discursive and material strategies at hand.
This implies a different mode of territoriality than seen in prior forms of 
modernity, one influenced by greater uncertainty, increased speed and information 
accumulation and reflexive operationalisation by state institutions in response. But 
how is this reflexivity actually ‘fed’? The reflexive regulation within international 
processes and organisations (such as treaties, conferences, diplomatic recognition, 
and so forth) is one way which encourages the development of territorially bound 
units—states themselves—to become the central ‘power-containers’ of modernity 
and still help order the system. In democratic polities, publics and interest groups 
also generally provide input into policy making and are monitored reflexively as 
such.
But increasingly, applied knowledges—technologies—also have a major role 
to play in a reflexively-organised territorial strategy. More and more, state 
institutions have greater resources at hand to develop and implement—and 
continually adjust—a particular border strategy than ever before, including advanced 
information and technology. Many of the world’s borders, with the U.S.-Mexico and 
U.S.-Canadian cases as the vanguards, are now high-tech ‘nets’: these are sites of 
continual surveillance and intelligence gathering. There, surveillance cameras and 
advanced sensor technology capture heat and movement and then inform physical 
defences, becoming the new instruments of territorial control and information 
gathering. In addition to this information, states also increasingly use statistics, 
public opinion gathering mechanisms, and other devices to monitor the 
‘effectiveness’ or appeal of particular territorial practices, such as border 
securitisation initiatives against undocumented workers or widening trade flows 
under open trade rules.
Several examples will illustrate the concept of reflexive territoriality a bit 
further. Based on nightly flow patterns of border crossers, for instance, defences on 
the U.S.-Mexico border are continuously and quickly re-appropriated to new areas of 
increased activity. Moreover, a special provision of immigration legislation in the
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United States, to be analysed in chapter six, seeks to record the entry and exit record 
of every person crossing the U.S.-Canadian border. As examples of Giddens’s 
modem institutions, growing territorial bureaucracies like the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) (and within it, the U.S. Border Patrol) concerned with 
immigration and border control are the fasting growing American federal agencies. 
The INS compiles, monitors, and presents entry data to legislative and executive 
authorities and elites who are increasingly revising and testing border policy 
‘effectiveness’ which can be characterised in terms of a regulative scheme. The 
monitoring is strategic, as authorities implement ever more complicated, high-tech 
and pervasive instruments of surveillance, control, and information gathering on 
many borders around the world, moves illustrative of this kind of reflexive control of 
territoriality.
Strategies can also be channelled in various concrete ways, some of which 
impact collective identity. The case studies, for example, will illustrate this through 
elite-led policies that construct particular spatial narratives of exclusion and help 
consolidate national collective identity. As the research will also indicate, the 
rigidity or fluidity of borders in the current system can rely on the reflexive ordering 
of the state system partially via these institutional or elite responses. The argument 
here suggests reflexive modernisation has a tendency to alter the balance of 
competing ‘modernities’ in some border situations; current policies of strict, 
‘hardened’ territoriality in evidence around some boundaries may be seen as a move 
to ‘push back’ conditions in a reflexive way to what Beck calls a prior modernity— 
where space and identity could be correlated and ‘controlled’, especially in the face 
of new socio-economic mobilities under globalisation.
2.6 R eflexive Territoriality  as R e g u l a t io n  a n d  
Em a n c ip a t io n
To link this discussion of territoriality to the empirical work which follows 
and advance the argument, we can understand the inclusive or exclusive 
manifestations of reflexive territoriality as ‘regulation’ or ‘emancipation’. The 
concepts of reflexive territoriality and regulation/emancipation thus work as a 
package to help analyse contemporary border practices and discourses. The general 
idea here is adapted from a recent schema developed by the Portuguese sociologist
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Boaventura de Sousa Santos and is remarkably useful for coming to terms with some 
contemporary state border practices.103
Santos is concerned with what he considers ‘the most fundamental of all the 
problems confronting us...the problem of the collapse of social emancipation into 
social regulation’.104 The prevailing paradigm of modernity, he argues, suggests a 
dialectical tension between social regulation and social emancipation; history follows 
a pattern of crisis followed by regulation followed by emancipation and so on, 
culminating with the welfare state. Emancipation, then, is ‘the other of regulation’. 
The development of the social sciences has only reinforced this progression with its 
overriding idea of the future as progress.
Santos is concerned, however, that this dialectical tension has never actually 
existed and instead, ‘rather than being the other of social regulation, social 
emancipation has become its double’: it is degenerated and conflated, thus leading to 
a dearth of any progressive emancipatory projects.105 He argues any emancipatory 
project in modernity is likely to lead to new forms of social regulation which are 
actually less progressive and ultimately more deleterious for society.
Thus, he seeks to rethink social transformation without ‘rethinking the past’ 
and tries to retrieve an idea of progress through a framing of a ‘roots’ and ‘options’ 
equation within modernity. ‘Roots’ are permanent, singular, consistent, large-scale; 
options are small-scale, variable, ephemeral, and replaceable. Medieval society, for 
example, was a society of roots, but modem society operates on a logic of options. 
Globalisation, he argues, has brought an end to the equation, massively destabilising 
it and making each side interchangeable, subject only to an effect of scale or 
intensity. This has only served to accelerate the conflation of emancipation and 
regulation.
103 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘The Fall of the Angelus Novus: Beyond the Modem Game of 
Roots and Options’, Current Sociology 46, no. 2 (1998): 101.
104 Ibid., 81
105 Such projects, for Santos, would revolve not around an abstract idea of ‘progress’, but a principle 
of hope, human initiative, and non-conformity. See ibid., 82.
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Santos then moves on to posit a paradigm of modernity that involves two 
main forms of ‘knowledge’ which can only be understood in relation through a 
trajectory to a particular kind of ‘ignorance’. This point has particular relevance for 
us here. The first form he identifies is hegemonic ‘knowledge-as-regulation’, which 
furthers the trajectory between ignorance—designated as ‘chaos’—and a point of 
knowledge understood as ‘order’; this is widely seen as progression to the future 
within most modem thought.106
The second form, ‘knowledge-as-emancipation’, ‘consists of a trajectory 
between a point of ignorance designated as colonialism and a point of knowledge 
designated as solidarity’.107 ‘Knowledge-as-regulation’, however, he suggests, has 
won in the contest between the two forms to become a hegemonic force in recent 
history. Now the future must be considered as ‘order’, and the past is seen as some 
sort of ‘chaos’ to be released from. Suffering, particularly among the 
disenfranchised (minorities, women, children, and migrants, for example) has 
resulted, given they were, and often still are, considered ‘dangerous’ representations 
of ‘chaos’ in the face of order and colonialism.
Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s allegory of history,108 Santos’s ideas provide 
important epistemological clarifications by unmasking a neutralisation which has 
allowed ‘human suffering... [to] be justified in the name of the struggle of order and 
colonialism against chaos and solidarity.’109 In his view, ‘solidarity’ and non­
conformity as forms of knowledge are antidotes to this kind of human suffering. In 
the end, knowledge-as-regulation can turn human initiative into a form of ignorance, 
especially when combined with dangerous hegemonic globalisation.
To apply his thinking to the project at hand, in the face of ontological 
insecurity, the reflexively organised modem state, in this sense, can be understood to 
desire regularity, order, and overall shape, and, can seek to displace those elements, 
defined as ‘risks’ and ‘threats’, which might disrupt these goals. Ultimately, the 
reflexive state is concerned with ‘taming’ the undesirable mobile flows that impact 
it, or at least presenting the image that it has such ‘chaotic’ matters under ‘control’.
The previous section introduced the concept of reflexive territoriality as a 
qualitatively different way of conceptualising territoriality. Its use in conjunction
106 Ibid., 101.
107 Ibid.
108 See Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (New York: Schocken, 1968).
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with this regulatory scheme should now emerge: increasingly, territorial ‘control’ is 
reflexively organised and sought, partly via surveillance and information gathering 
technology, at boundaries. State bureaucracies concerned with immigration and 
border control compile, monitor, and present this data to legislative and executive 
authorities and elites who are increasingly revising and testing border policy 
‘effectiveness’ in a contingent way, according to the degree of regulation towards 
‘control’ or ‘order’—or at least the image thereof—desired.
This kind of regulation is unlike earlier historical forms of territoriality when 
the state was less concerned with such detail and ‘order’, sought a means-end 
approach, or did not have the technical abilities for vast information gathering or 
advanced boundary monitoring and security.110 Moreover, the questions of insecurity 
about ‘threats’ were not the same. The key point is new knowledge and power 
structures can be productive of one kind or another of ‘order’, or territoriality.
Interestingly, the modem project of ‘controlling’ space in such a way may be 
increasingly at odds with the scope of migration movements as well as other 
mobilities in the system. As illustrated earlier in this chapter, the regulation of space 
and identity in modernity sought a coincidence of people (identity) and territory, 
subsuming difference and ‘chaos’ into a kind of cultural and social homogeneity and 
national ‘order’. Concomitant with this reflex within political territoriality are 
moves to ‘secure’ and reinforce external boundaries, largely through increased 
reinforcements and technological infrastructures, in an attempt to realise this 
idealised state against the ‘other’, the political and social threat (often to national or 
social identity) brought on by flows of individuals across those same boundaries.
To return more concretely to Santos’s understanding of modem knowledge, 
the politics of representation involved in presenting the image of territorial or border 
‘security’ and a stable, unified collective identity relies on modernity’s ‘knowledge- 
as-regulation’ form. Regulation—to produce a particular ‘order’ of border 
security—is the privileged point of knowledge. This is cast against the kind of 
‘chaos’, e.g., ‘ignorance’ which is seen to result from flows of individuals over 
borders, multinational or mixed identities, and diverse cultures: the newly defined 
‘dangers’ and risks. This argument will be illustrated empirically through the case 
studies later in this thesis.
109 Santos, ‘The Fall of the Angelus Novus’, 101.
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2.7 C o n c l u d in g  Remarks
This discussion of political territoriality, identity, and borders in the 
international system sets the subject of inquiry for the next chapter: an exploration 
into what frameworks have been used, and those now available both inside and 
outside the discipline of IR, for understanding borders, regulation, and identity. This 
involves examining what scholarship in ‘border studies’ from different disciplines 
has to say about the changing nature of territorial and identity relationships, 
particularly under globalisation. To analyse these complex and salient relationships, 
the subsequent chapter also introduces two theoretical tools which might be used for 
such explorations, particularly at an unclear moment of both change and continuity 
in international politics. The case studies in later chapters then turn to examine the 
concrete empirical dimensions and implications of current, reflexive border 
regulations and their supportive discourses in the American borderlands.
110 See Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters (Cambridge: Polity, 1987).
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
Th e  Co n t e x t  o f  Bo r d e r  St u d ie s
3.0 In t r o d u c t io n
Presumably, these territoriality, identity, and regulatory dynamics would be 
fertile ground for the study of borders in IR and other disciplines. Unfortunately, 
this has not generally been the case. When Lord Curzon introduced his 1907 
Romanes lecture, ‘Frontiers’, he in fact reflected the realist-inspired mode of 
thinking about boundaries that would come to dominate the disciplines of 
International Relations and Geography.1 Until recently, the concept of borders was 
chained to such rigid disciplinary channels, strictly confined to analysis of the 
delineation of the world’s political boundaries, and conflicts over them, and often 
done using blunt or poor conceptual tools. The study of borders was primarily 
conducted by international lawyers, diplomats, and IR scholars adhering, quite 
understandably at the time, to state-centric realist assumptions surrounding existing 
Tines’ on political world maps. The framework of modem political territoriality, and 
our concomitant cartographic biases exposed in the previous chapter, informed 
thinking about these matters nearly carte blanche. Studies were (and to a large 
extent still are) largely technical or diplomatic matters: increasingly ever more 
precise technologies are rationally applied to determine the exact mapping of the 
earth’s surface, understanding states as static, reified empirical objects for scientific 
examination or borders as issues of conflict.
IR was indeed in a slumber until the last decade concerning territoriality; 
ironically, few substantive studies of borders exist in the field. As Albert aptly 
points out, ‘it seems surprising that the discipline of international relations did not 
take up the issue of substantive change in the quality, shape, and construction of 
territorial spaces earlier’.3 When the issue was discussed, it was done in a highly 
positivist manner. Political Geography, where we might expect to find innovation in 
work on territoriality, as Newman argues, was also dominated by similar tendencies, 
with almost all work on boundaries being done from a research agenda that focussed
1 George Nathaniel Curzon, Frontiers: The Romanes Lecture 1907 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1908).
2 See David Sibley, Geographies o f Exclusion (London: Routledge, 1995).
3 Mathias Albert, ‘Boundaries, Territory and Postmodemity’, in Boundaries, Territory and 
Postmodemity, ed. David Newman (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 55.
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on strategic issues (including the suspect associations with the fascist-linked German 
school of Geopolitics in the 1930s and 1940s), or on the state, and was chiefly non- 
theoretical and descriptive.4 Work by Friedrich Ratzel, C.B. Fawcett, and Halford 
Mackinder—a ‘father’ of Political Geography—among others, concentrated on an 
assumed deterministic link between geography and politics and carried with it a 
state-centric locus as well as concepts like balance of power.5 This corpus of 
thought, and its assumptions, in turn, found its way into mainstream IR as we shall 
see in this chapter.
Only in the past decade or so has the sense of a potentially qualitative 
transformation in statehood emerged with new discussions of ‘globalisation’. 
Transnational issues have caused pause among some scholars and refocused 
attention on boundaries. But even now, the debate tends to be characterised as either 
the disappearance or new relevance of boundaries or in broad dichotomised terms, 
e.g., ‘states versus markets’ or ‘global governance versus state governance’. These 
all cast too sweeping dichotomies and lack recognition of the real, complex, and 
contradictory implications of globalisation. Instead, what is needed is a more subtle, 
wider, and sensitive understanding of the processes and relations driving the 
production of and change in world borders. It is in what widely has been called 
‘border studies’ that some fresher conceptual approaches can be found to the 
changing territorial and identity patterns outlined in the last chapter.
Following a brief survey of the ‘older’ state of border studies—and the 
impact it had on IR thinking—this chapter proceeds to seek other insights by 
examining and synthesising major developments in border thinking in the 1990s, 
when ‘border studies’ expanded and became a transdisciplinary field of study. 
Developments in ‘critical’ Political Geography, Cultural Studies, literary theory, and 
Anthropology all did much to further our thinking about the role of borders in social 
and political life, but have yet to be properly introduced into IR; thus their 
contributions may be unknown to many scholars. Those that deal with globalisation 
and transnational issues are particularly important. An engagement with geopolitical 
analysis, for example, can offer crucial views on the spatial dimensions of politics;
4 David Newman, ‘Geopolitics Renaissant: Territory, Sovereignty and the World Political Map’, in 
Boundaries, Territory and Postmodemity, 1-2.
5 For an overview of this traditional, mainstream work on boundaries in Geopolitics, see Charles B. 
Hagain, ‘Geopolitics’, The Journal o f Politics 4, no. 4 (1942): 478-90. Hagain surveys early 
theoretical work on the relationship between geography and politics, and those scholars who asserted 
the deterministic, ‘scientific’ nature of this dynamic, an assumption common in much early work in 
the field: ‘Geopolitics’, he writes ‘may be summed up as an attempt to find a deterministic principle 
which controls the development of states’. Idem, 489.
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territoriality, borders, and sovereignty are but only three bedrock IR concepts that 
might benefit from such an evaluation. In-line with its emphasis on certain 
alternative theories, the study adopts a critical view of Geopolitics, defined by O 
Tuathail as the ‘politics of writing global space’ through discourse—often in foreign 
policy, elite-driven situations.6 This concept and its potential impact for ER theory in 
geileral and this thesis in particular are explored in the chapter.
This chapter offers a transdisciplinary survey of the new border thinking, and 
is done with the intent to apply the concepts to an ER theory agenda as well as the 
empirical research which follows—particularly as they inform thinking on the 
relationships between space and identity. Accordingly, this chapter asks, given the 
centrality of borders in modernity and the international system, how have the social 
sciences and other disciplines explained and understood boundaries, widely defined? 
Moreover, what do border studies have to say about the changing nature of territorial 
and identity relationships, particularly at a moment of reflexive modernity, where 
mobile flows increasingly put pressure on modem territorial organisation? After a 
thorough exploration of these questions, we end with a brief summary and synthesis 
of the conceptual grounded covered. This sets the stage for the following chapter 
that offers several ‘tools’ for probing the multifaceted nature of American border 
practices and discourses—and their impact on collective identity—as well as 
providing a preliminary basis for exploring other such dynamics around the world.
3.1 Bo rders a n d  Bo rder  Studies
Borders in the international system have myriad characteristics and 
meanings, many of which are contradictory. An international boundary, such as in 
the U.S.-Mexico case, may be completely open to capital and trade, but shut to the 
movement of labour. Moreover, every border in the world is unique, and as argued 
in this thesis, must be seen as a particular, historically contingent web of processes 
and relations that is always under construction by certain actors and forces. 
Seemingly, then, a narrow, regional studies-like focus on a particular boundary 
would presumably be the proper starting point for research. Why then is a wider 
conceptual examination of what we call a ‘boundary’ necessary, or for that matter, 
why should we examine the field of ‘border studies’? Why unpack the notion of a 
‘border’?
6 Gearoid O Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics o f Writing Global Space (Minneapolis:
77
There are several reasons for this. First, because of their unique nature as 
‘junctions’ of a variety of different political, cultural, and social processes and 
systems—particularly as transnational situations which expose the dimensions and 
implications of globalisation in local, personal, and direct ways—borders serve as 
fruitful ‘laboratories’ for social science research. Often, as is the case with the U.S.- 
Mexico boundary, borders can be the most visible interface between very different 
social, economic, and political systems. Second, because they are so often familiar, 
and in a sense, ‘invisible’ (and have often been treated as such in IR), borders can be 
difficult to de-reify and really understand. As this section argues, because of their 
complicated and multidimensional nature, borders can only be analysed within a 
wider theoretical contextualisation which appreciates the larger dimensions of what 
borders—understood as constructed mechanisms of political and social difference— 
actually are: how they arise, how they function, and how they change. Supporting 
this line of research, Anderson and O’Dowd persuasively argue that particular case 
studies of local boundaries and their associated regions ‘whether political, 
economic, social, or cultural can only be understood in terms of wider 
conceptualizations’.7 Especially in a world of intensifying mobilities and the 
changes they bring (which can be difficult to grasp and predict), a multidimensional 
and transdisciplinary approach to an analysis of borders in a deterritorialising and 
reterritorialising world is necessary. Accordingly, this chapter proceeds with such an 
examination. Moreover, as much of this literature may be unfamiliar to IR scholars, 
the highlights are included here as both an exercise in hopefully fruitful intellectual 
‘hybridisation’ but also as a prelude to future research directions.
Borders and Limits
We live in a time and space in which borders, both literal and figurative, exist 
everywhere...A border maps limits; it keeps people in and out of an area; it marks 
the ending of a safe zone and the beginning of an unsafe zone. To confront a border 
and, more so, to cross a border presumes great risk.
—Alejandro Morales8
The construction of reality, quite simply, depends on borders. Meaning, 
content, and form in the physical, social, and political worlds require distinct
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 18.
7 James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd, ‘Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory 
Meanings, Changing Significance’, Regional Studies 33, no. 7 (1999): 594.
8 See Alejandro Morales, ‘Dynamic Identities in Heterotopia’, in Alejandro Morales: Fiction Past, 
Present, Future Perfect, ed. Jose Antonio Gurpegui (Tempe, AZ: Bilingual Review, 1996), 14-27.
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delimitations, differentiations, differences—all of which are formulated by, through, 
over, and under different kinds of borders and ‘boundings’. If we follow Morales’s 
thinking above, we are taking a lot of risks lately; the end of the Cold War, as just 
one example, signalled a need in international relations to reconfigure difference as 
the Soviet Union no longer provided a convenient backdrop for American foreign 
policy and major unforeseen divisions in the world emerged. This is to say nothing 
of the late modem trends of transnationalism fostering globalisation, and 
cultural/information technology flows alluded to in the previous chapter which all 
too pose new (and even sometimes familiar) arrangements for borders and the state 
through their de- and reterritorialisation tendencies. But while they may assert new 
challenges to the bounded territorial apparatus, states are likely to remain the key 
form of socio-political organisation, as will be demonstrated in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis. The challenge for border studies, then, is not to reproduce 
existing ‘end of state’ arguments nor rigid statist scholarship, but rather engineer 
approaches which appreciate the changing meanings—and representations—of 
borders in a dynamic world and do so in a critical way.
So to begin to understand how de- and reterritorialisation actually play out, 
we need to thoroughly investigate the notion of a ‘border’. We need to take step 
away from easy and familiar understandings of boundaries which tempt us to see 
them as familiar Tines’ on maps and instead explore a more holistic view of 
difference and limits. Our entire social and political order is predicated on these 
ways in which we separate or ‘border’ things—our family from strangers, moral 
from immoral, English from Scots, Americans from Mexicans, Mexicans from 
Canadians.
Only through the boundaries of difference can the unique exist. The process 
of differentiating is generally done to assign meaning and uniqueness to things, thus 
giving us a sense of identity, distinctiveness, order, and ultimately security. As such, 
borders are crucial for identity formation in addition to being important markers for 
ethics, justice, and other normative considerations. Numerous social and ethical 
judgements underlie those differentiations. Where we draw, in Zerubavel’s term, 
that ‘Fine Line’ is of major importance in order to understand our social world.9 
The flexibility or rigidity of that line (for example in including or excluding certain
9 See Eviatar Zerubavel, The Fine Line: Making Distinctions in Everyday Life New York: The Free 
Press, 1991).
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kinds of refugees from the state), and thus our perception, is reflected in both theory 
and practice.
Because different terms conceptualise difference in this way, some 
clarification may be useful before proceeding. Confusion often results in the varied 
and sometimes inconsistent usage of ‘border’, ‘boundary’, and ‘borderlands’. A 
boundary, in its deployment here, typically refers to a legal (constructed) political 
line of difference—commonly an interstate boundary. A border, of course, can refer 
to this as well (and is also used in this way here), but is also employed in this study 
in a much wider, more figurative sense as well. ‘A border’, Anzaldua poetically 
reminds us, ‘is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge’ but a ‘borderland’, 
alternatively, is ‘a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of 
an unnatural boundary’.10 This term was first used in 1921 by Herbert Eugene 
Bolton to describe the Spanish Borderlands, Spain’s then-northern frontier which 
began to be established in the early 16th century.11 Today, borderlands are zones 
adjacent to an arbitrary, binational political border, infused with interesting and 
singular ethnic and social patterns that are often termed ‘border culture’.
Noted scholar Martinez, in what is probably the definitive study on life and 
society in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, calls the unique forces that shape 
borderlands around the world, such as international conflict and accommodation,
19separateness, and transnational interaction, the ‘borderlands milieu’. The truly 
‘international’ environment of borders gives residents numerous opportunities for 
symbiotic interaction through trade, tourism, migration, information, and generally, 
exchange. People on borders must often deal with strife, territorial disputes, and 
conflicts over natural resources and conversely, can also offer co-operative, 
accommodating solutions. Ethnic conflict may also be present in borderlands; 
cultural friction or accommodation may be the end-products of a mixed, 
heterogeneous population.
Separateness often affects border communities tom between identities, 
nationalisms, and cultures that may emanate from the ‘centres’ of states. The 
exposure to ‘foreign’ values and norms can often, nevertheless, lead to tolerance of 
ethnic and cultural differences. Martinez argues those who live in borderlands are
10 Gloria Anzaldua, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (San Francisco: Aunt Lute, 1987), 3.
11 Richard L. Nostrand, ‘A Changing Culture Region’, in Borderlands Sourcebook: A Guide to the 
Literature on Northern Mexico and the United States, eds. Ellwyn R. Stoddard, Richard L. Nostrand, 
and Jonathan West (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983), 14.
12 Oscar J. Martinez, Border People: Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (Tucson, AZ: 
University of Arizona Press 1994), 10.
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generally unique individuals who are often shaped by a transnational processes and 
an environment that is distant from the ‘centres’.13 This can be a universal 
phenomenon since many borderlanders share the same functional experiences across 
the world. Going further to generalise about these functional experiences and 
international relationships, Martinez has in fact created four models to characterise 
borderland interactions: alienated, co-existent, interdependent, and integrated.14
Since they are unique sites for research because they serve as microcosms of 
larger systems and trends, borderlands and their boundaries—particularly those that 
are socially and politically created—have become an intriguing transdisciplinary 
phenomenon increasingly attracting artists, writers, and scholars from many 
disciplines, including Cultural Studies, literary theory, Anthropology, gender studies, 
Chicano studies, and Geography.15 Even the emergence of the Internet as an 
unparalleled global communications tool which bypasses state frontiers has pushed 
notions of boundaries into the popular imagination and introduced major questions 
of regulation and control.16 This new—if still limited—general swelling of interest 
is largely due to the fact that borders may be ‘simultaneously historical, natural, 
cultural, political, economic, or symbolic phenomena’.17 They present themselves as 
interfaces and points of transitions between ideas, concepts, and movements and thus 
make themselves open to various lines of inquiry.
These varieties of border studies tend to be isolated in select (and often
marginalised) spheres of social theory. Yet, according to Welchman, ‘as much as
any other manifestation in the early 1990s’ they ‘marked a new stage in the debates
1 8over postmodernism, cultural studies, and postcolonialism’. The resulting ‘border
13 Ibid., xvii.
14 Ibid. Martinez’s analysis, however, can rely too heavily on traditional state assumptions that serve 
to reproduce those discourses and moreover suffers from a lack of contextualisation in wider 
processes and systems like globalisation.
15 For but a few illustrative examples in Geography, see, for instance, John House, Frontier on the Rio 
Grande: A Political Geography o f Development and Social Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992); 
in Anthropology, see the seminal work by Frederick Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The 
Social Organization o f Cultural Difference (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969). In planning 
and transport network analysis, see Peter Nijkamp, ed., New Borders and Old Barriers in Spatial 
Development (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1994).
16 Much is also being written about borders (primarily the lack thereof) in cyberspace. See, for 
example, Maureen A. O’Rourke, ‘Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World’, 
Minnesota Law Review 82, no. 3 (1998): 609; Brian Kahin and Charles Nesson, eds., Borders in 
Cyberspace: Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1997).
17 Anssi Paasi, ‘Constructing Territories, Boundaries and Regional Identities’, in Contested Territory: 
Border Disputes at the Edge o f the Former Soviet Empire, ed. Tuomas Forsberg (Brookfield, VT: 
Edward Elgar, 1995), 42.
18 John C. Welchman, ‘Introduction’, in Rethinking Borders, ed. John Welchman (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1996), xii.
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theory’, however, has not found its way to any significant extent into IR nor has it 
ever been surveyed and analysed from an IR or transdisciplinary perspective. In an 
effort to fill this void, the following constitutes a brief review of how borders are 
treated, modified, and appropriated in a variety of disciplines. This is provided to 
canvass existing knowledge, identify gaps in this corpus, and finally offer new and 
previously unexplored insights on how border thinking might be applied to IR theory 
and the identities/border/orders project.
The ‘transdisciplinary’ approach utilised here is also inspired by an attempt 
to transcend often reified lines of division between academic disciplines. Zerubavel, 
for instance, outlines the process of sculpting academic identity as a ‘mental act of 
“lumping” supposedly homogeneous clusters of identity (selves, organisations, 
religious denominations, generations, ethnic groups, nations) and “splitting” them off 
from one another as distinct, separate entities’.19 In turn, intellectual inquiry tends to 
be mapped and organised in a separate manner; while this is occasionally useful to 
organise the act of research, if the lines are too rigid, they may in Zerubavel’s view, 
‘allow no “contact” whatsoever between them [and] also eschew any effort to build 
“bridges” across those divides’.20 Rigidity, then, can lead to compartmentalisation 
and little contact between, for example, the social sciences and the humanities. 
Innovation and change are thus restricted.
In the end, he calls for a more flexible outlook:
intellectual boundaries inevitably promote a certain ‘closing’ of the mind that often 
produces the kind of intellectual tunnel vision we aptly call 
‘narrow-mindedness’...Envisioning discrete islands of scholarship presupposes the 
use of intellectual blinders that inevitably confine scholars’ mental vision to certain 
‘intellectual ghettos’.21
A flexible intellectual approach can seek a wider—yet ordered and coherent 
agenda—that allows for complex, intricate academic identities and draws on 
multiple fields for conceptual development in a dynamic and fluid way. That spirit 
informs what follows.
19 Eviatar Zerubavel, ‘Lumping and Splitting: Notes on Social Classification’, Sociological Forum 11, 
no. 3 (1996): 421-34.
20 Eviatar Zerubavel, ‘The Rigid, The Fuzzy, and the Flexible: Notes on the Mental Sculpting of 
Academic Identity’, Social Research 62, no. 4 (1995): 1094
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3.2 Bo r d er  St u d ie s: D evelopm ents in  A nth ro po lo g y  a n d  
Literary  Th e o r y  a n d  th eir  A pplication  t o  IR
We proceed with our survey by beginning in what might broadly be grouped 
as ‘cultural studies’. Anthropology, in particular, may be one of the initial fields 
where boundaries were extensively studied. The prominent Norwegian 
anthropologist Frederik Barth in his seminal 1969 work, Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries, was one of the first to analyse the symbolism of borders, surveying the
22social and cultural separation and differentiation that formulate social attitudes. 
Barth ‘examines the border guards and boundary mechanisms that separate and 
differentiate social groups in their attitudes and perceptions’.23 Boundaries for Barth 
are both attributes and causes of the ‘principles of separation’ that the national 
community is concerned with—they differentiate the other and thus define the self: 
‘[t]he ethnic boundary’, he famously writes, ‘defines the group, not the cultural stuff 
that it encloses’.24
More recent work in Anthropology is returning to the meaning of boundaries 
in relation to spatial and social organisation, but still struggles to fill a major dearth 
in anthropological perspectives on borderland and cross-border cultures. Donnan 
and Wilson sought in 1994 to be the first develop an ‘anthropology of frontiers’ 
which seeks to examine ‘the cultural constructions which symbolise the boundaries 
between communities, and between nations [which] are lost in the midst of the “big 
picture” of “national” and “international” relations’.25 Similarly, 1996 saw the 
publication of Setting Boundaries, a major collection in Anthropology devoted to 
examining the cultural encoding, social construction, and enactment of borders and 
the ‘dynamism in... lines of marking—[their] changes, transformations, interactions,
0  f \redefinition’. The authors take an approach to boundaries which, like that of some 
literary critics, considers borders as physical but also social, temporal, conceptual, 
and/or symbolic entities which may be permeable and negotiable, driven by 
inclusion and exclusion. As such they are ‘separating and unifying, divisive and 
inclusive, definitional, invisible, transforming, and transformative’ but always
21 Ibid., 1095.
22 Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries.
23 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 10.
24 Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, 15.
25 Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson, ‘An Anthropology of Frontiers’, in Border Approaches: 
Anthropological Perspectives on Frontiers, eds. Hastings Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson (Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America, 1994), 10.
26 Deborah Pellow, ed. Setting Boundaries: The Anthropology o f Spatial and Social Organization 
(Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey, 1996), 1.
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defined in relation to a socio-cultural context—as ‘spatial manifestations of 
culture’.27
Scholars working in this area tend to explore the spatial design of social 
relations, the control of boundaries and the boundaries of control, and the interface 
between conceptual and physical boundaries.28 Human or social classification is 
prominent here; they argue boundaries and the flows of public, private, or collective 
spaces are increasingly intertwined, complex, and ambiguous. Borders mark the 
obvious limits of symbolic, administrative, and physical space but must be 
uncovered because they are ‘recognizable, accepted, and unproblematic’ making 
them too often familiar and invisible. They are also highly linked to a reflexive 
understanding of the self, a claim bom out by extensive anthropological fieldwork 
and illustrated by the case studies in this thesis.29 Important for IR, anthropologists 
have also asserted the control of space and struggle over its definition is also deeply 
related to power.; as Pittin suggests, urban design, for example in Nigeria, controls 
movement, identity, and class structure in many settings.
To take a similar example, recent Israeli government policy uses and 
produces space for the literal and symbolic exclusion of Palestinians in the 
settlement pattern of the West Bank; middle class homes with prominent expensive 
red tile roofs are built on desirable hills that overlook Palestinian settlements mired 
in poverty. Moreover, new highway bypasses into the West Bank deliberately have 
few exits for Palestinian settlements and serve to connect only new Israeli towns and 
enclaves in the West Bank with the employment centres of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. 
The constmction of these borders, according to the Israelis, ‘is to prevent 
confrontation between the two groups’ while the Palestinians maintain the policy’s 
ultimate aim is ‘to block an independent Palestinian state and to destroy any 
geographical continuity between Palestinian territories’.31 The geography of power 
and identity here suggests the deep borders of the conflict. Order, for many cultures 
and societies, is clearly connected with spatial, power structures: boundaries.
27 Ibid., 1.
28 See, for example, Takie Sugiyama Lebra, ‘The Spatial Layout of Hierarchy: Residential Style of the 
Modem Japanese Nobility’; Graeme J. Hardie, ‘Boundaries Real and Imagined’; and Renee Pittin, 
‘Negotiating Boundaries: A Perspective from Nigeria’, all in ibid.
29 See Roderick J. Lawrence, ‘The Multidimensional Nature of Boundaries: An Integrative Historical 
Perspective’, in ibid.
30 Pittin, ‘Negotiating Boundaries’.
31 Lee Hockstader, ‘Peace Pact Paves Way for More Pavement; Israeli Roads Bisect Palestinian 
Property’, Washington Post (20 November 1998): A49.
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Anthropological perspectives on war have informed some IR and conflict 
theory in the past and, given the impact of political boundaries on the conditions and 
causes of conflict, the appearance of new work from a conflict resolution perspective
• t  'X'J • • •that elaborates an ‘anthropology of frontiers’ is not surprising. Drawn initially 
from studies of the Ireland-Northern Ireland boundary, central insights here form 
around the processes taking place at both old and new borders; local border 
communities, Donnan and Wilson suggest, are in ‘extremely dynamic dialectical 
relationship[s] with people and institutions of other ethnic groups and nations, both 
within and outside of their states...they are often major agents of change in socio­
political processes of significance’.33 An ethnography of borderlands, in this case, 
can impart ‘distinct and concrete views of social, cultural, and political identities at 
the most tangible interface of nation-states’ where they mark ‘“home” from the 
“foreign”’.34
At least three important insights for IR theory emerge from these studies of 
boundaries in Anthropology. First, we see the problematisation of borders as a ‘key 
concept’ in the study of social organisation and culture; this illustrates its growing 
salience in a related field to IR. Moreover, the concept is widened beyond the 
understanding of boundaries in a static, legal sense and instead expanded to include 
conceptual boundaries which are no less real than physical ones. Second, borders 
are considered as spatial manifestations of culture which—like the state—are no 
longer understood to be necessarily clearly bounded or unproblematic. The spatial 
aspect of culture in particular helps ‘anchor’ understandings of, for example, 
ethnicity, gender, and conflict.35 Duchacek was moving towards this idea in IR 
when he argued territoriality can refer to either geographical or social spaces. 
While the balance of this comment argues the organisation of spatial relations is not 
fundamentally cultural as some anthropologists argue, but rather a complicated 
combination of cultural, economic, and political factors—identities and orders—at 
least the dialogue can now be reinvigorated. Finally, this work illustrates the tie 
between social and cultural ‘ordering’ (and organisation) through the drawing of 
boundaries which is tied up with power. The anthropological dimension of the
32 Donnan and Wilson, Border Approaches.
33 Ibid., 2.
34 Ibid., 3.
35 See Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries and Pellow, Setting Boundaries.
36 Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension o f Politics (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1987).
37 Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1969).
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cultural nature of boundaries, then, gives us another clue into identity/border/order 
relationships, particularly those in borderlands.
Literary Theory
While Anthropology advanced its thinking, literary analysis is the field where 
the concept of ‘the border’ is most embraced and where it has received most of its 
exciting analytical development. This move is related to the advent of ‘border 
theory’ in ‘critical’ literary studies. The border and its intersection with the themes 
of postmodemity is providing a rich lode of fresh insightful paths of inquiry. 
Giddens, while not directly articulating the theme of ‘the border’, suggests that this 
development is not surprising, arguing it is precisely in the fields of literature, art, 
and design that the strands of new thought tend to grow in fecund ground.38
In recent years, the surge in ‘border’ related work in the fields of literary and 
cultural criticism has soared; Rosaldo’s Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social 
Analysis, Hicks’s Border Writing: The Multidimensional Text, Behar’s Translated 
Woman: Crossing the Border with Esperanza’s Story, and collections by Calderon 
and Saldivar, Criticism in the Borderlands are but a few key examples.39 These 
volumes examine the prevailing discourse of their academic disciplines and the 
concept of a ‘borderlands’ identity seen through literary interpretation. Many of 
these works deal with Chicano or Latino identities, and indeed it is Chicano studies, 
as Johnson and Michaelsen contend ‘more than any other [which] has refocused 
critical attention on the concept of the border’, precisely as the Latino population in 
the United States soars and the state becomes more heterogeneous.40 Overall, this 
corpus attempts to move ‘border identities’ beyond simple postulations for their own 
sake to deeper and more subtle forms of analysis. The key insights are the critical 
problematisation of borders as arbitrary and the move to identify them as sometimes 
oppressive or homogenising representations of dominant political and economic 
systems, not unlike what may be needed in IR. They thus invite a more subtle 
understanding of difference, of fluid, multi-dimensional identities.
38 See Anthony Giddens, The Consequences o f Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1990).
39 Renato Rosaldo, Culture and Truth: The Remaking o f Social Analysis, 2d ed. (Boston: Beacon, 
1991); Emily D. Hicks, Border Writing: The Multidimensional Text (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991); Ruth Behar, Translated Woman: Crossing the Border with Esperanza’s Story 
(Boston: Beacon, 1993); and Hector Calderon and Jose David Saldivar, Criticism in the Borderlands: 
Studies in Chicano Literature, and Ideology (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991).
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However, it was Gloria Anzaldua’s trailblazing book Borderlands/La 
Frontera: The New Mestiza, which anchored these literary explorations of borders 
and continues to strongly influence the field.41 By fashioning herself as a 
multidimensional persona, Anzaldua poetically seeks out the multiple cultural 
possibilities of borderlands, exploring the bending and bleeding of identity, violence, 
and creativity latent in the U.S.-Mexico case—the birthplace of border studies—but 
also subjectivity in global borderlands more generally. Anzaldua’s text is repeatedly 
cited in the literary theory field and beyond; her complex positioning of identity, 
homosexuality, Chicano, Native American, and Mexican culture is unique and 
important and may prove increasingly important to examinations of culture and 
identity in IR theory, particularly as an articulation of a different way of 
understanding subjectivity and the political.42 Anzaldua’s work is a powerful 
articulation of alterity in expanding global zones (like the U.S.-Mexico borderlands) 
of contested meanings, space, and identities. To live in the Borderlands, she 
poignantly writes, means you:
are neither hispana india negra espahola 
ni gabacha, eres mestiza, mulata, half-breed 
while carrying all five races on your back 
not knowing which side to turn to, run from...
put chile in the borsht,
eat whole wheat tortillas,
speak Tex-Mex with a Brooklyn accent;
be stopped by la migra43 at the border checkpoints...
To survive the Borderlands
you must live sin fronteras44 
be a crossroads.45
Attempting to come to terms with this influx of literature on border studies, a 
recent collection entitled Border Theory: The Limits of Cultural Politics manages the 
most definitive articulation yet of these concepts, seeking to ‘rethink the place of the
40 David E. Johnson and Scott Michaelsen, ‘Border Secrets: An Introduction’, in Border Theory: The 
Limits o f  Cultural Politics, eds. Scott Michaelsen and David Johnson (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), 22.
41 See Anzaldua, Borderlands-La Frontera.
42 Peter Mandaville in a recent article heralds Anzaldua’s work as an innovative exposition of 
subjectivity and identity, but he lacks a theoretically informed concept of the border to push the 
analysis further. See Peter Mandaville, ‘Territory and Translocality: Discrepant Idioms of Political 
Identity’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): 653-73.
43 La migra — the U.S. Border Patrol, the branch of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) responsible for apprehending migrants and controlling access into the state.
44 sin fronteras — without borders
45 Anzaldua, Borderlands-La Frontera, 194.
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border in border studies’.46 Johnson and Michaelsen introduce the volume by 
suggesting the contributors’ foci are ‘on the sorts of “soft” borders produced within 
broadly liberal discourse: benevolent nationalisms, cultural essentialisms,
multiculturalisms, and the like—in short, the state of border studies’.47 The essays 
theorise the idea of ‘the border’ by taking it across transdisciplinary and 
paradigmatic ground—blending histories, Sociology, feminism, post-structuralism, 
and other theory: identity and difference are problematised.
As a result of this work, we have the sketches of a broad based ‘border 
theory’ emerging in the literary and cultural studies fields: concern with inclusion 
and exclusion (core concepts in much of critical theory), a multicultural approach to 
rhetoric and difference, and a need to probe relational and oppositional agency in 
attempt to go beyond the binary. It seeks to understand the border—and more 
importantly the future—as the
place in short of a certain property, and of a certain propemess. You might say that 
one belongs there, that we will find ourselves there, facing one another across that 
divide.48
Here we can find the limits and possibilities of identities by probing and criticising 
both unnecessary and necessary boundaries. Moreover, the theory as applied can 
suggest a move toward the deterritorialisation of culture and language where 
‘crossings’ of various kinds occur across time and states but are in tension with the 
reterritorialisation impulses produced by state practices (such as the exclusion of 
persons socially or physically).49
This kind of border thinking is useful in a critical sense because it uncovers 
the researcher’s often unintentional bias towards the dominant territorialisation of the 
world which can occur not only through state-based physical and symbolic means, 
including violence, but also through key complicit discourse embedded in most 
academic inquiry. Beck has recently, in fact, issued a call in Sociology to release the
46 Johnson and Michaelsen, ‘Border Secrets: An Introduction’, 28. Another extremely useful recent 
contribution is Reading the Shape of the World: Toward an International Cultural Studies, eds. 
Henry Schwarz and Richard Dienst (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996) The focus is on cultural studies 
as contributors seeks a ‘reading’ of images, texts, and otherness in a heterogeneous world. Borders 
are a key theme; Azade Seyhan’s piece in the collection, ‘From Minor Literature, Across Border 
Culture to Hyphenated Criticisms’ is an analysis of forms of cross border cultural inquiry detailing 
new voices of political identity can emerge from the other in the literature of spatial, temporal, and 
historical cultural borderlands. This new approach, she suggests, is a more open and mutual 
encounter which offers the powerful possibility for both contention and agreement—and synthesis—  
between cultures and ultimately understanding.
47 Johnson and Michaelsen, ‘Border Secrets’, 1.
48 Ibid., 15.
49 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987). See also Hicks, Border Writing.
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field from a mutually dependent relationship with the state ‘container’ (such as their 
focus on ‘domestic’ statistics) which formulates the limits of epistemology and 
inquiry and is no longer, in his view, as relevant in a transnational world moving into 
a ‘second age of modernity’.50 It should be remembered that this sort of emphasis 
does not imply a rejection of the state or its boundaries as units of analysis (they are, 
in fact, utilised in this way here) nor does it suggest embracing simplistic arguments 
put forward by scholars such as Ohmae that boundaries are things of the past, 
implying sovereignty has fundamentally changed in the international system.51 
Instead, border thinking as developed here seeks to disrupt what Agnew, like Beck, 
calls ‘methodological nationalism’, the acceptance of the state and nation as pre­
given within the confines of the ‘territorial trap’, if only to self-reflectively examine 
our assumptions.52
The relevant points developed from this transdisciplinary thinking in what we 
might broadly call ‘cultural studies’ include thinking about border discourses in a 
critical manner, both for their use in destabilising or reinforcing dominant direct 
nation-state/identity correlations, or simple understandings of culture, but also 
problematising borders of all kinds, as well as the material and discursive processes 
which support them. This also means resisting the temptation to assume such an 
approach is necessarily a more ‘inclusive’ or ‘progressive’ mode of analysis. 
Instead, these scholars argue strongly for elevating it as a key cultural-political 
indicator and tool—especially as it can help us understand what Johnson and Scott 
call the ‘secret’ of border insights: ‘the border of identity, the limit between inside 
and outside’, a recommendation taken on here for IR in a changing world under new 
pressures.53
This stance is broadly in-line with a critical approach to IR that emphasises 
emancipatory agendas within a modem, but self-reflective, rationality. As Hoffman 
maintains, such a pluralistic ‘essence of rationality’ which is drawn from Habermas, 
‘entails a limitless invitation to criticism.. .pointing] to open ended knowledge 
which is continually subject to critical assessment’.54 In much the same way,
50 See Ulrich Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of Second Age of Modernity’, British 
Journal o f Sociology 51, no. 1 (2000): 79-105.
51 See Kenichi Ohmae, The End o f the Nation State (New York: Free Press, 1995).
52 See John Agnew, ‘Transnational Liberalism and the New Geopolitics of Power’, paper presented at 
the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Toronto, 20 March 1997 and ‘The 
Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory’, Review of 
International Political Economy 1 (1994): 53-80.
53 Johnson and Michaelsen, ‘Border Secrets’.
54 Mark Hoffman, ‘Conversations on Critical International Relations Theory’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 17, no. 1 (1988): 92.
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thinking about borders and limits in this way follows this critical, self-reflective 
route.
3.3 Bo r d er  Stu dies: Geopolitics
Continuing with the border as an underlying problematic, this section broadly 
examines Political Geography, particularly Geopolitics—its roots, conceptual basis, 
and connections with IR theory through new strands of critical thought. Geopolitics 
has a direct bearing on a borders-oriented research agenda in IR, chiefly because it is 
an organising approach to the study of political space. One of Geopolitics’ most 
salient contributions to IR may in fact be the manner in which its spatial problematic 
and disciplinary assumptions have informed some mainstream realist thinking in IR 
on the state and territoriality.
While understood in different ways historically, Geopolitics has traditionally 
been conceived of as the study of the geography of international relations, of foreign 
policy and territorial or strategic considerations, often in great power rivalries.55 
Among others, geographers like Isaiah Bowman and Alfred Mahan, Friedrich Ratzel 
and C.B. Fawcett were highly influential early on in the field, undertaking studies 
concerned with the vision, dynamics, and structure of the contemporary political 
map—and the state’s organic connection to territory (e.g., Raum for Ratzel) that 
extents to its frontiers—all generally imbued with considerations of power.56
It was Halford Mackinder—a ‘father’ of modem Political Geography— 
though, who established many of the outlines of modem Geopolitics and framed
* S7some early foundations in mainstream ER thought on territory and power. In 
establishing his ‘new’ conception of Geography, Sir Mackinder saw a world of zero- 
sum power games in a closed system consisting of blocs of states where one must 
‘think imperially...as a theatre for British activity’.58 In this ‘general struggle for
55 Simon Dalby and Gearoid O Tuathail, Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 1998); Gearoid 
O Tuathail, ‘Thinking Critically about Geopolitics’, in The Geopolitics Reader, eds. Gearoid 6  
Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge (London: Routledge, 1998); Harold Sprout and Margaret 
Sprout, ‘Geography and International Politics in an Era of Revolutionary Change’, Journal o f Conflict 
Resolution 4 (1960): 145-61.
56 See Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie (Berlin: Eugen Oberhummer, 1923). For commentary, 
see Hagain, ‘Geopolitics’, 491.
57 For representative work, see Halford Mackinder, ‘On the Scope and Methods of Geography’, 
Proceedings o f the Royal Geographical Society, NS9 (1887), 141-74; ‘The Physical Basis of Political 
Geography’, Scottish Geographical Magazine 6 (1890): 78-84; The Nations o f the World: An 
Elementary Study in Geography (London: George Philip and Son, 1910); and Democratic Ideals and 
Reality: A Study in the Politics o f Reconstruction (London: Constable and Company, 1919).
58 Halford Mackinder, ‘The Teaching of Geography from an Imperial Point of View, and the Use 
Which Could and Should be Made of Visual Instruction’, Geographical Teacher, no. 6 (1912): 83.
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national survival’, Mackinder, Mayhew notes, ‘allow[ed] geographical facts 
presented in narrative and visual forms to drive his political analyses’, and modelled 
political positions accordingly.59 The parallels of his thought with those of IR 
realism (and the assumptions a critical perspective would point to) could not be 
clearer.
This entire geopolitical tradition, then, began by understanding international 
politics as a unified, deterministic phenomenon influenced largely by geographical 
facts. Most often, Geopolitics was a state-centric, ‘non-discursive phenomenon’, 
somehow distinguished and objectively ‘above’ dominant social, political, and 
ideological narratives. The field tended to focus on the physical environment as the 
location (and determinant) for international politics and foreign policy. In this 
regard, Newman and Paasi remind us that ‘boundary studies have had a long, 
descriptive, and relatively non-theoretical history in geography’.60 Borders in 
Geopolitics were simply largely seen as lines delineating separate territories to be 
fought over. As O Tuathail suggests, Geopolitics, traditionally understood, 
‘promotes a spatial way of thinking that arranges different actors, elements, and 
locations simultaneously on a global chessboard’, much like mainstream realist ER.61
Much of this work and its assumptions, in fact, found its way into 
mainstream ER; like Lord Curzon’s writings, this corpus of Political Geography was 
reflective of a powerful mode of thought in the field from the 1930s. Many realist 
accounts in IR, as Goltmann’s illustrative period piece of 1951 suggests, draw
fk0)elements of their worldview from this kind of thinking. Donnelly’s new 
comprehensive survey of realism and International Relations, which examines the 
nature of power politics in the field, notes the influence of power, interest, and the 
state in realist accounts from Carr and Morgenthau in the first generation, to Waltz 
and Mearsheimer more recently. These, in part, owe some of their foundational 
concepts like balance of power to earlier developments in Political Geography 
including those made by Mackinder.
On a pedagogical level, these geographers’ ideas were also considered key 
for the study of international politics and for policy formulation. Coones has
59 R. Mayhew, ‘Halford Mackinder’s “New” Political Geography and the Geographical Tradition’, 
Political Geography, no. 19 (2000): 788.
60 David Newman and Anssi Paasi, ‘Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Boundary 
Narratives in Political Geography’, Progress in Human Geography 22, no. 2 (1998): 189.
61 O Tuathail, ‘Thinking Critically about Geopolitics’, 1.
62 See Jean Goltmann, ‘Geography and International Relations’, World Politics 3, no. 2 (1951): 53-73.
63 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000).
91
documented the heavy impact Mackinder’s conception of geography had in 
educational institutions and curricula.64 As early as 1948, Fifield set out in a 
fascinating and influential article on ‘The Introductory Course in International 
Relations’ to recommend the ‘ideas of men like Ratzel...[and] Mackinder’.65 In 
terms of application, Flanders, for example, advised in a wartime article that the 
‘balance of power approach was the use Mackinder intended should be made of his 
geopolitical analysis’ and its application meant a policy whereby ‘the United State 
exploit time-space-power relationships’.66 Such geopolitical sentiment was common 
in a good deal of mainstream post-War thinking in IR.
Geopolitics then grew in popularity during the Cold War as a codeword for 
the superpower struggle to dominate global politics through a broad cast of national 
interests manifested in diplomacy, military might, economic and political alliances, 
and ideology. At least in the U.S., the spatial strategy and spatial meaning of the 
Cold War (defined in terms of an official geopolitical enemy—the Soviet Union) 
became senseless when this era drew to a close and new issues and configurations 
emerged. Geopolitics is now being reformulated to move beyond dealing with only 
territorial conflict and instead towards non-statist political forms which pose new 
problems (ethnic conflict, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental 
degradation, for example). Some have represented this as the ‘New World Order’, 
the ‘End of History’, the ‘Coming Anarchy’, or the ‘Clash of Civilizations’, among 
others.67 But it remains very unclear if these, and other simple diagnoses of current 
‘geopolitics’, are on target. Instead, the global order is up for debate; its study has 
enjoyed a recent revival in contemporary discourse, because as O Tuathail maintains, 
‘in a shrinking and speeding world of intense time-space compression wrought by 
telecommunications revolutions and globalising economic networks and webs, the 
desire for perspectives offering “timeless insight” is stronger than ever’. We must, 
as O Tuathail asserts, however ‘refuse the rush to essentialize change and delimit it
64 Paul Coones, Mackinder’s ‘Scope and Methods o f Geography’ After a Hundred Years (Oxford: 
Oxford School of Geography, 1987).
65 Russell H. Fifield, ‘The Introductory Course in International Relations’, American Political Science 
Review 42, no. 6 (1948): 1193.
66 Dwight P. Flanders, ‘Geopolitics and American Post-War Policy’, Political Science Quarterly 60, 
no. 4 (1945): 580, 584.
67 See George H. Bush, ‘Toward a New World Order’, from Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the 
United States: George Bush (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990); Francis 
Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest 16 (summer 1989); Robert Kaplan, ‘The 
Coming Anarchy’, The Atlantic Monthly (February 1994); Samuel Huntington, The Clash of  
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). For an 
excellent discussion of this debate, see Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ‘“Civilization” on Trial’, 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 28, no. 1 (1999): 141-53.
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as a kind of geographical antagonism’ as ‘the best intellectual defence against the 
nostrums of geopoliticans seeking to “sell” us a world where the dramas are simple, 
the identities pure and the antagonisms clear’.69
'Critical* Geopolitics
Given the above, can Geopolitics offer anything to IR to help understand 
borders and identity under globalisation? Much, if we turn from traditional to 
critical Geopolitics. This new, critical movement in the field, spearheaded by O
70Tuathail, Dalby, Agnew, and Harley, among others, has emerged with some force. 
Those working in this school set out to determine the ‘politics of writing global 
space’ by unpacking traditional geographical assumptions in international political 
practice and theory. Politics is no longer understood as a struggle over a political 
map of nation-states but rather as discourse, ‘a culturally and politically varied way 
of describing, representing and writing about geography and international 
relations’.71 These scholars seek to
critically reconceptualize [Geopolitics] as a discursive practice by which 
intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to 
represent it as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples, and 
dramas.72
O Tuathail, for example, has recently undertaken a cogent analysis of 
Mackinder’s influence in the field.73 Similarly, like the work here, Radcliffe has 
sought innovative answers to the questions surrounding ‘multiple geographies of 
identities’—the relationships between national identities and space expressed in state 
actions and discourses.74 These kinds of critical approaches, like some of those 
emerging in IR, seek to ‘ask how the cartographic imagination of here and there,
68 O Tuathail, ‘Thinking Critically about Geopolitics’, 1.
69 Ibid., 104.
70 For representative work, see 6  Tuathail and Dalby, Rethinking Geopolitics-, John Agnew, 
Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics (London: Routledge, 1998).
71 6  Tuathail, ‘Rethinking Geopolitics’, 3.
72 Gearoid 6  Tuathail and John Agnew, ‘Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geographical 
Reasoning in American Foreign Policy’, in The Geopolitics Reader, eds. Gearoid O Tuathail, Simon 
Dalby, and Paul Routledge (London: Routledge, 1998), 80.
73 This critique is provided in Gearoid 6  Tuathail, ‘Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics 
and Risk Society’, Journal o f  Strategic Studies 22, no. 2-3 (1999): 107-24.
74 See Sarah Radcliffe, ‘Frontiers and Popular Nationhood: Geographies of Identity in the 1995 
Ecuador-Peru Border Dispute’, Political Geography 17, no. 3 (1998): 272-93.
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inside and outside...work to both facilitate some political possibilities and actions
n c
and exclude and silence others’.
This task is to understand dominant discourses which seek to represent their 
own truths and agendas, framed as non-objective ‘knowledge’ by elites as a political 
project. In reality, political spaces are far from natural or given phenomena and are 
created, in part, by particular knowledge production processes, driven by actors such 
as the media and political elites, thereby crafting a discourse which helps set the 
ontological categories in which politics is developed. In a similar critical vein, 
Agnew argues questions mainstream IR’s tendency to begin with certain ontological 
assumptions about statehood that can lead us to think of power as a historical 
constant; instead of reproducing this, he seeks in recent work to understand the
n/:
‘historically changing character and spatial structure of power’.
Discourse analysis, not surprisingly, is central to the critical Geopolitics 
project, as it is to this thesis. As will be discussed in the next chapter, discourses— 
modes of verbal and textual production—are virtual ‘sets of capabilities’ or ‘systems 
of possibility for knowledge’ which enable actors to realise agendas and ‘write’ 
international politics.77 They are textual and transitory, employed by those in 
positions of influence, such as writers, statesmen, officials, academics and others 
who act, comment, and help frame politics. This kind of knowledge takes a 
particularly important role in the design of foreign policy; rhetoric (i.e., a ‘New 
World Order’, a ‘Line in the Sand’, the ‘Evil Empire’ just to note a few key phrases 
of American foreign policy discourse of the past years) reconceptualises and thus 
helps reformulates political objectives. This, according to scholars interested in 
critical Geopolitics, has tremendous implications for the formulation of enemies, 
objectives, and the general economic and political restructuring now occurring.
Like some of the border studies work in literary theory and cultural studies, 
critical Geopolitical approaches present problematics based on resistance and power
no
relationships. They are premised on the Foucaultian notion that ‘the exercise of
75 Simon Dalby, ‘A Critical Geopolitics of Global Governance’, paper presented at the Annual 
Conference of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March 2000, 2.
76 John Agnew, ‘Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity, and 
Movement in World Politics’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): 499.
77 Robert Philip Weber, Basic Content Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985), 69. On discourses, 
see chapter four and Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1980); see also 
Richard Ashley, ‘The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory of 
International Politics’, Alternatives 14 (1987): 403-34; James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro, 
Intemational/Intertextual Relations (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989); and Michael Shapiro, 
The Politics o f Representation (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).
78 O Tuathail, ‘Thinking Critically’, 10.
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power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces 
effects of power’.79 Examining these forms of resistance which impact identities and 
borders and manifest themselves in the ‘orders’ of the current environment will be a 
central task for critical Geopolitics and the associated IR research proposed here. 
Some of the tools applied later on, for instance, seek to ‘unmask’ this discourse in 
theoretical and empirical terms. Much of the work being done in this area is 
concerned with finding ways to ‘move beyond the state when trying to map domestic 
and international developments’ and seeks to avoid ‘privileging of a Western, 
masculinized, seeing subject as the authoritative, transcendent reader, and 
practitioner of international politics’.80 These scholars often work along post­
structuralist lines to identify discourses and practices of power which are played out 
in international politics.
Thus, this body of work is important for this study for several reasons. First, 
it provides an alternate viewpoint and approach to the study of borders that is taken 
up with the identities/borders/orders heuristic tool and applied in the case studies. 
By reconceptualising political space as a field of power relationships and discourse, 
critical Geopolitics opens a boundary study like this one to question inclusion and
exclusion and ‘boundedness’, also important in any critical International Relations
81theory that seeks to challenge some realist notions. The work pushes boundary 
studies beyond legalistic analysis to instead seek the less studied, but complicated 
practices of writing space; O Tuathail puts it well: ‘the geographical heterogeneity 
and hybridity of the world is always much messier than our geopolitical maps of 
it’.82 Critical Geopolitics has thus helped move some geographic study beyond 
modernity’s ‘territorial trap’, the image of the world as strict and distinct territorial 
units Agnew eloquently pointed out in 1994. Second, while geographers typically 
take boundaries to be products of the territoriality of states, ‘not least because 
geographic process of socialization have taught us to acknowledge the state 
system—a spatial system which is characterized by more or less exclusive 
boundaries’, we can understand the discursive power relationships behind the setting
79 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 52.
80 Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (London: Reaktion Books, 1997), 120.
81 See, for example, Andrew Linklater, The Transformation o f Political Community (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1998). Linklater’s work, whilst not without its shortcomings in terms o f questions of 
universalism and a mostly exclusive focus on states as the sites of transformation, does seek a ‘post- 
Westphalian’ vision of multiple authorities, identities, and citizenship and thus problematises bounded 
space.
8 Gearoid O Tuathail, ‘Thinking Critically about Geopolitics’, in The Geopolitics Reader, eds. 
Gearoid O Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge (London: Routledge, 1998), 111.
83 Agnew, ‘The Territorial Trap’.
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of these boundaries which are indicative of political limits and practices.84 Third, in 
relation to identity and closely linked to the concept of multilayered identities is the 
idea of ‘multiple geographies’. As Rose and Routledge suggest, ‘geographies are 
about the interwoven processes of symbolic meanings, communicative processes, 
political discourse, cultural practices...physical settings...and envisioned desires and 
hopes’.85 Constructed in part by identities and power dynamics, geographies, then, 
can be layered and contested. Finally, we need to understand the complex and 
important relationship between cartographic practices and political decisions, 
realising there is nothing fixed or final about a historical map, and that mapping is a 
structure of power which connects territory with social order. Both case studies will 
illustrate these ideas.
3.4 Borders a n d  In t e r n a tio n a l  Relations
Armed with a rough sketch of how borders and space are being theorised in 
other disciplines, we can now turn to a more engaged and tailored examination of 
how borders are treated in International Relations. Surprisingly, as Donnan and
or
Wilson argue, ‘very few scholars have sustained an interest’ in borders in IR. But 
space is one of the bedrock concepts that predicates international politics; from the 
earliest attempts at philosophising about space, such as over the polis in Plato, to 
Lockean social contract theory proclaiming a function of government is to arbitrate 
private property—control over space has been a key underlying problem for IR. The 
differentiation of space, indeed, is the structure upon which the territorially based 
system of states rests; boundaries make space possible and, as a dynamic of
R7inside/outside, create the realm of international relations. Mainstream IR theory 
has often simply accepted a limited understanding of the concept which understands 
it as a ‘container’ of politics and identities, leading to approaches dominated by (and 
partially reproducing) a very particular view of states as closed, fixed, security 
minded units. The bounded state is the standard starting point for the majority of
84 Newman and Paasi, ‘Fences and Neighbours’, 187; Jean Gottman, The Significance of Territory 
(Charlottesville, VA: The University Press of Virginia, 1973); Sack, Human Territoriality; Peter 
Taylor, Political Geography (London: Longman, 1993).
85 Gillian Rose and Paul Routledge, ‘Scotland’s Geographies: Problematizing Places, Peoples, and 
Identities’, Scotlands 3 (winter 1996): 1.
86 Donnan and Wilson, ‘An Anthropology of Frontiers’, 7.
87 See R.B.J Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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analyses in IR.88 But it is important to remember this is a process of social 
construction. Scholars, policy makers, and observers therefore need to ensure that 
these concepts are not reified or accepted carte blanche.
What the discipline does well with the concept is recognising the political 
nature of space. Keith and Pile highlight this idea in a recent collection devoted to 
exploring this idea:
We believe...that all spatialities are political because they are the (covert) medium 
and (disguised) expression of asymmetrical relations of power...there must be a 
commitment to the continual questioning of location, movement, and direction—to 
challenging hegemonic constructions of place, of politics, and of identity.89
Foucault—even more eloquently—elaborates:
Securing space, in whatever form, is a political act...The occupying of space is an 
assertion of power, and continual displacement is power’s spatial effect.90
And thus the basic problematic for both traditional and modem border studies in IR 
is set out.
"Traditional3 and "Modern3 Border Studies in IR
To understand the spatial dimension of politics, most IR scholars have 
grappled with interstate boundaries. Borders are symbolic and material delineations 
of space and thus representative of territoriality. Classical Political Science has 
generally drawn rigid conceptualisations of the state, primarily concerned with 
territory and borders as areas of conflict and the modem state system, centred on 
concepts of nationalism, territoriality, and sovereignty.91 ‘Traditional’ border studies 
with these concerns are marked by a legal and empirical work often focused on 
conflict over disputed borders, particularly as the number of borders in the world 
increases. Spener and Staudt call this ‘old-style border studies’, complaining it has 
a ‘relatively narrow spatial agenda’.
88 See Richard Ashley, ‘Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 17, no. 2 (1988): 227-62; Shapiro and 
Alker, Challenging Boundaries.
89 Michael Keith and Steve Pile, ‘Introduction’ and ‘Conclusion: Towards New Radical 
Geographies’, in Place and the Politics o f Identity, eds. Michael Keith and Steve Pile (London: 
Routledge, 1993), 220.
90 Foucault, Power/Knowledge.
91 Raimondo Strassoldo, ‘The Study of Boundaries: A System-Oriented, Multidisciplinary, 
Bibliographic Essay’, Jerusalem Journal o f International Relations 2, no. 3 (1977): 97.
92 Ibid.
93 David Spener and Kathleen Staudt, ‘The View from the Frontier: Theoretical Perspectives 
Undisciplined’, in The U.S.-Mexico Border: Transcending Divisions, Contesting Identities, eds. 
David Spener and Kathleen Staudt (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 14.
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Scholars working along more pluralist lines in ER engaged in ‘modem’ 
border studies such as Keamey, Strassoldo, and Taylor, however, have 
conceptualised new ways of looking at the world system and borders that focus on 
socio-economic aspects such as community, interdependence, and 
transnationalism.94 These approaches assess the way the world is changing because 
of growth in global interactions illustrated in the previous chapter.95
The globalist ‘end of the state’ argument, or at least movement towards it 
(despite many debates about the empirical extent of changes), in particular has 
opened up border analysis beyond the realist’s static, statist framework, widening 
numerous avenues for the study of transnational border processes and interactions. 
Giddens’s concept of the state as a ‘power container’ of economic, cultural, and 
social forces is altered by Taylor and others who see it now as a ‘leaking 
container’.96 In that sense, clearly, the state’s Teaks’ are springing at its borders. 
But this sort of thinking has had a paradoxical effect: it reinforces the conceptual 
‘state container’ idea, e.g., that states are the only given forms of political 
organisation. For those who take further steps beyond the state, such as Mandaville 
and Soguk, other kinds of alternative, non-state politics are emerging which cross 
borders.97 And all of these pose considerable questions about the relationships 
between borders, territory, and identity.
In this ‘modem’ branch of border studies in IR, interstate boundaries around 
the world are considered ‘filters’ of transnational flows whose ‘mesh’ varies in size 
and composition. Borders in this conception may be zones of transition, separation, 
or integration which include or exclude. Sometimes this occurs in a highly 
contradictory way, such as practices which allow free transit of capital but not labour 
over a particular international boundary. Moreover, state control may paradoxically 
be strongest at a vulnerable border amidst transnational changes. Boundaries, then, 
within this school of border studies, are understood as empirical manifestations of 
state power and territoriality.
94 Strassoldo, ‘The Study of Boundaries’, 384.
95 Michael Keamey, ‘Borders and Boundaries of State and Self at the End of Empire’, Journal of 
Historical Sociology 4, no. 1 (1991): 52-75; Peter Taylor, ‘The State as Container: Territoriality in 
the Modem World-System’, Progress in Human Geography 18 (1994): 151-62.
96 Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity, 1985); Taylor, ‘The State as 
Container’, 157
97 See Mandaville, ‘Territory and Translocality’ and Nevzat Soguk and Geoffrey Whitehall, 
‘Wandering Grounds: Transversality, Identity, Territoriality, and Movement’, Millennium: Journal o f 
International Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): 675-98.
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The approach to border studies offered in this study—whilst depending 
deeply on the core problematic of territoriality and the ‘mobile’ ‘flows’ of late 
modernity discussed in the prior chapter—goes one step further than this, along what 
might be considered critical lines. To illustrate, consider two IR scholars of note, 
David Campbell and Michael Shapiro, who bring important assets to border studies 
in IR theory. The begin in their work with Richard Ashley’s contention that where a 
boundary exists is not the question for IR, but rather the issue is what conditions and 
practices produce and naturalise it.98 Campbell understands foreign policy as a 
collection of discourses which create boundaries to produce territoriality and 
identity.99 Politics, he writes, is a practice of ‘writing space’, of setting frames and 
limits of the political; in effect, drawing borders. Shapiro, in another post-positivist 
account, seeks to follow from the scholarship of Derrida and Levinas to critique 
‘sovereignty’s moral cartography’.100 By ‘unreading’ global histories and opposing 
dominant spatial discourses, he seeks to recover other forms of bordering practices, 
other kinds of socio-political organisation. This involves unpacking existing, 
geographically-tied ethics (such as the moral worth of the state) which is primarily 
premised on dominant geopolitical traditions of sovereignty in the classical school. 
From his work, we receive important reminders that territorial practices have largely 
been representations of overriding ethical and political problematics, such as 
European policies against the other—and often the imposing of a universalising, 
spatial narrative of identity imbued with a particular ethical resonance that may 
obscure other alternative configurations.101
So whilst the approach here incorporates this ‘modem’ school of border 
studies, especially work which develops the transnational perspective, like Shapiro, 
it tries to go further by incorporating this critical perspective which questions the
1 0 9representation of borders and practices in the international system. Nor does the 
thesis take the state container idea as necessarily central to research, but rather is 
open to the kind of heterogeneous border theorising elaborated earlier in this chapter.
98 See Ashley, ‘Untying the Sovereign State’, 227-62.
99 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics o f Identity 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).
100 Michael Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures o f War (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), 171. See also the important work edited by Michael Shapiro and Hayward 
Alker, Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996).
101 Ibid., 172-209.
102 For examples of transnational communities developing, see Kearney, ‘Borders and Boundaries’. 
Kearney examines how borders are being eroded but argues difference is still produced in 
anthropological terms along boundaries.
99
This is in line with Tomblin’s appeal for ‘thinking critically about borders...in an age
1 A -l
of shifting boundaries and paradigms’.
This view is partly inspired by a critical theory perspective in IR, important 
since it renders identity, inclusion, exclusion, and boundedness problematic and 
disputes (or reflexively re-evaluates) space-identity relationships. This critique, 
headed recently by Linklater, seems a worthwhile project for the study of ‘identities, 
borders, and orders’ that characterise the global environment.104 This tact can also 
seek to understand and question borders as sets of practices and discourses which 
are not confined to material state borders; borders manifest themselves in a variety of 
discourses and practices, which are often symbolic. Territoriality can be justified 
through many discourses and narratives, including imagery, legislation, popular 
culture, and so forth, practices often exuded from the ‘centres’ The next chapter on 
methodological tools, in fact, focuses on narrative analysis with this in mind. This 
more critical approach gives us additional conceptual resources to understand the 
complicated and changing meanings of borders and how this translates politically.
Our approach eschews taking ‘the border’ for granted or associating it with 
an exclusively progressive agenda but instead probing the limits of diversity and 
inclusion. Instead, we can understand borders as sites of cultural production which 
are tied to and utilised by states; they extend, modify, and cross oppositional socio- 
spatial consciousness, sometimes reinforcing state identity, sometimes offering more 
flexible or hybrid versions. The border becomes both an end and a filter between 
systems. The step offered here, through problematising the border itself, questions 
the regulatory forces of inclusion and exclusion production along it, accepting the 
concept of the border works at many levels: the cultural, spatial, symbolic, 
psychological, social, and political. Placing the work within this transdisciplinary 
emphasis on limits reminds us of the complexities of difference and heterogeneity 
operating in many borderlands (and even ‘centres’) today.
More importantly, however, the approach focuses our attention on the forces 
and processes which produce given outcomes. By denaturalising the concept of the 
border, analysis can be sharper, less assuming, and perhaps more insightful. The 
objective is to unpack phenomena taken for granted in the geographical ‘writing’ of 
political space. Such an evaluation would be premised on the notion that some
103 Stephen G. Tomblin, ‘Shifting Boundaries and Borderlands Discourses’, Acadiensis 23, no. 1
(1993): 203.
104 See Andrew Linklater, The Transformation o f Political Community (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
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borders are necessary to respect difference, but perhaps question those that reproduce 
the conditions for conflict.105
However, the single biggest problem with existing attempts in IR and related 
fields to construct a theory of international borders, such as those by Strassoldo and 
Martinez, is the fact that they lack immersion within a larger social theory, especially 
one that deals with change. While not attempting to undertake the task of 
developing such theory, this study does modestly seek to embed IR discussions of 
borders within a reflexive understanding of modem territoriality and identity: 
processes and relations, such as regulation and control (both discursive and 
material), sustain interstate boundaries and identities. Moreover, the thesis attempts 
to develop the important idea that within the socio-political realm, all borders are 
constructed phenomena, historically contingent, and dependent on continual forms 
of political and social production to exist. They are not inevitable or unalterable. 
They cannot be reified as the edges of static, essentialised nation-state ‘containers’ 
nor can policies which regulate them be evaluated unless the discourses which frame 
such practices and constructions are examined.
3.5 Co n c l u d in g  R emarks
This chapter began against the backdrop of an international environment 
increasingly characterised by system ‘mobilities’ under globalisation that are 
affecting identities, borders, and states in interesting, sometimes contradictory ways. 
To a large extent, disciplines attempt to reflect their perceptions of their political and 
social worlds and times. Border studies in IR and elsewhere, until recently, indeed 
reflected an older worldview predicated on particular static geographic and territorial 
assumptions. The study of borders in IR in the past was largely non-theoretical and 
historical, concerned chiefly with static delineations and disputes over pre-given 
legal Tines’ over the globe which went hand-in-hand with a realist-inspired 
understanding of the state system as the chief level of analysis. The deeper 
dimensions of the discursive and material factors inherent in borders was largely 
ignored as they rapidly became ‘invisible’ and highly naturalised phenomena or 
‘givens’. Unfortunately, as a result few proper border studies exist in IR.
But by demonstrating the usefulness of the ‘border’ concept in a more 
‘mobile’-oriented approach, by breaking it from its traditional Geopolitical and
105 Strassoldo, ‘The Study of Boundaries’. See also ibid.
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realist IR moorings, we instead can draw on useful theorisation of the concept 
occurring in other disciplines. Cultural Studies, broadly defined, first moved 
theorisation of the concept of the border forward, seeking to understand the spatial 
dimensions of identity and the power relationships which surround the cultural 
aspects of borders. Anthropologists have examined the interplay between culture 
and borders, and the dimensions of difference and conflict which sometimes result 
from their interaction. In literary theory, borders were critically problematised as 
arbitrary and moves were then made to identify them as sometimes oppressive or 
homogenising representations of dominant political and economic systems. 
Together, these studies invited a more subtle understanding of difference, of fluid, or 
multi-dimensional identities in a world which grows more heterogeneous and old 
Enlightenment fantasies of single territories to match unified, homogeneous 
populations are increasingly irrelevant in reality—but are ideas that still are major 
political weapons in popular discourse.
Even in a complementary field to IR like Geopolitics, where one might 
expect to find useful explorations of borders, until recently border studies were also 
moribund. In fact, the realpolitik, realist-oriented work of Mackinder and others was 
highly influential in the foundations of mainstream IR, lending weight to concepts 
like balance of power and national interest formulated in part by geographical 
determinism. But the new ‘Critical Geopolitics’, which focus on the ‘writing’ of 
political space through discursive practices has sought deeper understandings of 
international boundaries and the political-social process which maintain and change 
them, especially with conditions of globalisation. The sensitivity paid here to 
discourse and its impact on collective identity and the way power is accordingly 
exercised across and through boundaries globally is important for ER.
This corpus of work from outside IR offers multiple insights for an inquiry 
within the discipline concerning territoriality and identity, specifically the processes 
of inclusion and exclusion over state boundaries. First, the emphasis on seeing 
borders as a ‘key concept’ which are complicated, contradictory, and 
multidimensional and fruitful opportunities for social analysis and theorisation is 
prescriptive; they must be unpacked and analysed on their own terms, as is done 
here. These works have ‘opened’ the concept of the border, creating space for 
rigorous thinking on the real implications of boundaries on the ground. 
Particularised case studies of borders in international studies, then, must be evaluated 
in this way but also within larger conceptual and historical contexts as well. Second,
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on this point, seeing borders as inherent constructed metapattems in social and 
political life—as limits which are both spatial and non-spatial in nature—opens up 
lines of inquiry into the connections into other forms of difference, such as identity. 
Third, the work re-introduces the element of power in forging discourse and 
difference across and around boundaries, both international and social, a point which 
will be taken up in the next chapter. Finally, when work in these other disciplines is 
able to view border discourses in a critical manner, this becomes useful in 
questioning dominant direct state/identity correlations, or simple understandings of 
culture by problematising borders of all kinds, as well as the material and discursive 
processes which support them.
The more innovative thinking on borders in IR is increasingly situated in the 
more critical sectors of the field, especially those informed by transdisciplinary work 
and those concerned with the implications of globalisation outlined in the pervious 
chapter. This kind of ‘border thinking’ advocated here understands borders as 
interesting, constructed and contested sites of political and social production which 
are tied to and utilised by states; they impact socio-spatial consciousness, sometimes 
reinforcing state identity, sometimes promoting more flexible or hybrid versions. 
Borders become seen as both ends and filters between states and systems, as 
metaphors of identity and difference, and ultimately as complicated, 
multidimensional phenomena. They are thus opened as ripe avenues for research on 
limits in social and political life. This thinking, coupled with chapter two’s 
examination of the contemporary implications of change and continuity for 
territoriality and identity, constitutes the contextual locus for the balance of the 
thesis. Moreover, it points us to look next for appropriately tailored, specific 
theoretical tools that can structure productive empirical studies of borderlands as 
well as larger identity and order issues in ER. The following chapter undertakes this 
task.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
To o ls  fo r  Ex plo r a tio n : Th e  
Id e n t it ie s /B o r d e r s /O rders Tr ia d  a n d  N arrative
Analysis
4.0 In t r o d u c t io n
Moving from the wider framework of border studies provided in the previous 
chapter, this chapter follows on with the identification and articulation of specific 
research tools. First, it helps introduce and justify the ‘identities/borders/orders’ 
(i/b/o) project as the basis to explore the issues of borders within IR. The project, 
under development by Yosef Lapid and other border-oriented researchers, launches a 
heuristic or orienting tool—known as the i/b/o triad—which focuses on the processes 
and relations associated with these three ‘key* concepts as they apply to international 
political and social questions. Inspired by new ‘border thinking’, the triad 
encourages a controlled evaluation of the dynamics of identities, borders, and orders 
at a moment increasingly impacted by globalisation and fluidity.
The i/b/o project and its supportive triad are deliberately designed to be open 
to a variety of methodological or theoretical approaches. It is also amenable to 
research that converges on specific relationships between the concepts. Before 
exploring wider ‘order’ questions and connections in the conclusion, the thesis’ case 
focus on a specific ‘leg’ of the triad: the interplay between identity (i)—particularly 
conceptions of national identity—and borders (b) as social and political processes. 
The chapter argues that there is a strong co-constitutive, socialising link between 
borders and collective identity within territorial discourses world-wide, and this, in 
turn has implications for international order. State re- and deterritorialisation 
policies and narratives are some of the methods of inclusion and exclusion that 
create differentiation along the triad, particularly important in collective identity 
construction. This theoretical chapter, then, sets out the basis for the subsequent 
empirical discussions developed later in the thesis concerning the U.S.-Mexico and 
U.S.-Canadian borderlands.
Collective identity is therefore investigated by considering the impact of the 
spatial dimension of politics—which involves settling control over particular 
territory—on historical dynamics of identity change and constitution. This is an 
undertheorised and sometimes misunderstood link. The ‘i-b’ concept is closely
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related to the idea of ‘socio-spatial consciousness’, first elaborated by Paasi, 
whereby individuals and communities are socialised as members of a territorially 
bound community.1 Specifically, the i/b/o triad will be applied to help understand 
the impact of modem space and place, enforced through official state practices and 
discourses, on identity construction for those living in borderlands.
The analysis then proceeds with a discussion of nationalism as a particular 
and powerful political form of collective identity mobilisation, impacting large 
components of the global order. Nationalism is an especially salient concept in 
contemporary discussions of IR because it is an important form of identification, 
especially when paired with the state; as is well-noted, the nationalist surge has 
strongly erupted in the globalising post-Cold War world. The theoretical disjunction 
between territory and nationalism is especially important in the current mobile- 
oriented global environment.2 This disjunction is examined through the symbolic 
and material impact of boundaries on identity in the socio-political construction of 
‘imagined communities’ of bounded space, often forged against transnational 
pressures or the other.
In an increasingly transnational environment, the ‘sites’ where such tensions 
of national identity and order in real people’s lives emerge are often borderlands. 
These junctions of the state system can be where nationalism—used here to mean 
state substantiation and consolidation of identity on civic (and to a certain extent 
ethnic) grounds—becomes a political force brought into relief against an other. In 
fact, this chapter argues because it is a powerful and often problematic expression of 
identity which can be constructed and manipulated politically against the other in 
such territorial discourses, nationalism in border situations presents important policy 
implications. This is particularly true in both case studies of this thesis: the U.S.- 
Mexico and U.S.-Canadian borderlands. Thus, a necessary, but cursory review of 
the rich literature on nationalism (limited to its application to borders and the other) 
is warranted, as is a working and limited definition which acknowledges the 
problematic (and often misused) nature of the term.
Second, to help undertake research to understand some of these i/b/o 
relationships, the balance of the chapter introduces narrative analysis. This is a 
preliminary methodology designed to partially unlock some of the language, power,
1 Anssi Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies o f the
Finnish-Russian Border (Chichester: John Wiley, 1996).
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and spatial relationships—within the triad—which help set the political conditions 
for particular territoriality and identity positions. The focus is on the narratives of 
representation, the ways in which language and symbolism articulate and impact 
policy problems and viewpoints and then authorise possible solutions.
Narratives which surround borders and territorial practices serve as symbolic 
resources for collective identity formation, helping constitute our understandings and 
naturalisations of the boundaries around us by setting the fields of interpretation and 
possibility. This is, in a sense, the politics of ‘writing space’. In doing research 
informed by this interpretive methodology, we can begin to evaluate changes in 
collective identity when boundaries are ‘re-inscribed’ through particular socio­
political practices that are articulated in official state ‘texts’ and manifested, for
•i
example, in securitisation policies.
The chapter asks several research questions: given the reflexive nature of 
political territoriality in some situations, and its accompanying deterritorialisation or 
reterritorialisation policy impulses, how do we come to terms with contemporary 
territoriality and identity patterns, especially as exemplified in local experiences 
(e.g., in borderlands) of globalisation? What theoretical frameworks are in place or 
can be developed to study borders and identity in more revealing ways, more closely 
probing their complicated and multifaceted nature and their relationships to global 
order? What tools might be available to make theoretically informed and controlled 
empirical studies of border practices (such as policy and discourse) in the U.S.- 
Canada and U.S.-Mexico cases, as well as unlocking the larger implications for 
international order such processes evoke?
4.1 T h e  Id e n t it ie s / B o rders/O rders H euristic  Triad
This section details the development and application of the 
identities/borders/orders (i/b/o) analytical triad to study global patterns of change and 
provides some justification as to its necessity.4 This discussion then proceeds with 
an overview of how it works with the two specific case studies. The i/b/o triad is an
2 Yosef Lapid, ‘Theorizing the “National” in International Relations Theory: Reflections on 
Nationalism and Neorealism’, in International Organization: A Reader, eds. Friedrich Kratochwil and 
Edward Mansfield (New York: HarperCollins, 1994).
3 On ‘re-inscribing’ territoriality, see John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing 
Modernity in International Relations’, International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 139-74.
4 As noted in the introduction, the i/b/o project owes its genesis to Yosef Lapid but is being 
theoretically developed and expanded in different directions by other scholars as well. The two case 
studies included here are some of the first original empirical work at the triad’s intersections.
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open, orienting, heuristic tool part of a larger research project designed to produce 
new theoretical insights by gathering and then coupling—in a triadic but non- 
hierarchical way—three key concepts in International Relations and then analysing 
the resulting interrelated and co-constitutive relationships. It is thus constructed to 
try and provide new research results in addition to pushing theorising of the concepts 
themselves further.5 Thinking in terms of the triad helps focus and narrow scholarly 
attention on particular, illustrative facets of a complex, dynamic international 
environment.
Before proceeding with an explication of the triad, some initial rationale and 
justification for this new project is of import at the outset. Amid all kinds of projects 
advertised as ‘new’ in IR, why this one? Why do we need this triad in IR now? 
What can it do for IR beyond that which existing resources already provide? Why 
wed this triad with a narrative approach?
Whilst few new undertakings in the field could completely insulate 
themselves from a thorough ‘justification’ critique, the i/b/o project group has 
several reasons to maintain cautious optimism that some of this sort of criticism may 
be overcome if some innovation does occur. First, the i/b/o project takes as a 
starting assumption that new or improved conceptual devices or vocabularies are 
necessary given a period of possible transformation under globalisation, as chapter 
two suggests. The current ‘problematic salience’ of the triad is deduced from a 
variety of policy issues: to suggest but a few, fragmentation and integration 
developments such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, African 
states, and regional integration (EU, NAFTA) along with the implications of mass 
movement from migration, refugees, capital, and information.
While these are not all ‘new’ issues, as Lapid maintains, they are increasingly 
problematic because in the post-Cold War era, i/b/o issues are increasingly driven by 
patterns of ‘complexity’ and ‘fluidity’.6 Developments that involve contradictions 
and changes in identity (ethnic conflict, for example), borders (globalisation, for 
example), and the international order (configurations of ‘nation’ and ‘state’, for 
instance) pose these sorts of puzzles. IR has begun to respond to these problematics 
in what he calls the ‘X without Y’ and/or the ‘W plus Z’ fashion; recent publications 
in the discipline discuss ‘Sovereignty without Territoriality’, ‘Nations without
5 See Yosef Lapid, ‘Identities/Borders/Orders: A Rationale for a New Voyage in IR Theory’, in 
Identities, Borders, Orders: New Directions in International Relations Theory, eds. Mathias Albert, 
David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).
6 Ibid.
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Borders’, or ‘Order without the Other’, or ‘glocalisation’ and ‘fragmagration’. 
While these suggest a new problematisation or focus, they unfortunately deploy a 
simplistic ‘either/or’ dynamic that can miss some nuances of contemporary 
transformation.
Furthermore, system mobilities (diasporas, migration, transnational economic 
actors) suggest a need to problematise both identity and place, and then look at any 
overarching changes in the international system. The clear correlation between who 
one is and where one lives has been deeply ingrained in the modem worldview, a 
pattern that extends far back in history. For centuries, people tended to stay put. 
Kinship structures dictated that roots be laid in a particular dimension of space— 
perhaps a hamlet, region, fiefdom, or more recently, a nation-state. The lack of 
advanced forms of communication and transportation limited mobility and the 
transfer of ideas; most people kept their lives (and thus their identities) tethered to a 
territory. This is now under possible transformation.
Given the complexity, puzzles, and turbulence of the current period where 
international politics is increasingly transitory and uncertain, however, previously 
easy categorisations may not be able to come to terms with a changing global 
environment. But interest in the relationships between identity, space, gender, 
representation, and difference consolidating in the field of border studies discussed 
in the previous chapter has, according to some scholars, Ted to very fruitful 
unraveling of older, enlightenment “ways of seeing’” .7 In the end, an ‘engaged 
pluralist’ approach, considering multiple techniques of inquiry, and an emphasis on 
ontological, not exclusively methodological issues, seems wise.8 The i/b/o project is 
being developed in that spirit.
Three Key Concepts
Of all the concepts used to understand the social and political world, why 
isolate and gather these three? Because they are abstract or generic ideas generalised 
from a particular instances or phenomena, certain ‘key’ concepts should be adopted 
for study because they canvasses an important slice of reality. When looking at
7 Jos Boys, ‘Beyond Maps and Metaphors: Re-thinking the Relationships Between Architecture and 
Gender’, in New Frontiers o f Space, Bodies and Gender, ed. Rosa Ainley (London: Routledge, 1998), 
204
8 For a further discussion of issues of approach, see Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The 
Return o f Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner,
1996).
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many aspects of the international political realm, the broad, interrelated concepts of 
‘identity’, ‘border’, and ‘order’ seem to characterise a surprising amount of activity.
In the case of ‘identity’, instead of seeing it as an appendix to basic social 
structures or an epiphenomenal phenomena which would eventually give way to 
larger universalisation projects, as traditional IR scholars once did, identity emerged 
after the Cold War with increased status in a field that usefully began to take a 
‘cultural turn’.9 From the question of identity, it may be suggested, many other 
issues flow. And indeed, this concept will maintain its centrality because of its 
existential, fundamental nature and its continued—if always contested—application 
in various socio-political practices, from conflict to popular culture and 
demographics. The increased political relevance of difference in a more 
heterogeneous world has gone hand in hand with renewed wider theoretical 
engagement with identity in the field.
The salience and richness of the ‘borders’ concept should be clear from the 
previous discussion in chapters two and three, so no additional space will be spent on 
it here. With the resurgence of the concept in other fields of social analysis, it seems 
apt to include it in an ER study, because, like identity, borders too are ever-lasting 
components of any bound political community—and phenomena which are always 
‘crossed’ in some interesting way. Moreover, they are universal experiences in 
many social and political realms; researching them, as Keith and Pile point out, can 
reveal ‘injustices and old polarities, naturalized in our imagined geographies where 
everybody is ascribed a popular place, [which] can be deconstructed through the 
politics of location’.10 Because they posit the limits of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, of self 
and other, as this thesis illustrates, we can use them as vehicles for many kinds of 
research.
Including borders on the same level as the more established concepts of 
identities and orders may be surprising to some in IR, particularly given its non- 
theoretical and unremarkable conceptual background in the field. However, as 
indicated earlier, the concept’s productivity lies in revealing questions of difference 
and territoriality in many social and political classifications and interactions.
The inclusion of ‘orders’ in the triad should be clear to most ER scholars, as 
this is one of the ‘bedrock’, traditional issues of inquiry in the field, connoting 
political control and form or generally alternatives to formlessness in the system (or
9 See Yosef Lapid, ‘Culture’s Ship’, in The Return o f Culture and Identity.
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in extreme cases, anarchy). Many of the great questions of war and peace, 
governance, regulation, diplomacy, and international regimes, to name but a few, 
concern order—its components, norms, actors, direction, and changes. Debate over 
the nature of the emerging post-Cold War ‘order’ or ‘disorder’, for example, or the 
impact of globalisation seems to dominate the field. Post-Cold War foreign policy 
structures all, in some way, try to come to terms with what the emerging ‘order’ 
actually is indeed and how it can be dealt with. As economic and social expansion, 
instability, and change emerge as foci of policy considerations (markedly differing 
from prior state-centric and strategic encounters between superpowers), questions 
and descriptions of ‘order change’ are proffered with increased frequency by many 
IR scholars, including Kratochwil, Ruggie, Duchacek, Taylor, Rosenau, among 
many others. One common strain in their thinking is a sense that the international 
order is being altered and, somehow, possibly integrated by transnational forces, 
democratisation, a globalising political economy, and increased socio-cultural 
transaction and, generally, some sort of change.11 The resulting questions of order, 
from multi-level governance, to regimes, to splintered federalism, suggest a world 
where anarchy, norms, and interaction may be increasingly socially constructed 
factors that can be reflexively understood.12 Indeed, many of these issues of social 
and political constitution are being intriguingly theorised within what has become 
known as the ‘constructivist’ school in ER which is rising in prominence as the so- 
called new ‘middle ground’ of the discipline.13 Regardless of approach, order should 
be also considered a ‘lasting’ concept as any particular ‘world order’ is a temporary 
and contingent situation.
10 Michael Keith and Steve Pile, ‘Introduction’, in Place and the Politics o f Identity, eds. Michael 
Keith and Steve Pile (London: Routledge, 1993), 1.
11 For a survey of these, see John A. Hall and T. V. Paul, eds., International Order and the Future o f  
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Third Try at 
World Order? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War’, Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 
4 (1994): 553-70; and Philip F. Kelly, ‘The Geographies and Politics of Globalization’, Progress in 
Human Geography 23, no. 3 (1999): 359-401.
12 See Stefano Guzzini, ‘A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations’, European 
Journal o f International Relations 6, no. 2 (2000): 147-82.
13 On constructivism and also the theory vis-a-vis the state, see Emmanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle 
Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, European Journal o f International Relations 3, no. 1
(1997): 319-63; Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, 
World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 324-48; Ted Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in International 
Relations Theory’, International Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 171-200; and Thomas J. Biersteker and 
Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996).
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Analysis o f the Triad
But why assemble these three concepts together in this manner? The i/b/o 
project envisions the grouping will be productive for several reasons. First, as Lapid 
asserts,
they form a triad because they are not merely related to, but strongly implicated in, 
each other. It follows that, if we want to study problems associated with one of 
these concepts, we cannot avoid—or, at least, we can richly benefit from—also 
considering the other two.14
Thus, the nexus of the concepts are interrelated in an interesting way because they 
are co-constituting, not simply associated with one another in some way. They are 
best studied as processes in relation. These are triangular relationships that tie, 
ironically almost ‘circularly’ to one another. Because the triad probes interrelated, 
mutually constituted relationships in space and time, it represents the potential for 
opening up new directions in social theory. Natter and Jones, articulating support for 
such a rationale agree:
inasmuch as social relations constitute and embed both identities and space, 
theorizing the linkages between these moments is an important task for social 
theory.15
The i/b/o triad, and other similar pluralistic analyses, are well designed for such an 
exploration.
Second, by mining and then integrating cross-disciplinary research on each 
concept—beyond the rigid disciplinary channels in which they are typically 
studied—fertile ‘hybridisation’ and new ideas may result from i/b/o research.16 As 
Dogan maintains, this process of hybridisation begins with borrowing and lending of 
concepts, methods, theories, and praxes.17 Since scholars in a variety of disciplines 
have particular expertise on each concept, it makes sense to invite such dialogue vis- 
a-vis the triad’s connections.
For the IR field in particular, Lapid maintains the triad can be useful in 
developing theory for several reasons: first, conceptual orientation on the new map
14 Lapid, ‘Identities, Borders, Orders’, 10.
15 Wolfgang Natter and John Paul Jones III, ‘Identity, Space, and other Uncertainties’, in Space and 
Social Theory: Interpreting Modernity and Postmodemity, eds. Georges Benko and Ulf Strohmayer 
(London: Blackwell, 1998), 142.
16 Mattei Dogan, ‘The New Social Sciences: Cracks in the Disciplinary Walls’, International Social 
Science Journal, no. 153 (1997): 429-44; Karen A. Cerulo and Janet M. Ruane, ‘Coming Together: 
New Taxonomies for the Analysis of Social Relations’, Sociological Inquiry, 68 no. 3 (1998): 398- 
425.
17 Mattei Dogan, ‘The Hybridization of Social Science Knowledge’, Library Trends 45, no. 2 (1996): 
296-314.
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of global politics can proceed without resorting to pre-given categories of analysis. 
Second, it can help integrate a theoretically fragmented IR, ‘balancing 
fragmenting.. .tendencies’ in a ‘divided discipline’ with ‘integrative concepts and 
opportunities through a flexible tool like i/b/o’.18 This is done in the spirit of a 
flexible academic mindset and an engaged, pluralistic approach to theorising. Work 
that has the triad in common, but may approach the issues with conflicting 
worldviews or metatheoretical positions, could be shared because of this common 
point of reference and thus may potentially be less likely to be ignored a priori by 
the discipline.
Finally, the triad provides something often needed when examining complex 
issues like globalisation or migration: focus. This is done by narrowing and isolating 
three key concepts and their relationships to one another. Too often, many studies of 
globalisation can lack clarity because they get lost in the large field of questions at 
hand or ignore the local or regional perspective. Taking even just one segment of the 
i/b/o triad (for instance identity-order relationships in the study of ethnic conflict and 
multilateral intervention), may help a researcher pinpoint specific questions and find 
the best lines of approach.
As a cautionary note to all this, it is important to recognise that triads like 
i/b/o are not to be accepted as unproblematic prima face nor should they be assumed 
to be ‘critical’ as such. There are both theoretical and political implications and 
problems with these kinds of moves; as noted earlier, the triad is only intended to 
help de-couple rigidity, to open up new cognitive possibilities and then highlight 
certain relationships that partly inform and constitute a changing global order. It 
cannot, nor does it, pretend to begin to explain the whole of reality or international 
politics, or offer all the dimensions of particular socio-political phenomena like 
borders. Rather it simply intends to offer a new, slightly different path of approach 
which may help shed new light on some of the puzzles of a changing global order.
Metbodologccd Issues and Critiques
There are several methodological issues worth noting here. First, it should be 
remembered the i/b/o model is a pre-theoretical, orienting tool. The project, as it is 
currently set out, does not seek to engage in formal theory building, nor does it 
prioritise one particular component of the triad or posit causal dominance. Each
18 K J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (London:
112
component of the triad interacts and is interdependent with the other two, but is not 
necessarily a dependent variable or privileged theoretically.
Second, as alluded to above, the i/b/o tool is itself neutral about ontological, 
epistemological, or methodological preferences. The empirical work informed by it 
may be approached from a variety of pluralistic perspectives (such as 
post-structuralism, discourse analysis, neo-realism, interpretivism, positivism, 
feminism, and others). Recognising different epistemological assumptions, however, 
does not necessitate relativism in distinguishing between them. While using the tool, 
for example, we can hold on to a critical theory perspective that seeks to maintain 
notions of progress, foundational ethics, and reason. Or, a researcher could, for 
example, undertake a realist analysis of the role of force and nationalism in boundary 
construction during a conflict. This study in particular is committed to a critical, 
sociological perspective on the i/b/o triad, as applied in the case study chapters.
While the tool is wide and open, the individual researcher’s approach and 
usage of the concepts need not be. For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to 
set out some initial narrowing limits for the discussion: ‘borders’ will be considered 
examined generally as interstate boundaries (but to a degree also as metaphors and 
representations)—and the American borderlands in particular; ‘orders’ denotes the 
patterns of governance and modes of domestic and international interaction in the 
North American case (under NAFTA); and ‘identity’ here is explored in terms of 
collective identity, understood often as nationalism. The approach is broadly 
interpretive, utilising narrative analysis as a methodological tool for explorations 
around particular Tegs’ of the triad.
4.2 C o l l e c t i v e  I d e n t i t y  a n d  S p ace— a n  ‘I-B’ D y n a m ic
Any discussion of identity, whether couched in terms of gender, sexuality, race, or 
class, necessarily involves the questions of boundaries—as in where and how 
identity becomes circumscribed.
—Wolfgang Natter and John Paul Jones19
Pointing to the importance of ‘boundaries’ in identity issues, Natter and Jones 
echo in a poststructural voice a well-known, mainstream political geographer 
working years ago. Writing in 1978, J.R.V. Prescott offered a relatively standard 
analysis of borders in Boundaries and Frontiers. After surveying border typologies,
Allen and Unwin, 1985); Lapid, ‘Identities, Borders, Orders’, 16.
19 Natter and Jones, ‘Identity, Space, and other Uncertainties’, 143.
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terminology, and border disputes around the world, he offered this claim about 
identities and borders:
It was suggested...that a boundary may exert some influence upon the attitudes of 
persons living in the borderland and on the policies of states separated by the 
boundaries. The studies have not yet been made which would justify or reject this 
concept.20
The i/b/o triad, as applied here, undertakes exactly this goal: evaluating 
attitudes, and identities that are intimately related and sometimes co-constituted by 
both material and discursive border practices. Part of the overall i/b/o agenda calls 
for research that can interrogate the socially constructed nature of identity, 
particularly under conditions of globalisation. This, in turn, has implications for 
world order: a tension, this comment suggests, may exist as collective, state-identity 
(civic and to a certain degree ethnic-centred) moves higher or lower within an 
individual’s schema of identification priorities and allegiances, thus lending support 
or resistance to the variety of official state projects which may draw upon these 
symbolic resources As the case studies will illustrate in the U.S., the manipulation 
(or highlighting) of national collective identity through the vehicle of the border, for 
example, can lend political support to particular elites, institutions, and policies.
This section takes a specific, identity-border (‘i-b’) dynamic in the triad to 
study theoretically. The move from triad to dyad in this section is largely a 
schematic exercise, designed to isolate a key relationship (‘i-b’) for intense study and 
then proceeding in the case studies and conclusion to draw larger connections with 
order. Here, political territoriality, the processes of regulation and control over 
territory, is seen to be important in identity consolidation, connecting space to a 
sense of group uniqueness or elements of national myth. Identity consolidation is a 
historically contingent process which fluctuates, based partly on state policy action 
in reterritorialisation or deterritorialisation and other transient factors. Understood in 
another way, the effect can be related to state inclusion and exclusion of certain 
transnational mobilities at international borders—of undocumented workers or 
asylum seekers, for example. This works in the American case, and probably others 
around the world, to help reconfigure and strengthen a coherent sense of collective 
national identity.
While much of the IR literature acknowledges the relationship between 
territory and identity by analysing how nationalism is tied to notions of the ‘land’,
20 J.R.V. Prescott, Boundaries and Frontiers (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 203.
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e.g., one’s ‘motherland’ or ‘fatherland’, the theoretical implications of bordering 
practices and border ‘settings’ through narrative and material practices—the 
concepts under examination here—are surprisingly underdeveloped. This leads
Natter and Jones to complain the spatial component of collective identity formation
01is woefully under-conceptualised. They attempt to redress this through a post­
structuralist vein, drawing upon Derrida and Mouffe’s work. Their task is to 
‘envision a post-structuralist, or non-essentialist, theory of space that is 
commensurate with post-structuralist identity theory’; to do this, they attempt to 
‘dislodge remaining essentialisms from spatial thought’.22
Such a post-structuralist route, while promising in that it questions 
established ontological and methodological premises, need not be the only approach 
to the study of identity formation and borders. ‘Spatialised’ narratives of identity 
can also be explored from more ‘traditional’ starting points. Marable, for example, 
has linked a notion of ‘bordering’ with processes of exclusion, arguing that the 
concepts of ethnicity and race involve differentiation, processes that tend to operate 
in an opposite directions against the other; in the case of African-Americans, for 
instance, exclusion was used to help realise difference from white Americans (but 
not inferiority towards whites), but in the case of white Americans, bordering was 
used to affect and indicate subordination of Blacks.
Surprisingly few scholars read in IR, with the notable exception of Anderson, 
Barth, Conversi, and select others, however, set out to examine these complex and 
varied relationships between identity and borders. Those that do, such as Anderson 
and O’Dowd, usefully point out the core i/b/o relationship at stake as they discuss 
the relationship between borders and those peoples and things they enclose:
Territorial borders both shape and are shaped by what they contain, and what crosses 
or is prevented from crossing them. The ‘container’ and ‘contents’ are mutually 
exclusive.24
It should be remembered there is no necessary (or generally empirically 
demonstrated) congruence between culture, society, and state. While, as pointed out 
earlier, borders may be arbitrary simplifications and designated limits of the 
political, the relationship between this bounded space and the identities within them
21 Natter and Jones, ‘Identity, Space, and Other Uncertainties’, 143.
22 Ibid, 142.
23 Manning Marable, Race, Reform and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction o f Black America, 
1945-1990 (Jackson, MI: University Press of Mississippi, 1992).
24 James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd, ‘Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory 
Meanings, Changing Significance’, Regional Studies 33, no. 7 (1999): 594.
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is still important. Few scholars have examined this relationship, and most studies of 
collective identity formation, although they may deal with the factor of territory 
(such as a ‘homeland’ especially in cases of ethnic identity), have neglected to 
examine the edges of that space: the borders and their discourses which themselves 
act in the production of collective identities.
When considering the formation of collective identity for this study, then, at 
least three factors must be considered. First, the making of identities is seen as an 
active, constructed, and modem process that involves inclusion and exclusion against 
others; the resulting form is one of potentially many identities an individual might 
hold or prioritise. Like any other act of classifying reality, constructing an identity is 
a creative process of actively ‘sculpting’ distinct mental clusters, and as noted 
earlier, there are multiple ‘maps’ of overlapping and competing identities each of us 
carry. National identity is one of several possible overlapping identities but 
nevertheless is often the most salient and politically manifest identities which the 
state is in a position to territorialise and help construct. It remains a highly 
important form of collective identity in international politics. Second, the imaginary 
process of creating traditions and of activating collective memories extends through 
time and is historically contingent.27 Third, collective identities have a spatial 
referent under analysis here, the reinforcement of which can help create difference 
against an other.
The example of Europe anchors these points. The quest for an overarching 
political structure in the EU, for instance, demands a rethinking of the nature of the 
borders of ‘nation’ and’ state’ where, as Platt and Jones suggest, ‘ffontier-fixity 
dissolves [and] no neat pattern of region and/or nationality seems likely to replace 
it...the feuds of tomorrow are likely to be far more avarice than has been anticipated: 
state-nations, long-buried nationalities, immigrants, new regional identities and
* • * 9 8rising city states are all jostling for houseroom inside the new Europe’. Europe is 
simultaneously undergoing processes of centralisation and of fragmentation as 
boundaries are devalued and valued simultaneously, overlapping different spheres of 
identity as well as economic and social management.
25 Christena E. Nippert-Eng, Home and Work: Negotiating Boundaries Through Everyday Life 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 7-18.
26 See Liah Greenfeld and Daniel Chirot, ‘Nationalism and Aggression’, Theory and Society 23
(1994): 79-130.
27 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f  
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).
28 Steve Platt, ‘Introduction’, New Statesman: Borderlands Supplement (19 June 1992): 2.
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Exclusionary practices may help solidity collective identity. Conceptions of 
national ‘security’, for example, are increasingly correlated to political identities 
which exist partly through the construction of boundaries with the dangerous other. 
As Campbell has successfully illustrated with his landmark study of the Gulf War, 
the narratives of security in that military action were written through a process of
29‘othering’ the Iraqi enemy, essentially drawing borders: a ‘line in the sand’. 
Recently, Takacs has persuasively demonstrated anti-immigration discourse in the 
U.S.-Mexico case
works on a symbolic level to recuperate a coherent sense of national identity in 
response to the social and psychic ‘alien-nation’ caused by the global penetration of 
capitalism.30
She goes on to argue that under conditions of transnationalism, ‘containment’
is sought by certain state actors through forms of exclusion, such as Proposition 187,
a harsh anti-immigration measure approved by voters in California in 1994; this is a
1
notion which will be explored in greater depth in the case studies. For strength and 
distinctiveness, she argues, nations constitute themselves against the other. Indeed in 
the first instance, the idea of a bordered nation necessarily implies the existence of 
others, as Gellner often asserted.32 This line of argument has recently been extended 
by Triandafyllidou who argues nationalism must be understood as ‘double-edged’ or 
‘inclusive-exclusive’: thus in addition to limiting who is included in the civic or 
ethnic community, ‘the quest for authenticity of the national self is inseparable from 
the conception of others’.33 This is particularly true for those individuals or groups 
that pose a perceived and/or real ‘treat’ (such as migrants or terrorists, as suggested 
here). The argument in this thesis goes further—connecting the spatial dynamic 
within the i/b/o triad—suggesting state borders serve to help realise the material and 
discursive practices of reinforcing national identity, separating the included from the 
excluded and actualising difference and sometimes division.
29 See David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics o f Identity 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).
30 Stacy Takacs, ‘Alien-Nation: Immigration, National Identity and Transnationalism’, Cultural 
Studies 13, no. 4 (1999): 591.
31 Proposition 187 was a public referendum in California which was highly exclusionary; it denied 
undocumented workers access to many public services, including welfare, non-emergency medical 
care, and other social benefits. Officials were obliged to report individuals they suspected to be 
‘illegal’ to immigration authorities. A U.S. Federal District Judge later ruled many of provisions 
unconstitutional, however, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), the subject of later chapters on the U.S. borderlands, re-imposed many similar welfare 
restrictions.
32 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964).
33 Anna Triandafyllidou, ‘National Identity and the “Other”’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, no. 4
(1998): 596.
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All of these notions, however, rely on particular conceptual and theoretical 
notions of nationalism as collective identity. Because of continual misuse by 
scholars, the term ‘nation’ has lost much of its meaning, leading Tishkov to usefully 
assert ‘nation and nationalism...are not academic or politically functional 
categories’.34 Weberian or historical approaches understand nationalism as a global 
phenomena localised within particular states; over the years, this dominant ‘meta- 
categorical’ usage has resulted in terminological confusion surrounding ‘nation’, 
‘nationalism’, ‘multi-national’, and ‘transnational’. The distraction in many 
contemporary IR accounts caused by the synonymic, inter-changeable usage of 
‘nation’ and ‘state’ is another example; all of this often moves far beyond the ethnic 
designations many scholars employed when first using the term.
While this is not a project on nationalism per se, this conceptual problem is 
acknowledged and more disciplined use of ‘nationalism’ is sought which depends on 
a highly state or polity focussed account, broadly understood as a unification of a 
group on civic (and sometimes ethnic) grounds, over a particular territory with a 
shared, perceived historical framework and myth, culture, and economy. 
Accordingly, this account seeks to see it as a form of collective identity that is 
predicated on the concepts of instrumentality and malleability in explaining a 
particular ideological movement centred around a civic group identity, e.g., 
‘nationalism’, and its change.35 The focus is on the state which can substantiate a 
collectivity through particular power-imbued practices and discourses, the primary 
tools of such consolidations.
Ultimately, this rests on a theory that argues for the social construction of 
identity.36 This is by no means an uncontested notion. Before proceeding, then, with 
an analysis of the interplay between nationalism and bounded space, some discussion 
of this particular school of national identity formation and change, within the larger 
context of nationalism studies, is necessary.
'Modern3 Nationalism: A Brief Theoretical (De)tour
As discussed, because it is difficult phenomenon to define and theorise, the 
study of nationalism is a large and complicated enterprise, splintered, sometimes
34 Valery A. Tishkov, ‘Forget the “Nation”: Post-Nationalist Understanding of Nationalism’, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 23, no. 4 (2000): 626.
35 See Anthony Smith, National Identity (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), 73.
36 For an excellent overview of this literature, see Craig Calhoun, ed., Social Theory and the Politics 
o f Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
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misappropriated, and in any event involving many scholarly debates well beyond 
critique or explication here. One debate relating to the nature of the bond between 
nation, territory, and borders, nonetheless, is of import and relates to the question: is 
nationalism a modem, socially constructed phenomenon with a role for elites and 
susceptible to change or a transcendent, ‘primordialist’ phenomenon that is generally 
unchangeable?37 This distinction remains critical as it is brought to bear on the 
premises of critical theory and the socially constmcted nature of boundaries.
Scholars who advance the instrumentalist perspective include Hobsbawm and 
Brass; they see nationalism (as understood here) as generally an elite-oriented, 
modem phenomenon.38 Indeed, as Motyl suggests, while different theorists provide 
different answers on how the nation is formed, most ‘premise their arguments on the 
centrality of elites’.39 Hobsbawm, for instance, argues the nation is an ‘invented’ 
tradition devised by political elites to legitimise their power—collective identity, 
then, is an artificial and epiphenomenal phenomenon that can be manipulated. 
Moreover, ultimately, they suggest, the nation ‘belongs exclusively to a particular 
and historically recent, period’.40
Similarly, Brass rejects the primordialist view that every person carries with 
him or her certain attachments derived from place of birth, kinship, relationships, 
religion, and language that are ‘natural’ and not subject to choice. While such 
attachments may have ‘emotive significance’, Brass suggests they are ‘variable’, 
especially when people command more than one language, change religious 
affiliation, and move globally through the new milieu of social and economic space, 
illustrated by the increases in mass travel, migration, and diasporaic activity, for 
example. For these thinkers, the study of elite competition and manipulation is the 
key to understand nationalism. Such perspectives clash quite clearly with those of 
the primordialists like Van den Berghe who argue nationalism is a natural, deep 
seeded, pre-modem, socio-biological event associated with kinship and the believe 
the nation-state is a kind of ‘super-family’ 41
37 See Steven Grosby, ‘The Verdict of History: The Inexpungeable Tie of Primordiality - A Response 
to Eller and Coughlan’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 17, no. 1 (1994): 164.
38 Eric Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2d ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory 
and Comparison (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991).
39 Alexander Motyl, ‘The Modernity of Nationalism: Nations, States and Nation-states in the 
Contemporary’, Journal o f International Affairs 45, no. 2 (1992): 321.
40 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention o f Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 9.
41 Pierre Van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (New York: Elsevier, 1981).
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The modernist/instrumentalist perspective (while simplified here), however, 
can be more telling because it can explain the growing fluidity of identities drawn 
out and overlapped in part by the breakdown of multinational states, the proliferation 
of multinational corporations which draw power away from the state, and rapid 
technological and economic transformations such as large migrant worker/expatriate 
populations—the developments drawn out in chapter two.42 Multiple and hybrid 
identities characteristic of late modernity, such as Turks in Germany or Mexicans in 
the United States, are becoming more common. While not a ‘modernist’ as such, 
Anthony Smith traces a key historical point made by one set of nationalism scholars 
that explains why the modernist approach is so salient in these situations. These 
scholars, he points out, argue the resistance to economic exploitation by core states 
in the 16th century took the form of nationalism as a force for industrialisation and 
mass mobilisation 43 Anderson, and Marxist analysts like Naim, point to similar 
economic factors as clearly modem underpinnings of nationalism while Gellner 
suggests the most frequently recurring element of nationhood is a common culture.44
More importantly, Smith identifies another ‘modem’ school premised on the 
understanding that
ethnic and national units afford convenient ‘sites’ for generating mass support in the 
universal struggle o f  elites...ethnic symbols and boundaries are able to evoke greater 
commitment...under a single banner.45
This view, Smith asserts, holds ‘ethnicity as fundamentally instrumental’, 
lending support to the argument here identities are, to a significant degree, socially 
constmcted and able to be altered and manipulated as the political community 
widens or narrows, potentially excluding or reinforcing ethnic or national feelings. 
This melds well with a border-oriented approach to identity construction that relies 
on narrative, symbolic, state manifestations of difference and consolidation in civic 
or ethnic collective identity situations within and across boundaries.
Borders and Nationalism
Borders, indeed, are critical to the study of nationalism. Conversi goes so far 
as to maintain ‘nationalism is a struggle over the definition of spatial boundaries’ 46
42 Smith, National Identity, 8.
43 Ibid.
44 Tom Naim, The Break-up o f Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism (London: New Left Books,
1981); Anderson, Imagined Communities’, Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York
University Press, 1997).
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His argument goes on to suggest ‘no nationalism is conceivable apart from the 
nation-state’; and in fact, nationalism has a ‘crucial border-generating function’.47 
He has recently extended the argument to include a renewed emphasis on cultural
• Aft tselection in nationalist mobilisations through boundary setting. Ultimately, 
boundaries are needed to provide distinction between groups and symbolise 
important aspects of national identity. They are critical state substantiation practices 
to consolidate civic-ethnic identity, especially in shifting borderland zones 
sometimes subject to ‘foreign’ influence. Lantemari places the debate back in the 
realm of critical theory:
groups tend to define themselves, not by reference to their own characteristics, but 
by exclusion, that is by comparison to ‘strangers’.49
Nationalism and collective identity formation, thus, can be a process of 
reterritorialisation, excluding and differentiating against the other. Such boundaries, 
Wolin asserts, ‘are a metaphor of containment’ that proclaim identity and 
difference.50
Barth reinforces this argument through his discussion of the symbolism of 
borders, surveying the separation and differentiation that formulate social attitudes.51 
Paralleling Smith’s second school of modernists, Barth ‘examines the border guards 
and boundary mechanism that separate and differentiate social groups in their 
attitudes and perceptions’, to a large degree the goal of the empirical work that 
follows.52 Boundaries, then, are both attributes and causes of the ‘principles of 
separation’ the national community is concerned with—they differentiate the other 
and thus help define the self.
Similarly, Anderson’s more symbolic-focused analysis follows Barth’s 
model, highlighting the
various ‘border guards’, symbols that make the barriers between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (the 
strangers and outsiders) visible.54
45 Smith, National Identity, 9.
46 Daniele Conversi, ‘Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary 
Maintenance and Creation’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): 78.
47 Ibid., 75.
48 See Daniele Conversi, ‘Nationalism, Boundaries, and Violence’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): 553-84.
49 Vittorio Lantemari, Identita e Differenza: Percorsi Storico-antropologici (Naples: Liguori Press, 
1986), 67 and ‘Ethnocentrism and Ideology’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 3, no. 1 (1980): 52-66.
50 Sheldon S. Wolin, ‘Fugitive Democracy’, in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries 
o f the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 33.
51 Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries.
52 Smith, National Identity, 10.
53 Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries.
54 Smith, National Identity, 14.
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These kind of distinctions are precisely the kind of analysis critical theory seeks 
because they allow us to begin to answer Linklater’s challenging question about how 
we understand ‘separateness’. Through what Conversi calls ‘transactionalism’, i.e., 
the exchanges and relationships between human groups, ‘separateness’ of identity 
and nationality are constructed.55 The contesting forces over and under boundaries, 
then, ultimately help create difference.56 And as Paasi reminds us, borders and their 
meanings of national identity are historically contingent and part of the production 
and institutionalisation of territories and territoriality, and thus of order. Collective 
identities, in the end, as Zuniga persuasively writes
are essentially unique combinations of temporal (historical) dimensions and of 
spatial (territorial) dimensions. Common history and common territory—this pair 
permits affective, symbolic, and intersubjective recognition among human beings— 
where territory touches narrative.58
These views, as noted, are not without opposition; Grosby’s work on 
territoriality is an important counter-critique worth discussion. He understands 
territoriality as a ‘transcendent primordial’ feature of modem societies that would 
seem to stand in opposition to this thesis. Grosby rejects the assertions of Giddens, 
Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawm that ‘territoriality and nationality are exclusively 
modem phenomena’ preferring instead a deeper, ‘structural, symbolic condition’ for 
territory.59 Interestingly, Grosby admits the modem proliferation of communication, 
technology, and global markets have made larger territories possible and even 
suggests smaller heterogeneous societies tied to territoriality can exist within larger 
bounded communities.60 That admission, however, weakens his earlier claims about 
the seeming powerful ‘transcendental’ nature of territoriality. While territorial 
attachments, borders, and nationality certainly have important emotive significance, 
they are not natural and immutable. As the theoretical background suggests, and the 
case studies on the U.S. borderlands will empirically illustrate, national sentiment 
and territorial ties are instead quite modem, malleable, and in particular, often
55 Conversi, ‘Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism’, 77.
56 Kathryn Manzo, Creating Boundaries: The Politics o f Race and Nation (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1996).
57 Anssi Paasi, ‘Deconstructing Regions: Notes on the Scales of Spatial Life’, Environment and 
Planning A 23, no. 2 (1991): 239-56.
58 Victor Zuniga, ‘Nations and Borders: Romantic Nationalism and the Project of Modernity’, in The 
U.S.-Mexico Border: Transcending Divisions, Contesting Identities, eds. David Spener and Kathleen 
Staudt (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 43-44.
59 Steven Grosby, ‘Territoriality: The Transcendental, Primordial Feature of Modem Societies’, 
Nations and Nationalism 1, no. 2 (1995): 150-53.
60 Ibid., 154.
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tractable by elites who influence perceptions through material (e.g., physical 
boundaries and infrastructure) and discursive (policy and textual) means.
The Concept ofSodo-Spatialisation
The identities/borders/orders triad as applied here is inherently concerned 
with how humans understand and are socialised by space and, by direct extension, by 
borders (e.g., the ‘i-b’ link). As noted, the way in which identity is impacted by 
these political delimitations—both material and discursive—is of considerable 
interest and has implications for order as well. In a recent analysis, Goff argues for 
this point:
Despite the penetration of porous national boundaries by foreign goods, people, 
ideas, and capital, borders delineate a bounded space in which members share a 
common idiom. Therefore, states can imbue borders with new meaning through the 
(reconstruction of the political community that lies within them.61
But political community can also be reconstructed from without, through 
reterritorialisation. Two prominent scholars, Shields and Paasi, are at the forefront 
in contemporary explorations of the dimensions of this relationship in the social 
sciences, calling it ‘social spatialization’ or ‘socio-spatialization’, respectively. For 
Shields, social spatialisation designates
the ongoing social construction of the spatial at the level of the social imaginary 
(collective mythologies, presuppositions) as well as interventions in the landscape.63
The landscape, for example, could be an international border or a cityscape, perhaps 
an inner-city ghetto. Social spatialisation, in these terms, suggests imagined 
geographies, metaphors, and divisions driven by socio-political practices. Similarly, 
Shields goes on to argue that through social spatialisation, ‘places and spaces are 
hypostatised from the world of real space relations to the symbolic realm of cultural 
significations’; material and discursive means transfer the external social world to 
the inner, personal realm of individuals.64
The approach used in the case studies, however, follows Paasi on the 
construction of ‘socio-spatial consciousness’ because it has a more strictly socio­
61 Patricia M. Goff, ‘Invisible Borders: Economic Liberalization and National Identity’, International 
Studies Quarterly 44, no. 4 (2000): 539.
62 Rob Shields, Places on the Margin: Alternative Geographies o f Modernity (London: Routledge, 
1991) and Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness.
63 Shields, Places on the Margin, 31.
64 Ibid., 47.
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political perspective.65 Socio-spatial consciousness is the process whereby 
individuals and communities are socialised as members of a territorially bound 
community. Because the power structures which govern borders dictate their 
material and symbolic dimensions, they construct narratives and traditions of social 
cohesion and common fate. They thus are directly connected with collective identity 
formation. This is a fascinating relationship not explicated enough in IR nor 
constituted in process or i/b/o terms. Of particular interest to this study are the 
official state narratives that, as the next section of this chapter argues, help construct 
modem border discourses which impact collective identity formation. These 
narratives, Paasi writes, are
constructed on national identities and threats, and on bounded, exclusive spaces, 
[and] are expressions of national socialization processes...boundaries usually play a 
key role in these narratives.66
People, as Somers and Gibon suggest, locate themselves in social narratives 
they are often not responsible for.67 States, as argued here, have a major role to play 
in this socio-spatialisation process, crafting the meanings of the collective (the 
national) and its boundaries through narratives that often involve divisions between 
‘us’ and the other. National collective identity, in the end, is a discourse partly 
guided and constmcted by official state texts and practices. The inscription of
borders and sovereignty vis-a-vis immigration regulation, for example, is well noted
•  68by Waever and Doty and will be a subject of analysis later in this thesis. The 
important point here is that borders can be understood as narrative processes 
impacting collective identity formation rather than simply static modem lines. We 
examine how in the next section.
65 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness.
66 Anssi Paasi, ‘Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse: The Finnish-Russian Border’, Regional 
Studies 33, no. 7 (1999): 9.
67 Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson, ‘Reclaiming the Epistemological “Other”: Narrative and the 
Social Constitution of Identity’, in Social Theory and the Politics o f Identity.
68 See Ole Waever et al, Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1993) and Roxanne Lynn Doty, ‘Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of 
National Identity’, in State Sovereignty as Social Construct.
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4.3 N arrative A nalysis: A  Theo retical  a n d  Research  
O u t l in e
Writing is the continuation of politics by other means.
—Philippe Sollers69
The premise of this section holds that the reproduction of political space and 
collective identity are partially driven by the processes and relations of the state 
system and the intersubjective construction of norms of territoriality and spatiality. 
Moreover, as previous sections of this chapter suggest, a clear interrelated dynamic 
of space and identity exists, particularly given the starting assumption that both are 
socially and politically constituted. In fact, as chapter two illustrated, territoriality, 
political control over space, is continuously exercised in various ways. Practices of 
differentiation and representation are key in this ‘maintenance’ project, impacting 
the wider identities and orders which they link to. Borders, of all kinds, it seems are 
seen to require patrols. Clearly, actual deployment of state force or the imposition of 
physical barriers, for instance, are standard practices for such support, as is the 
international ‘status’ given by other states and international organisations to 
boundaries. But so too are the discursive narratives which allow and support these 
possibilities, even if they simply serve, as the case studies will suggest, to help create 
images of ‘control’ whilst transnational flows persist at the same or greater levels— 
and the underlying ‘chaos’ (designated epistemologically as ‘ignorance’) is 
somehow ordered in a variety of ways.
In addition to studying new kinds of deterritorialising movements such as 
globalisation, the interesting question that emerges from a look at these border 
practices, however, asks under what conditions are these possibilities maintained? 
How does a democratic state like the U.S. legitimatise its control or securitisation of 
its borderlands? How does it set the parameters for what constitutes national 
collective identity within and against its borders? How does it re-inscribe national 
consciousness and differentiation against a growing tide of transnational economic 
and social forces? In effect, what processes and relations set the limits of political 
possibility? What current political initiatives and discourse, including symbols, help 
‘write’ that space?
In answering these sorts of questions, discourse and narratives are 
instrumental. Accordingly, this section suggests a methodology for this sort of
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analysis and in the case studies that follow. Discourse analysis is increasingly being 
used in the social sciences in conjunction with cultural theory and critical theory to
7 0  •unlock the relationships between language and power. Whilst they of course 
cannot completely account for the existence of borders, they do set out the 
possibilities and rules for their operation and continuity, or the official or historical 
order of discursive and political possibility. Borders simply do not exist; they are 
constantly in the process of becoming, constituted in large part by the 
interrelationship between identities and orders. The policy narratives which play a 
role in this relationship are thus the critical objects for examination here: words and 
symbols have constitutive power in making meaning and creating images which can 
impact political action. This thesis asks what role representational practices 
embedded in official policy discourses have in conceptions of identity.
Discourse analysis is an approach that can involve many dimensions; 
unfortunately the term is now so widely used as to dilute some of its theoretical 
impact and meaning. Thus, before turning to the empirical studies of recent 
discourse surrounding the U.S. borderlands and U.S. border control policies (and 
some of the wider theoretical and practical implications of these practices) the 
following section provides some working definitions of discourse and an overview 
of some of the theoretical considerations it involves.
Discourse: Defmitions and Theoretical Implications
The fluidity of meaning of the term ‘discourse’ makes it a challenge to come 
up with a precise conceptual definition; its recent vogue in fields like Social Theory, 
Cultural Studies, Literary Theory, and increasingly IR, has resulted in it being 
deployed in a variety of consistent and inconsistent ways. Some scholars, for
71instance, use it interchangeably with ‘text’ whilst others differentiate the two. 
Some rely on the strict, more technical examinations of discourse applied in 
linguistic analysis. Others, like Foucault, link it to power and socio-political 
structures. His indeed was perhaps the most significant contribution to our 
understanding of discourse, and some of his thought is examined here.
69 Philippe Sollers, Sur le materialisme: de I’atomisme a la dialectique revolutionnaire (Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1974).
70 Because o f the dominance of positivist and rationalist models which use quantitative methodology, 
IR has often spent ‘little attention to the role of the symbolic in the political process’. See David 
Kertzer, Rituals, Politics, and Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 7.
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The move from its general usage (to signify conversation), to the sense that it 
embodies a system of rules and representations of experience, was perhaps the most 
important development in its use in social analysis. As Fowler asserts,
Discourse is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values, and 
categories which it embodies; these beliefs etc. constitute a way of looking at the 
world, an organization or representation of experience—‘ideology’ in the neutral 
non-pejorative sense.72
This definition is very useful for our considerations, particularly if paired with 
Foucault’s deployment which treats discourse ‘sometimes as the general domain of 
all statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes 
as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements’.73 Through this 
denotation, Foucault expands our understanding of the term to account for a thematic 
coherence of statements (such as a ‘discourse of post-colonialism’, for example) and 
he further broadens this by seeking analyses of the ‘regulated’ rules and structures 
which produce supportive texts.
This move leads to the association of language as a system that helps to 
determine how people think and express themselves, or in this context, sets the social 
and political context of possibility. As Mills helpfully clarifies
a discourse is not a disembodied collection of statements, but groupings of 
utterances or sentences...which are determined by that social context and which 
contribute to the way that social context continues its existence.74
Symbols like metaphors are important elements of discourse, and are of 
particular interest in the case studies. The study of symbols—what Cohen defines as 
‘objects, acts, relationships of linguistic formations that stand ambiguously for a 
multiplicity of meanings, evoke emotions, and impel men to action’ —emulates the 
goals of Turner, Levi-Strauss, Geertz and others who maintain ‘good social science
7 (\involves finding the symbolic meaning of everyday social practices’.
71 Sara Mills, Discourse (London: Routledge, 1997), 11. See also David Crystal, The Cambridge 
Encyclopaedia o f Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 116.
72 Cited in Jeremy Hawthorn, A Concise Glossary o f Contemporary Literary Theory (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1992), 48.
73 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology o f Knowledge, trans. Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972), 
80.
74 Mills, Discourse, 11.
75 Abner Cohen, Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology o f Power and Symbolism in 
Complex Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974), 23, emphasis in original.
76 Harold Kincaid, Philosophical Foundations o f the Social Sciences: Analyzing Controversies in 
Social Research (New York: Cambridge University Press., 1996), 215.
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Metaphors, in particular, are a well-established important component of 
communication.77 Because of the connotations they carry, studying them can be 
productive in uncovering deep meanings.78 Metaphors help people make sense of 
politics, often a largely symbolic process. Specifically in the case of some 
borderlands, metaphors and symbols underpin much of the discourse about national 
collective identity. Political symbolism, such as signs, walls, and maps, as well as 
economic and social symbols (the poverty on the southern side of the U.S. Mexico 
border, for example) compete in the identity games and narratives along the frontier.
Also important here is recognising that discourses in general are often 
organised in an exclusionary way: the ‘unsayable’ is a result of the naturalisation of a 
particular discourse. Moreover, discourses are in continual contestation with one 
another and the winning narrative has a highly significant impact in how one 
interprets a text. Discourse, then, can be seen as the ‘practices that systematically 
form the objects of which they speak’: it is instrumental in the production of an
79outcome.
Within it, a structure emerges, which, as Mills asserts, consists of the 
‘systematicity of the ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving which 
are formed within a particular context, and because of the effects of those ways of 
thinking and behaving’; the dominant discursive structure, as Foucault would argue, 
in any particular instance, is constructed and supported by power interests which 
formulate the ‘lenses’ through which truth and knowledge are accessed and 
understood and social relations are formulated.80 The relationships between social 
structures, economics, and politics and discourse, Foucault maintained, are complex 
and non-hierarchical, but each part of a network of overarching power relations.
This formulation, for Foucault, meant altering the notion of subjectivity:
One had to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, 
that’s to say to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the 
subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that 
is a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, 
discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject
77 See Norman Denzin, The Research Act (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978).
78 As Denzin suggests, ‘the metaphor is chiefly a tool for revealing special properties of an object or 
event’. Ibid., 46. Habermas sees the ‘grammar of language games.. .governs not only the combination 
of symbols but the interpretation of linguistic symbols through actions and expressions’. See Jurgen 
Habermas, ‘On Hermeneutics Claim to Universality’, in The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts o f the 
German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present, ed. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (New York: 
Continuum Press, 1994), 297.
79 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 49.
80 See Michel Foucault, The History o f Sexuality: An Introduction, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1978).
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which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty 
sameness throughout the course of history.81
Such is the partial goal of a critical discourse analysis or ‘archaeology’ which can 
unlock and identify struggles over power structures and language and what maintains 
them.82 In this case, dominant narratives, institutionally produced through a variety 
of texts, constitute the objects and limits of policy formulation. Moreover, they can 
be easily rarefied and reproduced; norms and institutional pressures restrict the 
theoretically infinite number of statements that can be made. Foucault was quick to 
suggest the order of discourse was thus a highly constrained phenomenon because of 
these unwritten rules.
Discourse analysis, then, seeks to understand
Any connected discrete linear material...which contains more than one elementary 
sentence, some global structure characterising the whole discourse or large sections 
of it. The structure is a pattern of occurrence (i.e., a recurrence of segments of a 
discourse relative to each other.83
Thus, an analyst looks to language as constituting both the subject of the discourse 
(the speaker and audience) and the possible objects (desire) of the text. Foucault 
maintained the objective is to show how a particular textual formulations ‘derive (in 
spite of their extreme diversity, and in spite of their dispersion in time) from the 
same set of relations’.85 It should also be noted that the discourse need not 
necessarily reflect political reality, but rather can help construct a variety of political 
imaginaries.
Accordingly, this approach assumes a ‘constitutive’ theory of language as 
opposed to ‘referential’ theory which ‘sees language as a neutral medium, passively 
connecting thoughts and actions’.86 A constitutive theory recognises the processes 
and relations between language and meaning ‘develop through the strategic
81 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 1972-77, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton: 
Harvester, 1980), 59.
82 ‘Archaeological’ analysis, for Foucault, involves exactly this sort of analysis of discursive 
structures, to access not the truth of a statement but the support mechanisms (processes) which keep 
them in place. See The Archaeology of Knowledge. We should note, however, that many critics point 
to two ‘phases’ in Foucault’s work. The first, his ‘archaeologies’, concentrates on the autonomous 
nature of discourse whereas the second, or ‘genealogical’, understands discourse more as a instrument 
of institutional practices.
83 Zellig Harris, Discourse Analysis Reprints (The Hague: Mouton, 1963), 7
84 This is consistent with critical theory’s collapse of the subject/object distinction.
85 Foucault, The Archaeology o f Knowledge, 68.
86 Hugh Mehan, ‘The Discourse of the Illegal Immigration Debate: A Case Study in the Politics of 
Representation’, Discourse & Society 8, no. 2 (1997): 251.
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application of discursive practices and strategies' ^  The strategies in play suggest 
the linguistic, rhetorical, or symbolic practices which help realise particular goals by 
representing individuals, identities, and spaces in various historical modes. But, as 
Mehan notes, the word ‘strategy’ can suggest deliberate action but in reality 
‘participants in discourse seldom choose strategies consciously from a roster of 
alternatives; they most often use discourse strategies quite unintentionally’.88 
Because of this, he maintains discourse strategies are dependent on the socio-cultural 
context in which they are deployed; the corresponding political effect means the
OQ
narrative moulds ‘are largely shaped through discursive practices’.
So, whilst this modification is a highly productive theoretical formulation, it 
still presents questions of agency and also begs the question if it, or this critique 
itself, is somehow independent of the discursive structures at stake. The short 
answer is that they are not; the analysts’ own theoretical statements are indeed not 
free of the existing frameworks, but they may or may not challenge dominant 
discourses and express their own ‘truth’ within overall limits. Here, the ‘reading’ of 
the texts proceeds as an interrogation, asking why the discourse takes the particular 
structure it does, what relations and processes this structure derives from, and what 
effects the discourse has on state regulatoiy policies—ultimately the goal is to place 
the narrative in relationship to state practices.90 A further difficulty emerges when 
‘in the quest to use discourse as an attempt to make coherent the incoherences of 
public life...one discourse trades on the other, borrowing metaphors for justification, 
creating an inevitable layering of meaning’.91 The task for the scholar then is to 
understand intertextuality, acknowledge it as such, but recognise that no discourse, in 
this sense, stands alone.
87 Ibid., emphasis added. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (London: 
Blackwell, 1951); Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination (Austin, TX: University of Texas 
Press, 1981); and Foucault The Archaeology o f Knowledge.
88 Mehan, ‘The Discourse of the Illegal Immigration Debate’, 251.
89 Ibid., 252.
90 One could possibly specify the questions asked (the question of authorship; the question of 
readership (who reads the text); what is the object, the political dynamics, of the text; the question of 
how the text deals with dissent or other perspectives/paradigms.
91 Sanford F. Schram and Philip T. Neisser, ‘The Cycle of Representation: The House Republicans 
and the Contract with America’, in Tales o f the State: Narrative in Contemporary U.S. Politics and 
Public Policy, eds. Sanford F. Schram and Philip T. Neisser (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
1997). See also Jacques Derrida, ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy’, in 
Margins o f Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
130
'Narrating3 Borders: Official State Discourse
Embedded within discourse is narrative, the widespread, interrelated matrix 
of ‘stories’ which help make sense of both the cultural-social and the political 
worlds. ‘Story’ here does not connote fictional, non-‘objective’ tales, but rather 
suggests the knowledges and social ‘truths’ embedded in particular textual (written, 
spoken, or visual) representations which help construct the limits of political 
possibility.92 Narratives provide key ‘framing’ devices which contextualise and 
render intelligible the discursive practices alluded to in the previous section. Schram 
and Neisser, two leading scholars on the connection between narrative and politics, 
assert
narrative practices.. .are embedded in all discourse, making the unavoidable political 
selectivity of narrative—sometimes called ‘bias’—an ineliminable part of all 
representational practices, including even those of the state.93
Ultimately, they assert, narrative ‘helps constitute the world as we know it’.94 Thus, 
it serves an important role in the socio-political construction of borders of various 
kinds—political, social, even ethical.
Narratives circulate throughout politics and culture in varying degrees, 
importance, and dominance. ‘Hegemonic’ narratives, in fact, may be so pervasive as 
to go unnoticed, continuously reproduced through a variety of practices (or ‘orders’ 
in i/b/o terms), deployed or bolstered by commonly accepted imagery (the guise of 
national foundation myths or neo-liberalism, for example), some of which are 
identified in this thesis but often go unexamined.95 Important to study also are the 
‘counter-narratives’ (to the prevailing power-embedded hegemonic narratives such 
as the ‘New World Order’, ‘globalisation’, the ‘American Dream’, and so forth) 
which are often not accessible through prevailing positivist/rationalist epistemologies 
and ontologies or are simply ignored.96 Indeed, as we shall see, narrative analysis
92 Falling under this definition are a variety of documents: records, court decisions, legislation, 
speeches, interviews, reports, essays, maps, and other data: texts is ‘a generic term that refers to 
various forms of written, verbal, and non-verbal communication.. .that are subject to study and 
interpretation’. See Danny Balfour and William Mesaros, ‘Connecting the Local Narratives: Public 
Administration as a Hermeneutic Science’, Public Administration Review 54, no. 6 (1994): 559.
93 Schram and Neisser, introduction to Tales o f the State, 2.
94 Ibid., 5.
95 See also Anne Norton, Republic o f Signs: Liberal Theory and American Popular Culture (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993).
96 Ibid., 7. See Richard Delgado, ‘Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative’, 
Michigan Law Review 87 (August 1989): 2411-41. For an example of the dimensions of discursive 
political economy, see Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan, ‘The Imagined Economy: Mapping 
Transformations in the Contemporary State’, Millennium: Journal o f International Relations 28, no. 3 
(1999): 267-88.
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opens the scholarly arena to sometimes marginalised approaches to policy, such as 
social constructivism, cultural theory, poststructualism, Marxism, and others.
The study of narrative is increasingly being recognised as a productive and 
interesting inquiry, particularly as textual analysis proceeds along poststructural or
07critical lines in cultural studies, literary theory, Sociology, and other fields. 
Narrative policy analysis, which is applied here, stems from a new, post-positivist 
literature in International Relations and other social sciences which offers new 
perspectives on problems conventionally analysed from positivist positions; the work 
focuses on ‘how representational practices (whether they are rhetorical, discursive,
• • ORor symbolic) contexualize, fame, or narrate policy problems and their solutions’. 
As Dolan and Dumm argue, policy analysis must focus on these representational 
practices by unearthing how the public, scholars, and policy-makers understand the 
issue at stake and what is developed on the public agenda."
This kind of analysis can also reveal how narratives become ‘particularly 
effective medium[s] for reinscribing race, gender, or class identities’, many of the 
issues at stake in an i/b/o-oriented research project.100 Representational practices, as 
Connolly, Shapiro, Edleman, and others argue, are crucial in designating the 
naturalised and reproduced identification processes and relations that legitimate the 
state and connect it to national collective identity.101 Understanding them is the task 
at hand here.
In addition to unlocking some of the identity and power/knowledge dynamics 
surrounding a dominant policy structuring discourse (and how they are perceived 
publicly), narrative analysis can also be helpful in seeking alternative choices or at 
least shedding new light on old problems: Neustadt and May, prominent mainstream 
public policy scholars, for instance, now advise that the question ‘What is the story 
behind an issue?’ is a more revealing query for the public policy analyst than ‘What
97 For a collection of approaches, see Emery Roe, ed., Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and 
Practice (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994).
98 Schram and Neisser, introduction to Tales o f the State, 6. See also, as Schram and Neisser note, 
Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art o f Political Decision-Making (New York: Norton, 1997); 
Martin Rein and Donald Schon, Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution o f Intractable Policy 
Controversies (New York: Basic Books, 1994), Roe, Narrative Policy Analysis', John Forester, 
Critical Theory, Public Policy, and Planning Practice (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1993); and M.E. Hawkesworth, Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis (Albany, NY: State 
University Press of New York Press, 1988).
99 Dolan and Dumm, Rhetorical Republic.
100 Schram and Neisser, Tales o f the State, 2.
101 See William Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations o f Political
Paradox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Shapiro, The Politics o f Representation', and 
Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle.
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is the problem?’102 Schram and Neisser, in pointing to the possible emancipatory 
potential of narrative policy analysis, argue it can then ‘become a critical practice as 
well as a theoretical activity’.103 By deconstructing and denaturalising the narratives 
implicit in the reproduction of political space, for example, the possibility for 
transformation or inclusion is opened.
Thus, narrative policy analysis is a salient approach to help understand the 
dynamics and frameworks articulated by policymakers (and by extension, publics) 
which support and constitute policy claims and choices. It lets us reflect on the role 
narratives play—as constitutive forces—in contemporary political controversies and 
developments. Policy often proceeds after and through a process of contestation 
between prevailing (or ‘hegemonic’) and counter narratives. Thus a ‘metanarrative’ 
(small-m, non-homogenising non- totalising), Roe suggests, emerges—even as a 
temporary stability—as the preferred policy candidate.104 This tends to be told by 
comparison to non-stories, or counter-narratives. The case studies and conclusion of 
this thesis argue in-depth about this process, partly seen as what Bakhtin calls a 
‘dialogism’.105 The emergent metanarratives then set the options for policy 
deployment, defining the ‘problem’, ‘risk’, or ‘opportunity’ and possible solutions at 
hand. In such a way, they are not unlike Foucault’s ‘discursive formations’ that 
mould around certain themes, such as sexuality. They can, however, be extended to 
classic IR or policy concepts and issues, like the nation-state, immigration, and 
borders, among others.106 In studying them, Roe goes on to suggest looking at
stories commonly used in describing and analyzing policy issues [which] are a force 
in themselves, and must be considered explicitly in assessing policy options...they 
continue to underwrite and stablize the assumptions for decision making in the face 
of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization.107
What is important to remember in a reflexive sense is that because narrative 
is so pervasive, both the terms in which a policy is deliberated and the policy itself
102 Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses o f History for Decision-Makers 
(New York: The Free Press, 1986), 106.
103 Schram and Neisser, Tales o f the State, 5.
104 Ibid., 4, 52.
105 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination-, Tzvetan Todorov, ‘Bilingualism, Dialogism and 
Schizophrenia’, New Formations no. 17 (summer 1992): 16.
106 Foucault, The Archaeology o f Knowledge. Discursive formations, can be found, according to 
Foucault, ‘whenever between objects, types of statement, concepts of thematic choices, one can 
define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformation)...subjected [to] 
the rules of formation. The rules of formation are conditions of existence in a given discursive 
formation’. Idem, 38.
107 Roe, Narrative Policy Analysis, 2
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are narratives; public policy, in effect, is a politically selective narrative between the 
state and its citizens.
A frequent charge lodged against narrative analysis (and indeed much of 
qualitative research) is that is that it is somehow ‘soft’, ‘relative’, or ‘non-objective’. 
Again, the dynamic of discursive/narrative analysis itself helps us sort out that 
question: because we are entering into the i/b/o-informed research from an 
interpretive, critical standpoint, research can be done in a reflexive, pluralistic, 
qualitative manner which examines the processes and relations which constitute both 
the narrative as well as the real-world policy changes which it allows and 
reproduces. The approach here does not attempt ‘to fit program activities or people’s 
experiences into predetermined standardized categories’ as used in quantitative 
analysis; thus qualitative research instead seeks to ‘understand the point of view and 
experiences of other persons’.108
More importantly, this may be able to unlock some of the power relations and 
processes which continuously sustain (and constrain) particular narratives. Foucault 
persuasively illustrated the discursive formations, the connections, orders, 
correlations, and positions between texts. A good analysis, then, would also 
‘unmask’ or ‘unpack’ the prevailing framings of international political phenomena, 
such as territoriality and collective identity, and open these to potential conceptual 
and empirical transformation in a system of plural values. In the end, we can never 
truly understand the object of analysis independent of how it is mediated and 
represented in existing narratives. Even facts, as Lyotard argued, are constructed 
through narratives.109
In this case, as Presnell maintains, however, narrative analysis does provide a 
firm footing for knowledge claims by analysing source data (interviews and policy 
texts, in this study) to ‘make explicit the implicit meanings’ of the ‘authors’ in the 
context of their identity and worldview.110 In terms of falsification, counter­
examples to the claim that discourse can explain the political actions studied might 
be offered (from a different social science perspective, for example). But, as Larsen 
states, ‘the discourse [or narrative] framework is very general (as its aim is to present 
general structures in the language) and the limits to the nature of the politics which
108 Patton, Qualitative Evaluation Methods, 22, 36.
109 Jean-Fran?ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
110 Mick Presnell, ‘Postmodern Ethnography: From Representing the Other to Co-Producing a Text’, 
in Interpretive Approaches to Interpersonal Communication, eds. Kathryn Carter and Mick Presnell 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 24.
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would fall within the discourse framework are wide’; this is not, he writes, 
‘qualitatively different from other macro approaches in the social sciences’ such as 
realism in IR.111
Accordingly, it should also be noted a discursive or narrative analysis does
not rule out other explanations but rather seeks to complement them in a pluralistic
way; as discussed earlier, other structural explanations (material, for example) are
possible. As Waever suggests, discursive analysis, can even begin to ‘link’ different
theories, such as domestic pressures, psychological factors, interest groups, and other
110commonly accepted factors in political actions.
One of the main institutional sanctioning, control, and production sites in
modem states is official government discourse. Governments have a special role in
both deploying and writing policy (in a discursive sense) and crafting a particular
‘order’. Here, a highly salient example of the power/knowledge nexus comes into
play. Official narratives play a key ideational role in affecting the structures of
knowledge surrounding policy initiatives, formulating the constrained and unwritten
mles within which they are decided upon, and representing solutions; these are then
11^supported or rejected among the public in democratic situations. The parameters 
of official discourse could potentially range from mild social regulation to a desire, 
expressed through metaphor and paradigmaticity, to ‘repair the state’s legitimation 
deficit’ through the creation of ‘a distinct object that is fashioned from the discourses 
of law, epistemology, social science, and common-sense’ to help maintain existing 
ideological and state apparatuses.114
In this sense, official state narratives fall within what Bakhtin calls an 
‘authoritative discourse’, an automatically privileged, non-interpretable narrative:
The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our own; it 
binds us, quite independent of any power it might have to persuade us internally; we 
encounter it with its authority already fused to it. The authoritative word is located 
in a distanced zone, organically connected with a past that is felt to be hierarchically 
higher. It is, so to speak, the word of the fathers.115
Thus, it makes sense to speak of an official discourse, of a dominant narrative 
(reproduced both through international systemic forces and domestically through
111 Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis, 33.
112 Waever, ‘The Language of Foreign Policy’.
113 For a radical critique of official state discourse, see Frank Burton and Pat Carlen, Official 
Discourse: On Discourse Analysis, Government Publications, Ideology, and the State (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1997).
114 Burton and Carlen, Official Discourse, 30, 34.
115 M.M. Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’, in The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael Holquist 
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981), 342.
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texts: official policy documents, policy speeches, administrative rules, websites, and 
so forth) which has a distinct and important role in reproducing, for example, the 
authority of the state over its borders and its practices which have an impact on 
collective identity.116 Indeed, as Somers and Gibson write, these ‘struggles over 
narrations are...struggles over identity’.117 Where and how that ‘border’ is set, both 
literally and discursively, is a window on how ‘the political’ is set and realised. 
Narratives play a key role in constructing this political space and thus constitute an 
important area of i/b/o examination. How the ‘problem’, in effect, is defined in the 
narrative is vitally important; as Burton and Carlen suggest, ‘official discourse places 
subjects within sets of knowledges and modes of recognition that produce specific 
and meaningful readings’.118
Important too are the ‘stories’ which are not told. Stone, Schram, and 
Neisser in fact contend that the goal of a critical policy analyst should ‘not be to 
distinguish reasoned deliberation from instances of rumormongering, but to 
interrogate all policy-making activity for its narrativity and asses the consequences 
given the persuasiveness of particular tales’.119 We must, as Shapiro persuasively 
suggests, ‘unread’ narratives, looking for their ‘remainders’, or what has been left
1 9 0out in order to understand the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. In that spirit, 
some of the counter-narratives of the American borderlands, for instance, are 
identified later in chapters of this thesis.
As will be argued in the next two chapters, however, the metanarrative there 
seems to be in tension with the dynamics of reterritorialisation (such as neo-racism, 
border ‘control’) and deterritorialisation (NAFTA, for instance).121 This is consistent 
with the assumption that the process of formulating such subjects in discourse and 
practice is continual and always contested. At a time of post-Cold War uncertainty, 
some communities are at odds with increased global or regional integration and a 
propensity to turn inward to national, regional, or ethnic identities for expression 
under globalisation emerges. The discursive search for new ‘enemies’ in ‘illegal 
immigrants’, for example as Mehan indicates, is on—just as is the concomitant
116 On modernity’s ‘dominant spatial story’, see Michael J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping 
Cultures o f War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997 )
117 Somers and Gibson, ‘Reclaiming the Epistemological “Other”’.
118 Ibid., 46.
119 Schram and Neisser, Tales o f the State, 6; Stone, Policy Paradox.
120 Michael Shapiro, ‘The Ethics of Encounter: Unreading/Unmapping the Imperium’, in Violent 
Cartographies.
121 For an excellent example of French reterritorialisation practices which is informed by Giles 
Delueze and Felix Guattari’s work on coding desire, see Doty, ‘Neoracism and the Politics of Desire’.
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narrative supporting border control and securitisation to ‘protect’ American 
sovereignty (and identity) as the balance of this thesis suggests.
The critique in the empirical component of this thesis examines how the 
components and structure of official state discourse on the U.S. borderlands is 
framed, how this can in some cases present a ideological or ideational ‘closure’ and 
then turns to other theoretical and policy implications the official narrative poses.122 
This is done recognising official state discourse has the tendency to ‘set up its own 
credentials in such a way that it can both hammer home the point of its own study 
and adjudicate between other versions of the story, incorporating some versions, 
over-ruling others’; it is pedagogical in the sense it presents ‘proper’ examples and 
must be analysed as such.123 Before moving on to do this, however, it will be useful 
to trace existing work on narrative analysis and then set out a methodology for the 
studies.
Narratwe Policy Analysis in Action
In addition to the case study developed here, several recent, important studies 
of narrative and politics have illustrated the salience and productivity of this 
approach. One IR scholar who has worked extensively in these terms is Michael 
Shapiro. Utilising innovative textual analysis methods and texts, Shapiro’s writings 
on various kinds of ‘representations’ like language and imagery have illuminated 
many debates in an informed poststructural/critical way.124 While only 
encompassing a portion of his work, his studies of narratives are controversial, but 
stimulate debate as they denaturalise commonly accepted IR concepts and 
narratives.125
Shapiro’s work on immigration and political narratives in the United States is 
of particular relevance here, not only for his theoretical contributions, but also 
because of what he has chosen to examine: migration and the American political and
122 Burton and Carlen argue that official discourse is largely a ‘signifying practice’ manifested as a 
‘technology of ideological closure’ which only extend legitimacy to the capitalist politico-judicial 
structures of the state. See Official Discourse, 8-13.
123 Ibid., 77, emphasis in original.
124 See, among his other work, Michael Shapiro, Language and Political Understanding: The Politics 
o f Discursive Practices (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981) and The Politics o f  
Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, And Policy Analysis
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).
125 See his groundbreaking co-edited collection, Challenging Boundaries, which marks a crucial turn 
in ‘border’ related work and is dealt with in the literature section of chapter three: Michael J. Shapiro 
and Hayward R. Alker, eds., Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996),
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identity community.126 Seeking to understand the aftermath of the 1994 U.S. 
Republican party’s ‘Contract with America’ as it relates to anti-immigrant sentiment, 
Shapiro deploys a narrative analysis of the construction of immigrants and ‘illegal 
aliens’ who transgress borders as ‘threats to valued models of personhood and to 
images of a unified national society and culture’, images which have important 
political manifestations: ‘they are continuously recycled in the narratives that 
constitute the “American” nation’.127
Using an historical analysis of several ethnographical and sociological 
reports from the early twentieth century to today (ranging from President Theodore 
Roosevelt to E.A. Ross to Peter Brimelow), Shapiro argues this widely read work 
‘questions the ability of American society to assimilate culturally the current influx 
of people to (what they construct as) an American cultural core’, supposedly 
necessary for the sustenance of the American democratic ‘idea’.128 Important here is 
Shapiro’s ability, through the narrative analysis, to link identity and the national 
story, which, he argues, has been written to ‘connect personhood with the national 
identity.. .particularly contentious during periods in which the boundaries of the self 
have been altered’;129 arguably the case under current conditions of globalisation. 
The notion of borders is critical in this process o f ‘constituting Americans’.130
A focus on narrative and borders is supported by Shapiro’s contention that 
‘the story of a unified national culture, designed to legitimate the ethnic and spatial 
boundary policing of the modem state, retains its force’.131 Through key textual 
illustrations which illustrate—although incompletely—the debate over immigration 
in the United States (perhaps one of the most widely recognised abilities and hence 
support-generating factors for ‘strong’ borders), Shapiro shows how narrative 
analysis can uncover the ‘alienating scripts’ which produce the alien other. He does 
this as an attempt to create an opening to ‘relax territorial models of identity and 
[recognise] the amoeba-like existence of cultural boundaries’, which would lead to 
the important recognition ‘there can be no culturally dangerous others, only 
dangerous ways of estranging others’.132 Similar narrative analyses have recently
126 Michael Shapiro, ‘Winning the West, Unwelcoming the Immigrant: Alternative Stories of 




130 See Priscilla Wald, Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative Form (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1995).
131 Shapiro, Winning the West, 26.
132 Ibid, 26.
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been conducted on subjects ranging from the discourses of so-called ‘Welfare 
Queens’, to myth and stereotype in American policy in Apartheid South Africa, to 
ethnic demography. Thus, the construction of identity narratives is a contested 
process of political and social representations and tracing them can reveal much 
about both the spatial and non-spatial ‘borders’ in play in determinations of the 
political.
Foreign Policy Analysis
Significant advances in the study of discourse and politics were made in the 
1990s. Waever and those in the ‘Copenhagen School’ of International Relations 
began several pioneering works on discourse in Europe, particularly emphasising the 
notion of ‘security communities’. Like Waever, Larsen’s recent work, Foreign 
Policy and Discourse Analysis, uses discourse analysis to examine several foreign 
policy cases in contemporary Europe. Larsen’s book sets out a helpful theoretical 
introduction along the lines suggested here, but is important in its deployment of 
these principles to study actual empirical policy disputes among states (France and 
Britain) and the European Union. Moreover, he successfully points out both the 
benefits and limitations of such an analysis.
Larsen identifies several gaps in the existing foreign policy analysis 
literature, namely a propensity to concentrate on the individual decision-maker; a 
predominating positivism; and finally, heavy assumptions that language is 
‘transparent’ and thus unproblematic.134 These constraints tend to ‘narrow’ work 
and can mask larger trends: the totality of beliefs, and the interrelatedness of beliefs 
and the decision-makers themselves. While traditional analyses may be useful in 
understanding many foreign policy decisions, he suggests, they can obscure the 
additional dimensions that a discursive approach can yield, such as insights into the 
role of language in a system of values and rules (his definition of discourse) and the 
connection between autonomous language, power, and identities (a la Foucault).
This work is also helpful in pointing out some of the limitations of a 
discursive or narrative analysis. First, he clarifies that ‘a change in discourse is not a 
complete change of discourse’; thus components of the discourse (which are derived
133 See, for example, Ole Waever, ‘The Language of Foreign Policy’, Journal o f  Peace Research 27, 
no. 3 (1990): 334-43.
134 Henrik Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 3.
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from ‘governing statements’) might change without altering the main discursive 
1 ^rules and themes. This is important as it allow us to deal with individual 
component changes or differences (in, say policy bills on immigration) drawn from 
the overarching structural narrative (e.g., ‘border control’). It is also important to 
note that discursive fields are always contested by other discourses. Larsen limits his 
inquiry to ‘discursive practice’, ‘the way in which the discourse is projected onto 
society.. .that is, its effects in the social world such as the arguments of social 
actors...or the actions or beliefs emanating from societal institutions’. The 
discursive/political structure is one source, for example, of foreign policy (but 
foreign policy does not reduce to this only; economic structures, for instance, are 
consequential as well). As Larsen notes, geopolitical or historical factors can exist 
and are often simply reflected in the political discourse. The key point is that the 
study of the narrative provides insight into the framing devices which operate and 
connect other factors. The applied analysis here proceeds along similar lines.
The political discourse Larsen uses takes in the written and oral contributions 
made by actors (and framed by the governing discursive pattern) in a universal way; 
it includes both elites and the products of other actors, like newspapers. This breaks 
from the traditional foreign policy literature which tends to focus on elites; as Larsen 
writes, discourse is ‘not primarily a locational concept; it is a particular structure of
• 1 1 7  »meaning which is carried by actors in a particular situation’. He extends this 
theoretical framework to several case studies bolstered by much textual analysis on 
Britain, France, and the EU, and reveals new insights into their relationships and 
stands towards ‘Europe’.
Principles for a Preliminary Narrative Analysis Methodology
From both the theoretical work set out earlier in this chapter, as well as the 
case examples by Roe, Shapiro, and Larsen, we can begin to draw a preliminary, 
four-part methodological outline to analyse narratives in the American borderlands 
case studies and that may also be useful for future research.138
Step One - Textual Identification: Identify and relate the key, source 





documents, such as legislative bills, but also supporting speeches, interviews, 
and statements by policymakers as well as important interest groups and 
publics. Both traditional ‘political’ documents such as legislative bills, 
committee reports, administration statements and the like as well as other 
texts, especially those written by elites, such as editorials, academic reports, 
imagery, stories, and so forth are part of the narrative or counter-narrative. 
Research and space considerations, however, require the discussion to be 
limited to key, representative policy documents and pronunciations, as well 
as select public statements from major interest groups or individuals. 
Selection should be made, according to Larsen, so as to ‘understand the 
language and broad societal nature of the discourse’.139 This must be done 
while qualifying that the material under examination is not fully 
representative of all aspects of the debate.
Step Two — Analysis of Dominant Narrative: Examine the historically 
contingent developments which set the context for the texts, thus presenting 
the political environment in which the policy germinated. In posing the 
particular ‘problem’, ‘threat’, or ‘risk’, discursive regularity is displayed. 
Next, trace the reoccurring elements of the narrative where this is set out and 
policy is proposed as a concrete aim of the state to solve the ‘problem’ at 
hand. A narrative analysis would seek to explicate these actions and their 
pattern. Often, the narrative history of the problem is provided and built with 
an implicit argument; the state may then use official discourse to neutralise 
any potential objection. This can be done by reaffirming its ‘just’ nature and 
rights or authority, possibly asking the public to understand how such 
problems arise or pointing out how they are mistaken; or they may in the end 
resort to common sense, natural reason, or patriotism.140 Alternative 
paradigms can be suppressed through these legitimised statecraft practices.
Ultimately, then in this second step, the stories which underwrite or 
stabilise the assumptions for policymaking in the given context must be 
exposed and analysed. As noted in the theoretical review, actors 
(institutional and otherwise) speak and write out of existing political power




structures and discourses which are historically contingent; (no discourse is 
entirely original), but rather temporarily stabilised and appropriated.141
Step Three -  Analysis of Counter-Narratives: Through the same method, 
identify and examine alternatives to the official narrative, and, if applicable, 
illustrate how these competing scripts play out empirically.
Step Four -  Analysis of Metanarrative and Critical Openings: Uncover a 
‘metanarrative ’ which is told by the comparison of the two stories and is 
reproduced materially and discursively through policy implementation. 
Ultimately, a good analysis will illustrate the discursive formations—the 
connections, orders, correlations, and positions between texts—that gets a 
metanarrative in place. Evaluate whether this metanarrative, as Roe argues, 
‘recasts the issue in such a way to make it more amenable to 
policymaking’.142 This may be followed by a further step of ‘reconstruction’, 
or suggesting particular critical alternatives, such as favouring tolerance or 
creating strategies to amplify marginalised interests or perspectives.
This methodology is applied in the subsequent empirical chapters along the 
lines of open, qualitative research: as one way to navigate the i/b/o triad by probing 
the co-constitutive relationships between national identity, interstate borders, and, by 
extension, international order.143 More specifically, the narrative analysis approach 
allows us to access, as Paasi does, the social and historical construction of 
boundaries and socio-spatial consciousness, particularly with regard to the state; he 
too understands ‘the representation of state boundaries [are] laden with strong 
visible/non-visible, local/non-local, ideological, and metaphorical dimensions’.144
Along with the underlying analysis of official narrative structures manifested 
in public texts such as legislation (the chief ‘data’ in the U.S.-Canada example), 
because direct interviews were also employed in the case study on the U.S.-Mexico 
borderlands, they require a brief methodological note. The interviews follow Smith 
and are based on a ‘semi-structured’ approach, with a set of questions on an 
interview schedule that guides but does not confine an extended, informal,
141 Ibid., 252.
142 Roe, Narrative Policy Analysis, 4.
143 Charles C. Ragin, Constructing Social Research: The Unity and Diversity o f Method (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1994).
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conversational session.145 Thus, they seek a phenomenological ‘open-ended 
narrative’ to achieve greater depth and detail.146 Smith maintains this 
phenomenological position ‘tr[ies] to enter, as far as is possible, the psychological 
and social world of the respondent’.147 Because, as Paasi helpfully reminds us, the 
‘use of language and discourses’ is a major factor ‘in the social construction of 
spatial demarcations and boundaries—and of the world’; this research tact is similar 
to a hermeneutic method which ‘seeks to discover...meaning...by examining how 
the individual consciousness [of the subject] reflects and refracts the spirit of the
The questions asked in the interviews were neutral and both 
‘experience/behaviour’ centred, dealing with what the respondent does, and 
including opinion/value/feeling queries that attempt to access the ‘cognitive and 
interpretive process of people’.149 Most were open-ended to allow the respondents 
full range to describe their thoughts, feelings, and perceptions about Operation Hold 
the Line, undocumented workers, and the U.S.-Mexico border in an attempt to 
unlock the respondent’s construction of social and territorial identity. Direct 
quotations from the interviews and selected secondary sources, then, are presented as 
the basic sources for this qualitative measurement and inductive analysis (within the 
narrative method) used to identify ‘patterns, themes, and categories’ from the data.150 
The method here follows sociologist Lofland’s technique in gathering data:
The commitment to get close, to be factual, descriptive, and quotive, constitutes a 
significant commitment to represent the participants in their own terms. This does 
not mean that one becomes an apologist for them, but rather that one faithfully 
depicts what goes on in their lives and what life is like for them...A major 
methodological consequence of these commitments is that the qualitative study of 
people in situ is a process of discovery.151
144 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness, 63.
145 Jonathan A. Smith, ‘Semi-Structured Interviewing and Qualitative Analysis’, in Rethinking 
Methods in Psychology, eds. Jonathan A. Smith, Ron Harree, and Luk Van Langenhove (London: 
Sage, 1995).
146 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Evaluation Methods (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980).
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148 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness, 7. See also Presnell, ‘Postmodern 
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This kind of active, involved role in qualitative measurement is inspired by 
phenomenological traditions that, in the words of Bogdan and Taylor, are ‘concerned 
with understanding human behaviour from the actor’s own frame of reference... the 
phenomenologist examines how the world is experienced. For him or her the 
important reality is what people imagine it to be’.152 Thus, the social world is 
examined from the participant’s awareness and perspective, not the researchers; the 
method then emphasises returning to the empirical world to examine how the 
analysis fits the phenomenon at hand.153 Situating the local view in the ‘small 
narratives’ that describe the daily lives and events for borderlanders is particularly 
appropriate for a study of regional changes. So too are determining the metaphoric 
practices that are key in the construction of national identity narratives. When this 
data is brought together with official policy texts, multiple dimensions of border 
narratives are available for study.
4.4 Co n c lu d in g  Remarks
This chapter began by departing from the premise that it is useful to think 
about borders in a time of globalisation and possible transformation. Border studies 
in various disciplines, including IR, have move forward from the days where the 
study of boundaries was largely non-theoretical and historical, concerned chiefly 
with static delineations and disputes over pre-given legal Tines’ which went hand-in- 
hand with (and mutually reinforced) a realist-inspired understanding of the nation­
state system as the chief level of analysis. But the deeper dimensions, the discursive 
and material factors, inherent in borders were largely ignored as they became 
‘invisible’ and highly naturalised phenomena. Moreover, the concept was rarely 
coupled with other insightful ideas, such as identity or order.
152 Robert Bogdan and Steven J. Taylor, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: A 
Phenomenological Approach to the Social Sciences (London: Wiley-Interscience, 1975), 2.
153 Patton, Qualitative Evaluation Methods, 47. The ‘objectivity’ sought here is in line with Scriven’s 
emphasis on accuracy of observation rather than the maintenance of distance from the subject. See 
Michael Scriven, ‘Objectivity and Subjectivity in Education Research’, in Philosophical Redirection 
of Educational Research: The Seventy-first Yearbook o f the National Society for the Study o f  
Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); this tact seeks qualitative objectivity 
through the quality of observations. We proceed, then, with the understanding that hermeneutical 
consciousness, as Habermas explains ‘demolishes the objectivistic self-conception of the traditional 
human sciences’ because of ‘the bond between the interpreting scholar and the hermeneutical 
situation from which he starts’. See ‘On Hermeneutics Claim to Universality’, 299. Impartial 
understanding is thus found through ‘reflection on the effective relationship in which the knowing 
subject always stands to its object’, idem, 298.
144
But, as argued in chapter two, the dynamics of political territoriality in a 
world of intensifying mobilities and flows is a particularly rich avenue of social 
research; thus international borderlands are productive ‘laboratories’ for inquiry. 
But beyond simply understanding them as isolated social phenomena (or even using 
them as a single concept) they, like their very empirical functions, are best analysed 
in conjunction with other aspects of social and political life; by definition, they 
implicate order and identity. One new tool to understand the relationships between 
territory and identity, and more importantly, how this plays out politically, is the 
i/b/o heuristic triad. The i/b/o project seeks to evaluate the myriad, co-constitutive 
processes and relations which produce and reproduce identities, borders, and orders 
in international politics. The triad is deliberately open and wide, and amenable to a 
variety of approaches, from both mainstream and less traditional avenues.
The approach utilised here for the case studies on the American borderlands 
seeks to operate between the identity (i) and border (b) points of the triad and then 
connect these to wider considerations of order (o) questions as well. The chapter 
illustrated the connection between space and collective identity. That analysis relied 
on a notion of a constructed ‘national’ collective identity as modem, state-focussed 
phenomena of unification and substantiation on civic, and to some extent ethnic, 
identity grounds. Official state discourse and the material borders which it 
reinforces are some of the chief tools of such consolidations. This takes a modem, 
instmmental view of nationalism as a movement to realise such collective identities, 
giving a high priority to elites and symbolic practices. Because the state ‘container’ 
and its ‘contents’ can be mutually formative, it is important to look at how these two 
sectors of the i/b/o triad interrelate and then explore implications for order. The 
concept of ‘socio-spatialisation’ was introduced as a particular way to examine the 
connection between how political collectivities understand their identity vis-a-vis 
various kinds of borders.
Finally, the chapter illustrated a methodology of narrative analysis as one 
way of examining this particular i/b/o link. Narrative analysis, as a form of 
discourse analysis, seeks to understand the defining ‘scripts’ of international 
relations: texts and their connection to power. In effect, these are the framing 
devices which politically and socially set definitions and create the possibilities for 
particular, political formulations of problems and policies, such as ‘border control’. 
With the methodological exposition detailed here, narrative analysis is the means for 
travelling along the ‘i-b’ link in the triad in the case studies which follow.
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Ultimately, this methodology will help uncover a dominant metanarrative in the 
official American borderlands discourse that seeks to reinforce an existing domestic 
and international order and consolidate national identity.
Why are the American borderlands amenable to such an approach? An open, 
flexible methodological outlook is particularly useful in borderlands studies,154 
because, as Spener and Staudt suggest, borderlands cannot be ‘disciplined with one 
way of knowing; their map cannot be drawn from any single vantage point’.155 The 
unique, multiple, transnational aspects of borderlands life cannot be pigeonholed into 
one academic discipline or approach. Accordingly, useful contributions and 
methodologies are sometimes necessarily drawn from the margins. As Ashley and 
Walker maintain, ‘marginal sites thus resist knowing in the sense celebrated in 
modem culture, where to “know” is to construct a coherent representation that 
excludes contesting interpretations and controls’.156
This approach informs the empirical i/b/o work on the case studies of the 
U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borderlands in the next two chapters. Specifically, 
the research is conducted by clarifying and analysing U.S. border and immigration 
policy through an in-depth examination of the textual ‘data’—the rhetoric, 
documents, and comments, what Scott calls the ‘public’ and ‘hidden’ transcripts— 
which continually affect boundaries and patterns of identity, territoriality, and the 
movement of migrants.157 The texts analysed are representational, but by no means 
exhaustive, of the entire debate which goes on. Following Mehan and the 
methodological principles set out above, representative documents from the public 
discussion surrounding the new border policy were collected were read and reread to 
highlight the narrative strategies—and the very language of the law—employed by 
individuals who are often institutionally representative (such as Congressmen) to 
represent space and difference and persuade the public, partially by setting out 
discursive possibilities for policy action which invoke national myth.
Moreover, the chapters which follow are also concerned with the material 
dimensions of U.S. border policy, such as militarisation and physical boundary
154 On rigid, flexible, and fuzzy academic identities and approaches, see Eviatar Zerubavel, ‘The 
Rigid, The Fuzzy, and the Flexible: Notes on the Mental Sculpting of Academic Identity’, Social 
Research 62, no. 4 (1995): 1093.
155 David Spener and Kathleen Staudt, ‘The View from the Frontier: Theoretical Perspectives 
Undisciplined’, in The U.S.-Mexico Border: Transcending Divisions, Contesting Identities, eds. David 
Spener and Kathleen Staudt (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1998), 25.
156 Richard K. Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, ‘Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in 
International Studies’, International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990): 263.
157 See James C. Scott, Domination and the Art o f Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1990).
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construction, which cannot be ignored despite this discursive, theoretical focus; their 
‘authorisation’ is indeed related to the narrative strategy. Thus, developments on the 
ground are examined and understood in conjunction with the official language and 
policy narration of the borders—using the legislation, supporting statements, and 
direct interviews with policymakers—as well as ‘official’ and ‘non-official’ counter­
narratives. The overall goals remain bringing to light new understanding of the 
processes and politics of bordering and identity construction as they affect political 
and social orders in North America.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
Th e  Tu r b u l e n t  U .S.-M ex ic o  Bo r d e r l a n d s
5.0 In t r o d u c t io n : T h e  Sec u r itisa tio n  o f  t h e  U .S .-M exico  
B o r d e r l a n d s
That fence over there—the Americans make a big deal of it.
—Charles Boyer, Hold Back the Dawn, 1941
At the stroke of midnight on 19 September 1993, the ‘Thin Green Line’ 
swept along the American banks of the Rio Grande river. In a dramatic fashion 
Charles Boyer would have approved of, 450 U.S. Border Patrol agents moved within 
line of sight of one another along twenty miles of the international boundary that 
thinly divides El Paso, U.S.A and Juarez, Mexico. Using night scope goggles, a 
network of linked electronic sensors to detect heat and motion, and employing a 
large cadre of agents who maintained a constant watchful gaze across the river into 
Mexico, ‘Operation Blockade’ began as a high-profile and high-intensity vigil to 
attempt to seal the international boundary from unofficial incursions into United 
States territory, chiefly undertaken by poor undocumented Mexican migrants seeking 
work in the informal service or agriculture sectors across the country.
This reterritorialisation initiative (later renamed ‘Operation Hold the Line’)— 
and its supporting narratives—have become the regulatory cornerstone of 
contemporary American territorial policy. As part of a larger, national securitisation 
plan, Operation Hold the Line was more than a simple or cosmetic change in U.S. 
policy. It was the most significant development along the border in decades. It has 
had a significant material effect on the boundary and has also worked to help 
consolidate collective identity. Indeed, as the new exemplar of ‘border control’ in 
the U.S., the initiative and subsequent developments play a major role in how 
borderlanders understand, reconstruct, and deal with the border, because of both its 
real material effects as well as its supportive official narratives. Both will be 
examined in this chapter.
These material and discursive changes came at a critical moment, at a time of 
both increased dynamism and tension at the border; the booming maquiladora (twin
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assembly plant) industry and the trend towards increasing economic integration 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have injected a surge of 
transnational economic opportunity and development into the border ‘order’ while at 
the same time increased exclusionary restrictions on legal and illegal immigration 
temper the mix. Both economic and political developments take place against a long 
historical backdrop of extensive cultural and social interaction across a state frontier 
with unique identity patterns. In fact, in many ways cities on both sides of the 
boundary have been considered single communities; they enjoy a variety of 
economic, social, and cultural ties that span the line and constitute a unique ‘zone’ or 
borderland extending hundreds of miles into each state.
The current situation in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands is representative of the 
kinds of challenges, especially those posed by the intensification of various 
transnational mobilities—capital, trade, information, and labour—facing states and 
border regions globally. To fully understand these issues, however, the kind of 
multifaceted and transdisciplinary approach to border studies outlined in chapter 
three—in conjunction with the focussing prism of the i/b/o triad—are necessary to 
explore what exactly the U.S.-Mexico border is beyond simply a 2,000 mile political 
frontier that separates an information age superpower and a rapidly developing state. 
That kind of analysis involves looking at material factors, such as militarisation, as 
well as constructed socio-political borders that are economic, ethical, or 
psychological in nature. This is particularly important as globalisation, 
securitisation, and nationalism affect the lives of the 23 million citizens who live 
along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Indeed, the policy dynamics and discourse of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands 
constitute elements of an important social laboratory to critically examine some of 
the mounting issues of the post-Cold War era. As the premier ‘joint’ between the 
first and third worlds, the U.S.-Mexico borderlands are the only area of their kind in 
the world and thus are of thus of high importance and interest for study, particularly 
for International Relations. The resulting kinds of identity and territory relationships 
(e.g., ‘i-b’ dynamics) in particular present numerous questions of policy and theory 
surrounding this unique unit of analysis in an IR inquiry.1 Some of the ‘tools’
1 As chapter three pointed out, the social sciences can have a tendency to rely on the state as the 
principle organising unit of politics and socio-cultural identity. Phenomena such as borderlanders,
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presented in this thesis are equipped to do this, particularly a narrative analysis 
methodology within the i/b/o triad. Such a study also presents the opportunity to 
evaluate the normative implications and alternatives to current border policies.
The case study begins with an historical and contemporary reading of the 
U.S.-Mexico borderlands. This is a boundary representative of modem political 
territoriality, produced through expansionary violence and delineated in the 
epistemological and process fashion characteristic of Western modernity, examined 
in chapter two. Despite this, the borderlands have emerged, especially under 
NAFTA, as a dynamic, unique, ‘interdependent’ zone of intense economic and social 
interaction among the two states. Here, transnational forces for free trade and socio­
cultural interaction clash with new American restrictions on the movement of labour. 
After recognising and evaluating this historical and contemporary pattern of ‘order’ 
in the borderlands within the i/b/o triad, the chapter then moves to undertake an 
extensive empirical analysis of the narratives of Operation Hold the Line—which is 
still in effect not only in El Paso, but clear along the southern frontier and thus is 
representative of contemporary U.S. border ‘control’ policies that are often 
reflexively organised. The chapter also considers more recent developments, such as 
increased militarisation or securitisation and barrier construction.2 By applying the 
theoretical i/b/o tool (particularly focussed on the ‘i-b’ link between national 
collective identity and borders established in the last chapter) and using the method 
of narrative analysis to study how the policy was initiated, justified, and received in 
both official and public circles, we can begin to understand how modem territoriality 
and identity patterns and processes in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands have changed 
and are now being produced through a dominant metanarrative.
This chapter will then argue for three main points that rotate around the i/b/o 
triad. First, the emergent material and discursive policy of reterritorialising the 
border serves to help consolidate notions of national American collective identity. 
The discursive and material launch of the Operation, and the subsequent 
securitisation of the frontier, partly recast the social and historical construction of the
diasporas, or migrants with complex identities, can defy this presumption and only further the call for 
a reflective and critical approach concerned with difference.
2 On the concept of ‘securitisation’, see the groundbreaking work by the Copenhagen School who 
have released the issue of security from its traditional moorings in IR, seeing it as an active and 
important dimension of many processes, including the environment and society. For example, see 
Ole Waever et al, Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1993).
150
U.S.-Mexico border and changed socio-spatial consciousness whereby individuals 
and communities are socialised as members of a territorially bound community.3 
This struggle over the redefinition of space is directly related to an understanding of 
social consciousness that creates a clearer, exclusionary notion of collective identity 
by illuminating the ‘us’ and the ‘other’ division. That dichotomy is both symbolised 
and literally reinforced by the existence of the territorial boundary as well as the U.S. 
Border Patrol’s tighter policy along it. In this case, national collective identity is 
being partly reconstituted through the vehicle of nationalism—actualised by 
supportive official material and narrative strategies that rely in part on spatial 
demarcations as well as larger scripts of national myth and stereotypes.
Second, the policy is representative of reflexive territoriality: informed, 
affected, and readjusted through advanced technology, surveillance, and policy 
monitoring—all of which are employed in the drive to ‘control’ the boundary, a clear 
‘borders-orders’ (‘b-o’) dynamic. The perceived policy need to counter the territorial 
‘risk’ here is also reflexive: the ‘hazards’ to be combated (in this case undocumented 
workers and illicit narcotics) are the product of industrialisation and demand in the 
U.S. itself.
Finally, the metanarrative emerging from this case fosters and presents a 
representation to the public of border security (regulation). The image is of a 
particular ‘order’ being advanced in the face of ‘chaotic’ threats to the state and 
nation—the shifting and mixing of identities and cultures and large-scale 
demographic changes in the borderlands encouraged by economic and socio-cultural 
mobilities under NAFTA and globalisation. This border ‘image’, which has 
particular political purposes, emerges despite strong empirical evidence that the 
multi-year, multi-billion dollar policy has not radically stemmed cross-border flows 
of labour. Instead, it robustly implicates a notion of ‘knowledge as regulation’, as 
set out in chapter two.
3 Anssi Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies o f the 
Finish-Russian Border (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1996).
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5.1 T h e  U .S.-M exico  Bo r d e r l a n d s  a t  t h e  M illen niu m
The U.S.-Mexican border es una herida abierta where the Third World grates 
against the first and bleeds.
—Gloria Anzaldua4
Why research the U.S.-Mexico borderlands? The U.S.-Mexico borderlands 
are one of the most intriguing, yet understudied, areas of cultural, political, and 
economic transition in the world. No where else do the conditions of the first world 
meeting—or ‘grating’ as Anzaldua vividly puts it—against the third exist, sharply 
manifested along and through a contested international boundary. This situation 
alone presents several important dynamics.5 Surprisingly, these unique—and 
relatively convenient—research conditions have attracted little scholarly interest, 
perhaps in part because of the relative neglect of the region politically and its 
assumed ‘peripheral’ status. As Spener and Staudt suggest, ‘relatively few academic 
studies to date have been able to pro vide...detailed accounts of recent developments 
along the border’.6 Like border studies in general, the area has, until recently, 
received scant treatment in the social sciences, and very little theoretical or empirical 
attention in International Relations. The case and possibilities for involved and 
critical IR inquiries seems evident.
The 1,951 mile boundary separates an economic superpower racing into the 
information age with overflowing abundance and a struggling developing state 
burgeoning with youthful energy, a vibrant culture, but plagued by myriad social, 
economic, and political challenges.7 Here, several cultures, identities, economies, 
and histories collide, often in an asymmetric manner.8 Indeed, it is a land not just of
4 Gloria Anzaldua, ‘To live in the Borderlands means you’, in Borderlands-La Frontera: The New 
Mestizo (San Francisco: Aunt Lute, 1987), 3.
5 The dynamics of this third-first world situation are highly interesting on a variety of levels. For 
example, infectious disease rates along the border are higher than average on the American side, yet 
well below Mexican national averages on that side of the boundary. Many other similar relationships 
exist. See Anthony I. Asiwaju, Borderlands Research: A Comparative Perspective (El Paso, TX: 
Center for Inter-American and Border Studies-University of Texas at El Paso, 1983), 34.
6 David Spener and Kathleen Staudt, ‘The View from the Frontier: Theoretical Perspectives 
Undisciplined’, in The U.S.-Mexico Border: Transcending Divisions, Contesting Identities, eds. 
David Spener and Kathleen Staudt (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 237.
7 Major social, political, and economic reforms taking place in Mexico, including the end of over 70 
years of one-party domination with the recent election of President Vicente Fox and his radical 
rethinking of the border (such as pushing for openness), may begin to hasten that progress.
8 See Tom Barry, Crossing the Line: Immigrants, Economic Integration, and Drug Enforcement on 
the U.S.-Mexico Border (Albuquerque, NM: Resource Center Press, 1994).
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a single geopolitical boundary formed in violence and mapped out in rational 
manner, but also of multiple zones of contestation where identities and movement 
collide with state structures, policies, police, and people. More so than in the 
Canadian case, two separate cultures and political systems come face to face in a 
way unlike across any other boundary in the world. Border cultures and subcultures 
extend along multiple fault lines—stretching into each state and varying significantly 
even among different sections of the line.
These multiple of layers of interaction, contestation, and production that help 
continuously formulate the border and make it a rich venue for the embryonic 
research that does exist. The fascinating situation has brought some scholars to 
conclude the ‘Mexican-U.S. border [has become] the model of border studies and 
borderlands genre throughout the world’.9 And indeed, the U.S.-Mexico borderlands 
constitute one of the most economically, socially, and politically important boundary 
zones in the world. Considered as a region (Mexico calls the borderlands El Tercer 
Pais, ‘The Third Country’), it is the ‘fourth member of NAFTA’ with a population of 
over 23 million and a gross product of over $300 billion a year.10 An astounding 450 
million crossings occur over the border each year.11
Mexico is the second largest trading partner with the United States (behind 
Canada) and the source of 27 per cent of its petroleum imports.12 Mexico, like 
Canada, represents a huge potential market as North America integrates 
economically under NAFTA. In fact, neoliberal free trade under NAFTA is 
burgeoning at the border (trebling since the treaty was signed) as new jobs are 
created in Mexico in the booming maquila industry which employs over 1.6 million 
individuals in over 4000 plants, most of which are operated by multinational firms.13 
Given deregulated, nearly tariff free conditions by 2004 (which have reduced the role 
of the state), trade of goods and services through the continent has increased
9 Robert R. Alvarez, ‘The Mexican-U.S. Border: The Making of an Anthropology of Borderlands’, 
Annual Review o f Anthropology 24 (1995): 451.
10 See Timothy C. Brown, ‘The Fourth Member of NAFTA: The U.S.-Mexico Border’, Annals o f the 
American Academy o f Political and Social Science 550(1997): 104-21.
n Ibid.
12 Paul Ganster and Alan Sweedler, ‘United States-Mexico Border Region’, in United States-Mexico 
Border Statistics Since 1900 (Los Angeles: University of California at Los Angeles Latin American 
Center Publications, 1990), 421; Abraham Lowenthal, ‘The Intermestic Hemisphere’, New 
Perspectives Quarterly 9, no. 3 (summer 1992): 38.
13 Mexican Maquila Information Center, Maquila Overview 
[http://www.maquilaportal.com/Visitors_Site/nav21.htm] (24 January 2001).
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dramatically in this new economic space.14 Since NAFTA was implemented, for 
example, truck crossings between Texas and Mexico alone have increased from just 
under 1.5 million in 1993 to more than 4.3 million in 1999.15
Tremendous population growth is another prominent trend in the 
borderlands; at current rates, the population of the borderlands will double in 22 
years.16 Many of these individuals are of Mexican origin and the growing number of 
Latinos on the border has fostered extensive social and cultural linkages and 
interdependency.17 This situation presages changes in the U.S. as a whole at the 
dawn of the 21st century: the Latino population in the United States is now at 35 
million and is the fastest growing ethnic group, nearly the country’s largest ethnic 
minority.18 Lowenthal now points to North America as the ‘Intermestic Hemisphere’ 
where international spill-over of domestic trends into international policy involving 
Latin America is occurring.19 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the U.S.- 
Mexico borderlands. These trends point to an increasingly complicated dynamic 
centred to some degree on transnationalism which Kearney argues means a ‘blurring’ 
or ‘reordering...of the binary cultural, social and epistemological distinctions’ of the 
modem state system.20
But beneath all the dynamism, the borderlands are also a complex and often 
violent zone of contested space, symbols, and meanings, many created because of the 
asymmetric order there.21 It is at the border where the contentious issues of U.S.- 
Mexican relations emerge; law enforcement, narcotics trafficking, transboundary 
environmental degradation, and migration all appear to be increasing in very 
interdependent relationships (demand by U.S. agribusiness for cheap undocumented
14 See Isidro Morales, ‘NAFTA: The Institutionalisation of Mexican Geo-economic Spaces’, Third 
World Quarterly 20, no. 5 (1999): 971-93.
15 Connie Mabin, ‘Texas Senators Call on Bush to Appoint Federal Border Czar’, The Associated 
Press (17 January 2001), [CISNEWS@cis.org] (18 January 2001).
16 John R. Weeks and Roberto Ham-Chande, ‘A Demographic Perspective of the U.S.-Mexico 
Border’, in Demographic Dynamics o f the U.S.-Mexico Border, eds. John R. Weeks and Roberto 
Ham-Chande (El Paso, TX: Texas Western Press, 1992), 6.
17 In the larger bilateral context, Mexico is also its main conduit for narcotics. See Ganster and 
Sweedler, ‘United States-Mexico Border Region’, 421. See also Lowenthal, ‘The Intermestic 
Hemisphere’.
18 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Projections o f the United States by Age, Sex, Race, and 
Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996). See 
also Jorge del Pinal and Audrey Singer ‘Generations o f Diversity: Latinos in the United States’, 
Population Bulletin 52, no. 3 (1997): 2-47.
19 Lowenthal, ‘The Intermestic Hemisphere’, 37.
20 Michael Kearney, ‘Borders and Boundaries of State and Self at the End of Empire’, Journal o f  
Historical Sociology A, no. 1 (1991): 55, 52-75.
21 Ibid.
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labour, for example, will continue to drive migration flows). Interestingly, 
commerce, information, and culture easily pass over the boundary—supporting an 
argument for deterritorialisation, but borderlanders now face what is rapidly 
becoming a ‘militarised’, and thus in some senses, a ‘closed’ border. Understanding 
this and these developments of the current order in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands can 
usefully proceed by suggesting the emergence of ‘dual’ regimes concerning the 
regulation of mobilities: the free movement of trade and capital but exclusionary 
restrictions on economic migration. The case study will point out the evolution of 
this position, which is linked to the implementation of NAFTA, and may be 
untenable in the long-run due to increased transnational pressures which impact the 
state’s abilities of economic regulation.22
5.2 A  B r ie f  H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  B o r d e r l a n d s
The historical development of the U.S.-Mexico boundary is a clear pattern of 
modem political territoriality, settled through force and then delineated on maps and 
the ground with precise, modem mechanisms and epistemologies—the same 
orientations outlined in chapter two. As Kearney suggests, the region is marked 
historically by shifts in the strength of the boundary, but, not in its sovereignty.23 
Thus, it is a clear example of a political border produced through violence and 
imperial reach: most of the southwestern United States was acquired by force in the 
Mexican-American war by 1848. Indeed, as one of the best instances of American 
‘Manifest Destiny’, U.S. expansionism ‘from sea to shining sea’ sought significant 
territorial advances in the southwest. Through the war and the vastly unbalanced 
peace treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, America won a boundary that ran along the
22 The issue of immigration under NAFTA is complex; the agreement does not have specific 
provisions for free movement of labour (aside from some specific temporary entry allowances for 
business personnel) but was signed with the future goal of reducing migratory flows. See Joyce C. 
Vialet, ‘A North American Free Trade Agreement and Immigration’, CRS Report for Congress 93-62 
EPW (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1993). Also as Sassen points out, NAFTA 
does include provisions establishing unaccountable bodies of ‘experts’ comprised of multinational 
firm representatives to make decisions. This, combined with the larger forces of globalisation, 
suggests the dual regime contradiction may be untenable in the long run, a problem the European 
Union has already sorted out. See Saskia Sassen, ‘Transnational Economies and National Migration 
Policies’, in Free Markets, Open Societies, Closed Borders? Trends in International Migration and 
Immigration Policy in the Americas, ed. Max J. Castro (Miami: North-South Center Press-University 
of Miami, 1999). Provisions of the treaty, such as Chapter 12, cede authority to external bodies. 
There is increasing evidence that transnational economic pressures will continue to mean that 
migration will increase as long as undocumented workers are valuable to the U.S. domestic economy.
23 Kearney, ‘Borders and Boundaries’.
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centre of the Rio Grande river between Texas and Mexico and then stretched in a 
discrete line of longitude across the southern part of what is now New Mexico, 
Arizona, and California to the Pacific Ocean. Additional portions of American 
territory in New Mexico were acquired with a $10 million deal of 1853 known as the 
Gadsden Purchase. That transaction marked the final continental consolidation of 
the Westphalian American state.
While the exact political boundary is no longer in dispute (from an American 
worldview),24 defining the U.S.-Mexico border region for study is perhaps a more 
unclear and contentious issue among border scholars because of the ambiguity of 
what can be seen as ‘non-spatial’ borders—questions of identity, ethnicity, influence, 
and migratory patterns—which defy the abstract political line. More critical 
linguists and sociologists, for instance, see the area in historical and cultural terms 
based on ethnicity and its limits of influence. Nostrand, as an example, views it as a 
wide zone ‘where the sharply contrasting Anglo and Latin cultures have converged 
to produce significant subcultures’.25 Latino influences extend far past the 
immediate political boundary; witness San Antonio which bears signs of the border, 
or Oregon, where the Mexican economic migrant harvests fruit, or Los Angeles 
where over 63 per cent of the students in the LA school district are of Latin 
American descent.26
The term ‘borderlands’, as discussed in chapter three, helps capture this idea, 
especially because the term originated to refer to this particular region. For 
demographic and statistical purposes, most U.S. scholars accept a 100 km swath of 
land through American and Mexican states.27 This study seeks the wider vision of 
the borderlands for the purposes of illustrating functional, non-spatial transnational 
processes such as trade and social ties that are helping build border communities but 
contrasts this view with the position of the policy community which tends to 
understand the border in strict terms of the international boundary.
24 Interestingly, some relatively mild resentment of this massive, and in their view unfair, 
appropriation of territory remains in certain Mexican circles.
25 Richard L. Nostrand, ‘A Changing Culture Region’, in Borderlands Sourcebook: A Guide to the 
Literature on Northern Mexico and the United States, eds. Ellwyn R. Stoddard, Richard L. Nostrand, 
and Jonathan West (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983), 6.
26 Lowenthal, ‘The Intermestic Hemisphere’, 38.
27 This encompasses the four American states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) and the 
six Mexican states (Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamalipas), as 
well as their respective internal political divisions, that line the nearly 2,000 mile border.
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Life in Interdependent Borderlands
In order to examine some of these transnational interactions, a brief look at 
life in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands is helpful since it is here that interdependence 
and interaction are a way of life, common elements of the ‘borderlands milieu’.28 
While the level of interaction depends on the nature of the binational relationship, 
strong symbiotic relationships tend to develop. Social and familial interaction across 
the boundary is frequent; U.S. residents or recent immigrants often travel and 
communicate on a daily basis with Mexican nationals. The several million Mexican 
nationals working in the United States overwhelm wire transfer services (sending 
over $7 billion back to Mexico in 2000—a crucial source for economic 
development) and flooding transportation networks over the border. Cultural 
exchanges are frequent; border literature and film is vibrant and expanding, and 
binational schools are being developed in some areas, such as Columbus, U.S.A. and 
Palomas, Mexico.
The twin-city phenomenon is particularly illustrative; sister cities Ciudad 
Juarez-El Paso share an economic relationship to a degree that peso devaluations in 
Juarez destabilise and depress downtown El Paso, forcing numerous shops to close 
while over 10,000 El Pasoens work in the maquiladoras in Juarez, the most 
important sector of the Mexican economy. These are companies operating under a 
special customs regime which allows them to temporarily import into Mexico on a 
duty free basis machinery, equipment, materials, parts and components and other 
items needed for the assembly or manufacture of finished goods for subsequent 
export. El Paso-Juarez, in fact, is the second largest area of such transborder 
manufacturing in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands.29 Production capital in the 
industrialised nation often utilises raw materials and inexpensive labour on the other 
side, as is the pattern with this industry. Maquiladoras are a sector very 
representative of globalisation.
The U.S.-Mexico border has generally fit into Strassoldo’s ‘peaceful co­
existence’ model and is an example of ‘interdependent’ borderlands since a relatively
28 Oscar J. Martinez, Border People: Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (Tucson, AZ: 
University of Arizona Press 1994), xvii.
29 An accurate and timely count is nearly impossible. Twin Plant News, published monthly in El 
Paso, publishes periodic counts. Some 275 plants run in Juarez, employing over 170,000 workers 
including over 10,000 El Pasoeans. See Mexican Maquila Information Center, Maquila Overview.
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stable international relations and economic climate has often existed between the two 
states.30 This is exemplified by historical patterns of informal co-operation. As 
Strassoldo notes, though, either state can easily pursue a policy of ‘closure— 
avoidance, dissociation, and separation’, possibly manifested by the construction of 
fences, walls or a ‘no man’s land’ in a situation of peaceful co-existence.31 The 
border has in fact experienced varying degrees of centralised control, ranging from 
benign neglect to allow de facto migration but more recently, heightened 
militarisation. This is exactly the situation developing now with new border policies 
centred on the Operation Hold the Line model.
5.3 T h e  M ilitar isa tio n  o f  th e  U .S.-M ex ic o  Bo r d e r l a n d s
The most recent trend in the history of these interdependent U.S.-Mexico 
borderlands is the reflexive securitisation of the international boundary in response 
to newly defined ‘threats’ and ‘risks’—specifically from flows of undocumented 
labourers and narcotics. The new policy was introduced in the wake of NAFTA 
which liberalised trade between the U.S. and Mexico but amid increased 
unemployment, social, and environmental distress on the border. The ‘boundary 
maintenance’ policy is designed out of a dominant, official narrative strategy which 
influences discourse and helps reinforce national sentiment through a security 
problematic and construction of the other.
The discursive and material manifestations of militarisation—physical 
fortifications, armed military forces, and high tech surveillance equipment—taken in 
conjunction with Border Patrol policies of exclusion such as ‘Operation Hold the 
Line’, this chapter argues, have at least three dimensions. First, they are seen as elite 
attempts to consolidate collective identity through creating territorial distinction 
against the backdrop of a border wide open under NAFTA to capital and trade, but 
not to movement of labour—a perceived and defined ‘threat’. Second, they help 
create an image of ‘order’ and ‘control’ against undesired mobilities (such as 
undocumented workers) that are seen to bring ‘chaos’ to American territory and 
society. And third, they are representative of a particular, reflexive territoriality
30 Raimondo Strassoldo, ‘The Study of Boundaries: A System-Oriented, Multidisciplinary, 
Bibliographic Essay’, Jerusalem Journal o f International Relations 2, no. 3 (1977): 81-107;
Martinez, Border People, 4.
31 Strassoldo, ‘The Study of Boundaries’.
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pattern which is informed, revised, and implemented by high technology and 
information flows at the boundary.
Because of the national security dimension (and public sensitivity) of the 
militarisation operations, open information on border activities of this nature is 
somewhat scarce. However, the initial germ of the policy narrative can be traced to a 
then-confidential 1993 analysis conducted by Sandia National Laboratories (a U.S. 
national science laboratory known for nuclear weapons research) under authorisation 
by the INS and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy.32 This 
report became highly influential in congressional policy circles and with the 
numerous federal agencies and military departments active on the border in anti­
narcotics (the ‘War on Drugs’) strategies. The analysis advised:
Significant improvements in border control could be achieved by introducing new 
or improved technologies and that the application of these could lead to reduced 
manpower and significant control of the Southwest Border.33
Immediately, the reliance on technology and the desire for state ‘control’ is 
apparent—the two key ideas under analysis in this study which suggest a reflexive 
territoriality strategy and an understanding of knowledge as ‘order’. Moreover, the 
premise that the border can actually be ‘controlled’ sets a defined parameter of the 
narrative strategy. The recommended procedure given to policymakers for 
‘improved control of the border’ was based on two tactics:
(1) Border enforcement: the use of heavily patrolled multiple barriers on the border 
to control the large number of illegal aliens and drugs crossing in the urban areas of 
the border; and
(2) Containment: additional 24-hour highway checkpoints to minimize the number 
of illegal aliens.34
Operation Hold the Line was initiated eight months after the publication of this 
report.
Following the replication of the Hold the Line strategy along the length of the 
southern boundary, the securitisation policy was open for public evaluation, even if it
32 Sandia National Laboratories, Advanced Systems Integration Department, Systematic Analysis o f  
the Southwest Border, vol. 1 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, 1993). A much 
earlier analysis of the issue was conducted by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 1974, but 
this received little attention as the focus on the border only emerged after the Cold War. See U.S. 
Department of Justice, A Secure Border: An Analysis o f Issues Affecting the U.S. Department o f  




received relatively little national attention. In 1994, Williams and Coronado set out 
to study the securitisation, and their work was followed by Dunn in 1996 on 
militarisation and Low-Intensity Conflict doctrine (LIC).35 Both studies provide 
further empirical evidence for the ‘hardening’ of the border (such as steel walls, 
armed border patrol agents, and military equipment and personnel) and analyse the 
causes of the securitisation, including undocumented migration, narcotics trade, and 
cross-border crime.
LIC doctrine and militarisation on the frontier, Dunn claims, means
the use of military rhetoric and ideology, as well as military tactics, strategy, 
technology, equipment and forces originally designed to meet perceived security 
threats in the third world.36
Employing tactics developed for American military operations in Central America 
during the 1980s, the strategy involves the construction of chain link fences, the use 
of night-vision goggles, infrared weapons, electronic sensors, and helicopters—all to 
reinforce and ‘control’ the border, and all on domestic soil. Much of this technology 
comes from the Central Intelligence Agency, including high capability cameras 
which can look into vehicles for hidden passengers, facial recognition systems, and 
even prototype devices which send an electric shock current to halt escaping cars.37 
Also worrisome, LIC doctrine calls for
so-called humanitarian aid [and] psychological operations to influence political and 
social attitudes among civilian populations.38
As the balance of the chapter will illustrate, the need to be seen as ‘controlling’ the 
border manifests itself in these attempts to direct the dominant public discourse on 
the policy—and this has an impact on national collective identity.
Also in 1996, International Defense Review published a little-noticed study 
on the technological aspects of border control measures being developed globally
35 See Edward J. Williams and Irasema Coronado, ‘The Hardening of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands: 
Causes and Consequences’, International Boundaries Research Unit Boundary and Security Bulletin 
1, no. 4 (1994): 69-74 and Timothy J. Dunn, The Militarization o f the U.S.-Mexico Border,
1978-1992 (Austin, TX: The Center for Mexican-American Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 
1996).
36 Dunn, The Militarization o f the U.S.-Mexico Border, 3.
37 As an INS Associate Commissioner stated, the CIA technology, such as a facial recognition system, 
‘is a clear example of this administration's initiatives to convert military and intelligence technology 
to domestic applications’. See Sandra Dibble, ‘Star Wars Arrives at the Border: High Tech 




and those increasingly undertaken by the United States, suggesting the U.S. ‘in 
particular, has been motivated to develop systems and equipment tailored 
specifically to the role of border patrol’.39 Their conclusions—and those of the case 
studies—both suggest the booming nature of the security and military industries in 
developing this new area of control as well as an increasing reliance on applied 
technology to monitor and securitise boundaries world-wide.
This is also further support for the reflexive understanding of territoriality set 
out earlier in the thesis; the authors concluded that the technology enables American 
officials to quickly and continuously reflexively re-evaluate their territorial strategies 
and adjust implementation (without having to wait for an open war conflict). And 
this all occurs with the prevailing official narrative strategy:
The resultant demands on the technology.. .can exceed even those imposed by more 
conventional military operations. What works, and what does not, soon becomes 
evident during repeated daily use; border-patrol forces do not have to wait for 
‘once-a-decade wars’ to test their equipment in earnest.40
As the 1997 National Drug Strategy report (which detailed presidential strategy for 
the border) advises:
The use of technological resources...has moved the Border Patrol into the 21st 
century of law enforcement. These devices enable field managers to more 
effectively apprehend and accurately track the crossing patterns of illegal entrants 41
Combined with technology programs such as ‘IDENT’, which is a biometric 
identification system to identify ‘aliens’ and is hailed as the ‘linchpin’ to new official 
efforts on the border—this strategy and infrastructure serves to create high intensity, 
co-ordinated knowledge flows that reflexively inform policymakers’ actions and, by 
extension, help condition their views on the border and its problems.
Military Involvement
U.S. military involvement along the border has gone beyond simply lending 
these technologies and tactics to the Border Patrol to direct force deployment. The 
Pentagon became involved with border operations amidst some controversy, given
39 Mark Hewish, ‘Security Systems Closing The Gap: Better Surveillance Is Creating More Secure 
Borders’, International Defense Review 29, no. 6 (1996): 49.
40 Ibid.
41 Barry R. McCaffrey, The 1997 National Drug Control Strategy Executive Overview (Washington, 
D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1997), np.
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prior legal prohibitions on the domestic use of military personnel.42 In a narrative 
phrased as the ‘War on Drugs’ and on ‘illegal aliens’, however, the U.S. Congress 
stepped in beginning in the early 1990s to provide additional military support to 
domestic law enforcement which was previously under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the U.S. Border Patrol. U.S. Defense Department participation was authorised and 
directed by the Congress under the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991.43 
This ‘national security’ strategy directed the INS to ‘gain, maintain, and extend 
control’ of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands in conjunction with the Pentagon. Since 
1993, major military resources have been allocated to the southern borderlands.
One of the most prominent divisions publicly known to operate there is 
called ‘Joint Task Force Six’ or JTF-6. JTF-6, which is comprised of co-ordinated 
military service components, provides ‘infrastructure and operational support’ to the 
INS along the U.S.-Mexico border. Implementing its mission requires the use of 
military personnel and techniques, such as intelligence gathering (i.e., high 
technology listening, viewing, and radar operations), air patrols, ground sensors, 
‘terrain denial’, ‘defence’ building (fortifications), deployment (ground patrols), 
‘fence and barrier construction’, and operational support services—all acts 
theoretically consistent with foreign combat mission training.44 Indeed, as the 
military asserts, this work gives units ‘actual and realistic field reconnaissance 
training that would facilitate their combat readiness’.45
Initially designed as an anti-drugs unit, in the mid-1990s JTF-6 became 
heavily engaged in anti-immigration operations, even outside the border region; by 
1998, JTF-6 had ‘coordinated more than 72,000 troops on some 3,300 missions in 30 
states’.46 This was fuelled by funding for Pentagon operations along the border 
which topped $100 million in FY1998.47
42 The 1878 Posse Comitatus law eliminated federal troop activity in domestic police operations; in 
the name of ‘national security’, however, new laws have weakened these restrictions.
43 U.S. Public Law Public Law 101-510, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 5 November 1990.
44 United States Army, Immigration and Naturalization Service and Joint Task Force Six Activities 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2000) [http://www.swf.usac.army.mil/ins/peis/peis.pdf] 
(23 January 2001), I-10-1-17.
45 Ibid., 1-10.
46 Tim Dunn, ‘Border War: As the U.S. Military Melds with Civilian Police Agencies, the First 
Casualties are Immigrants’, Resource Center o f the Americas Report [http://www.americas.org/ 
/NewsFeatures/2000009_Border/index.asp] (24 January 2001).
47 Nina M. Serafino, ‘U.S. Military Participation in Southwest Border Drug Control: Questions and 
Answers’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 98-767 F (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 1998), 5.
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The normative and practical implications of the military involvement are 
evident—from human rights concerns in the treatment of intercepted individuals, to 
military presence and patrols on U.S. mainland territory, to environmental damage. 
More recent events detailed below illustrate some of these issues. But as a reading 
the rhetoric of the initiatives suggests (e.g., ‘terrain denial’, ‘targets’) the mindset 
here is one of a highly dangerous situation requiring militarised solutions and 
massive ‘securitisation’ through defence technology. As the Defense Review report 
concludes:
The requirement to provide uninterrupted, in-depth surveillance of border areas is 
best met by harnessing complementary strengths of different sensor types and, 
ideally, integrating them into a centralized command-and-control system. For 
example, a chain of unattended ground sensors along a frontier can alert a 
surveillance radar to the presence of intruders, and the radar may then cue an 
electro-optical camera for target identification.48
All of this is part of a larger wave of major technological innovation and investment 
by defense contractors and governments around the world for border surveillance 
systems that can detect, identify, and eventually intercept movement across 
boundaries—all built with technology originally designed for conflict situations.49 
As first suggested in chapter two, the epistemological and implementation emphases 
again attempt territorial ‘mastery’ through the vehicle of technology.
5.4 ‘O p e r a t io n  Blo c k a d e’ a n d  ‘O pe r a t io n  H o l d  t h e  Lin e ’
In conjunction with the militarisation of the border, ‘Operation Blockade’ 
began in 1993 as an endeavour to seal the border to undocumented workers 
attempting to enter the U.S. Most entrants come from economically desperate areas 
of Mexico seeking low-paying, unofficial work in the agricultural or service sectors 
in the U.S. The new Border Patrol Sector Chief for El Paso (and now U.S. 
Congressman) Silvestre Reyes began the initiative that spread 450 Border Patrol 
agents along the border on a 7-day-per week, 24 hour-a-day watch under LIC 
doctrine. According to Border Patrol spokesman Doug Mosier, Reyes initiated the 
operation as
48 Hewish, ‘Security Systems’, 52.
49 As Hewish maintains, a large cache of military systems are being developed and implemented to 
these tasks. Ibid.
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a response to El Paso resident outcry of crime and danger attributed to illegal
Mexicans.50
Reyes proclaimed it ‘an overwhelming success of historical proportions’ pointing to 
figures that indicated detentions of undocumented workers—importantly in urban El 
Paso itself, but not the surrounding areas—fell to about 140 a day from a typical 
average of 1,000 a day.51
The policy reversed a standing, tacit tradition that allowed many 
undocumented workers access to El Paso, particularly to work in the informal sector 
of the American economy (such as for domestic work) for wages that far exceeded 
those available in Mexico. The blockade also effectively cut off the informal 
crossings of many residents of Juarez who could not afford official papers to work or 
visit friends and families in El Paso. Moreover, it inverted the Border Patrol’s focus 
from interior enforcement (such as sanctioning employers who hired undocumented 
workers) to concentrate security activity at the physical boundary line.
Initial criticism was lodged from the Mexican government and the some in 
the civil society sector: Roman Catholic bishops, America’s Watch, the Border 
Rights Coalition, a group called ‘Operation Bridge Builders’, and the American 
Friends Service Committee.52 Protests on the international bridges were conducted 
but appeared to fly in the face of seemingly overwhelming public support for the 
Operation. While the name of the operation was changed from ‘Operation Blockade’ 
to ‘Operation Hold the Line’, the policy in effect continues, as it wins support from 
Washington, D.C. and is emulated along other sections of the U.S.-Mexico border. 
President Clinton called it his ‘get tough policy’. In fact, as Krouse notes, 
‘Operation Hold the Line became the basis for the comprehensive border control 
strategy adopted by INS in 1995 known as “prevention through deterrence’”,
50 Doug Mosier, quoted in Jamey Simpson, ‘Operation Hold the Line: A Chronology of Events’, 
Norte/Sur: A Monthly Report on the Borderlands o f North Central Mexico 1, no. 4 (1993): 1.
51 David Sheppard, ‘Silvestre Reyes: His Blockade Changed City, Patrol’, The El Paso Times (1 
January 1994): 1A.
52 Interestingly, Mexico’s border policy is radically different. While the U.S. commits increasingly 
extensive resources to attempt to reinforce the boundary, Mexico’s traditional position does not 
involve discouraging its citizens to cross the international boundary illegally nor does it generally 
impede crossings on its side. In response to questions about this policy, Fernando Solis Camara, 
former head of the Mexican migration service said ‘At no time will we take any action that could 
discourage Mexicans from emigrating to the United States. That is because these are people who 
leave their families and their homes with the legitimate goal of bettering their lives’. See Anthony 
DePalma, ‘Border Deaths Don’t Change Mexico’s View of Crossings’, The New York Times (25 
August 1998) [http://www.nytimes.com] (30 August 1998).
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designed to supposedly prevent migrants from even attempting to cross the border 
illegally.53
Militarisation and Operation Hold the Line attempt to ‘seal’ the border to 
such flows, and in doing so signal a major change in the territorial discourse of the 
boundary. The following section is an empirical analysis of the major official 
narratives which underwrite the policy. Moreover, the evaluation is extended to help 
explore the worldviews of local residents, in particular the identity-territoriality 
relationships (the ‘i-b’ dynamic) impacted by militarisation (a component of order 
change). Drawing from the theoretical relationship between national collective 
identity and borders established in the last chapter, the study illustrates the 
reterritorialisation practice and discourse helps provide distinction between groups 
and symbolises important aspects of national identity. These are critical state 
substantiation practices used to help consolidate civic-ethnic identity, especially in a 
borderland zone characterised by foreign contact. The metaphors, rhetoric, and 
symbols, as the ‘texts’ involved, are major factors in the social delineation of space 
and help articulate the political narratives of identity (particularly nationalism); these 
are the constitutive elements of the official supportive narrative strategy.54 
Collective identity thus is partly guided and constructed by these official state texts 
and practices which are reflexively organised.
The examination of the border securitisation policies which follows works 
within the i/b/o triad and largely follows the narrative analysis methodology set out 
in the previous chapter. As that chapter indicated, the study of the narratives which 
support and connect boundaries, identity, and policy is a relatively undeveloped 
enterprise and has yet, generally, to utilise new perspectives on discourse analysis.55 
The approach here does take this up in an examination of the narratives surrounding 
militarisation and Operation Hold the Line, and is highly qualitative and interpretive. 
It includes direct interviews designed to uncover the border residents’ experiences,
53 William Rrouse, ‘U.S. Border Patrol Operations’, Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress 97-989EPW(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1997), 2.
54 On ‘discourse strategy’, see Hugh Mehan, ‘The Discourse of the Illegal Immigration Debate: A 
Case Study in the Politics of Representation’, Discourse and Society 8, no. 2 (1997): 249-70.
55 Exceptions include Anssi Paasi’s work, for example, and approaches coming from other fields.
See, for instance, a linguistic perspective from Donna M. Johnson, ‘Who is We?: Constructing 
Communities in U.S.-Mexico Border Discourse’, Discourse and Society 5, no. 2 (1994): 207-31. An 
excellent compilation from IR on these issues is Michael Shapiro and Hayward Alker, eds., 
Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996).
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attitudes, beliefs and thoughts—as well as analysis of the accompanying policy 
discourse: key public statements made by officials in Washington and the 
borderlands.56 The goals in this part of the study were to both uncover the dominant 
policy narrative and help understand the way participants in the debate see their 
collective identity and the border, illustrated through their use of metaphors and 
language. Their rhetoric and symbolisation are critical elements in the social 
construction of the self and the other, often vis-a-vis the official border policy 
discourse.
The empirical work, then, follows the preliminary steps of narrative analysis 
methodology: first broadly surveying and then identifying critical, representative 
texts—including interviews with some of the major participants in the discourse on 
Operation Hold the Line (major policymakers, activists, and residents in the El Paso, 
Texas borderland community). In-depth, conversational interviews were conducted 
or representative public statements identified in the discourse and key highlights 
selected.57 The second and third steps are done here by presenting and analysing the 
data along several broad dominant and alternative narrative lines. Finally, a 
metanarrative is established and explored, leading to conclusions about the study.
5.5 N arratives a n d  C o u n t e r -N arratives o f  O pe r a t io n  
H o l d  th e  Lin e
Americans and the Other
One main narrative concerning national collective identity that emerges from 
the research is that of ‘Americans’ and the other, e.g., undocumented Mexicans. The 
premise behind the construction of the other, as Paasi contends, is ‘an external entity
56 Data in this study was partly collected through a series of in-depth, open-ended qualitative 
interviews conducted in by the author in late 1996, designed to access the ‘cognitive and interpretive 
process of people’ and allow the respondents full range to describe their thoughts, feelings, and 
perceptions about Operation Hold the Line, undocumented workers, and the border—in a sense to 
partially understand their identity and worldviews. See Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative 
Evaluation Methods (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980), 207.
57 Select portions of their comments are reproduced here. Following the narrative analysis 
methodology established in the preceding chapter, the participants represent a cross-section of civil 
society as well as official policymakers—from the local to the federal level. They vary in their 
occupations and positions on border issues but were key and representative participants who helped 
construct various narratives and counter-narratives in the debate over border securitisation. For a list 
of respondents and their occupations, see the bibliography. Some of these comments are collected 
from secondary sources when direct interviews were not granted or possible. Sources are indicated in 
each reference note.
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against which “we” and “our” identity is mobilized’.58 This relationship can flow 
from an understanding of symbolic, social, and psychological ‘borders’, alluded to in 
chapter three, and is a clear ‘i-b’ dynamic. Nationalisms and other conceptions of 
collective identity spring from these boundaries of difference.59
The U.S.-Mexico international border is of course the ultimate symbolisation 
of the ‘us’-‘other’ schema because it structures both social, political, and territorial 
space. But that symbolic representation was only extended and reinforced with 
Operation Hold the Line, encouraging the development of a dominant nationalism 
narrative that operates in at least two dimensions: a dichotomous understandings of 
national identity and sovereignty, and also a depersonalised terminology concerning 
individuals. In the first case, the question of clashing national identities came to 
forefront with some respondents:
The Operation is to reinforce American versus Mexican. That’s the worse thing 
about it. It flows out of this historical condition.60
This borderlander, an immigrant rights advocate and outspoken opponent of the 
initiative, starkly identifies how she feels about being cast in strokes of nationalism.
Several of the respondents also addressed the question of nationality as they 
discussed the broadly positive reaction to Hold the Line in the Mexican-American 
community. Their comments are insights into prevailing concepts of identity, the 
other, and citizenship in the community:
There is this misperception that non-Mexicans have that the Mexican population is 
very homogeneous population that breeds this inbred loyalty and nothing could be 
further from the truth. [Reyes] wedged down that wedge because of the rhetoric he 
surrounded the operation with and with the context he really exploited the image. 
There’s a definite case of ‘us’ versus ‘them’.61
The interviewee here, a local journalist and opponent of the policy, nods to Reyes’ 
role in forcing ‘a wedge’ into the community—a clear symbol of what she feels the 
Operation did to change both sides of the border—specifically, reconstructing the 
other in the undocumented Mexican. In turn, this can help strengthen the bond
58 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness, 12.
59 David Morley and Kevin Robins, ‘Spaces of Identity: Communications Technologies and the 
Reconfiguration of Europe’, Screen 30 (1989): 10-34; Zdzislaw Mach, Symbols, Conflict, and 
Identity: Essays in Political Anthropology (Albany, NY: State University Press of New York 1993).
60 Debbie Nathan, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, 7 November 1996.
61 Suzan Kem, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, 11 December 1996.
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between citizen and state for those that are members of the dominant political 
community, the U.S.
A respondent observed a similar phenomenon during his work in Hatch, a 
small farming community of mostly Mexican immigrants 70 miles north of El Paso:
the recent immigrants want to close the door behind them as they come across. I 
don’t know if it is a nationalistic viewpoint or ‘I’m in, it’s too crowded’ or ‘being a 
good American’ or what but the recent immigrant Mexican-Americans are some of 
the biggest advocates of Hold the Line. In Hatch, there is probably more support of 
it among Mexican-Americans even than the Anglo population.62
Thus, a narrative of national myth—in particular an instrumentalist and modernist 
perspective—is particularly telling here especially as it affects identity through 
norms of ‘proper’ citizenship (such as being a ‘good American’) among recent 
immigrations who now wish to ‘close the door’. The ‘door’ symbol is a strikingly 
similar to other strong barrier images utilised by others in the debate—blockades and 
lines.
Finally, another view echoes this, pointing to the role of identity and 
citizenship, and the contradictory impulses of ethnicity and civic duty, play in 
responses of Mexican-Americans:
I think Reyes really understood the tension between Mexicans and 
Mexican-Americans. He understood the national tensions in this community which 
nobody talks about. I think that’s a lot of what Operation Blockade is all about...it’s 
not just about the nation’s fears about immigration but also the local tensions 
between Mexicans and Mexican-Americans—it makes it very concrete, easy to 
do.63
In addition to explicitly discussing the other, these respondents—and 
borderlanders in general—use a variety of revealing terminology and rhetoric when 
referring to their perceptions of Mexican migrants, which helps underpin their 
understandings of U.S. policy parameters on the border. In many ways, these also 
help construct the other and consolidate a particular identity. Some people, for 
example, rely on the American Friends Service Committee’s axiom that ‘no human 
being is illegal’ and consciously employ the term ‘undocumented worker’.64 This is 
a deliberate, if relatively rare, counter-narrative intervention. Most others, and 
especially those in the policy community, on the other hand, use the term ‘illegal 
alien’ to describe migrants, reinforcing the idea of the other and the non-legal status
62 David Steffen, interview by author, Las Cruces, New Mexico, 27 November 1996.
63 Nathan, interview.
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of such individuals, ideas associated with traditional conceptions of sovereignty and 
citizenship. The term ‘illegal alien’ is, in fact, dominant in most of the official 
narrative and helps further the criminalisation of economic migrants.
In addition to this, part of the construction of national identities within the 
prevailing narrative of exclusion also involves the collective representation of 
identity by ‘depersonalising’ membership through a stereotype of collective 
features.65 The use of stereotypes is often such a basis for deligitimation and moral 
exclusion.66 A borderlander, expresses this representation:
You have all these brown Mexicans on welfare and taking our jobs.67
This language of the ‘brown Mexican’, surprisingly common in some portions of the 
community, is consistent with Barth’s understanding of ethnic boundaries and their 
role in constructing and consolidating national collective identity. As we will also 
see in the next section, this use of stereotypes as foils for identity is indeed prevalent 
in the discourse strategy surrounding the initiative.
The dominant narrative strategy works to reinforce the social construction of 
the border by locating the ‘problem’ as undocumented Mexicans. An El Paso 
scholar pointed to the contradictions this entails:
We are constructing the problem as being a Third World problem to separate 
ourselves from it. We are related to Mexico economically. But we don't want to 
extend that relationship to a social one. We have an internal cleavage.68
The specialist on borderland public health, however, takes a rare, more 
optimistic position towards interaction fostered by international flows as 
‘innovation’, rejecting notions of static, statist identity:
We may as well have that intermixing, prepare for it, and understand it as opposed 
to just having it completely separate.69
64 Nathan, interview; Kem, interview.
65 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness, 59.
66 Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘Causes and Consequences of Delegitmiation: Models of Conflict and 
Ethnocentrism’, Journal o f Social Issues 46 (1990): 65-81.
67 Richard Taylor, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, 11 November 1996.
68 Pablo Vila, quoted in Karen Brandon, ‘U.S.-Mexico Border Becoming Haven for Criminals’, 




Reyes as Political Elite: ‘Order3 and National Identity
Border Patrol Chief Reyes was crucial because he both devised the initiative 
and participated in framing the official policy narrative. Some see him as an elite 
who capitalised on the latent sentiment in the community and then led, constructed, 
and galvanised a discourse of national sentiment, in part for personal political gain. 
Many Border Patrol agents themselves suggested privately Reyes’s political 
ambitions influenced his decision to launch the initiative.70 As this activist notes:
‘Hold the Line’ became this campaign slogan, and I was told by Border Patrol 
agents after the blockade that he just did it because he wants to run for Congress. 
He’s a very ambitious guy politically.71
Reyes was indeed successful in attracting increased attention and funding for border 
control operations; as the thesis illustrates, Congress approved funding for thousands 
more agents and enhanced Border Patrol operations. Even the head of INS called the 
operation ‘an extraordinarily successful innovation’.72 Congressman Lamar Smith, 
chairman of the U.S. House Subcommittee on Immigration, praised Reyes and his 
insights in a Committee Meeting on ‘Border Security’ and Hold the Line:
Securing our Nation’s borders against illegal immigration is the first priority of our 
immigration policy...It took the insight of a single person to change our whole 
outlook on this issue.. .Silvestre Reyes.73
Also noting the way public perceptions—‘socio-spatial consciousness’ in Paasi’s 
terms—had changed through Operation Hold the Line, the main local newspaper, the 
El Paso Times lauded Reyes, revealingly writing he ‘almost single-handedly 
changed the way we view the border’; the paper went so far as to name him 
‘newsmaker of the year’.74
According to some, even Reyes’s uses of crime statistics and his ‘rhetoric of 
fear’ about the ‘dangers’ of the undocumented migrant solidified public support
70 A Border Patrol agent who requested not to be identified, interview with author, El Paso, Texas (11 
November 1996).
71 Nathan, interview.
72 Doris Meissner, quoted in Carlos Hamann, ‘Public Supports Dramatic Change’, The El Paso Times 
(20 March 1994): 10A.
73 The Honourable Lamar Smith, ‘Opening Statement’ to the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Hearing on Border Security, 104th Cong., 1st sess., Serial 
13,1.
74 David Sheppard, ‘Silvestre Reyes: His Blockade Changed City, Patrol’, The El Paso Times (1 
January 1994): 1A.
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behind him. Certainly they helped define the ‘threat’ the reflexive territorial policy 
was designed to attempt to thwart:75
We are talking about racism and the way the picture is fomented by politicians for 
their own benefit.76
Seizing upon the ‘success’ of the initiative and a wave of popular support in 
the community, Reyes launched a victorious bid for the U.S. Congress, winning 71 
per cent of the vote, complete with campaign adverts that emphasised he ‘held the 
line on the border’. He is now ascending leadership positions in Congress, having 
recently been elected Chairman of the Hispanic Caucus. Clearly, Reyes—and indeed 
much of the policy community who supported and adapted the operation elsewhere 
on the border—understand separateness in a very strict way and fit into Hobsbawn 
and Smith’s conceptions of an elite.
His work, nonetheless, did not meet with universal praise among those 
opposed to the policy in the civil society sector. An activist accounts, albeit 
anecdotally, for Reyes’s success:
When Reyes justified it, he said we were going to protect the city from 
transvestites, another incredibly sexual metaphor. All this stuff about AIDS, 
beggars. He said‘at least now we’ll have our beggars’. He knows this community 
really well.77
These comments tentatively suggest Reyes’ role in manipulating public 
opinion by emphasising collective stereotypes, furthering a criminalisation discourse, 
and then defining the ‘disorder’ of the border as the policy ‘problem’; this too would 
coincide with an instrumentalist, elite-led role in helping consolidate national 
sentiment.
The implication of regulation as ‘order’ is the dominant feature of the official 
narrative of Operation Hold the Line. In discussions, Border Patrol agents 
repeatedly emphasised the ‘disorder’ caused by undocumented workers entering the 
borderlands:
There is a very serious havoc that can be reeked by unchecked illegal 
immigration.78
75 Kern, interview; Nathan, interview.
76 Kern, interview.
77 Nathan, interview.
78 Doug Mosier, interview by author, El Paso, Texas, 7 November 1996.
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This comment, by the Border Patrol spokesman, reflects the agency’s new policy of 
tighter control and serves to reinforce spatial consciousness in response to the 
‘havoc’ of a more interactive, ‘disordered’, and fluid situation brought on by the 
interdependence and transnationalisation that tends to characterise the border 
region—driven by demands for cheap labour in the U.S. Immediately, the ‘threat’ 
and ‘problem’ for the policy to try and solve is defined in the narrative strategy.
Reyes himself articulated his own vision of the situation in the borderlands 
before he stepped in, and in doing so formulated this main premise of the narrative 
strategy:
The situation was simply out of control. I'd never seen anything like it—you 
couldn’t go anywhere in the city without meeting panhandlers...In short, you had 
chaos and I didn’t like that.79
The focus creates a dichotomy of unprecedented ‘chaos’ and of order, requiring the 
‘control’ of the borderlands by reconfiguring difference and separation and, in effect, 
meant reterritorialisation. His next statement unknowingly, but directly, further 
implicates Santos’s ‘knowledge-as-regulation’ schema:
There was a disorder here when people were running around here which is scary to 
people.80
As argued in the pervious section, the regulations involved with the operation had a 
major impact in strengthening socio-spatial separateness when Reyes attempted to 
create ‘order’ (in the scheme suggested in chapter two, a form of ‘knowledge’) out of 
‘disorder’ (‘ignorance’) and galvanise ‘us’ against ‘them’. Regulation, in the guise 
of reterritorialised border control, could be applied and justified as a dominant, 
‘proper’, and hegemonic knowledge: with securitisation, the future would 
presumably mean border communities would be released from the ‘disorder’ created 
by ill-informed public policies of the past.
Reyes was not the only elite to articulate the problem of order in these terms. 
In dramatic rhetoric, Alan Bersin, the U.S. Attorney General’s Special 
Representative for border issues—President Clinton’s ‘Border Czar’—also expressed 
this central component of the narrative strategy, complete with nationalist zeal:
79 Sylvestre Reyes, quoted in Georgie Anne Geyer, ‘Strong Action Finally Puts Teeth Into U.S. 
Laws’, The El Paso Times (28 November 1993): 1G.
80 Sylvestre Reyes, quoted in Eduardo Montes, ‘Border Blockade Put Silvestre Reyes on the Map’, 
The El Paso Times (7 November 1993): IB.
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[0]ur duty and responsibility is to manage the border satisfactorily, to manage it 
away from the epic of lawlessness that has characterized that border for the 150 
years that the American Southwest has been a part of the United States, as 
contrasted with the northern half of Mexico.81
Security ‘management’ (e.g., proper application of knowledge or technology) can be 
the future solution to the ‘epic of lawlessness’ and ignorance of the past (and, by 
extension, that which is seen to characterise the Mexican state).
The Border Patrol’s spokesman, representative of numerous Border Patrol 
agents and indeed many El Pasoens, also promotes the perceived ‘success’ of the 
recent initiatives in similar terms:
I think people are very happy...[we] are cleaning up of a lot of problems—that was 
a positive effect of having the Operation.82
Another Border Patrol chief responded similarly:
Chaos reigned on the border. Not today.83
The border is projected to be ‘cleaned up’—those outside the bounds of the 
American political community have been rejected, and presumably the borderlands 
restored to a more ordered state. All of this narrative supports the reterritorialisation 
practices on the ground, helps provide distinction between groups, and symbolises 
important aspects of national identity, becoming a critical state substantiation 
practice to consolidate civic-ethnic identity, especially in a borderland ‘threatened’ 
by chaos and ‘illegal aliens’.
Finally, the spokesman voiced a comment representative of his worldview of 
sovereignty, isolationism, and the American national myth, dismissing any attempts 
to question securitisation:
First off, you have to respect the fact that there is an international boundary. It 
would be nice if we could say as a country that we will take care of all of the 
world’s economic and social problems. I don’t think it is realistic to assume that 
we can do that.84
81 Alan D. Berin, Statement before the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
Immigration and Claims Hearing on Border Security and Deterring Illegal Entry into the United 
Report, 105th Cong., 1st sess. H. Rept. 105-32, 16.
82 Mosier, interview.
83 William T. Veal, quoted in Joe Cantlup, ‘Arrests Up Since 1994 Crackdown at Border: Costly 
Effort Fails to Deter Illegal Flow’, San Diego Union-Tribune (20 February 2001) 
[http://www.uniontribune.com] (20 February 2001).
84 Mosier, interview.
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Metaphors o f  Inclusion and Exclusion
A further analysis of the very terminology and symbolisation (often 
expressed through metaphors) within the overarching narratives and counter­
narratives of these Border Patrol operations reveals the patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion operating in the discourse through particular territoriality-identity 
relationships. Looking at the language, Operation ‘Hold the Line’ was designed 
specifically to exclude ‘illegal aliens’ from crossing the ‘line’—the abstract 
representation of modem political territoriality and the exclusionary political limit.
To reinforce national difference, as Manzo reminds us, ‘the idea of the alien 
must be ever revived’ hence the painting of undocumented workers here as, quite 
literally ‘illegal aliens’, ‘national security threats’ that ‘invade’ in ‘tides’ and 
‘waves’.85 When such rhetoric is advanced—especially at an official level—its 
impact is readily apparent. Prior to these recent efforts, for example, the Border 
Patrol ran an initiative in 1954 called ‘Operation Wetback’, a highly derogatory 
moniker, to attempt to prevent similar incursions.86
These are the kinds of stereotypes of identity that emerged in the discourse. 
A respondent discussed her opinion of the American public’s view of undocumented 
workers trying to enter the U.S.:
[Americans] are still scared to death of the Mexican hordes coming over the 
border.87
Or, in the hyperbolic words of a border resident and retired Border Patrol agent:
The United States is in a crisis of catastrophic proportion...[it] is undergoing a 
large-scale invasion of Mexican, Central and South American entrants...adding to 
the poverty level and social problems. The United States has become a home for 
unwed mothers.88
This language of ‘invasion’ and ‘chaos’ are words used by some Border Patrol 
agents but also exist in the popular imagination of residents along the American side 
of the border. Within the dominant narrative, they help construct the prevailing 
threat and risk the territorial strategy of reterritorialisation is designed to confront.
85 Kathryn A. Manzo, Creating Boundaries: The Politics o f Race and Nation (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1996), 220; Dunn, The Militarization o f the U.S.-Mexico Border, 2.
86 Dunn, The Militarization o f the U.S.-Mexico Border, 14.
87 Kem, interview.
88 David Stoddard, Statement before the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
Immigration and Claims [http://www.house.gov/judiciary/106-stod.htm] (14 April 1999).
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These ‘risks’, a necessary result of mobilities of economic labour under 
globalisation, are cast to mean importing ‘poverty’, ‘unwed mothers’, and social 
disruption, creating a national ‘crisis’, presumably of a purportedly solid, 
homogeneous ‘American’ national identity and culture.
Indeed, in response to this kind of sentiment, Operation ‘Blockade’ and the 
militarisation efforts complete with LIC doctrine were introduced by the state in an 
attempt to curb such flows, or at least show the American people something was 
being done about the ‘illegal alien problem’. This rhetoric, though, was coolly 
received in some quarters, including the Mexican government. As an El Pasoean put 
it:
The word ‘blockade’ was the most unfortunate names ever chosen...it’s a word used 
to define an enemy and it implies stopping all trade and commerce.89
Language such as ‘Blockade’ and even ‘Hold the Line’ also served a major role in 
the overriding narrative strategy: it discursively aided the creation of a hostile border 
image in need of ‘control’.
In response to some of this kind of public pressure, the Border Patrol changed 
the name of the operation to ‘Hold the Line’, more subtle and diplomatic language. 
The agency explains the reasoning behind the name change:
I think the business community was very concerned about in their words the 
message that this kind of a name was sending to the business communities of El 
Paso and Juarez during a time when NAFTA was being promoted very heavily and 
this whole idea of trading and economic stimulation was being conveyed. Chief 
Reyes recognized that and as a courtesy very quickly changed the name to 
something they felt was more palatable.90
The use of ‘palatable’ here is of note; while the actual policy remained unchanged, 
this indicates the move was a crafted public relations attempt within the narrative 
strategy to promote acceptance of the policy. This is consistent with the 
psychological component of LIC doctrine. Some, though, had different feelings 
about the name change:
We have on the border all this military imagery and I’m sure it seemed real natural 
for Reyes to use military imagery...but that was a little too threatening to diplomatic 
relationships to use such a negative term. I continue to use the word blockade, it’s 
more honest word.91
89 Manny Aldana, quoted in Carlos Hamann, ‘Public Supports Dramatic Change’, The El Paso Times 




In the end, the Border Patrol, however, could not be clearer about rhetorical and 
material implications of the policy:
Operation Hold the Line was very simple—very symbolic of what we were trying 
to do and the name stuck.92
The Border Patrol’s public comments also clearly respond to a dual-regime, 
post-Cold War situation where economic integration and transnationalisation goes on 
under NAFTA just as exclusionary restrictions on labour are sought. They liken any 
comparison, however, to ‘apples and oranges’:
I think they [the Mexican government and critics] were concerned about the 
message that this operation sent at a time when NAFTA was on the front burner. 
We maintained then and we still maintain that it is apples and oranges. You cannot 
stimulate trade without a sound immigration policy.93
Irrespective of the economic argument that could be made, the metaphor of ‘apples 
and oranges’ is a crystallisation of the dominant pattern of inclusion and exclusion 
this study suggests—capital is admitted across the border while the undocumented 
who help drive economic expansion are sought to be excluded. As part of the 
counter-narrative, a resident gave her sentiment on this apparent contradiction, and 
how alternatives are perceived:
[People] see [the border] in economic terms and they understand that trade barriers 
should come down and that we should have this commerce and cultural exchange— 
they understand it, but when they get right down to the grass roots and talk about 
people, poor people, and the impact on poor people’s lives and shouldn’t poor 
people have the right to seek jobs here that they can’t find in Mexico—that’s where 
people go no—that’s where they want to draw the line...So that’s a hard place to 
reach.94
A Counter-Narrative of Community
One counter-narrative that emerged in the debate about the Operation 
concerned the notion of community. The idea of a binational community or 
integrated borderland with its own, unique normative and territorial dimensions apart 
from those of the state is of course the obvious alternative to closure and 





with the formation of Unite El Paso, a mainstream, blue ribbon citizens group with 
real questions about the border. One of their proposals, made right before the 
Operation Blockade began, suggested delineating a kind of free zone of movement 
between Juarez and El Paso, erasing the existing international boundary and moving 
ports of entry to the outskirts of both cities. As a person involved with the 
organisation explains:
[Unite El Paso] was a direct questioning of the border. They were talking about 
that in the spring and summer of 1993, before the Blockade. And I think that the 
Blockade just shut all that discussion down because all of a sudden the whole city 
was polarised...
I think it opened up a space for people to stop thinking about the border as this 
arbitrary line. And then that whole discussion got cut off.95
These representative statements suggest a different understanding of socio-spatial 
consciousness: this was an alternative attempt to create a transnational ‘space’, an 
integrated borderland and thus a kind of communitarian-like structure with new 
parameters of inclusion and exclusion. Migrant workers, for instance, would have 
limited access to the El Paso component of the community (as current guest worker 
proposals, in fact, now seek), and vice-versa. The community would also address the 
status of such migrants and their ethical responsibilities to them.
The Blockade, however, reoriented the community’s consciousness, as the 
chairman of the group argued:
Blockades tend to increase the stereotype and mindset that we’re supposed to be 
separate. It’s not the answer, it’s a Band-Aid to our problems.96
Nevertheless, Unite El Paso was a groundbreaking initiative in opposition to 
a strict territorial consciousness of identity and a worldview of separateness. It 
involved a new principle of separability, and irrespective of its real prospects for 
material change, injected alternatives into the discourse:
We talk about that in ways—border communities on both sides should have some 
input into the ways the borders are administered. Here in El Paso a real interesting 
image is moving the inspection away from the border and moving it out to the 
checkpoints just like it is in Mexico—opening the area so El Paso/Juarez can 
function more as a joined city. We talk about that in ways—border communities on 
both sides should have some input into the ways the borders are administered.97
95 Nathan, interview.




Here we see the fluid language of ‘joining’, spatial ‘opening’, a problematising of the 
boundary, and a call for localised, bi-national decision making.
Reflecting this communitarian idea, a director of a refugee centre in El Paso 
asked a central question about securitisation during a 1993 forum:
What happens to a community that prior to [Reyes’s arrival] was trying to discern 
what was best for both sides of the border? We are the ones who should decide the 
quality of the relationship.98
This is a call for a fostering of binational relationships and local control of decision 
making in the community. This kind of idea relies on the notion that border 
communities have more in common with one another—a closer common identity— 
than their respective state ‘centres’.
Counter-narratives like the Unite El Paso idea also emerged in the 
environmental and public health communities, which tend to recognise the 
arbitrariness of borders when thinking about their issues. One official elucidated his 
office’s proposal to create a similar sort of community:
In a lot of ways we wanted to have like a free trade zone a free health zone. But 
that has been very very difficult—the autonomy and sovereignty issues are huge. It 
hasn’t been able to happen.99
He suggests a different outlook:
Ultimately to me [the current policy] is a negative piece.. .because I believe to have 
barriers and borders and homogenizing pieces decreases the amount of innovation 
we have. Cutting down on that communication also, from a public health 
perspective also boxes things and makes you not as readily available to understand 
the issues that come from intermixing of populations and that’s going to happen 
without a doubt.100
His term ‘homogenizing pieces’ is an interesting metaphor that seems to vividly 
conceptualise what the Operation seeks to do—reinforce both spatial, cultural, and 
national separateness.
The border as a ‘region’ was a popular theme among the respondents as well. 
This consciousness can suggest an identity that recognises a certain 
interconnectedness apart from the static or state-centric identity most hold on to:
98 Rueben Garcia, quoted in David Sheppard, ‘College Crowd Cheers Border Patrol’, El Paso Times 
(10 October 1993): IB.
99 Steffen, interview.
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The border is a ‘region’—it is this way of getting people to take one step to the side 
and look at it. We truly do have more in common with people in Juarez than we do 
with people in Austin and certainly people in Washington, D.C. And this whole 
strip of border—all our problems are so interdependent—Juarez has more in 
common with us than they do with Chihuahua or Mexico City.101
Later, this resident proposed a new metaphor that does not involve opening the 
border but would constitute a reordered political territorial identity and a form of 
moral inclusion:
We like to talk about not having no borders at all, but having a border that is a kind 
of permeable membrane that is not a line and a border that is mutual, not just where 
one nation ends, but where two nations join.102
This kind of communitarian, ‘permeable’ membrane that ‘joins’ is an image that 
presents different dimensions of inclusion and exclusion. Previously excluded 
undocumented people might have a limited opportunity to pass through this new 
space.
The public health official offers us similar image of the border:
I think of it as a semi-permeable membrane, an osmotic membrane you have this 
diffusion going through and the concentration of where people go and were the 
membrane is also wealth, it’s really economics.103
While these proposals for critical alternatives in the borderlands may have not been 
politically feasible at the time—nor even now—they do mark an important, counter 
intervention in the discourse by simply advancing the idea other possibilities exist.
M aterial and Discursive Turns: Walls and Fences on the Border
While Unite El Paso proposed moving the current international boundary 
outside the city limits, and counter-narratives questioned further build-ups, the 
Border Patrol moved in conjunction with Operation Hold the Line to construct a 
variety of ramparts along the U.S.-Mexico boundary itself; this was an easily 
recognisable method or strategy of creating separateness in the political discourse 
and on the ground. The INS built a new 10 foot high fence at the border between
100 Ibid. In the interview, he emphasised that national distinctions and exclusionary impulses are 






Anapra, Mexico (a poor colonia or ‘neighbourhood’ of far northwest Juarez, without 
water or public utilities) and Sunland Park, New Mexico. Originally envisioned as a 
steel wall, INS altered its plans amid public protest and built a steel reinforced, 
chain-link fence with underground barriers to prevent digging beneath it.
Interestingly enough, the public seemed receptive to a the symbol of a ‘fence’ 
but not a ‘wall’. One respondent pondered this concept:
They put all this junk underneath so that nobody can dig their way down and 
they’re going to have some barbed wire at the top? Who cares? This is just as 
terrible a message to send. It is very symbolic. That wall image is real potent.104
But local residents, asking that a border crossing point be built instead, made their 
own, symbolic counter-narrative intervention: near the wall, they placed a clever 
home-made sign:
The 10,000 residents of Puerto de Anapra protest against the Berlin (Anapra) 
Wall.105
Unhappily, a resident of the poverty-stricken colonia asserted:
They’re building a corral around us like we are animals.106
The Border Patrol has a radically different view of the fence:
We feel very passionate about the idea of implementing tools that give us more 
efficiency, more manageability, in troublesome areas.107
These are clearly narratives in opposition; to the Border Patrol the wall is less a 
symbol than a ‘tool’ to help ‘manage’ their monitoring of the line. This kind of 
outlook represents their efforts to concentrate resources on the ‘front line’ in the 
struggle against illegal incursions into the U.S. The blockade, some felt, was simply 
a different kind of barrier:
The interesting thing about the wall—there was a lot of opposition and it was 
growing in El Paso—everyone thought the Blockade was fine, but a wall was 
something different in their minds, aesthetically, metaphorically, whatever. The 
blockade was just a human wall but they didn’t like this idea of this concrete, 
tangible wall that you can’t see through.108
104 Nathan, interview.
105 Author observation, 11 November 1997.




Perhaps the physical composition of the barrier does make a difference— 
since, as noted in the theoretical review, walls and boundaries are ‘metaphors of 
containment’ that signify identity and difference, borderlanders may be tacitly 
acknowledging interrelationships by embracing a transparent fence and are unwilling 
to impose further difference with construction of a solid wall that blocks a gaze into 
Mexico.109
The division of self and other is often paramount in various kinds of 
socio-spatial groupings and is forced into play here by the construction of these 
kinds of physical barriers. The role of spatiality and division (through the physical 
manifestation of a fence) can be directly correlated to the construction of 
otherness.110 Where this border fortification policy has been extended elsewhere, 
some residents have expressed similar views: a Naco, Arizona resident recently 
described a life of ‘constant surveillance...and constant suspicion’, heavily 
discouraged because the city is no longer open.111
Back in El Paso, a long-standing local resident in an editorial for the El Paso 
Times, seemed to strike the heart of the matter:
We have to confront the fact that this isn’t one big community anymore. And 
pretty soon, there will be a wall to remind us about that.112
5.6 R ec en t  D evelopm ents
Operation Hold the Line was so well-received in the policy community it 
became the cornerstone of American border policy from the mid-1990s; its initiation 
set into motion a broad pattern of securitisation along the southern frontier (and as 
the next chapter will illustrate, also to some extent in the northern borderlands). This 
‘success’ can be better understood only within the context of more recent 
developments. The material and narrative dimensions of these more recent changes 
(largely manifestations of reterritorialisation), detailed below, serve as additional
109 See Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization o f Cultural Difference 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969); see also Sheldon S. Wolin, ‘Fugitive Democracy’, in 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
110 Anssi Paasi, ‘Constructing Territories, Boundaries and Regional Identities’, in Contested Territory: 
Border Disputes at the Edge o f the Former Soviet Empire, ed. Tuomas Forsberg (Brookfield, VT: 
Edward Elgar, 1995).
111 Linda Morales, quoted in Interpreter Releases 77, no. 26 (10 July 2000), 672
112 Richard Vela, ‘Innocence of Border Christmas is Past’, Norte/Sur: A Monthly Report on The 
Borderlands o f North Central Mexico 1, no. 6 (1993): 3.
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support for the prevailing territoriality-identity dynamics elaborated in the previous 
section. They are also illustrative of a regulatory understanding of knowledge as 
‘order’ and are important reminders of some of the normative implications of the 
policy.
The official, dominant narrative of border securitisation—in the words of the 
INS’s latest budget requests—‘to improve our control over our international borders’ 
has continued to frame policy formulation increasing at a furious pace since the 
unveiling of Hold the Line.113 Support derived from public and congressional 
meetings, hearings, and both the Clinton and Bush administrations has meant 
burgeoning budgets for the INS at a time when most government agencies have been 
cut back.114 Funding of ‘technological capabilities’ for surveillance is a high priority, 
as is staffing of agents and the building of walls.
Much of this stems from immigration legislation of the mid-1990s. The 1996 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (HRIRA) built on the 
reterritorialisation impulses to authorise wide changes in American border policy.115 
While the bill is detailed extensively in the next chapter, its provisions and narrative 
have had a profound effect on the southern borderlands as well in the north by 
continuing and bolstering securitisation while devoting few resources to interior 
regulation. In the legislation, the U.S. Congress (among other immigration control 
measures) mandated the INS hire 1,000 agents per year through 2001, bringing the 
FY2000 total to over 9,000 agents, which represents more than a doubling of agents 
since FY 1993.116 According to the INS, the Border Patrol has grown by more than 
123 per cent since fiscal year 1994 and now has a $4.6 billion annual budget.117 It is 
now the largest body of domestic law enforcement authorised to carry firearms.
113 U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, ‘Strengthening the Nation’s 
Immigration System’ (1 February 1998) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1998) 
[http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/textonly/public_affairs/press_releases/FY99.html] (16 September 1998).
114 Numerous congressional hearings bolstered official narrative support for the radical build-up of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See U.S. House Subcommittee on Immigration and 
Claims, Border Security and Deterring Illegal Entry into the United States and Border Security.
1,5 Division C of U.S. Public Law 104-208, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 30 September 1996.
116 See U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol FY 2000 
Recruiting and Hiring Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000) 
[http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/factsheets/recmit.pdf] (30 January 20001). See also 
U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results 
Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed (Report # GAO/GGD-98-21) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1997) and Krouse, ‘U.S. Border Patrol Operations’.
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Violence in the Borderlands
The militarisation of the southern borderlands all this set in motion has 
indirectly taken the life of many undocumented persons by forcing them to cross the 
border in increasingly desolate and inhospitable areas. As will be illustrated below, 
urban securitisation has not stopped flows, but rather shifted them to dangerous rural 
areas. In 1997, however, the military presence on the border had direct, tragic 
consequences for a young American citizen on American soil. On 20 May, a U.S. 
Marine unit attached to JTF-6 was on a covert surveillance mission on the border 
near Redford, Texas. The team of four camouflaged Marines, armed with M-16 
assault rifles, pursued, shot, and killed Esequiel Hernandez Jr., an 18 year old 
American tending his goats in the area.
The killing dramatically highlights the dangers militarisation and violence 
pose along the borderlands, as well as the inherent issues surrounding U.S. military 
involvement with civilian law enforcement. In the Hernandez case, a congressional 
inquiry concluded that his death was
attributable to a series of failures on the part of Justice Department and Defense 
Department personnel who were negligent in their training and preparation for the 
border surveillance mission, and who failed to respond adequately to an emergency 
situation as it developed.118
These Marines were ill-trained for this kind of operation, as their background 
instruction (as is the case with most military units on the border) was designed for 
conflict situations. No JTF-6 personnel, nor any INS officials, were held 
accountable for the Hernandez killing, and U.S. Justice Department and INS were 
sharply criticised in the inquiry for withholding vital information to the case.119 
Moreover, Hernandez was targeted because he supposedly fit the profile of a drug- 
runner, injecting a negative stereotypical view of Latinos into the prevailing political 
discourse. The killing also reinforced the projection of violence on the border, a
117 See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol FY 2000 Recruiting and Hiring 
Report.
118 Lamar Smith, ‘Oversight Investigation of the Death of Esequiel Hernandez Jr.’, U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Report, 
105th Cong., 2d sess., 1998, Serial 11, 1.
119 Ibid. See also Roberto Suro, ‘Report: U.S. “Failures” Led to Border Death’, Washington Post (13 
November 1998): A3.
183
process already underway with militarisation.120 Armed infantry patrols were 
suspended after the shooting, but are now an option again, and JTF-6 continues to be 
active on the U.S.-Mexico border, recently employing Army attack helicopters for its 
missions. As an analyst recently commented:
There’s just so much out there already that has created an image of a fortress 
mentality like the Berlin Wall...The pressure from several hawk legislators and 
anti-immigrant groups is to put the military on the border. Now, we’re getting 
closer to that reality.121
Over Defense Department objections, the House of Representatives recently 
approved an amendment to the 2001 Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 4205) that 
would authorise the assignment of military personnel to assist in patrolling the 
Southwest border.122
More broadly, the process of securitisation that began with Hold the Line and 
entails the enlistment of the military in domestic law enforcement—at first limited to 
drugs, and now including migration—is an inauspicious omen in a dangerous cycle. 
Faced with self-inflicted, contradictory flows of migrant labour, the logic of 
regulation and order only fuels the state’s reliance on larger and more complex 
military-police structures and narratives to support these operations. Policy officials 
claim that if they can only get enough resources, they can finally solve the problem. 
The consequences are both immediate and potentially far-reaching. For migrants 
from Mexico, and for some Latinos in general, the results are already manifest in an 
increasing hostility in both material and discursive terms. Other shooting incidents 
by the Border Patrol along the border, mostly directed at Mexicans, are still 
occurring.
120 See Maria Jimenez, ‘War in the Borderlands’, NACLA Report on the Americas 26, no. 1 (1992): 
29-32.
121 Roberto Martinez quoted in Mike Glenn, ‘Laredo Patrol Welcomes Military, But Some Residents 
Say It’s Too Much’, Houston Chronicle (2 September 2000) [http://www.houstonchronicle.com] (3 
September 2000).
122 U.S. House, ‘National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001’, 106th Cong., 2d. sess., 
H.R. 4205; became Public Law 106-398.
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Vigilante Actions
In addition to pushing migrants to desolate areas of the border, militarisation 
has created a conflict-charged atmosphere, spawning hate groups and vigilantes to 
take up action along the southern borderlands which has resulted in civil and human 
rights violations and a climate of hatred and criminalisation. The pattern of violence 
reached new levels in 2000 when a variety of groups along the southern borderlands 
organised initiatives to enforce what they called ‘vigilante justice’; their assaults and 
shootings of undocumented workers have doubled.123 An armed group of 
‘volunteers’ in Texas called ‘Ranch Rescue’ recently organised to ‘provide security’ 
for ranchers ‘under invasion’ from ‘wanton criminal trespassers’, e.g., Mexican 
migrants.124 The group claims it is conducting armed patrols along the border and 
now solicits volunteers.
In the words and metaphors of another group called ‘American Patrol’, the 
call is to ‘Defend our Borders’ and ‘Maintain Our Sovereignty...Close The 
Border...Stop Importing Slave Labor and Poverty’; they further outline ‘What and 
Who is Behind the Mexican invasion of the American Southwest’.125 While much of 
this is still largely confined to the rhetorical realm, two of the two most infamous of 
the vigilante groups, ‘Republic of Texas’ and ‘Neighborhood Ranch Watch’, are 
active in the borderlands. Republic of Texas has made and plans further armed 
patrols to take undocumented workers back to Mexico. Neighborhood Ranch Watch 
is tied to Roger Barnett, a rancher who conducts armed patrols of his ranch, and 
claims he has rounded up ‘4,000 undocumented workers to date, 176 alone on a good 
weekend’.126 According to the League of United Latin American Citizens, more than 
450 migrants have been detained by ranchers, who allegedly have attacked 32 of the 
migrants and killed two.127
123 Jose Matus (Coalicion de Derechos Humans-Arizona Border Rights Project), letter to author, 23 
May 2000.
124 Tucker Teutsch, ‘Armed and Ludicrous: Militias on the Border’, San Antonio Current (14 
December 2000) [http://www.sacurrent.com] (20 December 2000). See Ranch Rescue’s website: 
[http://www.ranchrescue.com] (29 January 2001).
125 See [http://americanpatrol.com/index.html] (31 January 2001).
126 Roger Barnett, quoted in Hilary Mackenzie, ‘It’s an Act of War Against My Nation’, The Ottawa 
Citizen (2 December 2000): B l.
127 Minerva Canto, ‘Hispanics Urged to Rally Against Border Vigilantes: Forum Encourages Them to 
Speak Out Against Arizona Ranchers Detaining Trespassers’, The Orange County Register (18 July
2000) [http://www.orangecountyregister.com] (18 July 2000).
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Barnett wants the military to be posted at the U.S.-Mexico border, and further 
advocates American troops ‘invade Mexico and take it over’ before the Mexicans 
bring the U.S. ‘to its knees...It’s going to be anarchy. There’ll be fighting in the 
streets before too long...If the government can’t take care of it, we’ll have a civil 
war’.128 Neighborhood Ranch Watch recently published an anonymous, terrifying 
‘invitation’ to tourists to
have some fun in the sun...help keep trespassers from destroying private 
property...[placing] trip wire launchers...spotting illegal aliens.129
In May 2000, representatives from the vigilante groups met in Arizona to co-ordinate 
their efforts; members of the Ku Klux Klan and the National Organization for 
European American Rights attended.130 In response, former Mexican Foreign 
Secretary Rosario Green denounced the civilian patrols as ‘brutal displays of 
xenophobia. This is racist behaviour that violates all international rules’.131 But the 
nativist discourse creates a charged, tense atmosphere along the border and promotes 
erosion of civil rights already under strain with the securitisation policies and 
criminalisation of economic migrants.
5.7 A n  Em erg ent  M etanarrative
The dominant ‘metanarrative’ surrounding the initiatives presents an image 
of ‘order’ and ‘control’, achieved through regulation against a defined ‘threat’; fear 
and disorder is projected onto the border—consolidating and creating public support 
for securitisation and helping solidify a civic notion of national collective identity. 
In addition, this representation of U.S. border policy since Hold the Line may also 
serve raw political interests instead of actually ‘solving’ the contradictory problems 
it purports to deal with.
Operation Hold the Line, and similar urban securitisation measures along the 
frontier, have not stopped undocumented migration; in fact, they encourage it around 
the edges of the blockade, redirecting flows to less militarised, and more remote and 
hostile environments while at the same time fuelling the growth of transnational
128 Ibid.
129 Neighborhood Ranch Watch Program anonymous brochure. See Ignacio Ibarra, ‘Brochure Invites 
Volunteers to Join Border Watch’, Arizona Daily Star (20 April 2000); Matus, letter.
130 Ignacio Ibarra, ‘Cochise Ranchers Backed at Rally’, Arizona Daily Star (15 May 2000): A5.
131 Quoted in Mackenzie, ‘It’s an Act of War Against My Nation’, B l.
186
human smuggling cartels. While the latest round of reterritorialisation of the U.S.- 
Mexico borderlands is the largest yet, previous, similar efforts have failed. Even 
with the new resources, undocumented migration, in fact, as has at best not slowed, 
and at worst, increased under the new strategy, reaching near-record highs in 
2000.132
While the data is somewhat unclear due to practical difficulties in gathering 
accurate figures, a recent report by the U.S. Congress’ own investigative agency, the 
General Accounting Office (GAO), concluded the evidence for claims that the 
strategy was reducing flows of undocumented workers was ‘inconclusive’, despite 
seven years of effort and billions of dollars appropriated to the ‘problem’.133
Other data, in fact, indicates few determined migrants have been deterred by 
the new policy; even the INS does not now claim overall levels of undocumented 
migration have fallen in the post-Hold the Line era—despite maintaining levels 
would significantly drop when the policy was unveiled. As immigration specialist 
Wayne Cornelius asserts, militarisation has only worsened conditions on the border 
while not actually reducing flows:
It’s a failed policy.. .This approach has not generated any appreciable deterrence. 
The apprehension figures keep ratcheting up along the border.134
It has not done anything to reduce the hiring of workers by American 
employers...There are more undocumented workers today than before the build up 
started.135
That the image that does not correspond to the reality of these mobilities is further 
underscored by a recent analysis by the University of California:
The best data thus far indicate that adding 4,000 additional agents since 1995 and 
doubling border control expenditures did not reduce illegal entries significantly.136
132 See U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Fiscal Year 2001 
Monthly Statistical Report (Washington, D.C., Department of Justice, 2001). 
[http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/msijan01-2/index.htm] (1 May 2001).
133 U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results 
Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed (Letter Report, 12/11/97, GAO/GGD-98-21). Official 
estimates put the 7 year cost of securitisation in the San Diego sector alone between $6 and $9 billion.
134 Wayne Cornelius, quoted in Joe Cantlup, ‘Arrests Up Since 1994 Crackdown at Border: Costly 
Effort Fails to Deter Illegal Flow’, San Diego Union-Tribune (20 February 2001) 
[http://www.uniontribune.com] (20 February 2001).
135 Wayne Cornelius, quoted in Mackenzie, ‘It’s an Act of War Against My Nation’, B l.
136 University of California, Davis, ‘INS: Is Gatekeeper Working?’, Migration News 7, no. 9 
(September 2000) [http://migration.ucdavis.edu] (3 September 2000).
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Furthermore, their report concludes that militarisation has not slowed the hiring of 
undocumented workers in the farming and agribusiness sectors. Instead, growth of 
two to four per cent is expected, bringing the percentage of farm workers who are 
unauthorised up to 52 per cent.137 The report did indicate the new policies increased 
the length of average stays in the U.S. of undocumented migrants and smuggling 
activities—and the concomitant temptations for official corruption. Moreover, the 
anticipated (and publicly claimed) decline in crime in the borderlands because of the 
securitisation is also inconclusive.138 In some cases, many migrants who used to 
cross illegally have now simply regularised their crossing status.139
A recent, high-level bilateral study conducted by the Carnegie Endowment 
for Peace has introduced a surprising critique of the current reterritorialisation 
policies into the official discourse, urging a radical rethinking of the border and 
migration towards more openness, co-operation, and mutual responsibility:
It is increasingly recognized that current enforcement policies regarding 
unauthorized migration from Mexico are broken. Presently, the United States 
maintains a rigid patchwork of laws and mounts extensive unilateral law 
enforcement efforts. These have proven largely ineffective at achieving the 
intended outcomes of channeling migration through legal entry points and reducing 
unauthorized migration...As a result, too many migrants die trying to cross into the 
United States, too many hardworking immigrants are subject to exploitation...
[We] call for the re-conceptualization of the common border and the border region 
as a line of convergence rather than separation.140
This recognises many of the narrative justifications in official and public 
circles which support the metanarrative of image and control are based on flawed 
premises. For example, the assertion that economic and social instability originates 
from south of the border is untenable. Narrative claims that migrants are a ‘drain’ on 
the domestic U.S. economy, ‘sucking’ away social services, are contradicted by 
major empirical studies, including two by the respected non-partisan Urban Institute 
that suggest instead they are an aggregate gain for the economy, taking less than they
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., 6.6.
139 Catherine Orenstein, ‘Illegal Transnational Labor: Mexicans in California and Haitians in the 
Dominican Republic’, Journal o f International Affairs 48, no. 2 (1995): 604. See also American 
Friends Service Committee, ‘Operation Blockade: A City Divided’ (July 1994) (Philadelphia: 
American Friends Service Committee), 34.
140 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, The 
U.S.-Mexico Migration Panel, Mexico-U.S. Migration: A Shared Responsibility 
[http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/SumofRec.asp?p=6&from=pubdate] (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001) (10 May 2001).
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invest into the system, largely due to the boon they create for business because of 
low rages and the fact they rarely collect social security benefits (as this would 
expose their illegal status).141 Other research now suggests they actually have been a 
major reason for the unprecedented economic expansion of the U.S. during the 
1990s.142
Moreover, the metanarrative that drives current reterritorialisation is focussed 
on the external boundaries of the state, but not the actual regulation of migration 
(undocumented workers) away from the boundary; the INS’s professed goals of 
reducing illegal immigration seem little served by devoting less than 5 per cent of its 
budget to interior enforcement at workplaces, making only 110 raids in 2000 (down 
from 290 in 1999).143 The metanarrative diverts and directs attention only to the 
southern borderlands, compartmentalising, distancing, and simplifying the policy 
and the perceived problem. But, in fact, as the Urban Institute maintains, out of 
every ten undocumented workers in the U.S., only four crossed the southern 
border.144 Yet 90 per cent of those arrested are Mexican nationals and 85 per cent of 
the resources for border control are allocated to the southern borderlands.145 The 
majority of ‘illegal aliens’ in the United States, in reality, are visa overstayers who 
came to the country legally.
‘Sealing’ the U.S.-Mexico border is impossible. What instead emerges in the 
metanarrative is a politically constructed, highly successful, official image of
141 See Michael Fix, Jeffrey S. Passel, and Wendy Zimmermann, Summary o f Facts About 
Immigrants ’ Use o f Welfare (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1996) 
[http://www.urbaninstitute.org/immig/borjas.htm] (10 November 1996). The authors found most 
immigrants (94 per cent) do not use welfare and cite other Urban Institute researchers who have 
determined ‘that immigrant and native use rates for those of all ages are so close that they are not 
statistically different’. See also Michael Fix, Jefferey Passel, and Wendy Zimmermann, The Use of 
SSI and Other Welfare Programs by Immigrants, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1996) and 
George Boijas, ‘Immigration and Welfare: Some New Evidence’, Testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Immigration (6 February 1996) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1996). See also Jeffrey S. Passel, Rebecca L. Clark, and Manuel Garcia y Griego, How Much 
Do Immigrants Really Cost? (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute and Tomas Rivera Center) (22 
February 1994).
142 Forthcoming research by Neeta Fogg and others at the Center for Labor Market Studies at 
Northeastern University. She argues ‘immigrants have provided the labor force needed for the 
economic expansion’. See Mark Bixler, ‘Illegal Immigrants at Risk when Economy Weakens’, 
Atlanta Joumal-Constitution (5 March 2001) [http://www.accessatlanta.com] (5 March 2001).
143 See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol FY 2000 Recruiting and Hiring Report 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000) [http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/ 
/publicaffairs/factsheets/recruit.pdf] (23 January 2001); Bixler, ‘Illegal Immigrants’.
144 Michael Fix and Jeffrey Passel, Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight 
(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1994), 24, 25.
145 Maria Jimenez, ‘The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border’, In Motion Magazine 
[www.inmotionmagazinecom/mj 1 .html] (16 September 1998).
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‘control’ of the once ‘chaotic’, ‘invasion’-ridden boundary that was ‘under siege’. 
This is conducted within the unyielding official narrative goal of ‘being tough on 
illegal aliens’. An orderly, patrolled, and unified boundary projects a picture of a 
homogenous, stable territorial identity and serves, as in the case of some elites like 
Reyes and those in Border Patrol, to further political careers and bolster institutional 
resources. But the negative side effects—from militarisation to vigilante groups to 
deaths of migrants—remain, along with the complexity and contradictions of 
NAFTA economic integration to say nothing of the increasing poverty of the region. 
At the heart of the issue, reflexive territoriality is at play: advanced information and 
surveillance technology on the borders in conjunction with a transnational labour 
market is both the ‘cause’ and, ironically, the ‘effect’ of a dual North American 
economic regime. That regime attempts to restrict labour but frees trade and capital 
mobilities—but still seeks cheap undocumented labour in its domestic fields, 
gardens, and factories.
5.8 C o n c l u s i o n s
As one of the most dynamic areas of the world, the U.S.-Mexico borderlands 
offer an IR scholar a direct laboratory in which to examine important changes in 
international politics—particularly those involving territoriality, economics, 
technologies of security, and national collective identity. As we have seen, the 
border was forged in the linear, discrete pattern of modem political territoriality in 
the West, imposed and set through imperial violence. Despite the asymmetric nature 
of the boundary, a unique, complicated bi-national zone has developed that defies 
seeing the border in simple or abstract terms. The region is marked by a long history 
of social, cultural, and economic interaction of ‘mobilities’, a pattern of interaction 
now accelerating under globalisation and NAFTA, rapid industrialisation, and heavy 
population growth and movement of labour. Because migration in particular 
presents numerous challenges to the dominant official state narrative by introducing 
heterogeneity, ambiguity, and contradiction within previously ‘stable’ conceptions of 
national identity, it is perhaps a key issue for consideration in an i/b/o-directed study 
of borders and identity.
Why is this high cost (both in financial and human terms) reterritorialisation 
policy against economic migrants continuing, despite its seeming failure? This
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chapter’s evaluation of the ‘turbulent’ southern borderlands can answer this for us in 
three ways that operate within the i/b/o triad: the projection of an ‘image’ of control 
for particular political and knowledge ends in a metanarrative, the consolidation of a 
notion of national collective identity, and the conditions of transnational economic 
integration and labour flows. The projection of fear into the border through 
discursive and material means, including militarisation, can be interpreted in part as 
a political project to win additional political support and resources for INS/Border 
Patrol activities. The early but crucial 1993 Sandia weapons lab study, which helped 
establish the official narrative strategy, outlined how that might be done. The report, 
in fact, highlights the importance of discursive control, candidly recommending
A good public relations program.. .one which emphasizes the barriers are not an act
of unfriendliness, but an act of control.146
Managing image and manufacturing a dominant narrative, then, becomes highly 
important in the overall strategy.
The official narrative strategy can indeed be interpreted as an issue of 
‘control’. As the study illustrated, the dominant metanarrative framed the policy 
problem as one of ‘chaos’ and ‘disorder’. The official stated loss of ‘control’ 
(incorrectly presupposing the border was ever ‘controlled’) resulted in a reflexive 
move by the state to tighten and centralise power and resources territorially: 
focussing reterritorialisation on the borders also delegates the ‘problem’ to the 
periphery, and the concentration on technological ‘solutions’ an easily perceived 
answer. This helps rally popular support, given the new appearance of ‘control’ on 
the boundary. And it also furthers an understanding of ‘knowledge-as-regulation’. 
As ‘control’ over ‘chaos’ is reflexively sought, both discursively and materially, so 
to is as sense of ‘progress’ and knowledge, directly correlated to ever more intense 
territorial regulation.
Ultimately, however, the need to counter this ‘risk’ territorially is reflexive: 
the ‘hazards’ to be combated are the product of domestic demand itself. The North 
American economic system favours low wages and profits for multinational firms, 
and ‘illegal immigration’ is an efficient component of transnational economic flows; 
territorial policies along the southern border, it can be argued, are actually designed 
to fail because labour is more valuable to the U.S. economy when it is illegal and
146 Sandia National Laboratories, Systematic Analysis, ES-10, emphasis added.
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undocumented—in fact, it is now seen as partly responsible for supporting the 
unprecedented economic boom of the 1990s. Interior enforcement by the INS 
through workplace controls is notoriously weak, with congressional and business 
interests often resisting such actions.147
Reflexivity is also indicated by the state’s reliance on advanced military 
technology to both attempt to ‘secure’ the boundary through surveillance devices, 
and also its data collecting and monitoring which allows it to re-appropriate border 
resources to stem new flows and manage the image of control politically. The 
creation of a poor class of individuals excluded from expanding networks and 
channels of information and control is also a product of Lash’s understanding of the 
structural conditions of reflexivity, highlighted in chapter two.148
The metanarrative, as illustrated, revolves around a particular representation 
of border control that does not necessarily correlate with current transnational 
realities under NAFTA and masks alternatives.149 With the dynamics of mobilities in 
the international system, including never before seen flows of goods, individuals, 
and capital, even more massive allocation of border resources and security cannot 
hope to stem illegal flows, especially any policies that restrict corporate or private 
sector interests. Further tightening under the logic of the global economy is 
infeasible given the sheer numbers of ‘legitimate’ crossings (which are only 
projected to dramatically increase over the next twenty years); even a vast expansion 
of Border Patrol agents could not hope to cope with the force of North American 
economic integration and global flows. A re-evaluation of current policy, therefore, 
seems appropriate.
Significant normative implications also result from the reterritorialisation 
policy and are fostered by elements of the narrative, including a charged atmosphere 
at the border (spawning the Marine shooting and vigilante violence) as well as the
147 For example, the number of INS investigations into employment of undocumented migrants fell 
nearly 50 per cent last year, from 3,898 in 1999 to 1,966 in 2000. See Kerry Townsend, ‘U.S. 
Downturn Threatens to Close Shutters on Cheap Workforce’, The Financial Times (21 February 
2001) [http://www.ft.com] (21 February 2001).
148 See Scott Lash, ‘Reflexivity and its Doubles: Structure, Aesthetics, Community’, in Reflexive 
Modernization: Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modem Social Order, eds. Ulrich Beck, 
Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).
149 Alternatives do exist, such an increased bilateral responsibility and co-ordinatation with the private 
sector on smuggling activities (for instance, inspections in advance of arrival at borders). For several 
ideas on this, see Stephen Flynn, ‘Globalization and the Future of Border Control’, Washington Paper 
(Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000)
[http://www.foreignrelations.org/BorderControl/chapters/chapterl.htm] (24 January 2001).
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deaths of migrants. The Center for Immigration Research at the University of 
Houston has documented at least 1600 deaths of undocumented migrant crossers 
from 1993-1997.150 According to Mexico, 491 reported deaths occurred in 2000.151 
Reterritorialising policies of exclusion dating from 1993 (the beginning of Operation 
Hold the Line) can be implicated in this, largely due to the shifting of migratory 
patterns to highly treacherous and inhospitable (i.e., hot and rugged desert terrain). 
Both Amnesty International and the UN Human Rights Secretary Mary Robinson 
have condemned the militarisation for this reason.152
As the case study demonstrated, reterritorialisation on the border also helps 
consolidate a notion of national collective identity. The ‘imagined community’ of 
American civic national identity is a constructed entity rather than a somehow 
naturally occurring evolution; it is a continually sustained through a particular 
narrative.153 Securitisation, as illustrated, plays its part in this. In this case, it is 
mobilised against a foil of the ‘alien’ other, against crime and disorder, and 
depersonalised stereotypes: existential ‘threats’ that require reflexive solutions.
The border discourse of identity and migration is ripe with metaphoric 
practices, key political symbols.154 Metaphoric practices produce and latch meaning 
within a particular narrative to policies and subjects—and in this case help realise the 
constitution of national identity. Here, they tend to be centred around exclusionary 
talk of ‘aliens’, ‘floods’ and ‘invasions’ which ‘poison’ the local communities and 
thus criminalise economic migrants who seek jobs for the taking in America that 
helped build the economic success of the 1990s. Racist undertones can also colour 
the debate—although it is framed in terms of ‘immigration’ control.
The voices in the border discourse exposed here illustrate the processes and 
dynamics of one of the foundations of this study—the social construction of 
boundaries. Ultimately, the dominant material and discursive dimensions of Hold 
the Line helped alter the way El Pasoeans understand their boundedness by changing
150 See a study published by the International Migration Review 33 (1999): 430-54. See also 
[http://www.uh.edu/cir/death.htm] (24 January 2001). See also The American Friends Service 
Committee, Deportee Monitoring Project (July 2000) [http://www.afsc.org/ilemp/brdr2kcv.htm] (24 
January 2001).
151 Reuters News Service, ‘U.S. Border Policy Blamed for Rise in Migrant Deaths’ (14 February
2001) [http://www.reuters.com] (14 February 2001).
152 See Dunn, ‘Border War’.
153 This formulation does not imply it is a weak construction nor does it deny real material effects.
154 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980), 94.
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the dominant territorial discourse of the border, even amidst economic integration 
and various mobilities. Conversi addressees this issue: ‘when identities slide into 
each other, borders “must” be established, although this effort is also presented by 
nationalist elites as an attempt to maintain a pre-existing or primordial national 
boundary’.155 Border Patrol Chief Reyes, from an instrumentalist perspective, helped 
shift that bond between citizen, ethnicity, and state through both policy change on 
the ground and a new narrative strategy that garnered mass public support. This was 
illustrated when the respondents discussed the broadly positive reception of his 
initiative in the Mexican-American community and public opinion polls which draw 
the same conclusion.
From an i/b/o perspective, we can return to Paasi’s concept of spatial 
socialisation as the process by which individuals and collectivities are ‘socialised’ to 
belong and identify with a particular bounded territorial community.156 Operation 
Hold the Line, the border, the other, and collective identity are inherent in the 
rhetoric, metaphors and symbolisation that help constitute this socio-spatial 
grouping. The ‘us’ - ‘them’ or ‘I’ - ‘we’ constitution of identity directly follows the 
‘borderlines between human and “something else’” .157 Those exclusionary 
‘borderlines’ in the spatial consciousness of residents are being drawn along the 
southern frontier.
Some in the study offered counter-narrative interventions, applauding 
attempts to forge a binational community similar to an integrated borderland in the 
Unite El Paso effort or visualising the border as a ‘region’ or a permeable 
‘membrane’. Some rejected the rhetoric of exclusion and stereotyping, and the 
construction of further walls. However, the metanarrative here is extremely 
powerful and popular—few choose to question it.
The international scene at the millennium is marked by the same kind of 
changes impacting the U.S.-Mexico borderlands; concomitant with this 
transformation are new discourses of identity and constructions of boundaries. The 
borders of bounded communities appear to be hardening in an exclusionary fashion, 
not to capital, but to individuals, particularly in cases where the state influences 
boundaries and discourse to promote or demote conceptions of order and identity.
155 Daniele Conversi, ‘Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary 
Maintenance and Creation’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1, no. 1 (spring 1995): 79.
156 Paasi, ‘Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness’.
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New critical perspectives and forms of border studies like this one will be 
increasingly important to understand the nuanced play of identities, borders, and 
order in a turbulent and ‘shaken’ world.158
The future of the U.S.-Mexico border region remains uncertain and 
continues to be contested. As economic interdependence is fostered, and as Mexico 
develops, perhaps a move towards an communitarian-like ‘integrated’ borderland 
might be possible; the democratic election of Mexican president Vicente Fox has 
uncorked new enthusiasm for change, as he seeks an open, EU-style border 
arrangement in 20-30 years. New guest worker proposals in 2001 also suggest the 
possibility of more regularised, legal labour flows.
All of this would pose not only greater theoretical questions for IR, but also 
possibly foster the construction of a distinct, binational ‘border’ identity and ethical 
community for the residents of the region.159 Anderson’s notion of ‘imagined 
communities’—the imagined limits of national communities, their boundedness— 
might be helpful in such conceptions because it suggests the possibility for change, 
for altering, under the proper conditions, the conscious reconstruction of the limits of 
the national community.160 Ultimately, this is a goal of some critical theory—to 
question inclusion and exclusion and ensure the ‘fine lines’ we draw—our principles 
of separability—are just and lead to positive social change. At the very least, they 
may open up the future possibilities for transformation.
Perhaps Gloria Anzaldua found the best way to understand the border when 
she wrote
To survive the Borderlands
you must live sin fronteras161 
be a crossroads.162
This will increasingly become the challenge of identity in the turbulent southern 
borderlands.
157 Ibid., 9.
158 See Stephen Chan, ‘A Story Beyond Telos: Redeeming the Shield of Achilles for a Realism of 
Rights in IR’, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 28, no. 1 (1999): 101-15.
159 Mathias Albert and Lothar Brock, ‘New Relationships Between Territory and State: The U.S- 
Mexico Border in Perspective’, in The U.S.-Mexico Border: Transcending Divisions, Contesting 
Identities, eds. David Spener and Kathleen Staudt (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1998), 215.
160 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991).
161 ‘without borders.’
162 Anzaldua, ‘To live in the Borderlands means you’, 194.
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Accepting this, the next chapter turns to the U.S.-Canadian borderlands, 
which in some ways is an excellent counterpoint to this case. Despite a more 
symmetric binational relationship, dynamics there are surprisingly similar to some of 
the same pressures and narratives of the southern borderlands: reterritorialisation and 
economic integration under NAFTA may manifest different questions of identity and 
order, but still a similar metanarrative emerges.
196
C H A P T E R  S I X
N arrating  t h e  U.S.-Ca n a d ia n  Bo r d er la n d s
6.0 I n t r o d u c t i o n
The thesis has begun to theoretically and empirically unpack some of the 
phenomena that seek, on one level, to challenge traditional interstate borders but on 
another, only serve to replicate them; these include transnationalisation and 
globalisation especially noticeable in interdependent borderlands states. The 
deterritorialisation driven by mobilities—intensified flows of peoples, information, 
and capital—and the corresponding state responses of regulation informed and 
achieved by surveillance and other technologies—suggest a pattern of reflexive 
territoriality. This is typically imposed by the advanced information state and made 
possible framing contemporary policy and public discourse.
The identities/borders/orders heuristic tool can help us deconstruct and re­
evaluate some of the constitutive processes and relationships surrounding 
globalisation. In this chapter, the triad is put to use to critically examine the 
relationships between official state narratives and policy which help construct a 
particular state ‘order’. The focus is on those representational practices and policies 
surrounding the U.S.-Canadian border which help designate individuals discretely as 
citizens, identify threats, and construct national sentiment. In regards to the 
‘identity’ component of the triad, for instance, these practices have a key role in 
legitimating the state and connecting its territory to national collective identity, a 
dynamic explored theoretically in the latter half of chapter four.1
As chapter three suggested, borders in general, and the North American 
NAFTA case in particular, present excellent opportunities to study intensifying flows 
of transnational capital, information, and labour. These can promote greater 
continental integration and more ‘porous’ borders also prompt contestation over 
questions of migration, regionalism, and identity as the ‘joints of continental
1 See William Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations o f Political Paradox (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) and Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
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articulation’.2 Where one would expect liberalisation of border controls (especially 
between Canada and the U.S., for example) tightening is underway.
The last chapter argued the new post-Cold War, exclusionary securitisation 
of borders and migrants is one response to this uncertainty and a partial means for 
collective identity constitution on the U.S.-Mexico border. Taking just that case, 
border policy in the United States would appear to be informed by new initiatives to 
securitise state boundaries, reflecting the development of two policy regimes: 
economic integration through decreased restrictions on capital and trade flows in 
North America with a concurrent, exclusionary tightening of labour movements. 
There, the ‘national’ worldviews of borderlanders are partly consolidated by 
exclusionary state territorial activities and securitisation narratives, creating a 
‘turbulent’ region.
But does this pattern of securitisation and identity formation apply to the 
U.S.-Canadian borderlands, which have enjoyed stable international relationships 
that historically allowed for an undefended boundary? In this more symmetrical 
situation, what do the dynamics of seemingly similar identity and economic 
development patterns between the U.S. and Canada mean for border practices and 
differentiation narratives, in contrast to the U.S.-Mexican case? What additional or 
different considerations are involved in the reflexive formulation of political 
territoriality in the northern borderlands?
To a large extent, this chapter will suggest in the U.S.-Canadian case, the 
politics of representation also involves the presentation of an image of border 
‘security’. This reinforces the generally accepted exclusionary role of modem 
borders, based on an idea of ‘knowledge-as-regulation’ set out in chapter two. 
Reterritorialisation strategies work to help construct the same ‘threats’ and ‘risks’ the 
state seeks to control. Even then, in considering border policy with Canada, like that 
in the southern borderlands, official U.S. narratives and representations construct an 
‘order’ made more from the ‘image’ of control rather than making actual policy 
advances on issues like terrorism.
Like in the Mexican border research, to see how political space is written on 
the U.S.-Canadian border, this chapter examines discourse and narrative, the ways in
2 Victor Konrad, ‘Borderlines and Borderlands in the Geography of Canada-United States Relations’, 
in North America Without Borders? Integrating Canada, the United States, and Mexico, eds. Stephen 
J. Randall, Herman Konrad, and Sheldon Silverman (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1992),
191.
3 See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘The Fall of the Angelus Novus: Beyond the Modem Game of 
Roots and Options’, Current Sociology 46, no. 2 (1998): 101.
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which language and symbolism articulate political positions and power and 
constitute our understandings and naturalisations of the boundaries around us by 
setting the fields of interpretation and possibility. Shapiro reminds us of the 
usefulness of such an approach:
Given that our understanding of conflict, war, or more generally, the space within 
which international politics is deployed is always mediated by modes of 
representation and thus by all the various mechanisms involved in text 
construction—grammars, rhetorics, and narrativity—we must operate within a view 
of politics that is sensitive to textuality. . ..political processes are, among other things, 
contests over the alternative understandings (often implicit) immanent 
in.. .representational practices.4
Accordingly, the focus here is on the ‘scripts’ and representations of international 
relations, and in particular, those of borders—often reified or taken as static legal 
‘givens’ in the international system. Again, a narrative focus does not imply the 
rejection of competing explanatory facts, such as material demands, but rather serves 
a complementary clarifying lens to the politics and, in a sense, the ‘orders’ at hand 
and their possibilities.
Unlike the previous case study, however, the examination here is largely 
devoted to government policy texts and supportive policy speeches, thereby gaining 
access to different aspects of policy development and justification. In particular, the 
chapter offers an empirical analysis of the official documentation and public debate 
forming the narratives which surround both current developments on the border and 
the watershed Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(HRIRA).5 These discursive structures help write (and ultimately physically 
construct) exclusionary space by attempting strict control of entry and exit along the 
northern line. Increasingly, the ‘defence’ of the previously considered undefended 
northern borderlands is becoming the sought-after reality in some policy circles.6
More specifically, several research questions are offered: what do the 
changing modes of differentiation and integration suggest for the link between 
territory, borders, and national identity in the U.S.-Canadian border case? How can 
narrative policy analysis and the identities/borders/orders conceptual triad serve as a 
useful tools to examine the complex nexus of these key relationships in the post-
4 Michael J. Shapiro, ‘Textualizing Global Politics’, in International/IntertextualRelations: 
Postmodern Readings o f World Politics, eds. James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (New York: 
Lexington Books, 1989), 13, emphasis added.
5 Division C of U.S. Public Law 104-208,104th Cong., 2d sess., 30 September 1996.
6 See Dean Paton, ‘Along the Other U.S. Border, Problems Rise’, Christian Science Monitor (22 
September 2000) [http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2000/09/22/fp3sl-csm.shtml] (1 October 2000).
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Cold War, NAFTA era on the U.S.-Canadian border? How are political space and 
identity being produced there? Finally, what ‘metanarrative’ is emerging within this 
exclusionary border discourse?
This chapter proceeds with an emphasis on the practices and representations 
embedded within these narratives which help reproduce modem norms of 
territoriality and identity vis-a-vis Canada and defined threats. Drawing from the 
conceptual overview of work on discourse, the section looks to help denaturalise the 
conditions and power frameworks through a constitutive theory of language. The 
work is informed by a narrative policy analysis methodology set out in chapter four. 
The next section examines the development of the U.S.-Canadian borderlands as a 
modem political cartography. The analysis of major public texts relating to border 
issues, especially the IIRIRA of 1996, follows, and the chapter concludes with an 
evaluation of contemporary developments which help formulate the counter­
narratives and emergent metanarrative of this border. While one might expect vast 
differences from the southern borderlands case just detailed, the research here will 
suggest that, even in these borderlands between ostensibly analogous and relatively 
integrated socio-political states like the U.S. and Canada, the dominant trends 
towards reterritorialisation persists.
6.1 ‘R ea d in g ’ th e  U .S.-C anada  Bo rderlands
Canada is unthinkable without its border with the U.S.A.
—Martin Kuester7
As the chapter on border studies noted, boundaries are socially and politically 
constmcted phenomena which require continual processes and relations to be 
reproduced. Borders, moreover, are political representations of power that have 
much to do with the spatiality of self, identity, and state; they configure political and 
cultural difference and ‘connect territory with social order’.8 As some scholars have 
shown, there are numerous symbolic and ideational relationships between the 
territorial organisation achieved through bordering practices and kinds of socio­
political groupings; the ‘spatial socialisation’ or constitution of identity, for example,
The article itself is a good example of reinforcing an image of ‘problems’ and lack of ‘control’ as the 
predominant policy problems on the northern American border with Canada.
Martin Kuester, ed., Canadian Studies: A Literary Approach (Bochum: Universitatsverlag Dr. N. 
Brockmeyer, 1995), 9.
8 Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (London: Reaktion Books, 1997), 20.
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often follows the ‘borderlines between human and “something else”’.9 Moreover, 
bordering practices are historically contingent, drawing on and being reproduced by 
various, unique patterns of socio-political organisation and notions of difference.
‘Identities, borders, and orders’ are indeed in play along the U.S.-Canadian 
frontier. As the textual analysis will illustrate, recent political developments and 
enabling narratives serve to help construct a ‘threat’—of terrorism and 
undocumented migration—to the national political idea and territoriality of the 
United States. In place too are nationalism narratives which increasingly complicate 
and resist movement towards heightened integration and border liberalisation in 
North America (something, as chapter five indicates, is even more clearly in 
evidence in the southern borderlands with Mexico).
The construction of identity narratives and territoriality in the U.S.-Canadian 
borderlands is embedded in a long historical pattern surrounding the three i/b/o 
nodes. In order to understand the current dimension of these late modem 
geographies of identity, order, and the implications of change in the northern 
borderlands, we must first contextualise the historical evolution of this region—and 
importantly, the processes of modernity that constmcted the boundary. The borders 
of the United States are illustrative of the kind of political mapping distinctive to 
modem socio-political organisation. The historical and theoretical survey of that 
process was set out in chapter two of this study. This section, then, goes on to 
examine the event of the demarcation of the northern border as a concrete example 
of this process. It was settled partly by diplomacy and partly by violence, but as an 
evolving historical discourse it continues to represent a ‘solid’ view of modem 
borders and political territoriality despite new ‘cartographic anxieties’ spurred by 
transnational pressures under NAFTA.10
Historical Overview
The establishment of northern international boundary of the United States is 
an excellent illustration of the forces of territoriality and nationalism (borders and 
identities) in the birthing environment of the American state—and indeed the larger
9 Anssi Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies o f the Finnish- 
Russian Border (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1996), 9; see also Mathias Albert, ‘On Boundaries, 
Territory, and Postmodemity: An International Relations Perspective’, in Boundaries, Territory and 
Postmodemity, ed. David Newman (London: Frank Cass, 1999) and Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The 
Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989).
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North American political and economic order. In effect, the boundaries of the state 
were achieved through the violent production and movement of fixed and exclusive 
borders gradually westward, re-mapping the space of the continent in a rational 
manner, over pre-modem forms of political organisation; the frontiers of American 
society gradually progressed followed to establish the sovereign state.
The consolidation of the 49th parallel as the northern border of the United
States, in fact, is a classic exemplar of the processes and discourses of modem
boundary determination; Fawcett called it ‘by far the best known astronomical
boundary line’ in the world.11 In setting the boundary, diplomats relied on a deep
Western tradition in political thought which operates on early modem
epistemological principles; this required strict, sharp differentiation of political
entities, meant to be territorialised ‘containers’ of collective identity and national
mission.12 As elaborated in chapter two of this work, these processes are realisations
of modernity’s major cartographic frameworks; in effect, this contingent political
representation of space has had a direct impact on norms and practices of
11territoriality, power, and order both metaphorically and on the ground.
Ignoring alternative, older methods of presenting political space, as modem 
cartographic and delimitation technologies advanced, the earth’s entire surface was 
‘rendered equivalent’ and ‘all localness...vanish[ed] in the homogenisation and 
geometrisation of space’.14 What was left denied a multitude of diverse identities, 
ecological and cultural factors (including vast Native American holdings); this 
boundary setting through violence served as a vehicle for a variety of knowledge- 
power relationships, primarily backing the sovereign state and modem, bureaucratic, 
and even imperial control. In the end, this process helped create a powerful narrative 
of ‘exclusive spatial notions of identity’.15
10 Sankaran Krishna, ‘Cartographic Anxieties: Mapping the Body Politic in India’, Alternatives 19, 
no. 3 (1994): 507-21.
11 C.B. Fawcett, Frontiers: A Study in Political Geography (Oxford: Clarendon, 1918), 68.
12 On the nation-state as ‘container’, see Peter Taylor, ‘The State as Container: Territoriality in the 
Modem World-System’, Progress in Human Geography 18 (1994): 151-62.
13 This issue is taken up in detail in chapter two of this thesis. For representative discussions of this 
idea, see, for instance, Richard Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986); David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy 
and the Politics o f Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); and Shapiro, Violent 
Cartographies-, Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity, 1985); J.B. 
Harley, ‘Deconstructing the Map’, in Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the 
Representation o f Landscape, eds. Trever J. Barnes and James S. Duncan (London: Routledge, 1992); 
and John C. Welchman, ed., Rethinking Borders (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996).
14 David Tumball, ‘Cartography and Science in Early Modem Europe: Mapping the Construction of 
Knowledge Spaces’, Imago Mundi 48 (1996): 7, 19.
15 Black, Maps and Politics, 57.
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The advancement of the frontier as boundary and idea was instrumental in 
forging the sovereign U.S. state; the various stages of solidifying the border with 
Canada (largely by 1846), marked steps toward the consolidation of the United 
States into the Westphalian system.16 As Konrad writes,
in the long run, the frontier thesis has defined the place of the United States in North 
America, and it has differentiated the United States from Canada and from 
Mexico...this differentiation has delineated the borderlines and overlooked the 
borderlands.17
The first step in the delineation of the border, however, was in 1783, when 
the northern boundary was established with Britain, running from the St. Croix 
river’s mouth to the ‘highlands’ between Maine and Quebec (but was only finally 
‘settled’ in 1842 with the advent of more precise scientific cartographic techniques). 
1814 saw the Treaty of Ghent confirming most American claims. In 1818, the 
northwestern border, the 49th parallel—a perfect longitudinal line—was chosen as 
the delimiting marker to the Rocky mountains. This was extended in 1846 when the 
Oregon territory was organised. The 20th century witnessed a handful of fishing 
boundaries disputed, but the majority of the 5,535 mile boundary is now 
uncontested. The Canadian border, sometimes rugged and desolate and frequently 
intersecting large bodies of water, was in the end a nineteenth century mapping very 
much in the terms of the modem, Western territorial project.
The irony interlaced with the setting of all these firm boundaries with the 
belief they would serve as solid edges of a nation-state ‘container’ is the fact they are 
actually the intense developed sites of cross-border interaction and integration, not to 
mention metaphors for the wider issues of national identity between and within the 
U.S., Canada, as well as local, sub-national or regional identities (such as indigenous 
tribes, Quebekers, or even the east-west divides in both states). All of these
1 Rrepresent various integrations across and beneath the northern border. As one
16 Zuniga makes an important distinction here between ‘borders’ and ‘frontiers’: ‘there are only a few 
societies in the history of the world that have specialized in producing borders. These have included 
the Chinese, Ottoman, British, French, Portuguese, Spanish, German, and Russian empires’. In the 
American case, however, he goes on to note that the United States is a unique historical agent: 
‘Americans for more than a century regarded their frontier as the point o f contact between 
“civilization and barbarism” and invented a new way of creating borders: filling empty spaces...to 
justify expansion’ whereas most other nation-state boundaries are the product of colonialism and its 
discourses. See Victor Zuniga, ‘Nations and Borders: Romantic Nationalism and the Project of 
Modernity’, in The U.S.-Mexico Border: Transcending Divisions, Contesting Identities, eds. David 
Spener and Kathleen Staudt (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 37.
1 Konrad, ‘Borderlines and Borderlands’.
18 On questions of identity, see for example Ian Angus, A Border Within: National Identity, Cultural 
Plurality, and Wilderness (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997) and Seymour Martin 
Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions o f the United States and Canada (London:
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writer put it, the 49th parallel is ‘itself a synecdoche, a rhetorical part standing for 
the rhetorical whole—at once joins and divides two nation-states, permits contact, 
influence, choice...and difference as well’.19 In the prairie/plains region, for 
instance, Kaye argues,
the border is most abstractly a geometrical concept, impl[ing] a distinction between 
the two sides of the border...it may imply both a region of bending and a region 
where contrasts are most precise simply because two cultures, two nations, meet 
face to face on territory differentiated only by that political abstraction, the border.20
The larger bilateral relationship has been built on a similar colonial history, a 
common dominant language, similar culture, and now booming commerce.
The Northern Borderlands Today
Since the establishment of the 49th parallel as the northern boundary of the 
United States and the southern border of Canada, both states have boasted they share 
the ‘longest undefended frontier’ in the world. The northern borderlands are what 
border expert Martinez, in his typology of borderlands, would call ‘interdependent’, 
possibly moving toward an ‘integrated’ status.21 If only because of the larger 
continental integration issues at stake, these borderlands are a significant metaphor 
or ‘joint’ between the two states, even as it is distinct and integrated itself. The 
geographical orientation of Canada places a large degree of its population near the 
borderlands, well-placed for trips to the U.S.: indeed 90 per cent of Canada’s 29 
million people live within 60 miles of the U.S. border. Nearly 30 million people 
make trips through the Detroit ports-of-entry each year; almost as many follow in the 
Buffalo region, and 20 million cross in the Seattle area.22
Nearly $1 billion in commerce takes place each day between the two 
countries, making Canada America’s largest trading partner.23 45 per cent of U.S.- 
Canada trade passes through the Michigan/Ontario Port-of-Entry and 30 per cent
Routledge, 1990). On sub-national cultural linkages, see Lauren McKinsey and Victor Konrad, 
Borderlands Reflections: The United States and Canada (Borderlands Monograph Series 1) (Orono, 
ME: University of Maine Press, 1989).
19 W.H. New, Borderlands: How We Talk About Canada (Vancouver: University o f British Columbia 
Press, 1998), 6.
20 Frances Kaye, Borderlands: Canadian/American Prairie/Plains Literature in English (Orono, ME: 
University of Maine Borderlands Project, 1989), 1.
21 See Oscar Martinez, Border People: Life and Society in the U.S-Mexico Borderlands (Tucson, AZ: 
University o f Arizona Press, 1994).
22 See U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Hearing 
on ‘The Impact of Section 110 of the 1996 Immigration Act on the Canadian-American Border’,
105th Cong., 1st sess., 1998, Committee Print J-105-61.
23 A good degree of this comes from daily commutes for shopping and jobs.
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goes through the Buffalo/Fort Erie/Niagara region. The Ambassador Bridge in 
Detroit accommodates the largest commercial exchange in the entire United States 
(almost 11 million vehicles in 1997, including more than 2.5 million trucks).24
The northern border straddles mutually interdependent communities; 
numerous examples of the international line literally bisecting community churches, 
restaurants, and even homes exist. Residents of these binational communities cross 
the line with regularity and have enjoyed years of prosperous and vibrant interaction. 
In many places, the boundary is unmarked or demarcated by a post or sign; multiple 
free crossing points have tended to exist, hence its long-standing ‘undefended’ 
moniker. Derby Line, Vermont, for instance, is physically spliced in two in places 
where Vermont collides with Quebec, and the two share municipal services, 
neighbourhoods, and even a library where the international line crosses. ‘We 
function here like one community’, says Kim Prangley, a second-generation librarian 
with dual citizenship who lives in Canada, ‘so if they really tighten up on border 
crossings, it would make life tougher not only for the library, but people on both 
sides of the border’.25
Because it cuts in some cases like ‘a cleaver’ through towns which have more 
in common with one another than their respective national, state, or provincial 
capitals, the border often is treated as ‘more nuisance than necessity’. 
Interconnectedness in some places in the borderlands means hybrid communities, 
divided often by only a painted stripe that can run through places as bizarre as 
community churches and libraries, leading even a U.S. Border Patrol supervisor to 
maintain in 1990 when asked about a proposed wall along the border to respond
You cannot do it—absolutely not.. .People here have their farms on the other side, 
their aunts and uncles too.. .The U.S.-Canada border is a living organism—a life and 
culture. We try not to disturb it.27
The historical discourse is almost one that suggests a highly relaxed territoriality that 
belies the arbitrary political demarcation. And a Canadian Mohawk Indian reminds 
us of even older, non-westem forms of territoriality and political organisation:
24 See Arlene Wilson, ‘NAFTA’s Effect on Canada-U.S. Trade and Investment’, Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress 97-889 E (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
1997).
25 Pamela Ferdinand Special, ‘Northern Border Has an Extra Edge: Security Tighter on Friendly 
Vermont-Canada Frontier’, The Washington Post (24 January 2000)
[http://www.washingtonpost.com] (24 January 2000).
26 Prit J. Vesilind, ‘Common Ground, Different Dreams’, National Geographic 111 (February 1990): 
100.
27 Wayne Preston, quoted in ibid., 104.
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This line—this imaginary line where the two white people couldn’t get along—does 
not affect us.. .It goes above our heads.28
Nevertheless, the border as a political representation has often cast the 
shadows of collective identity problematics in play in both the U.S. and Canada 
because the border can represent the foil against which collective identity can be 
realised. As the Canadian historian Pierre Berton remarks, ‘We know who we are 
not, even if we aren’t quite sure who we are. We are not American’. The 
questions surrounding collective identity are only increasing under increased 
economic and social interaction under NAFTA, leading some to call for measures to 
protect Canadian cultural and social resources.
In addition to illustrating the significance and interrelatedness of the two 
states, as well as the uniqueness and interdependence of the borderlands on their own 
terms, the important theoretical note here is that this particular political territoriality 
any seemingly ideal nation-territory relationships are not given, but continuously 
constructed through a variety of practices (such as narrative) commissioned by state, 
cultural, and social agents. Even since it was initially delineated, the politics of 
writing this space and the state’s inclusionary/exclusionary impulses through it are 
tied to collective identity formation (particularly nationalism) and their sustaining 
political discourses. Current material and discursive political developments, as the 
next sections will illustrate, suggest an end to the era of an ‘undefended’ frontier 
may be coming, in the form of increased U.S. policy action directed at stemming a 
variety of cross border flows and a perception such ‘controls’ will somehow decrease 
terrorist activity and migrant labour activity.
28 Francis Boots, quoted in ibid., 110.
29 Pierre Berton, quoted in ibid., 111.
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6.2 C h a n g in g  N a r r a tio n s  o f  Bo u n d e d  Spa c e  i n  t h e  U.S.- 
C a n a d ia n  Bo r d e r l a n d s : A  T ex tu a l  A nalysis
This bill will secure our borders, protect American lives, make America more 
competitive in the global marketplace...and encourage immigrants to be self-reliant.
—U.S. Representative Lamar Smith, on the 
House of Representatives floor upon the 
introduction of H.R. 2202 (IIRIRA).30
On 30 January 1996, with this hopeful remark Representative Lamar Smith 
introduced to the U.S. Congress H.R. 2202, the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).31 This was the most sweeping 
immigration legislation in 10 years. On 30 September 1996, U.S. President Bill 
Clinton signed this massive regulatory scheme into law.32 The act, subsequent 
developments, and the deployment of Operation Hold the Line examined in the last 
chapter, are the main points of crystallisation for American policy in the 
borderlands—and will have a far more reaching impact than anyone imagined at the 
time.
This landmark legislation officially marked a significant change in 
government policy in the American borderlands, which began to change and evolve 
with the end of the Cold War and the signing of NAFTA. The move, as we shall see, 
signalled a propensity for what can be termed as ‘Free Trade, Open Societies, and 
Closed Borders’, and served to help consolidate the securitisation of migration and 
borders in the U.S.33 The long-standing patterns of unofficial cross-border migration 
into the U.S. has been largely ignored or inadequately dealt with for many years 
(exemplified by the lack of any substantial discussion of the free movement of
30 Lamar Smith, ‘Support Immigration Reform’, Floor Statement, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Congressional Record, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 30 January 1996 (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government 
Printing Office), H930.
31 The House bill was H.R. 2210, the Senate version (which differed very slightly) was S. 1664. 
Congress eventually passed the conference report for the legislation, but the bill was then 
consolidated into a large omnibus spending package enacted late in the second legislative session of 
the 104th Congress to appropriate spending for FY97. This omnibus spending bill is known as the 
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 1997 (H.R. 3610, U.S. Public Law No. 104-208). 
Subsequent references are to the public law.
32 U.S. Public Law No. 104-208.
33 See Max J. Castro, ed., Free Markets, Open Societies, Closed Borders? Trends in International 
Migration and Immigration Policy in the Americas (Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press, 
1999). The securitisation of migrants is receiving new theoretical interest; for representative examples 
of this work, see Ole Waever et al, Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe 
(London: Pinter, 1993), Nana Poku and David T. Graham, eds., Redefining Security: Population 
Movements and National Security (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), and Wayne Cornelius et al, eds., 
Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).
labour within the NAFTA negotiations).34 But finally the flows, along with 
pressures of globalisation and domestic politics (primarily fears about terrorism), 
increased the sense of ‘insecurity’ that, in Congress’ view, required at least the 
symbolic protection of American borders.
The legislative change—and the subsequent modifications in law and 
political discourse—officially consolidated a pattern of American policy in the 
borderlands with Canada and Mexico. The IIRIRA articulated the degree to which 
‘border control’—and immigration in the context of a changing economic regime— 
had begun to dominate the American political landscape. Border control, 
immigration, and the ‘war on drugs’ moved higher on the foreign policy agenda of 
the state than they ever had been during the Cold War.
A reading of the IIRIRA and subsequent policy developments reveals distinct 
transformations in policy towards the securitisation of migrants and the physical 
boundary, a process serving, in part, to reconfigure the cultural and political 
production of America’s international boundaries. The current borderlands milieu is 
now at a new and sensitive moment. As examined in the previous chapter, in 
interdependent borderlands, identity and culture are particularly subject to the 
pressures and changes of globalisation—which can ‘produce a complex mix of 
responses centered around identity’.35
With the passage of IIRIRA, the status of the northern frontier of the United 
States suddenly became re-contested as the discourse of territoriality shifted. 
Massive security resources were shifted to the border zones. Long-held 
assumptions, like the nearly automatic entry of Canadians into American soil, were 
no longer necessarily valid. In particular, an often unnoticed component of the act 
known as Section 110 required, within a two year period, the registration of all 
entrants into the United States through the establishment of a high-tech, ‘secure’ 
entry and exit system at the boundary, a clear practice of reflexive territoriality.
The legislation presents a major public policy concern for the United States 
and Canada. Before examining the specifics of this legislation and proceeding with a 
reading of the narrative strategies and representations used to support this text of 
inclusion, exclusion, and identity—a brief survey of the political dynamics 
surrounding the bill will be appropriate.
34 See Joyce C. Vialet, ‘A North American Free Trade Agreement and Immigration’, Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress 93-62 EPW (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service), 1.
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Political Context o f the A ct
Major studies are underway elsewhere on the highly complex and intricate 
politics of immigration reform in the U.S.; only a cursory and superficial but 
necessary overview may be given here.36 The 1996 IIRIRA was passed in the midst 
of Republican (GOP) party control of the U.S. Congress; the GOP swept into office 
two years earlier gaining their first majority in 40 years. The IIRIRA came at a time 
when GOP partisans in the House pushed for welfare reform, tax cuts, regulation 
sunsetting, and other conservative agenda items. The political air in Washington was 
charged as usual—particularly with a Democratic White House—but not as volatile 
as it might have been as President Clinton positioned himself along popular centrist 
lines. Moreover, his administration aligned itself with several conservative 
initiatives, including border control. As a result, many GOP proposals, like the 
IIRIRA, stood excellent chances as the legislative session of the 105th Congress 
began. The rhetoric surrounding the debate and evolution of the policy in these 
political terms provides useful insights to help understand the dynamics of border 
policy within the theoretical framework elaborated earlier, especially as they were 
formulated by the dominant power structures and actors in Washington.
The American economic recovery of the 1990s had yet to fully begin when 
House Resolution 2202, the initial IIRIRA legislation, was introduced by U.S. 
Representative Lamar Smith. Smith, a Republican from Texas, is the powerful chair 
of the Immigration Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee and an ardent 
supporter of immigration restrictions, reduced welfare rights for immigrants 
(maintaining the position, which as we will see later, that both undocumented and 
documented workers should receive no public assistance), and increased border 
controls. His political agenda, then, along with many members of his party and 
some Democrats, was to draw a stronger moral, political, and legal boundary 
between Americans and the other—migrants, both legal and undocumented. Their 
inclusion, despite the fact they take unattractive, low-paying manual labour jobs 
going for the taking, was seen to create real ‘problems’, such as ‘draining’ public 
services.
35 Peter Marden, ‘Geographies of Dissent: Globalization, Identity, and the Nation’, Political 
Geography 16, no. 1 (1997): 38.
36 For but two examples, see James G. Gimpel and James R. Edwards, Jr., The Congressional Politics 
o f Immigration Reform (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 1999) and Frank D. Bean, Georges 
Vemez, and Charles B. Keely, Opening and Closing the Doors: Evaluating Immigration Reform and 
Control (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1989),
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The political momentum behind this legislative move had been building for 
several years, awaiting the proper climate to be released. Interest groups mobilised 
behind the plan, responding to pleas to reduce immigration by ‘regaining control of 
our northern and southern borders’. One in particular, known as FAIR (Federation 
for American Immigration Reform), renewed its calls for increased funding and 
infrastructure to achieve ‘border security’, and was influential in agenda setting. 
This influence was laced with a highly nationalistic, exclusionary, and militant 
rhetoric; the group went so far as to produce texts lamenting the ‘chaos on our 
borders’ and outlining ‘Ten Steps to Secure Our Borders’ such as massive tripartite 
fencing to ‘hold back the flood’ and ‘barrage of aliens’ thereby ‘regaining control of 
our northern and southern borders’.37 Their militarisation strategies were cited and 
endorsed in the influential Sandia Laboratories border study discussed in the 
previous chapter.38 Other conservative interests groups similarly aligned themselves 
behind the bill.
In response, then, to a variety of international and domestic political inputs, 
and, as argued later here, in an effort to help constitute national identity and present a 
metanarrative that presented the image of border control, the emergent legislation 
was packed with unprecedented resources devoted to border security. The law, in 
effect, is a keystone to any analysis of border policy in both the northern and 
southern borderlands. It is divided into six titles: Title I (border control, legal entry, 
and interior enforcement); Title II (alien smuggling and document fraud); Title III 
(inspection, apprehension, detention, and removal); Title IV (employment 
restrictions); Title V (public benefit restrictions); and Title VI (asylum, consular 
procedures, foreign student, and miscellaneous provisions). Those relevant to the 
analysis here—which elucidate the narrative strategies at work—Titles I and V, in 
particular, will be evaluated in turn, with special emphasis on crucial provisions in 
certain sections. This is followed by a discussion of subsequent developments in the 
debate and recent calls for the border to be ‘secured’ against terrorist threats.
Title I is largely dedicated to high resource allocations for boundary 
securitisation. Section 101 of the bill ‘Increases the number of Border Patrol agents 
by 1,000 in each of the next five years (FY 1997 to 2001)...in those areas of the
37 Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), Ten Steps to Securing America’s Borders 
(Washington, D.C.: Federation for American Immigration Reform, 1989), i, iii, 1, 12, 14 and How to 
Combat Illegal Immigration ((Washington, D.C.: Federation for American Immigration Reform,
1995), [http://www.fairus.org/html/04104606.htm] (20 February 00).
38 Sandia National Laboratories, Advanced Systems Integration Department, Systematic Analysis of 
the Southwest Border, vol. 1 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, 1993), ES-8.
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border identified as areas of high illegal entry into the United States in order to
• 10provide a uniform and visible deterrent to illegal entry on a continuing basis’. 
Section 102, ‘Improvement of Barriers at Border’, authorises the U.S. Attorney 
General to ‘take such actions as may be necessary to install additional physical 
barriers and roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection of illegal entrants) 
in the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high 
illegal entry into the United States’.40
Section 103, ‘Improved Border Equipment and Technology’ allows the 
Attorney General ‘to acquire and use, for the purpose of detection, interdiction, and 
reduction of illegal immigration into the United States, any Federal equipment 
(including fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, four-wheel drive vehicles, sedans, night 
vision goggles, night vision scopes, and sensor units) determined available for 
transfer by any other agency of the Federal Government upon request of the 
Attorney General’, thereby implicating the ‘technological answer’ to the problem, a 
strategy representative of reflexive territoriality.
With all of this, the bill effectively more than tripled the INS budget from FY 
1993 to FY 1999, boosting funding dramatically from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion; 
Border Patrol appropriations in particular approached $1 billion in FY1999 41 The 
bill sought to add extra 1,000 Border Patrol agents per year, pushing the overall total 
to nearly 8,000 (over an 80 percent increase since FY 1993, and a near doubling of 
the size of the Border Patrol by 2001).42 As a result of all this, during a time of 
government cut-backs (and GOP rhetoric of a ‘smaller federal government’), the INS 
is one of the fastest growing federal agencies and now makes up the largest corps of 
federal civilian employees able to make arrests and carry firearms.43
Section 110
In addition to massive new resource allocations, the IIRIRA set into law a 
stringent new initiative to help reterritorialise the northern border, creating 
prohibitive restrictions on cross-border travel despite the transnational pressures to
39 H.R. 2202.
40 Ibid.
41 William J. Krouse, ‘Immigration and Naturalization Service’s FY1999 Budget’, Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress 98-269 EPW (7 August 1998) (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 1998), 1, 2.
42 The agency, however, is now finding it difficult to find new recruits and complaints about 
inexperienced agents mishandling some duties have surfaced.
43 Krouse, ‘Immigration and Naturalisation Service’s FY1999 Budget’, 2.
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liberalise such regulations. This narrative is a salient example of the securitisation 
and regulation of the boundary. It relies on a narrative of strict, linear modem 
territoriality. This provision is known as ‘Section 110: Automated Entry-Exit 
Control System’.44
This component of the law required the INS to implement, within two years,
an
automated entry and exit control system that will collect a record of departure for 
every alien departing the United States and match the records of departure with the 
record of the alien’s arrival in the United States.45
The language of ‘every alien’ was drafted by Representative Smith and added in 
legislative conference ‘without knowing the effect’, thus catching many legislators 
by surprise.46 In a classic example of an attempt at late modem, technologically- 
organised state control, the system would electronically report on all non-U.S. 
citizens crossing the border; in effect it would require inspections by an INS officer 
of all entering individuals across both the northern and southern borderlands. This 
data, in addition to denying entry in many cases and effectively gutting the visa 
waiver program, would also gather information ‘regarding aliens who have remained 
in the United States beyond their authorized period of stay’, thereby theoretically 
allowing expulsion of those who overstay their visas.47 Thus Section 110 is a 
measure which is highly illustrative of reflexive state organisation of territoriality, as 
it constituting massive information flows for policy (re)evaluation.
The practical implementation of this measure, however, would cripple cross- 
border interaction and severely interfere with the neo-liberal NAFTA goals of free 
trade. Some estimates say it could cost as much as $3 billion a year to document 
each of the 100 million people who cross the border each year. The data collected in 
a few months alone would be greater than that currently stored in the Library of
AQ
Congress. Official after official in Canada and some in American border states 
have decried the measure, afraid the law will have a catastrophic effect on trade and 
movement across the border, where hundreds of thousands of people now cross daily
44 Title I, Section 110, ‘Automated Entry-Exit Control System’ of U.S. Public Law 104-208.
45 Ibid.
46 Laura Baxter, General Counsel for the U.S. House Immigration Subcommittee, interview by author, 
Washington, D.C., 11 November 1998 and Lisa Kesler, General Counsel for the U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Committee, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 11 November 1998. Baxter and Kesler were key 
players in the legislative struggle over Section 110.
47 For more on Section 110, see William J. Krouse and Ruth Ellen Wasem, ‘Immigration: Visa 
Entry/Exit Control System’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 98-89 EPW 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1998).
48 Ibid.
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with just an oral declaration of where they were bom and limited delays or issues.49 
Even at a minimum of thirty seconds for each crosser, it would, as some 
congressional staffers fear, effectively close the border; former Senator Abraham’s 
office estimated the border controls would create backups of two to 17 hours at the 
busiest crossings with Canada. Operators of the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit 
and Windsor, Ontario, the busiest crossing, have said the record keeping would 
effectively ‘shut down the border’ and disrupt the hundreds of millions of dollars a 
day in trade at that crossing alone.50 The provision, in addition to crippling 
economic growth of the borderlands and day-to-day interactions, would also severely 
disrupt the commerce which increasingly depends on ‘just-in-time’ manufacturing 
techniques in fabrication plants on both the southern and northern American 
borders.51
Section 110, despite its obvious shortcomings, was included in the IIRIRA 
for a variety of reasons. Many, as we shall see, are drawn from the narrative 
strategies and assumptions used to construct and pass the overall legislation. These, 
rather than the question of actual enforcement of Section 110, are at issue here. It 
might seem as though Section 110 would be meant only for the Mexico-U.S. border. 
Ironically for its proponents, however, the NAFTA-inspired ‘architecture’ of North 
American politics, as Cohn argues, made it ‘more difficult to separate Canada-U.S. 
from Mexico-U.S. cross-border travel issues’.52 Symmetry in dealings with both 
states on such matters is mandated in the treaty. NAFTA’s main impulse was the 
reduction of trade boundaries and so this results in a strange paradox.
In the case of Section 110, there are a variety of pressures for freer movement 
of individuals—not further restrictions—ranging from the macro globalisation level 
to the subnational level. These pressures were severely constrained by the legislative 
inclusion of the provision fed by anti-immigrant sentiment and other variables of 
domestic politics.53 Perhaps the most important of these was Representative Smith’s 
own influence and ability, as we shall see, to set the possibilities for the debate. In
49 For illustrations of these views, see Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, U.S -Canada 
Border Communities Conference Proceedings (28 September 1999) 
[http://www.ceip.Org/files/eventsAJ.S.-CanadaProceedings.asp] (24 January 2001).
50 Author interviews with congressional officials; Barry Brown, ‘INS Seeks Relief From New Law 
Seen Slowing Border Crossings’, The Washington Times (27 February 1998): 2A.
51 For an overview of the implications of the provision, see U.S. House Subcommittee on Immigration 
Hearing on ‘The Impact of Section 110 of the 1996 Immigration Act on the Canadian-American 
Border’, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 1998. Serial J-105-61.
52 For an overview of Section 110, see Theodore H. Cohn, ‘Cross Border Travel in North America: 
The Challenge of U.S. Section 110 Legislation’, Canadian-American Public Policy 40 (1999): 4.
53 For more on this, see ibid.
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effect, the discursive structure which constructed anti-immigrant and terrorism fears, 
as well as internal congressional dynamics (such as a decentralised committee 
process and the complexity of the entire IIRIRA bill), helped make Section 110 a 
reality; they defined the policy problem framework for the rest of Congress. 
Through legislation enacted in the 106th Congress in late 2000, implementation has 
now been delayed until 2004 but will proceed then with even more advanced 
technological surveillance measures—a further example of reflexive territoriality in 
practice.54
Textual Analysis
The IIRIRA, and in particular Section 110 (despite its eventual 
implementation delay), were chosen to be illuminated as the chapter’s case study 
because they are key exemplars of the overall shift in border policy in the United 
States, of the processes of state inclusion and exclusion in flux through de- and 
reterritorialisation occurring globally. In order to go into greater depth on this, the 
following section is a textual analysis of the key language of the legislation, major 
supporting committee reports, and public statements that make up the policy 
narrative.
The congressional committee who handled the legislation generated a report 
which argues, from the first page, the bill is
intended.. .to increase control over immigration to the United States [and]
reduce aliens’ use of welfare and certain other government benefits.55
From the beginning, then, the discourse of ‘alien’ and ‘control’ is set—these 
become the terms or frame for the rest of the restrictions; they are assumed 
problematisations, reduced beyond even ‘undocumented workers’ (a term preferred 
by those more sympathetic to these individuals).56 Instead, migrants are cast as a 
burden upon the state. In this report and elsewhere, Smith and his co-sponsors go 
further to cast the migrant as a new ‘threat’ facing the U.S. in the post-Cold War era:
54 See H.R. 4489, ‘Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 
2000’. This bill became Public Law No. 106-215.
55 U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Immigration Control and Financial 
Responsibility Act o f1996 (S. 1664) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 2
56 Refugee and migrant activists, among others, prefer this term for two reasons, arguing it better 
reflects the reality of the situation (i.e., that these are individuals filling open undesirable jobs) and 
because it does not demean a human as somehow ‘alien’.
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Increasingly, the failure to secure our borders threatens our national security.57
Our ‘porous border’, he says, needs to be disciplined to ‘dramatically curb the entry 
of illegal aliens and narcotics across it’.58 His political agenda, then, along with 
many members of his party and some Democrats, was to draw a stronger moral, 
political, and legal boundary between Americans and the other, particularly 
migrants, both legal and undocumented. This is a narrative that casts these 
mobilities as what Shapiro would call ‘threats to valued models of personhood and to 
images of a unified national society and culture’: dangers to the constitution of 
traditional American collective identity.59
In introducing the bill and garnering support for its brand of immigration 
reform, its powerful sponsor Representative Smith set into motion the dominant 
narrative for the debate. Smith invoked American ‘national interest’ at an almost 
seemingly apolitical moment in the story of American statehood:
Congress has a historic opportunity to create an immigration policy that serves 
America’s national interests—not the whims of special interests.60
Before going on to list the supposedly ‘non-special’ interests who endorsed the bill 
(seemingly all wholesome groups—the Hispanic Business Roundtable, United We 
Stand, Veterans of Foreign Wars, The National Association of Manufacturers, 
Information Technology Association of America, and American Council on 
International Personnel, among others), Smith cast the bill as reasonable, broad- 
based legislation—but implicit in the narrative was a tendency to draw a stronger 
moral, political, and legal boundaries, built on the larger, selective discursive 
structure:
This bill will secure our borders, protect American lives, make America more 
competitive in the global marketplace...and encourage immigrants to be 
self-reliant.61
In doing so, the appeal to ‘proper’ patriotic Americans was clearly made; 
here is the story of myth of American identity clearly spelled out, presumably 
something that can only be achieved by securitising borders and migrants; these are
57 Lamar Smith, Opening Statement on ‘Border Security and Deterring Illegal Entry into the United 
States’ to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the U.S. House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 23 April 1997, 1.
58 Ibid., 2.
59 Shapiro, ‘Winning the West’, 17-18.
60 Lamar Smith, ‘Extension of Remarks -  Support Immigration Reform’, Congressional Record,
104th Cong., 2d sess., 30 January 1996, H930.
61 Ibid.
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ff) •clear examples of what Shapiro calls ‘alienating scripts’. Moreover, the bill 
(evident from even its title) consists of a narrative strategy which paints immigrants 
as somehow ‘irresponsible’, not ‘self-reliant’, despite a rather large body of evidence 
which suggests, if anything, they are more self-reliant and less ‘draining’ of social 
services than long-standing citizens, given what they contribute to the system and 
economy.63 From narrative position, and within larger welfare reform initiatives, 
severe public benefit restrictions were imposed in the bill (Section V) on both legal 
and undocumented migrants in the country, focussing on the working class. These 
restricted migrants’ rights to bring relatives over and bared legal immigrants from 
programs such as SSI (social security pension benefits), food stamps, and from 
Medicaid (state health care for the indigent) for five years. Moreover, it also gave 
states the ability to permanently deny AFDC (disability care) and Medicaid to legal 
immigrants.64
Speaking in support of this provision, Representative Dana Rohrabacher 
asserted
We are supposed to be watching out for our own people. When we allocate money 
for benefits...it is supposed to benefit our citizens, the people that are paying taxes, 
who fought our wars. Instead [these] are drained away to illegal aliens.65
Thus, with a harsh, exclusionary and nationalist narrative strategy at work, some of 
the most severe anti-migrant, anti-family, divisive provisions of the bill were passed 
through a normatively exclusionary processes, even against those in the state legally 
and working towards citizenship.
Also embedded in this narrative strategy, and representing the Clinton 
Administration on the bill, Representative Ed Pastor continued the tale of 
enforcement and control, emphasising its popular political salience:
I would like to take this opportunity to highlight the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service’s [INS] efforts to control illegal immigration.. .The administration has made
62 Shaprio, Winning the West, 26.
63 See Michael Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel, ‘Trends in Noncitizens’ and Citizens’ Use of Public Benefits 
Following Welfare Reform: 1994-97’ (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1999) 
[http://www.urban.org/immig/trends.html] (20 February 2000) and Michael Fix, Jeffrey S. Passel, and 
Wendy Zimmermann, ‘Statement on The Use of SSI and Other Welfare Programs by Immigrants’, 
testimony before the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, 23 May 1996 
(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute) [http://www.urban.org/TESTIMON/fix.htm] (20 February
2000). These are two rigourous reports from the well-regarded, non-partisan Urban Institute.
64 Title V, U.S. Public Law 104-208.
65 Dana Rohrabacher, ‘Conference Report on H.R. 2202, Illegal Immigration Reform And Immigrant 
Responsibility Act Of 1996’, Congressional Record, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 25 September 1996, 
H11071.
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the enforcement of our borders a high priority...[and] has made control of illegal 
immigration a top priority.66
Later in his speech of support, Pastor expressed an unyielding faith in the modem 
narrative that maintains that regulation through technological mastery is somehow 
the simple answer for such public policy problems. Furthering the logic that 
additional enforcement resources and techniques can somehow effectively ‘seal’ the 
border (as seen in the case of Section 110), Pastor continued to argue ‘the INS did
• 67not have the personnel or the equipment to properly control this important frontier’. 
As a case of ‘knowledge-of-regulation’, this reflexive narrative strategy suggests that 
if only the proper technology and resources are employed, regulation is possible:
the goal is unambiguous: a border that deters illegal immigration, drug trafficking, 
and alien smuggling.68
By ‘providing the Border Patrol and other INS enforcement divisions with the 
personnel, equipment and technology to deter, detect and apprehend illegal aliens’, 
he argues, the administration can realise ‘the over-arching goal of the strategy.. .to 
make it so difficult and so costly to enter this county illegally that fewer individuals 
even try’.69 Hence, we can see the outlines of a reflexive territoriality approach 
which uses advanced technology resources to help inform—and implement—policy 
choices.
Other supporters sought to even more radically alter the bill in an effort to 
militarise the U.S. borderlands, a strategy outlined in the preceding chapter. 
Representative James Traficant offered an amendment to H.R. 2202 to authorise the 
use of military troops along the border to prevent ‘terrorists, drug traffickers, and 
illegal aliens into the United States’ which would allow the Secretary of Defense to
make not more than 10,000 Department of Defense personnel available to assist... at 
the request of the Attorney General, the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 
preventing the entry of terrorists, drug traffickers, and illegal aliens into the United 
States.70
While this particular amendment failed, a similar measure was passed by the House 
in June 1997. This particular amendment did attract a good degree of attention and
66 Ed Pastof, ‘Immigration and Naturalization Service Comprehensive Southwest Border Enforcement 





70 Amendment to H.R. 2202 offered by James Traficant, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Congressional Record, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 12 March 1996, H2124.
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heightened the public alarm about the seeming ‘chaos’ of the borderlands. Traficant 
was an enthusiastic supporter of efforts throughout the 1990s to utilise troops in the 
borderlands and was a chief architect of plans to use Low Intensity Conflict doctrine 
(LIC) in such operations, which tragically cost a young American citizen’s life in 
1998. During the debate, some Clinton administration officials even recommended 
increasing the size of the Border Patrol to 20,000 agents; the new Bush
71administration is expected to support or bolster such proposals.
One of the few counter-narratives to be discussed in the original public 
debate on H.R. 2202 came from Congressman Patrick Kennedy, a Democrat from 
Rhode Island. While ostensibly supporting checks on illegal immigration, Kennedy 
invoked the narrative of ‘America as immigrant society’ and ethnic identity in his 
vote against the bill:
This mean spirited bill...heightens the fear, hysteria, and anti-immigrant fervor that 
is running rampant across this country...It is a travesty that in an effort to curb 
illegal immigration, the authors of this bill have chosen to scapegoat children. Have 
we become so desperate that we must resort to these drastic measures? Creating an 
Orwellian society in which individuals must present a card to verify their legality 
refutes everything that is right and good about America. It is blind and unfair. It 
fans the flames of prejudice.72
In the end, however, such counter-discourses lost to a wave of large political 
support; the bill passed with a large margin and was signed into law by President 
Clinton.
Recent Developments
In early 2000, the Canadian border issue returned to the public stage. 
Millennial tensions spawned concern at the New Year that the Canadian border 
would be used as a conduit for terrorists wishing to ‘infiltrate’ American soil. In 
December 1999, Algerian-born Ahmed Ressam, a Montreal resident, was caught 
trying to enter the U.S. from Vancouver Island with a car full of explosives and was 
arrested. Taking this as a sign of still too loose a border (despite the restrictions 
imposed in the 1996 legislation), Congress initiated hearings on the ‘threat’ of 
terrorists, illegal aliens, and drug smugglers crossing the ‘porous’ U.S.-Canadian
71 David LaGesse, ‘Border Residents Urge Removal of Military’, Dallas Morning News (16 July
1997) [http:.//www.dallasnews.com] (16 July 1997).
72 Patrick J. Kennedy, ‘Extension of Remarks - H.R. 2202: The Immigration in the National Interest 
Act’, Congressional Record, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 26 March 1996, E457.
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borderlands.73 As in the southern borderlands, the narrative strategy again posed the 
problem as one o f ‘threat’, ‘disorder’, and calls for ‘security’ re-emerged.
These hearings were spearheaded anew by Congressman Smith. In his 
opening statement, Smith claimed border policy has ‘created a situation where 
terrorists, and also illegal aliens, alien smugglers, and drug smugglers, are 
increasingly using Canada as a transit country en route to the United States’; he went 
on to call Canada a ‘Club Med for terrorists’.74 This narrative move served to 
implicate the other and create the impression of disorder and threats lurking in the 
borderlands which hearken a call for national interests and protection.
Accordingly, signs of the securitisation of the northern borderlands, while not 
proceeding at the same scale as in the south, are now appearing. A plan to boost the 
U.S. border patrol presence at the Canadian border by 50 per cent may be the first 
step toward transforming the border into an armed frontier more like the Mexican 
case. Much of this discourse translates to surveillance techniques based on LIC 
doctrine, first outlined in the previous chapter: essentially borrowed military tactics 
and high technology equipment such as night vision goggles, underground sensors, 
day and night-vision cameras that may capture anything from armed drug smugglers 
to wild animals.75 Other new devices include seismic monitors that detect footsteps, 
metallic sensors that react to jewellery, and infrared detectors which sense heat. As 
part of the Border Patrol’s reflexive territorial strategy, these devices are 
continuously relocated to various parts of the northern frontier to electronically 
survey remote roads, trails, and rivers which cross the international boundary. 
Activity detected by this surveillance equipment is instantly sent to Border Patrol 
sector headquarters to be relayed to agents on the ground which then, often 
unsuccessfully, pursue the individuals. This advanced control strategy is well- 
received by the agency:
The technology significantly enhances the border patrol’s ability to maximize
effectiveness and officer safety.76
73 See Hilary Mackenzie, ‘Canada a “Club Med for Terrorists”: Congressman Slams Agencies for 
Bungling Arrest of Algerian Storm Delays Hearings On Border Issue’, The Ottawa Citizen (26 
January 2000) [http://www.ottawacitizen.com/] (27 January 2000).
74 Statement of Lamar Smith to Hearing on ‘Terrorist Threats to the United States’, U.S. House 
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims (25 January 2000) 
rhttp://www.house.gov/judiciary/smit0125.htm] (27 January 2000).
5 On Low-Intensity Conflict doctrine, see the groundbreaking work by Timothy Dunn, The 
Militarization o f the U.S-Mexico Border, 1978-1992 (Austin, TX: The Center for Mexican-American 
Studies, University o f Texas at Austin, 1996).
76 Doris Meissner, quoted in Peter Morton, Marina Jimenez, and Charlie Gillis, ‘Human Smugglers 
Turn to Canada as U.S. Cracks Down on Southern Border: Americans Install Underground Sensors in
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So argues Doris Meissner, former Commissioner of the INS. Territorial policy, in 
these terms, can thus be reflexively understood and resources re-appropriated or 
shifted according to perceived needs, threats, or goals. Virginia Kice, spokeswoman 
for the INS’s Western region affirmed this self-confrontational strategy that readjusts 
itself as needed within the particular narrative frame:
By deploying technology, we can make the agents that we do have more 
effective.. .1 think it’s a work-in-progress.77
And the larger concerns about security now envelop the northern 
borderlands, as Steve Garret, assistant chief of the Border Patrol’s Spokane, 
Washington state sector asserts:
In the past the [northern] border wasn’t an issue.. .really, the border was more of an 
afterthought.78
This comes in response to perceptions increased flows of undocumented 
migrants, smuggling rings, terrorists, and drugs are impacting the northern frontier. 
Keith Olson, a senior agent in the Blaine, Maine sector of the U.S. Border Patrol, for 
instance, argues
We’re getting hammered by Koreans right now...You only got two hands. You 
catch what you can catch.79
presumably he refers to syndicate smuggling, but his language reflects that of the 
dominant narrative: ‘invasion’, ‘catching’ as many humans as possible.
Before 1993 when Operation Hold the Line began, while the international 
borders of the U.S. where loosely monitored, most enforcement activity was focused 
on the interior, with checkpoints designed to intercept travelling undocumented 
workers, workforce raids conducted on employers who hired these workers, and so 
forth. This pattern came to an end with agribusiness pressure given a general worker 
shortage and the refocusing of attention to the boundaries themselves.
But the extension of securitisation northward signals ‘a fundamental change’ 
in how the United States treats the Canadian border, said Massimo Bergamini, vice- 
president of the Canadian Trucking Alliance whose organisation represents Canada’s
2,000 trucking companies:
Bid to Catch Illegals’, National Post (Canada) (17 March 1999), [CISNEWS@cis.org] (18 March 
1999).
77 Virginia Kice, quoted in Paton, ‘Along the Other U.S. Border’, emphasis added.
78 Steve Garret, quoted in ibid.
79 Keith Olson, quoted in ibid.
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They want to manage [the northern border] like they handle the southern border 
[with Mexico].80
The IIRIRA allocated massive resources to ‘defending’ the U.S.-Mexico 
border with high steel fences, barbed wire and 24-hour armed patrols; the Canadian 
border is woefully understaffed by comparison. But the discourse here is significant 
because as a force in itself, it continuously underwrites and stabilises the 
assumptions for decision making. For instance, Smith and other Republicans have 
again called for the implementation of the draconian measures originally imposed in 
the 1996 Act. In another major recent hearing on border security, he maintained
The U.S. now needs, more than ever, to develop and implement a system to track the 
entries and exits of foreign nationals.81
He then called for the immediate implementation of Section 110, with its 
strict exit and entry checks. Smith, in attempting to reinvigorate the narrative 
strategy, pushed for enforcement in strong terms: ‘I expect Congress will continue to 
protect Americans from threats at our borders’.82 Smith said that any proposed 
repeal of new border checks ‘threatens every American community’ because of 
‘illegal aliens, drug smugglers and terrorists who cross our borders at 
will.. .Considering the threats we face at our borders, a repeal would be short-sighted 
and dangerous’. Instead, Smith furthered the discourse of sovereignty.
If Canadians want more liberal immigration and drug policies, that is their decision. 
And if Americans want to act on security concerns, that is our decision. The issue is 
one of sovereignty, not who is to blame.83
In the vein of the chief narrative strategy, Smith tells a tale of the seemingly 
sovereign, independent state where national identity is under pressure by economic 
and social forces under NAFTA integration, changing demographic and social 
patterns in the state as a whole. In doing so, he implicates the power structures and 
representations which sustain this conceptualisation and suggest the range of options 
available for political action. Other ‘expert’ witnesses at his hearing backed this up, 
furthering calls to securitise the border:
To protect America, in my view, it is imperative that we accelerate the establishment 
of an entry-exit control system ...The future Ressams will travel to more remote
80 Barrie Mckenna, ‘Critics Assail U.S. Plan to Beef Up Customs: Terror Alerts Prompt Increased 
Border Security’, The Globe and Mail (Canada) (28 January 2000), [CISNEWS@cis.org] (28 January 
2000).
81 Smith, Hearing on ‘Terrorist Threats to the United States’.




locations that are less secure. So we must also enhance security between 
checkpoints. This can best be accomplished by technology and by increasing the 
number of Border Patrol agents and other law enforcement resources.84
As the narrative strategy took root—and the problem was defined in selective 
terms—high-profile attention increased. While Section 110 was originally largely 
Smith’s initiative, the threatening nature of the narrative attracted further attention 
from other Republican legislators—who also now seek to take policy action within 
its parameters: ‘Understaffing at our northern border is jeopardizing the security of
o c
our nation’, U.S. Senator Slade Gorton, has recently warned. Even U.S. House of 
Representatives Speaker Dennis Hastert has expressed concern during discussions 
with the White House on plans to increase funding and manpower; another typical 
sentiment, ‘we are definitely pushing for additional resources to be sent to the 
northern border’, came from Jim Troyer, a spokesman for Jack Metcalf, a
o/:
Republican congressman from Washington state.
6.3 F a d in g  C o u n t e r - N a r r a t i v e s :  I d e n t i t y  a n d  I n t e g r a t i o n
In keeping with the goal in a narrative analysis methodology to elucidate the 
‘marginal’ counter-narratives, to seek the ‘remainders’ of narratives in order to 
understand the alternative dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, at least two counter 
strands centred around identity and integration can be identified in the debates over 
American border policy.
Identity
As illustrated earlier, there are complex collective identity dynamics in play. 
The foreign bom population in the U.S. is at its highest level in a hundred years; 
heterogeneity in both its borderlands and increasingly in its centres is a growing
87reality. For example, the crackdown on undocumented migrants, especially those 
near the borders, as we saw earlier in the thesis, tends to be predicated on racial 
grounds; officials under the 1996 HRICA act and as a result of conservative U.S.
84 Statement of Gary Stubblefield, ‘Establishing A Comprehensive Strategy To Combat Terrorism’, 
Hearing on ‘Terrorist Threats to the United States’.
85 Slade Gorton, quoted in Ross Anderson, ‘Canadian Urges U.S. to Learn to Work Together’, Seattle 
Times (17 February 2000), [CISNEWS@cis.org] (18 February 2000).
86 Jan Cienski, ‘House Speaker Wants Revamping of U.S. Border Controls’, National Post (Canada) 
(28 January 2000), [CISNEWS@cis.org] (28 January 2000).
87 See U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000 Census Data (Washington, D.C. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
2001) [http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p20-519.pdf] (16 March 2001).
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Supreme Court rulings, now have wide scope to stop individuals who may look 
‘suspicious’. Some have suggested that this ‘racial profiling’ implicates the ‘dark 
side’ of new American border control. Those opposed to the 1996 act felt it unfairly 
discriminated against minority migrant workers in favour of businesses who could 
use their ethnicity and legal status as reverse pressure on wages; the act was widely 
criticised for its lack of emphasis on employer sanctions. Funding for additional INS 
inspectors, in fact, was eliminated in back-room conference meetings, according to
o o
some reports because of large agribusiness lobbying.
In some of the dissenting opinions contained in the conference report on H.R. 
2202, Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York expressed a counter-narrative 
view:
This bill...has been poisoned with unconscionable provisions that violate 
fundamental American values. Do we need to undercut public health efforts, 
destroy our environment, debase our fundamental values, violate the rights of 
American citizens and waste taxpayer dollars on foolish or dangerous enterprises in 
order to enforce our immigration? Of course not.89
His statement was followed by a similar message from Representative Luiz 
Gutierrez of Illinois:
For generations immigrants have played a vital role in our economy, but today 
immigrants play the role of villain in the Republican’s morality play. By exploiting 
a false image of millions of illegal immigrants crossing the border into the United 
States, Newt Gingrich and his Republican allies have crossed the border from 
decency to indecency.90
Nonetheless, the restrictions were included in the final bill which passed and 
was signed into law. While legislation several years later restored some of the public 
benefits to legal immigrants, in the midst of the very recent border alarm, there are 
but a few opposing voices against the call for more stringent profiling against 
minorities and the stepped-up enforcement efforts. Congresswoman Sheila Jackson 
Lee, at recent hearings, was one voice of dissent:
[W]e must not forget that a fundamental requisite of our freedom is a balance 
between control of the comings and goings at the border and our civil 
liberties... Stopping or searching individuals on the basis of race is not effective law 
enforcement policy, and it is not consistent with our democratic ideals, especially 
our commitment to equal protection under the law for all persons. It is neither 
legitimate nor defensible as a strategy for public protection...
88 U.S. House, Conference Report on ‘H.R. 2202, Illegal Immigration Reform And Immigrant 
Responsibility Act Of 1996’, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 25 September 1996.
89 Jerrold Nadler, ‘Conference Report on H.R. 2202’, HI 1085.
90 Ibid., HI 1086.
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Racial profiling at the border...is simply wrong...The recent border apprehensions 
in anticipation of Y2K problems were made with good, old fashioned police work, 
not with repressive efforts that militarize the border, discriminate based on race, or 
infringe on due process rights or diminish the right to an adequate hearing.91
Inte&ation
The re-imposition of the dominant narratives of difference, even if actual 
quantitative flows persist, also generally weakens continental integration and the 
restricts development of integrated borderlands by fostering distinct national identity 
patterns and a strict, ‘nation’-’state’ correspondence which is so often predicated in 
much of IR literature, consistent with some Enlightenment thinking that postulates a 
‘natural’—and often homogeneous—correlation and control between place, culture, 
and identity, a notion that is increasingly becoming outmoded in a globalised world 
of mobilities.92 Thus, some counter-narratives seek to expand particular political 
possibilities, such as increased integration. As the Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. 
Raymond Chretien recently said
Our relationship is a one-way mirror.. .Canadians don’t want a Wall of China at our 
border.93
On the ground, some borderlanders respond to these new divisive moves; for 
instance, International Falls grocery store owner Phil Paulbeck said he hopes Canada 
and the United States eventually ease up. He calls the restrictions at the international 
bridge over the Rainy River ‘a kind of Berlin Wall’ that can inhibit traffic and make 
it harder for citizens of the towns to interact:
In Europe you can drive between many countries just like you’d go from Minnesota 
to North Dakota here.. .We live in a place with fewer problems than Europe, yet we 
have this Checkpoint Charlie.94
The recent narrative strategy and moves to reterritorialise the borderlands sets 
back counter-narratives which have promoted increased, not decreased, integration 
and even put forth the idea of effectively removing the border. This would, of 
course, signal a fundamental shift in the North American ‘order’. Some senior 
immigration officials are convinced Canada and the U.S. should eliminate the border
91 Statement o f Sheila Jackson Lee, Oversight Hearing on Terrorist Threats to the United States, 25 
January 2000 [http://www.house.gov/judiciary/jlee0125.htm] (27 January 2000).
92 See, for example, Marden, ‘Geographies of Dissent’, and Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
93 Raymond Chretien, quoted in Anderson, ‘Canadian Urges U.S. To Leam to Work Together’.
94 Phil Paulbeck, quoted in Associated Press, ‘Canada Border Security Increased: Travelers at Falls 
Facing Longer Stops’ (28 December 1999), [CISNEWS@cis.org] (28 December 1999)..
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altogether and concentrate their efforts on perimeter defence, but the idea is 
considered too sensitive (or disruptive of the main narrative) to be seriously voiced.95
The narrative strategy of Lamar Smith and others who are now calling for the 
new security measures to be put in place along the Canadian border sends chills 
through government circles in Canada. Canada seeks co-operation with the U.S. on 
security matters because of its interests in the easy movement of goods to and from 
the U.S. It is one of the reasons Canada is keen to shift the discussion away from 
increased border controls and toward an examination of perimeter security similar to 
that developed in Europe under the Schengen treaty. That treaty requires each visa 
application to be approved by all 15 EU countries.96
Martha Nixon, Assistant Deputy Minister in charge of immigration 
operations in Canada, said she does not think the two states will ever be able to erect 
enough border controls ‘to really deter terrorism.. .to me that’s not a solution, which 
is why we’ve been trying very hard with the Americans to talk about this whole idea 
of perimeter’; instead
If you look at perimeter then you rely on your immigration control officers, your 
interdiction capabilities overseas, rather than allowing the problem to come here. 
We think we have to get at the problem before the problem gets to North America.97
This is clearly a strategy of integration and collective identification around the theme 
of ‘North America’, which also draws a clear parallel to the European Union.
The post-Cold War, NAFTA-inspired integration policies ostensibly 
encourage the facilitation of cross-border travel (deterritorialisation) along with other 
liberalisation initiatives are in tension with the impractical, difference-enforcing 
movement restrictions of reterritorialisation in the 1996 IIRIRA. As even President 
Clinton’s 1994 ‘Report on Immigration’ admitted
the openness of the world economy requires making commercial travel and tourism 
easier and friendlier. The U.S. economy clearly benefits from playing an energetic 
role in encouraging travel...[this] may conflict with the need to establish closer 
controls on cross-border traffic to enforce immigration laws.98
95 Barrie Mckenna, ‘Critics Assail U.S. Plan to Beef Up Customs: Terror Alerts Prompt Increased 
Border Security’, The Globe and Mail (Canada) (28 January 2000) [http://www.globeandmail.ca] (28 
January 2000).
96 The EU is also working toward a common asylum system that would create a standardised 
approach to the handling of refugee claims and provide a uniform status for those seeking protection.
9 Martha Nixon, quoted in Andrew Duffy, ‘Ottawa Urges U.S. to Adopt Continental Security Ring 
Anti-Terrorist ‘Perimeter’: Plan Would Mean Harmonized Visa Rules, Sharing Intelligence’, Southam 
News National Post (29 January 2000), [CISNEWS@cis.org] (31 January 2000).
98 William J. Clinton, Accepting the Immigration Challenge: The President’s Report on Immigration 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), 26, 42.
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Mutual interdependence and international or sub-national pressures under patterns of 
globalisation, in fact, place inherent stress on the capacities of the state for such 
regulation.
More liberalised border arrangements that foster deterritorialisation are 
widely perceived as a hallmark of integration and in certain academic and policy 
circles, historical ‘progress’ in a general sense." Ironically, though, this kind of 
counter-narrative is cast as somehow retrogressive and damaging. Dan Stein, for 
example, director of FAIR, a major anti-immigration right-wing interest group 
recently proclaimed
The porous nature of our northern border is inappropriate to the modem age...The 
legacy of the world’s largest unguarded land border will soon be history. What we 
need is a land border that requires inspections.100
Fewer stronger indictments of globalisation and integrated borderlands (‘porosity’) 
might be found.
Following our steps in narrative analysis, then, we can see a clear difference 
between the dominant and counter-narratives of the U.S.-Canadian borderlands, 
between policies seen as problem-solving, ‘ordering’ and regulative of ‘disorder’ and 
situations of ‘porosity’ and ‘threats’. The two counter-narratives of identity and 
integration, however, have been relatively marginalised in the current debate, 
qualifying as Shapiro’s ‘non-stories’. As recent events testify, the new political 
climate instead is only reinforcing the dominant narrative of state control. 
Representative Smith has, as noted, called for enactment of the tough immigration 
measures in Section 110 and repeal now seems unlikely, even if implementation is 
delayed. Irrespective of the outcome of the political debate, the narratives of an 
‘unprotected’ and ‘porous’ borderland have done much to rally public support and an 
understanding of separateness, further justifying the securitisation of the border and 
migrants.
Most recently, the call has grown louder to begin securitising the northern 
border like the southern; surprisingly even several border-state politicians, including 
former Senator Spencer Abraham of Michigan and Senator Patty Murray of 
Washington, have prodded the Clinton and Bush administrations to put as much 
effort and staff into defending the northern border as it does in the south. In a letter
99 The influential Wall Street Journal, for example, has historically always called for open borders and 
free labour movement in North America.
100 Dan Stein, quoted in Frederic J. Frommer, ‘Arrests Bolster Backers of Law Requiring Tracking of 
Foreigners’, Associated Press Wire (26 December 1999), [CISNEWS@cis.org] (28 December 1999).
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to former President Bill Clinton, Mr. Abraham, a staunch critic of Section 110 
(ironically called the ‘illegal alien’s best friend’ by an anti-immigration group101), 
called for a 50-50 split in resources. Abraham, who wants 5,000 new border-patrol 
agents hired over the next five years, held Senate immigration committee hearings 
on the issue in 2000.102 He used the rhetoric of a battle to reinforce political 
differentiation and tell us what is at stake: ‘It is real people on the front lines who 
make a difference’.103 The recent installation of sensors and high technology 
surveillance cameras, designed from the Mexican model, along the Niagara river is 
an ominous omen.104
The new George W. Bush administration is indicating it will continue 
strengthening the dominant narrative by bolstering the securitisation policy and 
further limiting alternatives. Bush’s proposals will mean over 11,000 Border Patrol 
agents will be deployed on the northern and southern borders by 2003, a 175 per cent 
increase since 1993.105 In the name of ‘strengthening border control and 
enforcement’, Bush plans ‘intelligence units along the Northern and Southwest 
borders [to] collect, analyze, and disseminate information to identify and interdict 
illegal entrants to the United States; monitor potential terrorist activity’ and will also 
fund
intrusion detection technology including high-resolution color and infrared cameras 
and state-of-the-art command centers as force multipliers to supplement the new 
agents and provide continuous monitoring of the border from remote sites. The 
proposed combination of intrusion detection technology, and a substantial number of 
new Border Patrol agents will permit INS to enforce the rule of law and enhance 
border management over larger portions of the border.106
It is clear that the new administration has simply accepted the defined frame 
of the dominant narrative established in 1993 which crystallised in 1996; they too 
seek to rely on ever more force as well as high technology and surveillance, as ‘force 
multipliers’ in the drive for regulation of the border. ‘Continuous monitoring’ of the 
borders from ‘remote sites’ connotes a continued reflexive approach to territoriality.
101 Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), ‘Border Checks Deemed “Critical First 
Step’” (Washington, D.C.: Federation for American Immigration Reform, 1998) 
[http://www.fairus.org/07475809.htm] (10 October 1998).
102 Mckenna, ‘Critics Assail U.S. Plan’.
103 Spencer Abraham, quoted in ‘Senators Urge Increased Border Security’, John Hughes, Associated 
Press Wire (10 February 2000), [CISNEWS@cis.org] 11 February 2000.
104 Canadian Press, ‘Residents Decry Surveillance Cameras at Border’ (16 August 2000), 
[CISNEWS@cis.org] (16 August 1998).
105 George W. Bush, ‘Reform the Immigration System’, in A Blueprint for New Beginning (2001 
Budget Proposal) [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/blueprint/budl4.html] (1 March 2001).
106 Ibid.
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6.4 T h e  M eta n a r r a tiv e  o f  Im age
All of this leads us to the final step of our preliminary narrative analysis 
method: identifying the resultant ‘metanarrative’, told by the comparison of the two 
stories and then reproduced in policy terms. In this case, the counter-narratives 
employed in the debate are highly marginalised, due to the power dynamics and 
policy interests which frame the main dominant narrative which lend it wide, 
bipartisan political support. By understanding the border in a modem territorial, 
sovereign frame, reducing transnational flows to ‘chaotic’ problems which can be 
solved by the proper application of technology, ‘control’ becomes the overriding and 
seemingly realisable objective. Regulation, as Santos reminds us, is often seen to
107lead to order and knowledge, as opposed to chaos and ignorance. Much of the 
emergent policy that seeks to regulate flows follows this pendulum, and because of 
this dichotomy, the metanarrative is thus able to ‘recast the issue in such a way to 
make it more amenable to policymaking’.108
Put another way this particular metanarrative can be understood through the 
concept of image. Earlier in this thesis, the question of the image of border control 
was raised. There are several significant, but often overlooked studies, which 
actually suggest that transnational mobilities (both ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’) persist 
despite the ‘hardening’ of the borderlands imposed by the legislation under analysis 
here. In effect, the representation of border security serves a particular political 
purpose—collective identity construction and resource appropriation—when the 
actually policy, in its own terms, is failing. As one Senate staffer candidly admitted, 
‘the state is making a feeble effort to control the uncontrollable’.109
Yielding support to this line, current data collected from the experiments to 
aggressively securitise the border (detailed here and in the last chapter) suggests that 
seven years and billions of dollars later, undocumented migration and drugs have not 
slowed. If the unprecedented, aggressive border security strategy prompted by the 
INS is reviewed, the agency itself is unable to illustrate any sign that the flow of 
migrants has slowed; indeed, the flows may have actually increased despite this 
reterritorialising strategy. Using the standard (and INS’s own) measurement statistic 
(apprehensions of undocumented persons crossing the boundary illegally), the 
strategy appears to be failing; agents apprehended just over 1.6 million people in
107 Santos, ‘The Fall of the Angelus Novus’, 101.
108 Roe, Narrative Policy Analysis, 4.
109 Kesler, interview.
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2000 (with apprehensions in early FY 2001 down by of 20%).110 This is 
approximately 400,000 more individuals than 1993 (when the policy began) but 
roughly equivalent to the 1.6 million in 1986 before the securitisation strategy.111 
Importantly, at no point in the overall policy narrative does the INS actually claim 
that they are reducing the overall flow of undocumented workers or terrorists into the 
U.S. As noted here, while some busy parts of the northern border are reinforced 
using the techniques identified in chapter five, crossers appear to simply shift to 
areas less stringently controlled, and often times are more desolate and dangerous.
Moreover, the narrative policy creates an image of control at the margins or 
the ‘front-lines’, i.e., on the boundaries themselves, but neglects the real effect 
elsewhere. Interior enforcement of immigration laws, for instance, is vastly 
neglected; estimates suggest 40 to 50 per cent of all undocumented individuals 
actually entered the state legally and have simply overstayed their visas, yet 85 per 
cent of resources to deal with the ‘undocumented problem’ are directed at border 
securitisation. Seventy to 85 per cent of the drugs in the U.S. come through legal 
ports of entry—thanks to NAFTA, conveyances on the Mexican side are not 
checked, leading the Attorney General of Texas to call it the ‘North American Free 
Trafficking Agreement’.112 A recent Carnegie study found that
no evidence suggests that even in places [along the border] where anti­
smuggling/anti-drug effort is most dedicated, the inspection system currently in 
pace.. .actually intercepts most would-be violators.113
A major U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report in fact recently 
reviewed American border policy and found ‘inconclusive results’: ‘despite the 
allocation of billions of dollars’, GAO ‘did not know whether the was producing the 
intended results’.114 Moreover, there is no deadline for completing the strategy, and 
the Border Patrol cannot say how much money or how many agents it will ultimately
110 See INS apprehension data: U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Southwest Border Apprehensions: FY2001 Monthly Statistical Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Justice) [http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/msijan01/ 
/SWBORD.HTM] (6 February 2001).
111 See U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, ‘Southwest Border 
Apprehensions’ (Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of Justice) [http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/ 
/aboutins/statistics/msrsep99/SWBORD.HTM] (24 February 2000).
112 Maria Jimenez, ‘The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border’, In Motion Magazine (6 September
1998) [http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/mjl.html] (10 September 1998).
113 Deborah Waller Meyers and Demetrios G. Papademetriou, ‘Walking a Fine Line: Issues in Border 
Management’, ISUMA: Canadian Journal o f  Policy Research 1, no. 1 (2000): 4; also available at 
[http://www.isuma.net/v01n01/waller/waller.htm] (24 January 2001).
114 U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results 
Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1998).
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need. Outside estimates go as high as 20,000 agents, nearly 2.5 times the existing 
force.
Moreover, this metanarrative of control and image, along with what is not 
being told, casts doubt that extending the strategy, as Bush intends to do, would be 
ultimately any more ‘effective’ in the northern borderlands with Canada than it is in 
the south, especially given the historic bilateral relationship between the two states. 
In terms of Section 110, the fact that INS has no current plans to implement the rules 
(and does not even know how to go about it) contradicts claims that the new border 
checks do not pose any threat of slowing legitimate cross-border traffic. Whilst the 
image that drugs and terrorism would be blocked was the main stated public 
justification for Section 110, reduction in these flows would be negligible as the 
proposed entry/exit system, even with advanced technology, cannot prevent their 
entry. As Flynn lucidly argues,
for drugs, thugs, and terrorists, borders pose little in the way of a barrier. In most 
instances they can find ways to move about the international system with virtual 
impunity.115
The overall focus on tightening, especially in an increasingly global economic 
situation, also masks any counter-narrative frameworks to create opportunities for 
co-operation on these matters, one of the better mechanisms for effective counter­
terrorism or a logical migration policy.
This evidence reinforces the argument here that the narration of the U.S.- 
Canadian borderlands, like that in the southern case, creates to some extent, the 
illusion of true ‘border control’ realised through the strategic metanarrative. The 
new strategy simply ends up securitising the border, disrupting borderland 
communities, and by doing so solidifies strict territoriality and difference. Some of 
the most telling data in the end speaks to just how large the transnational flows are in 
comparison to the public policy issues at hand: with hundreds of millions of 
crossings per year), less than one per cent of all entries, north and south, are 
illegal.116
Stephen Flynn, ‘Globalization and the Future of Border Control’, Washington Paper (Washington, 
D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000) [http://www.foreignrelations.org/BorderControl/chapters/ 
/chapterl.htm] (24 January 2001), 4.
116 David E. Lorey, The U.S.-Mexican Border In The Twentieth Century (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly 
Resources, 1999), 3. Only 1.1 per cent of the U.S. population consisted of undocumented Mexicans 
in 1996; the figure is even less for undocumented Canadians. See Enrique M. Loaeza Tovar, Susan 
Martin et al, Binational Study o f Migration Between Mexico and the United States (Mexico 
City/Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997), ii.
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6.5 C o n c l u sio n s
From its inception as a paramount instantiation of modem geopolitical 
mapping, the U.S.-Canadian frontier has given the appearance that it, like all others 
around the world, separates strict, delineated collective identities which are 
contained in two modem states. Even the geographical deployment of the boundary 
(mostly along the 49th parallel—itself a product of the modem cartography) suggests 
the sharp, differentiated ‘sovereign’ political representation of states which are the 
‘container(s) of all cultural meaning and sites of sovereign jurisdiction over territory, 
property, and abstract space’.117 Drawn from a long intellectual strand in Western 
political thought, this clear realisation of modernity’s ‘dominant spatial story’ has 
largely formulated the parameters for the political representation of the U.S.- 
Canadian borderlands.118
Moreover, as Shapiro and Soguk have pointed out, these dominant 
genealogical and spatial stories create ‘dominant practices of intelligibility’ which 
structure ‘international relations’ and thus limit alternative ethical and political 
problematics.119 The epistemological and ontological structures they rest on are 
similarly entrenched. Border discourses that support this dominant cartography and 
impose a spatial narrative of identity, as this study suggests, are metaphors of 
political limits.
Zuniga argues the symmetrical relationship in the U.S.-Canadian borderlands 
ironically tends to diminish interaction and intemationality much less than those 
dynamics produced by an asymmetry, such as along the U.S.-Mexican border. But a 
closer examination of the U.S.-Canadian borderlands, in fact, uncovers anything but 
completely differentiated spatial identities and interaction. Instead, a rich, vibrant 
historical mosaic of cultural, social, and economic interaction transcends this 
arbitrary political boundary. Moreover, growing transnational flows and contacts 
(among migrants and others) under NAFTA are prompting increased integration to
117 R.B.J. Walker, ‘State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time’, Millennium: 
Journal o f International Studies 20, no. 3 (1991): 445-61.
118 Whilst covered in chapter two of this thesis, the discussion of this lineage is too large to be 
developed here. However, it is widely recognised that modem sovereignty claims and representations 
follow from a tradition which begins with Plato, stretches through Locke, Hegel, Hobbes, and others. 
Some poststructural scholars (such as Richard Ashley, R.B J  Walker, David Campbell, and others) 
interrogate this pattern.
119 See Shapiro, Violent Cartographies and Nevzat Soguk and Geoffrey Whitehall, ‘Wandering 
Grounds: Transversality, Identity, Territoriality, and Modernity’, Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies 28, no. 3 (1999): 675-98. Shapiro, for instance, presents a Levinasian alternative 
to this logjam, and Soguk and Whitehall propose the concept of ‘transversality’ to come to terms with 
punctures in modernity’s ‘dominant spatial story’.
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potentially contest the collective identities within the greater North American 
political ‘space’. But, as this chapter has illustrated, these identities are instead being 
partly consolidated through narrative strategies of difference that underpinned 
American border policy in the 1990s. These culminated in the 1996 IIRIRA, 
including Section 110, and continue with recent developments to tighten the northern 
boundary. ‘Strategy’, again, is not used here to suggest a necessary deliberate 
selection among a variety of alternatives, but rather a potentially unintentional 
selection of representational practices of identity and space at a particular moment. 
The policies also draw on the modem penchant to attempt to simply reflexively 
‘control’ the boundary as the easy solution to complex problems of identity and 
movement.
Zygmunt Bauman maintains these attempts appear at precisely the moment 
when ‘in today’s world the great modem project of achieving a unified, managed and 
controlled space is facing its most critical challenge’ from processes of globalisation 
such as migration, global civil society links, and other transnational flows.120 Ash 
Amin and others further argue this change is now located in ‘diverse relational 
webs’, as individuals may be reshaped in contrasting ways in spaces that are not 
defined as separate ‘national’, ‘local’, or ‘global’, but rather ‘transversal’.121
But understanding such conditions may require alternative ways of 
examining and deconstmcting this political space, of bringing volume to a variety of 
counter-narratives. As this chapter has attempted to show, textual analysis which 
relies on a constitutive theory of language, while not intending to replace or subvert 
other analyses such as those based on material factors, tries to begin to unlock 
certain power/discourse structures to help understand the power/knowledge 
dynamics inherent in the dominant scripts and strategies of politics and its 
possibilities.
Narrative analysis fits well in the i/b/o heuristic tool, especially as a 
mechanism for empirical work at its intersections. What is significant here is the 
interrelationship between these three key concepts: reterritorialisation can not be 
explained solely in terms of one variable (e.g. identity) but rather at least two 
(identity and borders) if not all three. Identity is continuously differentiated, the 
border is reinforced discursively and politically through securitisation, and the 
corresponding socio-political order shifts. The i/b/o triad thus assists us in
120 Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, 16.
121 Ash Amin, ‘Placing Globalization’, Theory, Culture, and Society 14, no. 2 (1997): 129.
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understanding the more complex and subtle dynamics at work in this case of writing 
space: the northern border is being securitised through an emergent, exclusionary 
metanarrative strategy to help present the image of ‘control’ and differentiation (a 
particular order). By seeing each component in the triad not as static, but rather in 
the process of becoming, we can better conceptualise, understand, or potentially 
change these dynamics.
The attitudes and narratives enabling border ‘control’ and securitisation have 
typically been understood to be cyclical, pegged to a variety of factors, including 
economic and political conditions Most studies suggest when economic downturns 
occur, immigration is often clamped down on and borderlands closed to satisfy 
political demands that the other is not ‘stealing’ an American’s job or promoting 
further cultural and social heterogeneity. This chapter, however, has illustrated that 
current developments date from the 1996 Immigration Act are connected with the 
need to project the image of a firm, distinct border with Canada (and Mexico) under 
increased control and surveillance and occur despite an unprecedented economic 
boom in the U.S., which if anything, demands less restrictions on labour and whose 
overarching neo-liberal economic philosophy emphasises freer trade and integration. 
Counter-narratives, such as those which might recognise terrorism, and to some 
extent migration, as global phenomena increasingly tied to globalisation that are 
problems best solved by co-operative methods and shared information, have been 
marginalised.
What emerges from this is a metanarrative authorising border policy centred 
on technology, regulation, and image; this enables and supports a reflexive 
regulatory border policy increasingly foreclosing possibilities for increased 
integration or liberalised movement. It also reinforces static notions of collective 
identity created against someone (the undocumented worker or refugee) or 
something else (the ambiguous threat of drugs or terrorism)—defined ontologically 
as threats and risks to the state.
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C H A P T E R  S E V E N
C o n c l u s io n
7.0 O v e r v ie w
This thesis took as its main premise that a transdisciplinary study and 
problematisation of borders could begin to unlock some of the many dimensions of 
contemporary political territoriality and collective identity. Because borders are a 
significant ‘metapattem’ that formulate limits, definition, and difference throughout 
the personal, social, and political worlds, they are both excellent metaphors and 
subjects for exploration. In the form of interstate boundaries, they are crucial 
politically, making international relations as we understand it possible by 
circumscribing and producing unique, bounded communities in interaction.
But moreover, borders—and the social and political practices that help 
construct them—have an important role in national identity consolidation. A state’s 
policy for its borders—and its representations thereof—are thus key prisms for a 
researcher evaluating the nature of political community. Examining how the 
processes of inclusion and exclusion across boundaries work, and who and what it is 
admitted or denied, gives us real insights into both foreign relations and domestic 
politics.
Political territoriality, as a constructed strategy of border control, is 
continuously exercised by states in several ways. As chapter two indicated, practices 
of differentiation are key in this maintenance project; in a sense, they are also 
important to sustaining collective identities and various ‘orders’, such as integration 
or isolationism, world-wide. Borders, of all kinds, seem to require patrolling. 
Clearly, the actual deployment of force or the imposition of physical barriers are 
standard boundary-producing practices, as is the international status given by other 
states and international organisations to borders. But so too are the narrative 
strategies which allow and support these possibilities, even if, as in the U.S. case, 
they only serve to help create images of ‘control’ whilst transnational flows— 
designated epistemologically as ‘chaos’—persist at the same or intensified levels.
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A study like this one, then, that begins to question border practices and 
representations—beyond static legal lines on a world map—can help refocus IR 
theory by isolating some of the complexities of difference and change that seem to 
increasingly characterise the maps of both global and domestic politics. In this vein, 
this conclusion reviews the terrain covered in this thesis and opens new research 
directions, posing potential policy alternatives and trajectories for further study.
This conclusion is divided into three main components. The first recaps the 
theoretical ground examined: the history and changing nature of political 
territoriality as a modem form of control—particularly a notion of reflexive 
territoriality and regulation; globalisation and ‘mobilities’; transdisciplinary thinking 
on borders as limits and forms of difference; the identities/borders/order heuristic 
triad; identity-space relationships; and a preliminary narrative analysis methodology.
The second component reviews the major empirical findings of the study on 
the American borderlands. In a section that compares the two case studies, the 
discussion is extended to draw out the larger order (‘o’) implications for North 
America, synthesised from the i/b/o-directed case study research. This highlights the 
emergent political narratives which are currently helping write space and identity on 
the frontiers of the U.S. In particular, it re-identifies a metanarrative of 
representation associated with American border control policy as a form of reflexive 
political territoriality within an increasingly mobile-oriented ‘order’ of globalisation. 
Wider order implications for other borderlands around the world are also suggested.
The third and final component of the conclusion outlines a number of main 
directions for additional research, partly by pointing out some limitations of the 
thesis. The multidimensional nature of borders and identity present many more 
questions than this study poses or can answer—intriguing challenges for both the 
discipline of IR and policymakers on the ground in these increasingly key regions. 
Keeping true to the generally critical approach in the work here, the emphasis is on 
both alternative policy formulations for U.S. lawmakers facing border issues and 
new ontological and epistemological approaches for IR and social theorists to study 
questions of identity, border, and order constitution.
From a disciplinary perspective, several research strands emerge. The i/b/o 
triad is very young; further theoretical work on some of the salient relationships it 
suggests would likely be useful for a discipline often searching for new ways to 
understand a changing world. The many relationships between territoriality, identity,
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and order—the process of socio-spatialisation for example—which this thesis begins 
to explore need to be more thoroughly unpacked. Narrative analysis is an interesting 
methodology that can be applied to many policy situations in different contexts. The 
new literature on reflexive modernity may be also be useful in approaching 
mobilities and institutional change in states and the international system.
Drawing from the premises here that borders are dynamic, active, constructed 
forms of political territoriality and difference, new thinking in terms of processes and 
relations—viewing borders and other socio-political phenomena not as discrete, 
static entities but rather in a continual process of ‘becoming’ that depends on 
sustaining social connections—may be a promising ontological backing to future 
research. The sketches of such a ‘process relationalism’ understanding of 
international relations are suggested here as a productive, undeveloped theoretical 
component to fuel future exploration of identities, borders, and orders.
Much more empirical attention to global borderlands is also necessary; some 
potential directions for the American case are considered in this section of the 
conclusion. To develop additional understanding of the discursive formulation of the 
borderlands, national identities, and ‘problems’ like undocumented migrants, further 
narrative analysis can be conducted, both on the official level, and also on different 
local texts—such as those presented by undocumented migrants and more generally 
to encompass Mexican and Canadian perspectives. As more and more resources are 
dedicated to their development and deployment, an in-depth look of the 
technological issues surrounding border securitisation and reflexivity would also be 
intriguing.
The last section highlights some options for several policy alternatives to 
address some of the failings of current border policies in the American borderlands 
concerning issues of migration, trade, and terrorism. The conclusion ends with a 
look at some of the many normative, ethical questions surrounding current 
securitisation and exclusionary policies—which manifest themselves too often in 
migrant deaths and border tension—a tact that seems increasingly important in our 
continual quest to figure out both necessary and unnecessary borders.
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7.1 T h e o r e t i c a l  C o n t r i b u t i o n s
The theoretical terrain covered in the thesis comprised at least four strands. 
The first was an investigation of the little-explored concept of political territoriality 
from the pre-modem to the contemporary: constmcted strategies for political control 
and power over space through access and regulation. The historical change from 
loose, ambiguous frontiers to discrete, lineal boundaries went hand-in-hand with the 
rise of modernity and the consolidation of the state system, both epistemologically 
and materially. Concomitant with this process was the linking of some forms of 
collective identity to the state and the rise of dominant forms of cartographic 
mapping.
Empirical changes in the international system, represented in the thesis by the 
idea of transnational ‘mobilities’ of goods, information, capital, and individuals, 
mark a uneven, contradictory process of globalisation that fosters both change and 
continuity for the state. As both metaphor and practice, the intensification and linked 
relations of these mobilities, especially under economic integration regimes, suggest 
challenges for political territoriality; globalisation can thus result in manifestations of 
‘reterritorialisation’ or ‘deterritorialisation’, concepts which capture how states may 
inscribe their boundaries through exclusion or inclusion.
Mobilities present states with various kinds of threats or opportunities; this 
fact, coupled with new high-technology information flows (such as surveillance) can 
propel self-confrontational policy formulation, a trend which indicates increasing 
reflexivity in some advanced information-driven states. The discussion of political 
territoriality thus culminated with the notion of ‘reflexive territoriality’, drawn from 
existing literature on reflexive modernity to capture some dimensions of border 
policy, practices, and representations.
Connecting the concept of reflexive territoriality to border policy formulation 
was accomplished by adapting a schema of knowledge in modernity developed by 
Santos. His understanding of modem social regulation is based on a trajectory of 
knowledge that stretches from points designated as ‘ignorance’ to ‘emancipation’. 
Regulation is seen to lead to a privileged ‘order’ while ‘chaos’ is designated 
epistemologically as ignorance, something to be released from in the future. This 
thinking gives us insight into the implicit backing of much policy formulation—here, 
how territoriality can be reflexively oriented to attempt to achieve the goal of ‘order’
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through boundary regulation in the face of system mobilities (such as undocumented 
migrants) defined as threats or risks.
The second strand of theory developed in the thesis focused on ‘border 
studies’, seeking to find transdisciplinary contexts for problematising borders in this 
international environment. Traditional studies of borders in IR and other disciplines 
like Political Geography unfortunately tend to be chiefly non-theoretical and 
descriptive or positivist, centred on disputes over these Tines’ on political maps and 
largely operating from realist assumptions. New, more critical work, however, is 
directed toward the socio-political construction of boundaries, both political and 
social, and the manifestations of difference, power, and culture they represent. These 
contributions, when drawn into an IR study like this one, question the practices and 
representations involved with ‘writing’ these political demarcations and connecting 
territory with socio-political order.
Finding tools within this wide intellectual framework to probe borders and 
border discourses in this way constitutes the third theoretical contribution of the 
thesis. While much of its theoretical development is underway elsewhere, the thesis 
contributes to the evolution of an open, heuristic, orienting tool called the 
‘identities/borders/orders’ (i/b/o) triad. The main supposition behind the triad is that 
these three ‘key’ concepts are interrelated, and moreover co-constitutive. And as 
both discrete concepts as well as interconnected processes, the triad and its 
component parts describe interesting and problematic phenomena in the social and 
political worlds. As a pre-theory instrument, it offers conceptual guidance and focus 
to researchers seeking to investigate implications of, for example, globalisation (as 
an ‘order’ issue) on border or identity change.
The fourth and final theoretical component of the thesis suggests a particular 
methodology—narrative analysis—to help drive selected empirical work navigated 
by the i/b/o triad. Narrative analysis, as a form of discourse study, seeks to unlock 
the dynamics of some of the major ‘scripts’ and ‘texts’ of international relations. 
Operating from a constitutive theory of language, it uncovers some of the ways in 
which language and symbolism, like metaphors, structure political positions and 
possibilities through ‘metanarratives’ within policy debate and formulation. As 
applied here, the methodology works on the ‘i-b’ leg of the i/b/o triad to reveal 
particular territorial-identity relationships (the socio-spatialisation of national
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identity) in the discourse on U.S. border policy before connecting back to larger 
order questions.
7.2 Em pirical  Fin d in g s
Emergent Metanarratives of the American Borderlands
Operation Hold the Line, as the vanguard border securitisation initiative, 
became the model for U.S. policy as a whole in the 1990s. It was turning point in 
how the border was reconstructed in the wake of the Cold War: as a ‘problem’ 
conduit for a variety of defined ‘threats’ to the United States—terrorists, narcotics, 
undocumented economic migrants, and, more generally social instability and 
poverty. Helping to define the discursive parameters for action, the legislative 
blueprint for the policy can be traced to several important texts in Washington, but 
the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IDRJRA) 
is the landmark authorisation for border securitisation, earmarking hundreds of 
millions of dollars for Border Patrol agents, security systems, and fortifications. In 
conjunction with official policy documents, public statements from officials, and 
symbolism, these texts helped weave a dominant metanarrative of representation and 
control.
The empirical research of this thesis, guided by the theoretical context and 
tools reviewed above, undertook an extensive study of contemporary U.S. border 
policy and its supportive narratives. The findings can be grouped into three areas: 
the nature of interaction and community in the American borderlands; the 
material/technological aspects of securitisation policy; and the impact 
reterritorialisation has on national identity—all revealed in the thesis through an 
analysis of both local and state narratives.
While the interstate boundaries of the U.S. were violently forged in the 
epistemic and material fashion of modem political territoriality—as static, linear 
demarcations—cross-border communities have since developed because of long 
historical patterns of international interaction; the cases under study here may be 
classed as interdependent (U.S.-Mexico) or integrated (U.S.-Canada). Unique 
patterns of exchange, especially on the northern frontier, have meant the political 
boundary often bisects communities and even families. Because the U.S.-Mexico
239
border separates a developed from a developing state, it in particular presents a 
unique set of issues and challenges, from demographics to environmental 
degradation to economic development.
Extensive economic integration under NAFTA, and larger globalisation 
pressures which manifest themselves culturally and socially, have only accelerated 
change in the borderlands and present a number of major policy problems. High 
labour demands in the U.S for inexpensive workers in the agribusiness and service 
sectors of the economy, for example, pull individuals across both the northern and 
southern boundaries. Transnational economic pressures and liberalisation seek to 
link production and trade capacities, and information technology connects 
individuals and businesses to new degrees. Border factories (maquiladores) are 
increasingly utilised by multinational firms because of cheap labour conditions; such 
industrialisation, however, has also meant massive population growth and pollution. 
The relatively open nature of both borders provides opportunities—even with 
retenitorialisation—for determined crossers and narcotics to cross illicitly and meet 
American demands. Indeed, the need to counter these ‘risks’ territorially is 
reflexive: the ‘hazards’ to be combated (in this case of undocumented workers) are 
the product of industrialisation (the need for inexpensive labour in the U.S.) itself.
In the face of several of these cross-border mobilities, particularly narcotics 
and migrants, the U.S. began a high-profile, high-intensity campaign in the 1990s to 
‘seal’—or at least project the image it had sealed—its international boundaries. The 
history and process of this policy development are extensively profiled in the case 
studies. Costing billions of dollars, much of the regulation manifests itself through 
high technology and militarisation. Relying on a narrative that places faith in the 
power of technology to reflexively guide and regulate border control, policymakers 
borrowed knowledges from the military and directly applied armed forces and 
equipment to bring America’s borders under ‘control’. In the case of the Canadian 
border especially, Congress included Section 110 in the IIRIRA to deploy a tracking 
system that attempts to record entry and exit records for every individual crossing the 
border—an impractical and expensive initiative that, if implemented, threatens to 
effectively close the border; it is representative of the dominant parameters of the 
policy discourse. Technology thus helps fuel the state’s ability to reflexively 
organise its regulatory efforts.
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These narrative dynamics, expressed in both public discourse and political 
symbolism, combined with these material developments, have served to reconstruct 
America’s northern and southern borders through retenitorialisation. They also help 
consolidate notions of national collective identity. By invoking elements of national 
myth, by drawing firm symbolic, material, and rhetorical boundaries between ‘us’ 
and the alien ‘other’, and by relegating and presenting the ‘problems’ of disorder, 
poverty, and terrorism to the border, the case studies demonstrated the effect 
securitisation policies—and more importantly their political representation—have on 
American identity. In the case of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands and the narratives of 
Operation Hold the Line, the study’s analysis of interviews with and statements of 
residents and policymakers suggest the real impact retenitorialisation plays on socio- 
spatialisation. In the northern borderlands, a narrative analysis of official policy 
documents and statements uncovers the way that threats (e.g., of terrorism) are 
constructed and identity tales scripted, partly through the attempt to securitise by 
imposing strict control and exit along the border.
The thesis thus found the politics of representation involved in the political 
presentation of an image of border ‘security’ has implications for the socio- 
spatialisation of identity in borderland situations, specifically the reinforcement of 
difference and a ‘secure’ American nationalism narrative forged against transnational 
pressures. This dominant representation, the specific case studies argue, is based on 
modernity’s ‘knowledge-as-regulation’ form which furthers the trajectory of 
regulation between ignorance, designated as ‘chaos’ (inclusive flows of individuals, 
heterogeneity of identity and culture), and ‘knowledge’, understood as ‘order’ 
(exclusionary securitisation, homogeneous, stable identity and territoriality), which 
is sought by the new border policies.
In the American borderlands case, in fact, the narratives and images actually 
construct an ‘order’ made more from the image of ‘control’ rather than actually 
addressing some of the important policy questions, such as undocumented migration, 
it supposedly set out to do. Importantly, this must be seen as a continual, but not 
inevitable, process of constructing a dominant policy metanarrative. As a result, 
dual regimes now characterise the borderlands concerning labour and trade.
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Comparing the Two Case Studies: Examining the North American Order
The i/b/o triad assists us in making some comparative evaluations of both the 
southern and northern borderlands and then drawing out suggestive implications for 
a developing North American political structure. Because borders can be 
instruments of control that shape a particular order and identity (and vice-versa), 
policy in this area has an extremely important role. The i/b/o-directed study revealed 
patterns suggestive of U.S. national identity consolidation through state border 
practices and representations, despite intensified transnational mobilities emerging 
within North American under NAFTA. The policy narratives and linked practices 
examined help create dual regulatory regimes of exclusion of undesired ‘threats’ like 
undocumented labour and inclusion of desired flows, such as capital and production.
This policy is increasingly constructed and implemented reflexively but 
ostensibly is directed to maintain equal treatment of both the northern and southern 
borderlands. This official policy line under NAFTA dictates equality and parallel 
treatment of both neighbouring states.1 For instance, NAFTA-inspired constraints on 
policy-making made application of Section 110 to only Mexico infeasible, despite 
language in Congress seeking to do so anyway because ‘of a closer relationship with 
Canadians’.2
Unequal treatment, however, plays out in practice along each boundary: at 
the end of September 1999, about 1,200 U.S. customs agents and about 300 border- 
patrol agents were stationed along the U.S.-Canada border. The U.S.-Mexican 
border, while about half the length, had about 2,000 customs agents and 7,400 
border-patrol agents, wearing bulletproof vests and carrying sidearms. While this 
has been the historical pattern, recent developments point to an increasing 
convergence of northern and southern border policy. This is particularly evident in 
Section 110 and other provisions of the 1996 IIRIRA act, and even with more recent 
developments on the border which include renewed calls to securitise the northern 
borderlands. Some lawmakers have in fact claimed security at the Canada border is 
‘woefully inadequate’ and should be modelled on the U.S.- Mexico border.3 U.S.
1 See Theodore H. Cohn, ‘Cross Border Travel in North America: The Challenge of U.S. Section 110 
Legislation’, Canadian-American Public Policy 40 (1999): 4.
2 Lisa Kesler, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 11 November 1998.
3 Hilary Mackenzie, ‘Border Crackdown Denounced’, The Gazette (Montreal) (27 January 2000) 
[http://www.montrealgazette.com] (27 January 2000).
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Department of Justice internal reports now advise revising the INS’s ‘Strategic 
Border Plan’ to include more emphasis on the northern frontier: ‘securing the 
northern border requires...knowledge and insights of individuals experienced in 
securing the northern border, as well as lessons the Border Patrol has learned while 
implementing the strategic plan on the southwest border’.4
The dynamics of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands were once called by Tito 
Alegria ‘the adjacency of difference’ where interaction and identity are both 
accentuated and modified, particularly by the asymmetric nature of the border. If 
this is so, the adjacency of relative ‘sameness’ in the U.S.-Canadian case would 
seemingly present less interesting relationships.5 The U.S.-Canadian situation is 
however intriguing as a counterpoint to the U.S.-Mexico study not only because it is 
was once the longest undefended frontier in the world, but also because of the subtle 
and complex identity relationships between Canadians and Americans.
To some degree, this is in relief when compared to the U.S.-Mexico 
borderlands where somewhat different patterns of identity and exclusion are 
practised and represented through narratives which emphasise the nationalist stories 
of America, such as the ‘American Dream’, and promote difference against an other 
in the ‘brown’ Mexican who drains social services. But as the thesis’ textual 
analysis illustrates, like in the southern case, recent political developments and 
enabling narratives also serve to help construct ‘threats’ ‘from the north’ as well, i.e., 
terrorism and refugees, to consolidate the national political idea and territoriality of 
the United States. Accordingly, political space and difference is ‘written’ there too 
in a similar fashion, helping to project a normative order which ‘protects’ the 
imagined and intersubjective sovereign status of America against Canada, called by 
one lawmaker a ‘chaotic’ ‘Club Med for terrorists’.6
Ultimately, the overall, dominant metanarrative directs the problem and risk 
to both boundaries and the ‘sending’ states, be it Mexico with its migrants or Canada 
with its perceived lax refugee or terrorism policy. That political strategy formulates
4 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Border Patrol Efforts Along the 
Northern Border, Report No. 1-2000-04 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000) 
[http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/i200004/i200004.htm] (9 May 2001).
5 Tito Alegria, ‘La ciudad y los procesos transfronterizos entre Mexico y Estados Unidos’, Frontera 
Norte Sur 1, no. 2 (1989) [www.nmsu.edu/~frontera/] (13 January 1999).
6 Statement of Chairman Lamar Smith, United States House Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Hearing on ‘Terrorist Threats to the United States’, 106th 
Cong., 2d sess. 25 January 2000 [http://www.house.gov/judiciary/smit0125.htm] (27 January 2000).
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the possibilities for greater border securitisation on both the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.- 
Canada boundaries. The continuance of this tend seems inevitable, as reflexive 
territoriality operates by furthering the attempt to seal both frontiers from incursions 
by undocumented economic migrants or terrorists, increasingly through surveillance 
and ‘terrain denial’ technologies from the Pentagon and CIA. The pattern of 
allocating massive resources to ‘border control’—in both cases—is set to continue 
into the foreseeable future; the new Bush administration has signalled its willingness 
to do so. The representations of these policies also play well among many American 
voters; numerous public interest groups and research centres in Washington continue 
to produce panicky studies that assist in constructing these ‘threats’.
Who this serves seems clear: NAFTA has been an economic boom to large 
multinational firms able to appropriate low-wage labour (for example by shifting 
operations to Mexican maquila plants or using undocumented workers in domestic 
production) and those companies able to take advantage of massive trade 
liberalisation. Moreover, with the current high-level movement on an expanded 
trade agreement for the entire western hemisphere by the mid-2000s, it seems clear 
that U.S.-led policy seeks increased openness for international trade and economic 
development, largely in favour of transnational economic actors.
All of this points to the development of a somewhat contradictory dual order 
emerging in North America that has very real co-constitutive impacts on borders and 
identity. Boundaries are opened to facilitate expanded opportunities for 
transnationally-geared economic integration—encouraged by larger patterns of 
globalisation—while the state attempts to shut them to the flip side of such 
integration: ‘undesirable’ (yet demanded) mobilities such as the economic migrant so 
necessary for large sectors of the U.S. economy or illicit narcotics. Amidst greater 
trade liberalisation, securitisation policies try to dampen borderlands interaction, 
despite long-standing traditions of community and histories of migration that are 
developing an increasingly heterogeneous U.S. population with many foreign links 
and diverse cultural or social interests. This focus also accentuates the danger of 
further economic exploitation, degradation of environmental conditions, and growth 
in poverty, especially in the southern borderlands.
The question remains, however, is this new order sustainable? Some political 
economy scholars, for example, suggest that as the volume of trade, shipping, and 
travel burgeon with expanded economic agreements, state attempts to ‘seal’ U.S.
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borders from these undesired mobilities will grow increasingly futile. This is an 
issue taken up below in the discussion on policy alternatives.
7.3 Fu t u r e  R esearch  D ir e c t io n s: Th e o r y
Border Studies
The area of ‘border studies’ seems the appropriate place to ground future 
explorations of boundaries and identities, especially given its emphasis on thinking 
about these issues in fluid, unique ways. New work in the literature, in fact, is 
aggressively seeking insights into possible transformations, for example, in how we 
conceptualise multiple or hybrid identities, such as those held by diasporic 
communities, dual citizens, indigenous peoples, and even some borderlanders.7 
Research also seems necessary to determine the way in which information 
technology and other facets of globalisation affect communities across boundaries, 
such as fostering political participation back at home while abroad as a refugee or 
migrant (as the Mexican government is attempting to affect).
Most importantly, this area of study encourages the problematisation and 
continuous questioning of the many kinds of ‘borders’ society constructs, from the 
homogeneous and hegemonic to the ethical and inclusive. Nonetheless, as Minha-ha 
reminds us in an important warning: we cannot ‘run the risk’ of using the term 
‘border’ in a way which would ‘reduce it to yet another harmless catchword 
expropriated and popularized among progressive thinkers’.8 Furthermore, flexibility 
is the key which allows us to recognise the need and possibilities for boundaries 
while also avoiding intellectual closure by seeing them as permanent or thinking 
only in static or fixed terms.9
7 For an example of new work on identities and borderlands in Europe, see Vilho Harle, ‘Identity 
Politics on Borderlands’, paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies 
Association, Washington, D.C., February 1999.
g
Trinh Minha-ha, ‘An Acoustic Journey’, in Rethinking Borders, ed. John C. Welchman 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 2.
Mathias Albert, ‘Security as Boundary Function’, paper presented at the Annual Conference of the 
International Studies Association, Toronto, March 1997, 2
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The Identities/Borders/Orders Triad
The i/b/o project is an unfinished initiative, open to further exploration, 
maturation, and refinement. Its very construction is seen as an open-ended 
development process and different scholars are undertaking eclectic i/b/o-oriented 
work.10 Both its constituent elements—and their co-constitutive relationships— 
promise to provide researchers with many open puzzles and questions to ponder. All 
three concepts will be of lasting importance in discussions about international 
relations for the foreseeable future and much work remains to be done to thoroughly 
explore each of them. And, as indicated in the thesis, the relationships, for example, 
between borders and identity, or discourse and order, remain relatively 
underdeveloped theoretical undertakings. In particular, work on socio-spatial 
consciousness may help unlock the many symbolic, ideological, and material 
representations of boundaries.11
As a triad itself, the tool also implicates the question of metaphors and 
additional work in this regard seems a clear and necessary direction for a critical, 
interpretive research agenda concerned with political symbolism and 
representation.12 Although relatively understudied in IR, metaphor is often important 
in thinking about international politics; many theories, such as realism and 
liberalism, rely on metaphors to conceptualise and assemble systems and order (such 
as anarchy or the market).13 While they may be crucial in denoting and constructing 
borders, threats, orders and identities—as suggested in the thesis—this function is 
extremely complex; it can highlight certain political possibilities and obscure others. 
A deeper examination of how borders, identities, and orders are metaphoric—and 
why this is important—would formulate an excellent study.14
10 See the diversity of work in Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory, 
eds. Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2001).
11 Anssi Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies o f the
Finish-Russian Border (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1996), 63.
12 On the importance of metaphor in formulating and understanding reality, see Sheldon Sacks, ed., 
On Metaphor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 
Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
13 See Paul Chilton, Security Metaphors (New York: Peter Lang, 1996) and Murray Edelman, Politics 
as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971).
14 See Norman Denzin, The Research Act (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). As Denzin suggests, ‘the 
metaphor is chiefly a tool for revealing special properties of an object or event’. Idem, 46.
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Beyond the avenues of exploration inherent in the triad itself, in just its basic 
form it already offers the potential to structure and guide many future research 
undertakings. One promising i/b/o-oriented approach for future study, for example, 
involves the further development of the relationship between identity and security. 
Migration is a particularly salient example of a phenomena that is increasingly being 
‘securitised’ and defined as a threat, particularly after the end of the Cold War. This 
move is being drawn out of initial work by the Copenhagen school that widened our 
understanding of security beyond its traditional use in IR denoting force, weaponry, 
and armed conflict. Some scholars now understand security as a speech act, a 
construction of threat that involves a referent object, an inside via an outside, which 
is prior to or reconstructed in the process of securitisation.15 From this, some have 
suggested other ways of thinking of security, such as economic or social. Future 
i/b/o analyses might deal with the link between identity and security, widely defined, 
and explore how this helps and structure political communities. They might ask the 
question, for whom is security? Even relying on more traditional notions of security, 
the i/b/o triad might orient research directed at ethnic conflict, especially over 
questions of boundaries and identity.
As alluded to in the thesis, the globalisation debate seems another apt area for 
further i/b/o engagement. Because globalisation is implicated in many contemporary 
order issues, a variety of interesting research questions emerge. What happens, for 
example, to identity or diversity in the face of the homogeneity created by 
globalisation? What do the local, regional, or transnational experiences of 
globalisation mean for individuals or international actors? Many other potential 
questions could emerge from this productive framework.
Process Relationalism
To take the discussions opened in the thesis to a deeper, more metatheoretical 
level, future research might also consider developing process relationalism (p/r) as 
an interesting and potentially useful ontological basis for IR. Process relationalism, 
informed by a philosophical approach pioneered by Heraclitus and carried forth by 
Dewey, Whitehead, and Sheldon, is now being slowly developed and incorporated
15 See, for example, Ole Waever et al, Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe 
(London: Pinter, 1993),
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into IR, but requires substantial work.16 The process relationalism approach carries 
promise to help move IR debates beyond substantialism, which takes entities as 
primitives, and relationalism, which takes processes of social transaction as the basic 
building blocks of theory. This may also serve as a productive critique of 
constructivism, the so-called new ‘middle ground’ of the discipline.
P/r adopts a framework of analysis that focuses on the continuous 
‘configurations of ties—recurrent socio-cultural interaction—between social 
aggregates as the basis building blocks of social analysis’.17 This differs quite 
markedly from the dominant thinking in the social sciences of substantialism, which 
holds that ‘things’ or ‘entities’ are ontologically primary and fundamental, e.g., 
existing before processes and relations—which, in the end, are only conceived as 
occurring between entities. This divide, as Mustafa Emirbayer asserts, is no less 
than the current ‘fundamental dilemma’ in sociology: ‘whether to conceive of the 
world as consisting primarily in substances or in processes, in static “things” or in 
dynamic, unfolding relations’.18
The outlines of a similar problematic in IR appear to be emerging. Yosef 
Lapid, for example, has issued the call for a relational, ‘mobile’ approach to 
International Relations theory, which, among other things, would seek to understand 
how the ‘political’, the ‘inter’, and the ‘national’ are constituted.19 ‘Mobilities’ or 
forms of processes, he suggests, are a useful way of understanding change in the 
international system. The identities/borders/orders project is one such application in 
this direction. However, the integration of process philosophy with International 
Relations a relatively new enterprise. IR traditionally understands ‘process’ to mean 
or reduce to ‘process-tracing’ but process philosophy is an ontological approach that 
allows the incorporation of post-structural insights beyond simple interpretations of 
‘texts’.
16 Some of the pioneering work on process relationalism includes Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and 
Daniel H. Nexon, ‘Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics’, 
European Journal o f International Relations 5, no. 3 (1999): 291-332; Mustafa Emirbayer, 
‘Manifesto for a Relational Sociology’, American Journal o f Sociology 103, no. 2 (1997): 281-317; 
and Yosef Lapid, ‘On the Move: New Philosophical and Conceptual Resources for an Age of 
Transition’, paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Los 
Angeles, February 2000.
Charles Tilly, International Communities, Secure or Otherwise (New York: Center for the Social 
Sciences at Columbia University Pre-Print Series, 1996), 2.
18 Emirbayer, ‘Manifesto’, 287.
19 See Lapid, ‘On the Move’.
248
One foci for advancing a possible framework within a p/r approach is the 
concept of ‘trans-action*. Trans-action, in brief, is a specific understanding of 
process which sees the socio-political world as a series of relational transactions 
between non-detachable ‘entities’ (states, for example) which themselves are bundles 
of processes; the relation between them is the focus, not the entities themselves. 
Trans-action thus occurs ‘where systems of description and naming are employed to 
deal with aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to “elements” or 
other presumptively detachable or independent “entities”, “essences” or “realities”, 
and without isolation of presumptively detachable “relations” from such detachable 
“elements”’.20 This approach means that the units or entities in the transaction 
‘derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the (changing) functional roles 
they play within that transaction.. .which becomes the primary unit of analysis rather 
than the constituent elements themselves’.21
In this way, a trans-action understanding is similar, although in some ways 
significantly different, than structuration theory, as elaborated by Giddens as well as 
by some constructivist critics. Although the concept of trans-action was first 
articulated in the early twentieth century by John Dewey and Arthur Bentley, 
prominent process philosophers, any application for political analysis has not been 
undertaken, and so it might be usefully developed.22
Process relationalism’s emphasis on ‘becoming’, rather than traditional 
substance philosophy’s reliance on categories of static, ‘thing-oriented’ being, may 
be particularly appropriate for a view of borders, territoriality, and identity as 
processes of becoming, situated in larger, interconnected manifolds of process of the 
international system. Seeing these only as static ‘things’ can mask the conditions 
which make them possible and sustain them—as well as imply their inevitability. 
Finally, implicit in process metaphysics is the concept of change and transformation, 
which may possibly be made available for critical theory applications.
20 John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), 108.
21 Emirbayer, ‘Manifesto’, 287.
22 Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, 108.
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7.4 Fu t u r e  R esea rc h  D ir e c t io n s: Em pirical  Issues
The prospects for future empirical research on borderlands, both those 
detailed here and others globally, seem bright. Border situations in North America 
provide excellent research scenarios because of the multiple characteristics and 
variables both the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican cases present: a junction 
between an advanced state and a superpower, and one between that superpower with 
a developing state. Underlying these particular dynamics are the overall forces of 
economic and social integration between all three states under NAFTA. These 
factors make research here extremely productive for scholars from a variety of fields 
looking at issues as varied as health, the environment, demographics, and trade as 
well as for more traditional political studies.
In terms of additional work on the American borderlands case studies in this 
thesis, the analysis could be easily supplemented by further investigation of the 
narrative patterns occurring on the other side of each boundary: in the Mexican and 
Canadian discourses. Such a move would enrich the overall project by injecting 
views of those also highly affected by current American reterritorialising policies, 
and thus present a less U.S.-centric analysis. That sort of project would require large 
resources to accomplish but might prove highly interesting if the structure of the 
current study is expanded upon to uncover Mexican and Canadian metanarratives.
Comparative borderland analysis also has the potential to further expand our 
understandings of borders on a global scale, and in the process, highlight unique 
aspects of the North American cases. Such analyses are particularly relevant given 
the many questions of migration management and economic development, among 
other issues, facing all states. For example, the Russian-Kazakhstan border, as a 
membrane between the Western and Oriental civilisations and as a conduit for flows 
similar to those in the U.S.-Mexico case, would be a prime candidate for 
comparative exploration; similarly the Russian-Ukrainian border has parallels to the 
U.S.-Canadian boundary.
Some promising comparative work on borders and borderlands in Europe too 
is underway; of particular interest are those studies emphasising securitisation, 
especially between economically asymmetric states or between those in the EU and
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those that are not, such as Germany and Poland and Spain and Morocco.23 In many 
cases, scholars like Bigo argue that the EU has shifted its policing and securitisation 
priorities under the Schengen agreement to reinforce the external boundaries of the 
community, particularly to refugees and migrants.24
Many useful and similar avenues for i/b/o-directed research in this regard are 
available; a researcher could, as just one example, compare pressures of economic 
integration and globalisation in the EU and NAFTA cases and the corresponding 
demands on migrant labour in states. An analysis of the new means for reflexively 
organising border practices in advanced states would also be fruitful, as would very 
different work on borderlands in conflict situations or those in the developing world.
7.5 C ritical  a n d  N orm ative  P olicy  A lternatives
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of national debate in the U.S. on its 
borderlands and policies on immigration, poverty, and trade. Worse, few policy 
alternatives or counter-narratives circulate, limiting opportunities for more 
progressive solutions to the problems these regions face; the dominant metanarrative 
has, in fact, often prevented serious consideration of critical alternatives in 
Washington.
In order to develop other options, it seems important to first recognise a new 
mobile-oriented environment of globalisation and economic integration under 
NAFTA where diversity and interdependence need to be the hallmarks for future 
policy orientation. Finding balanced policy approaches that belie the current, ill- 
conceived and highly representational U.S. border ‘strategies’ is the next step. Re­
orienting the policy debate requires breaking the reliance on the dominant 
metanarrative that relegates problems only to the borderlands and leaves an incorrect 
impression of control and order.
23 See the excellent collection, The Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in 
North America and Europe, eds. Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2000).
24 See Didier Bigo, Border Regimes and Security in an Enlarged European Community Police Co­
operation with CEEC’s (Domenico di Fiesole, Italy: European University Institute, Robert Schuman 
Centre, 2000) and ‘Security, Borders, and the State’, in Borders and Border Regions in Europe and 
North America, eds. Paul Ganster, Alan Sweedler, James Scott (San Diego: Institute for Regional 
Studies of the Califomias, 1997). See also Malcom Anderson et al, Policing the European Union 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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In the case of the attempt to harden U.S. borders, especially the northern 
frontier, to terrorists and refugee crossings—such as Section 110 attempts to do— 
policymakers must first endorse the sensitive, highly integrated nature of the 
northern frontier and the long-standing patterns of cross-border interaction, including 
highly-prized trade flows—up to $1 billion per day. Instead of some of the myopic 
policies detailed in chapter six, the goal of screening terrorist activity and refugee 
movements might be better be served by co-operative, binational ‘perimeter’ 
measures or mutual intelligence sharing strategies. These are efforts that do not 
further securitise and project violence on boundaries that separate vibrant, inter­
linked communities. Further reterritorialisation of this border takes the bilateral 
relationship backward and threatens delicate international alliances.
In the case of undocumented migration, particularly from Mexico, problem 
solving also first involves understanding the unique, interdependent nature of the 
southern borderlands and then noting some of the failures of unilateral 
reterritorialisation policies by the U.S. As chapter five illustrated, these initiatives 
have proven largely unable to achieve the intended outcomes of reducing 
undocumented migration, instead they have fuelled the growth of international crime 
networks who smuggle migrants or push crossings to desolate and dangerous areas. 
Additionally, current policy frameworks fail to consider the transformational impact 
mobilities and agreements like NAFTA have on the state’s ability to regulate 
flows—especially over economic concerns such as labour.25 For example, fewer 
than one in 20 cars coming into the U.S. is inspected, borderland courts are 
overwhelmed by drug and deportation cases, and only one per cent of the 1.6 million 
undocumented migrants detained each year are prosecuted.26 Demand for illegal 
narcotics too remains high in the U.S., and NAFTA has eased the ability to smuggle 
drugs throughout North America.27 Inevitably, both the northern and southern
25 Under NAFTA, for example, unaccountable bodies of individual experts (often representatives of 
transnational economic interests) make economic decisions. See Saskia Sassen, ‘Transnational 
Economies and National Migration Policies’, in Free Markets, Open Societies, Closed Borders? 
Trends in International Migration and Immigration Policy in the Americas, ed. Max J. Castro 
(Miami: North-South Center Press-University of Miami, 1999).
26 See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Policy and Planning, Fiscal Year 
2001Monthly Statistical Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department o f Justice, 2001) 
[http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/msijan01-2/index.htm] (1 May 2001).
27 Much of the drugs are carried in some of the tens of thousands of trucks that cross the border each 
day, a procedure eased by NAFTA. See Kris Axtman, ‘Rising Border Traffic, More Drugs’,
Christian Science Monitor (8 May 2001) [http://www.csmonitor.eom/durable/2001/05/08/fpl0s2- 
csm.shtml] (10 May 2001).
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borderlands will remain open to determined migrants, terrorists, and narcotics.28 In 
response to this post-Cold war uncertainty, the attempt to continue to contain these 
issues within a security framework seems likely.
The wider dimensions of securitisation indeed flag major contradictions in 
U.S. policy, especially towards migration. To explore them entails making a 
counter-narrative move: acknowledging the valuable, long-standing role migrants 
have played in economic development and their status as non-‘alien’ individuals. 
Increasingly coveted by businesses as well as private citizens, the over six million 
undocumented workers in the U.S. perform the vast majority of jobs in the service 
and agricultural sectors at wages most Americans refuse to accept, and usually do so 
without benefits and under fear of detection. Were they not present, the U.S. 
economy would breakdown because of a severe labour shortage.29 As even some 
Republican lawmakers like Senator Pete Domenici now quietly assert, ‘We are 
encouraging a hypocrisy.. .At the border we arrest, but once they get here everyone 
opens their arms and says we’ve got a job for you’.30
Some progress on migration reform is being made. Spurred by the election 
of President Vicente Fox in Mexico, some policy alternatives were recently advanced 
through a positive counter-narrative intervention by a high-level working binational 
working group at the Carnegie Institute that included policy elites from both Mexico 
and the U.S.31 Recognising increased economic integration and the contradictory 
dual regime regulating different kinds mobilities, the group seeks to openly 
acknowledge and incorporate labour into wider discussions about the border. Their 
recommendations include expanding worker visas; co-operatively reducing 
transnational smuggling activity; jointly improving the border region and preventing 
dangerous crossings; and boosting the Mexican economy to limit migration
28 An internal U.S. Department of Justice study conducted in 2000 found that the northern border in 
particular was ‘wide open to criminal activity’ and would-be crossers. See Office of the Inspector 
General, Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border.
29 Interestingly, on the opposite end of the wage-spectrum, in 2000 Congress doubled the quota for 
high-skilled immigrants—mainly in the information technology sector—to 195,000.
30 Senator Pete Domenici, quoted in Eric Schmitt, ‘Americans (a)Love (b)Hate Immigrants’, The New 
York Times (14 January 2001) [http://www.nytimes.com] (14 January 2001).
31 .The U.S.-Mexico Migration Panel, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Instituto 
Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, Mexico-U.S. Migration: A Shared Responsibility (Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001) [http://www.ceip.org/files/ 
/Publications/SumofRec.asp?p=6&from=pubdate] (14 February 2001).
253
incentives.32 Other interest groups, including large business and labour organisations 
are also now calling for immigration reform, and in some cases, regularisation or 
legalisation of migrants.33
These developments follow an encouraging, if little noticed, recent set of 
studies on immigration. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that by 2008 
the United States will have over five million more jobs than people to fill them, and 
that very large proportions of the newly created jobs will require only high school 
level education and modest training.34 Even if this proves to be an optimistic 
prediction, historical evidence suggests the need for low-wage migrant labour would 
still persist. Moreover, if the Mexican economy continues to experience sustained 
growth (7 per cent in 2000), and if reform and investments in social sector occurs, 
migration pressures are expected to recede gradually over the next 15 to 20 years. In 
addition, with fertility rates now falling below replacement level in Mexico35, it is 
unlikely that high levels of migration will continue, minimising any long-term 
impact on the U.S.36 The rate of increase in the proportion of immigrants in 
California, one the heaviest immigrant states, for example rose only 12 per cent 
during the 1990s and will increase by only 8 per cent during the next 20 years; 
furthermore, the poverty rate among foreign-born fell from 19.8 per cent in 1990 to 
18.2 per cent in 2000 and is predicted to fall to 16.9 per cent by 2010, according to a 
University of Southern California study.37 The larger inter-state relationships these 
studies allude to justify special multilateral agreements; interdependence, in fact, 
could be seen within the context of globalisation as a means to strengthen global 
competitiveness.
In addition to Mexican and borderland economic development, the wider and 
easier availability of temporary legal work visas may be the best pragmatic
32 Ibid.
33 Major labour organisations such as the AFL-CIO now support amnesty for undocumented migrants 
and seek their organisation in unions.
34 Douglas Braddock, Employment Outlook: 1998-2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2000) [http://stats.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1999/ll/art5full.pdf] (9 May 2001).
35 According to conservative United Nations estimates, the 2000-2005 Mexican rate is 2.49 children 
per woman, and the low variant, which may be closer to the actual rate, is 2.27, slated to shrink still 
further to 2.02 in 2005-2010, below the replacement level. See United Nations, UN Population and 
Vital Statistics Report: July 2000 (Washington, D.C. United Nations Press, 2000).
36 Ben Wattenberg, ‘Melt, Melting, Melted’, American Enterprise Institute Article (15 March 2001) 
[http://www.aei.org/ra/rawatt010315.htm] (15 March 2001).
37 University of Southern California, Population Research Laboratory, Demographic Futures for  
California [http://www.usc.edu/org/pop/] (23 January 2001).
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alternative to current reterritorialisation policies: a well-conceived programme can 
create incentives for migrants to enter the U.S. labour market legally, instead of 
attempting hazardous border crossings or paying smugglers.38 Temporary work 
visas, with possible options for the future regularisation of immigration status, could 
be granted through a well-regulated guest-worker programme aimed at farm 
labourers and the hospitality, service, and informal labour sectors, but must be 
humane, ensuring proper social support, such as housing. This should help the 
United States advance one of its major foreign policy objectives—reducing 
unauthorised migration—while also meeting labour needs and recognising an 
increasingly integrated and heterogeneous state. Migrants would also earn higher 
wages in a more secure environment and would pay taxes to support an ageing U.S. 
population. Legislation to establish such a program is now under consideration by 
Congress.39
Counter-narratives that inject critical alternatives to reterritorialisation 
policies, like the visa proposals, begin the process of change. The open border 
proposals by the new Mexican President Fox—and the co-operative interest in his 
administration from many U.S. officials, including President Bush—also suggest 
hope. As Fox maintains, ‘in my vision, there is no place for steel barriers or 
barricades that have been built to divide us’; he has envisioned open borders in five 
to 10 years.40 While not a practical idea now or even in this time frame, Fox’s 
concept—and now also some positive gestures by the U.S. government—are 
themselves kinds of openings.41
Furthermore, dealing with the contradictions of a dual regime policy on 
mobilities by adjusting perspectives more positively requires addressing the
38 A temporary visa programme now exists (the H2A visa scheme) but is under-utilised because of 
low limits and cumbersome paperwork and bureaucratic procedures. See Ruth Ellen Wasem and 
Geoffrey K. Collver, ‘Immigration of Agricultural Guest Workers: Policy, Trends, and Legislative 
Issues’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service (15 February) [http://www.cnie.org/nle/ag-102.html] (10 May 2001).
39 Some bills under consideration in the 106th and 107th U.S. Congress to establish the framework for 
such a program include the Agricultural Opportunities Act (H.R. 4548) and the Agricultural Job 
Opportunities Benefits and Security Act of 2000 (H.R. 4056). The political future of these bills is 
uncertain; these initiatives, however, have limited but increasing support in Congress and retain some 
flaws, like highly limited access to permanent status for labourers.
Vicente Fox, quoted in Minerva Canto, ‘Fox Argues Open Borders Would Serve U.S., Canada’,
The Orange County Register (29 November 2000) [http://www.ocregister.com/] (30 November 
2000).
41 The new Bush administration has shown surprising willingness to engage with Mexico in 
rethinking the bilateral relationship to a certain degree.
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normative implications of migration (some of which are suggested below) and 
acknowledging the role migrants play both economically and socially, adding up to 
$10 billion a year to the U.S. economy.42 Increased liberalisation, regularisation, and 
integration of migrant flows is a long-term and difficult but positive goal. So too is 
reducing demand for illegal narcotics in the domestic U.S., given the increasing 
inability to stem these flows under NAFTA.
Normative Implications and Future Research
The border securitisation initiatives authorised by the dominant metanarrative 
in the U.S. and detailed in this thesis have important normative implications which 
sadly have received little scholarly or popular attention. These concerns emerge due 
to the projection of violence and tension on the borderlands with vigilante citizen 
operations—especially as confrontational incidents between these groups and 
migrants increase—as well as official state-sanctioned actions of militarisation and 
surveillance in its ‘tough’ stance in its ‘war’ on undocumented migrants and drugs.43 
As noted, these initiatives have a tendency to polarise and galvanise border 
communities and identities, illustrated in the case studies through the presence in the 
discourse of nationalistic rhetoric, stereotypes, and irrational fear from these state- 
defined ‘threats’. Borderlanders are also increasingly threatened by transnational 
criminal groups engaging in smuggling migrants or trafficking drugs.
Developed from the dominant metanarrative, the new policies also create 
dangerous and life-threatening conditions on the border, especially for migrants 
attempting to cross the southern border. Line-watch, securitisation strategies by the 
Border Patrol like Operation Hold the Line and Operation Gatekeeper have, to some 
degree, ‘sealed’ urban areas, meaning crossings are now directed to remote and 
inhospitable routes and this means more migrant deaths: nearly 400 in 2000 and at 
least 1600 between 1993-1997.44 In an average year, more die attempting to cross
42 Anonymous, ‘Let the Huddled Masses In’, The Economist (29 March 2001) 
[http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=554349] (29 March 2001).
43 Much of the recent vigilante violence—including recent shootings of migrants—and propaganda is 
documented in a report by the Southern Poverty Law Center, ‘Blood on the Border’, Intelligence 
Report (spring 2001) (Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center) 
[http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-index.html] (10 May 2001).
44 See Karl Eschbah, Karl, Jacqueline Hagan, and Nestor Rodriguez, ‘Death at the 
Border’, Working Paper WPS 97-2 (Houston: Center for Immigration Research, 1997).
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the U.S.-Mexico border than did in the entire history of the Berlin wall. The 
normative implications of this policy in particular remain largely ignored.
Militarisation and Defense Department involvement means troops and 
military technology at the border, increasing an atmosphere of conflict and the 
chance for accidental deaths (as the case of Esequiel Hernandez illustrates) as well as 
human rights violations because troops are not trained for domestic law enforcement. 
The expanded presence of police officials along the border also invokes a variety of 
civil liberties issues. Fear of possible deportation, for instance, has led some 
migrants to not obtain medical care for themselves or their children (who may be 
actually be U.S. citizens), or simply live in an atmosphere of harassment: routine 
traffic stops, for example, can be a pretence for nationality checks.45 The massive 
resources allocated for control and security might, in the long term, be better 
invested in sustainable economic and social development in both Mexico and the 
borderlands.
Further normative questions must be asked in future research, such as what 
forms of proper democratisation can be rendered under transnational forces?46 
Where will the boundaries for majoritarian procedures (which are never simply 
given) be set? How can drug dependency be reduced? Have integrated North 
American solutions, such as harmonised, co-operation on screenings upon initial 
entry into North America, been foreclosed? How can other emancipatory agendas be 
realised? In future work, we must maintain a critical eye by returning to the final 
step in narrative analysis: reconstruction in favour of tolerance and for strategies to 
amplify marginalised narratives, interests, and perspectives.
7.6 F in a l  Th o u g h t s
American history, as Frederick Jackson Turner suggested, has the frontier as 
its heart. As one of the first frontiers of colonial exploration and exploitation, the 
European powers, and the U.S. itself, utilised new mapping techniques and imposed 
forms of modem political territoriality on North America to create borders. Within 
its initial development as a state, the frontier was key in formulating social and
45 Greg Bloom, ‘El Paso’s Immigration Law Enforcement Monitoring Project’, Frontera NorteSur 
(November 2000) [http://www.nmsu.edu/~frontera/] (24 November 2000).
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political relationships in the U.S., partly through patterns of social-spatialisation that 
involved expansion, capitalism, individualism in a rugged environment—all seen as 
sanctioned by God. The frontier gradually shifted west, north, and south to engulf 
the entire continental span by 1890. In the process, a clear connection of the frontier 
to collective identity was established and endowed with these national American 
narratives of progress and exceptionalism.
Within these developing boundaries grew impersonal space, intensified 
capital structures, and bureaucracy, ultimately leading to a concentration of power at 
the federal level; frontiers become fixed as modem, reified expressions of power. 
The nature of borderland discourse in American today can still be read as an 
outgrowth of this historical lineage; the frontier remains the membrane to the foreign 
and a main testing ground for national identity as well as a mechanism for economic 
and social integration. While no longer expanding in the same sense, the 
reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation of the border—within and subject to larger 
transnational processes like globalisation—still represents critical activities of 
political socialisation. Borders, as this thesis has suggested, never simply exit: they 
are always in the process of becoming. Their narratives, policies, and representation 
to a large degree continue to attest to the measure and nature of America’s national 
political community.
In the end, the many processes of social ordering—and thus the construction 
of boundaries—will always involve fascinating dynamics of difference and unity. 
These dynamics reveal the intriguing but problematic nature of borders: they are 
mechanisms to inscribe both inclusion and exclusion in many important, but 
sometimes complex and contradictory, ways. Continuing to study and question their 
production and representation and will be vital in a changing world.
46 See S.L. Hurley, ‘Rationality, Democracy and Leaky Boundaries: Vertical vs. Horizontal 
Modularity’, Journal o f Political Philosophy 7, no. 2 (1999): 126-46.
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collected from secondary sources when direct interviews were not granted or possible. Sources or 
interview details are included in the chapter notes.
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